Phillips May 13. Cornwallis still found himself too weak to attempt anything of importance. He urged the evacuation of New York, and the concentration of the entire British army in Virginia, to which Clinton would not listen. On August 2 he established himself atYorktown, was invested there in September by Washington, who had received large French reinforcements, and surrendered on October 19, exactly six years and a half after the first blood shed in the war by the skirmish at Lexington. On the very same day Clinton sailed. from New York with seven thousand men to relieve him, and arrived at the Chesapeake on October 24, to find himself too late.

Such a series of transactions evidently opens the way for abundant controversy and recrimination between the officers concerned. Was Cornwallis's march through the Carolinas and Virginia undertaken with Sir Henry Clinton's approbation or consent? Upon his arrival in the Chesapeake, ought Clinton to have strongly reinforced him, even at the cost of abandoning New York? or to have withdrawn his forces while there was time? or, as he actually did, to have awaited events? Was the unfortunate selection of York Town as headquarters the fault of Cornwallis ? or was he constrained by Clinton's instructions to occupy and fortify a good harbour? Could the defence have been better conducted? and did Clinton use all possible expedition and diligence in coming to Cornwallis's relief? These were the questions chiefly agitated in the pamphlets of which I have now to give a bibliographical account.

They are as follows.

I. "NARRATIVE of Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. relative to his Conduct during part of his command of the King's Troops in North America; Particularly to that which respects the unfortunate Issue of the Campaign in 1781. With an Appendix, containing Copies and Extracts of those Parts of his Correspondence with Lord George Germain,

Earl Cornwallis, Rear Admiral Graves, &c. Which are referred to therein. London: Printed for J. Debrett, (successor to Mr. Almon) opposite Burlington-house, Piccadilly, 1783." 8vo. Half title, title and pp. 115, Slip of Errata.

Six editions of the NARRATIVE were issued in 1783, a seventh edition in 1785, and a reprint limited to 200 copies 8°, 75, 4o, and 25, fo, by John Campbell, Philadelphia, 1865.

The NARRATIVE was first published in January 1783. Earl Cornwallis received a copy on January 15.

The Monthly Review for January 1783 p. 89 gives this notice:-"It had been happy for this country [we are to write now in the preterpluperfect tense], that the conduct of our commanders had been so clear and decisive as to save them the trouble of penning narratives and defences. Ill success is the parent of accusation, exculpation, and recrimination; and in this detail Sir Henry Clinton acquits himself of all share in Lord Cornwallis's misfortune; leaving that general to answer for misconceptions of the orders sent him, and for the choice of the post which he was reduced to surrender. A counter representation may probably follow from the other side; and such is all the satisfaction we have, and are likely to have, for the loss of America!"

The Gentleman's Magazine February 1783 p. 147 says of the Narrative:-" Painful is the detail of such a losing game as our American warfare. It is like tearing open

a wound never to be healed. The principal view of the late commander-in-chief, like that of his predecessor, is to exculpate himself. For that purpose he contends, that a desultory war in Virginia, the taking possession of the posts of York and Gloucester (at least without objection), the undertaking operations in the Chesapeak, without having a naval superiority, &c. were measures far from being advised, always disapproved by him.

"To the latter (he says), 'Perhaps alone are we to impute our late misfortune (Lord Cornwallis's) in that quarter.'—An impartial reader, on perusing this Narrative, will hardly think that Sir Henry Clinton has exculpated himself from directing the Earl to take post at York and Gloucester.-His Lordship's Answer will be noticed in p. 155." 2. "AN ANSWER to that part of the Narrative of Lieutenant General Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. Which relates to the Conduct of Lieutenant General Earl Cornwallis, during the Campaign in North America,

in the year 1781. By Earl Cornwallis. London: Printed for J. Debrett, (Successor to Mr. Almon,) opposite Burlington House, Piccadilly,M.DCC.LXXXIII.' Svo. title, pp. xvi.; "Contents," 3 leaves, pp. 260, Slip of Errata. An edition of 200 copies 8°, 75, 4°, and 25, fo, was reprinted in Philadelphia, 1866. The Gentleman's Magazine February 1783 p. 155 gives this notice of the ANSWER:-"EARL CORNWALLIS has made as gallant a defence here as he did at York Town, with this material difference: he was there obliged to surrender an indefensible post to the far superior forces of his enemies; but in this entrenchment, we think, he has been able to repulse the warm attacks of his commander in chief. In short, from an impartial perusal of the correspondence here exhibited, we are clearly of opinion (to adopt his Lordship's words in his Introduction)' that our failure in North Carolina was not occasioned by our want of force to protect the rising of our friends, but by their timidity, and unwillingness to take an active and useful part;—that the move to Wilmington was rendered necessary from the distresses of the troops, and the sufferings of the numerous sick and wounded;-that the march into Virginia was undertaken for urgent reasons, which would not admit of his waiting for the approbation of the commander in chief ;—that he did not establish the station in Virginia, but only reinforce it ;that he occupied the posts of York and Gloucester, and was induced to remain in them by the prospect of relief uniformly held out to him by the commander in chief;-and that, during the considerable interval between his arrival at Petersburgh, and that of the French fleet in the Chesapeak, his corps was completely at the disposal of Sir Henry Clinton, either to be withdrawn, or employed in the