that the enemy would principally take their measures to prevent my escape to the southward. The success. of this attempt would, no doubt, have been precarious; and I cannot say that it would have been practicable to have reached New York; but, in our desperate situation, I thought it well deserved a trial. I shall make no other remark upon the enumeration that is made of the troops under my orders, than that a great part of them were dispersed in garrisons, totally out of my reach, la and that some regiments had hardly any ex[ xv ]istence, but in name. I am not in possession of the general returns of the southern district for the year 1781, but those of the corps under my immediate command, at different periods, are annexed to the Correspondence, 2d During that campaign, I reckoned among the many other embarrassments which I had to encounter, that, on some important occasions, it was impossible to communicate with, or to receive instructions from the Commander in Chief, in time to enable me to act according to his wishes :3a-4c But, I you la I cannot pretend to say what had after the desertions, sickness battles &c &c &c but I know what I left with you & what I afterwards sent you. 2d I left 5000 Men with your Lordship in 80, Genl Leslie joined you with 3000 More I sent Arnold with 2000, 500 more to Chesapeak to cooperate with yr Ldship I sent Genl Phillips to take the command and with him 3000 more to these I added 1500 Anspachs you had therefore acting with you and for you near 15000 Men. while I at New York had not more than 12000 including Provincials 3a we had both of us but too much cause to complain, but in this instance your Lordship does it without reason; for you say yourself a frigate with my dispatches was coming to you, from Charles Town, not 12 hours sail from you. 4c This was also your Lordships Complaint When you moved from Wilmington into Virginia, those who read will judge wher such complaint was well founded, in that instance; you lament in your letter to the Minister you are about to make a desperate move, without the Com. in Chief's approbation, in the same letter you say there is a frigate coming from Charles Town, (not 12 hours sail from you) and expected every hour, ୮ trust, it will appear from the Correspondence now laid before the public, - that our failure in North Carolina was not occasioned by our want of force to protect the rising of our friends, but by their timidity, and unwillingness to take an active and -useful part,la.2c that the move to Wilmington was rendered necessary from the distresses of the troops, and the sufferings of the numerous sick and wounded, 3a-4c.5d that the march into Virginia was undertaken for urgent reasons,74 which could not admit of my waiting for the approbation of the Commander in Chief,8a.9a-10c that I did not you say your army is in no state to move, & yet you march before those dispatches arrive; & I now appeal to yourself, whether if you had received them you would have marched into Virginia. la reduced from 3000 to 700 by desertion, illness, and action not two days food and in actual retreat how could y L. expect them to risk. 2c how could you expect they should after you had sacrificed them 9 months before, & tho you obtained a brilliant Victory in March 81. it had all the consequences of a defeat, you had not provisions or arms to give them; you were reduced from 3500 to 700 men, you were in actual retreat when you invited them to L join you. 3a from Crosscreek you were not above 60 miles from Campden, 90 from Wilmington, 4c pardon me my good Lord for these very reasons you should have fallen back from Crosscreek to Campden, where Lord Rawdon would supply all your wants, it was the shortest & safest way, by doing so, you obey'd your Commr in Chief's Orders; you fulfilled 66 your own promises, to cover S. Carolina." 5d Camden was nearer. 7d every reason for going back to C. Town no good one I fear for going into Virginia— what say the Cabinet in their Letter Page 49, 51. 8a All the urgent reasons were on the Contrary against your going. 9a had you waited a few hours more the arrival of the dispatches from Charles Town, you would have found all the urgent reasons were against your going. 10c on the contrary my good Lord, all the urgent reasons were against your going into Virginia, for by that move you exposed the Carolinas & Florida, and Charles Town, which "you had been ordered to consider "as the primary object," you risked your own Corps, that of Gen. Phillips, you broke in upon the C. in Chief Plan, you forced operations upon him which he was not prepared for, and had always declared against, in the most inimical Province, in the most unhealthy establish the station in Virginia, but only reinforce it,la.2c.3b that I occupied the posts of York and Gloucester by order, 4a.5b.6d. 7c and was in province, at the worst season, in a province where your army could not be supply'd from the country at least in a province from whence your army could not retreat, & where it could not remain in safety unless covered by a Fleet, or a respectable Place of arms till that Fleet should arrive. la Tis true your Lordship did only reinforce it; but tis Equally so that if you had not reinforced it, it would have been (except a small post to cover Frigates) have been withdrawn in the exposed, & sickly seasons. 2c true my good Lord you did not Establish the station in Virginia, a small station was established at your desire to favour your operations while the season permitted your acting in the Carolinas; but meant to be withdrawn when those should cease; and consequently if your Lordship had not come into Virginia, forced solid operation there; recommended it to the minister, & the Comr in Chief had not in consequence been ordered to support it, your Lordship will acknowledge it would except a small post have been withdrawn in June. 36 S H Clinton never had an Idea of solid establishment in Virginia till the provinces to the southward were recovered. till then S HC had no other views than of a small station to cover frigates and troops for desultory expedition in the healthy season to cooperate with you, your Lordsp therefore did establish vide page 96 Observns, 4a no my Good Lord you were ordered to occupy old Point Comfort securing a naval station in James River, not in York River, you were permitted tis true to fortifye York as an addl security to O P Comfort; but I did not disapprove of the choice you had made for the reasons you gave in your letter of the 24. August, when you took it : 5b read all my Corce with Gen Phillips. is there the least Idea of establishment in Virginia, merely a small station in Elizabeth river to cover frigates & desultory expeditions, during the season for operation in that unhealthy climate; I appeal whether I ever gave L. C. an order to occupy York & Gloucester: of the prospects L. C. could better judge than I. he knew the Enemy were 37 sail the 8th of Sepr and that we had only 21. I did not know the E. number till the 23d Sep: 6d I can with more propriety say contrary to My Orders but I have never yet charged you publickly with disobedience. 7c by whose order I know not but certainly contrary to S H Clinton's order: read his order of the 11th July page L. C. reply 167. it orders L. C. to examine and fortify old point Comfort which covers Hampton road in James river, it permits L. C. to fortify York also as an additional security to old P. Comfort but his Lordship moving the naval Station to York river instead of James River and fortifying York [xvi ]duced to remain in them by the prospect of relief, uniformly held out to me by the Commander in Chief la.2c.3d-4a and, that, during the considerable interval between my arrival at Petersburgh, and that of the French fleet in the Chesapeak, my corps was completely at the disposal of Sir Henry Clinton, 56.6b either to be withdrawn, or employed in the Upper Chesapeak, or sent back to the Carolinas 7a.8c.9d and consequently, that my and Gloucester to secure the Naval Station in York river is so far from being by order of SHC every body will agree that it was contrary to his order, tho SHC afterwards acquiesced in it. la Here your Lordship alters your tone; assurances I certainly never gave you; Prospect or hope you might have, & could you have held out longer, or the Fleet sailed sooner you might have been saved, but surely SH C. cannot be in the least responsable for either your conduct or that of the Navy. 2c No my good Lord, the only order you had was to occupy old point Comfort covering a naval station in James River-in strictness you acted contrary to orders by removing the naval station to York River; I did not however blame it then because you told me that it was the only station in which you could hope to give effectual protection to line of Battle ships, tis true you had no line of Battle ships with you when you were besieged; but the reader will judge of the sort of protection you could have given had they been with you: when they are informed, that all the ships during the siege which you did not sink were burned by the Enemy. 3d if I gave you hopes of relief it was from the Navy I recd them and if that Navy sd have sailed sooner or Yr Ldship could have defended yr Post longer you would have been succoured. 4a could I have conceived you would so soon alter your opinion & described that ground so differently as you do in that of the 20 Octr I should have ordered you at all events to remain at Old Point Comfort. 5b Lord Corns Corps ought to have been at S H C. disposal, but it was not, the minister ordered him not to take a man from Virginia, but to go there with all He could spare from N. York. 6b His Lordship is pleased to acknowledge he and his corps was under the orders of the Comr in Chief-tis great condescension— but the publick will recollect that the Cabinet disapproving of SH C plan of a reduced defensive post in E. river during the season of operation to the northward, had ordered SH C not to take a single man from Virginia otherwise there can be no doubt but that S HC disapproving of LC march into Virginia would have sent him back, if he had not been ordered to support him there. 7a read again the Ministers conduct and opinions were not the causes of the catastrophe,ld which terminated the unfortunate campaign of 1781. MANSFIELD-STREET, letter my good Lord, Page 49 my Narrative, & the Kings orders to me not to take a man from Virginia till that Province was Conquered: you surely will not then say that your Lordships Corps was at my disposal any time before I received the Ministers letters of the 7th and 14th July disapproving of your Lordships Plan; approving at last of that of the Comr in Chief, wch however He did not receive untill He had embarked to endeavour to relieve you from a Situation in which your ill timed, injudicious, ill-fated march into Virginia had engaged us; and therefore I must beg leave to repeat; that your Conduct and Councils did, in the first instance contribute to the Catastrophe which terminated the unfortunate Campaign 81; His Majesty's Cabinet had also their share; & the admiral in the West Indies His great very great share. SH Clinton S'en lave les mains 8c your Lordship has surely forgot the Kings order to S. H. Clinton not to take a man from Virginia till that province was conquered; & that S HC could not under such orders dispose of your Lordships corps, & I flatter myself you will do him the Justice to believe, that, if He had thought himself at liberty to do so, He would have ordered your Lordship to have followed his CORNWALLIS. Plan; or joined him at N. York; or sent you back to Carolinas; in Either of which cases, the Catastrophe of York Town could not have hap'ned, nor could America have been lost. As it is SH Clinton has only to say that by Lord Cornwallis coming into Virginia contrary to S HC's orders, & forcing operation there; and Lord Rodney's not bringing, or sending a Fleet to cover such operation according to orders the Catastrophe, which terminated the unfortunate Campaign, and put an End to British Empire in America has been produced; and of all which S. H. C. S'en lave les mains. 9d I must intreat you to read the Cabinet letter Pages 49. 51. once more then tell me if you really think Yr Corps was at My disposal or whether I was at Liberty at any time till I recd the King's Approbation of My Plan to have removed a Man from Virginia till that Province was conquered. 1d Therefore your Lordship's Conduct and your Councils if not the only causes were at least the primary causes of that Catastrophe. 2c The Narrative was written, in the Hope that the charges therein contained (tho expressed in as moderate terms as possible) Iwould have induced Lord Cornwallis to have desired a Court of Enquiry or Martial. among the |
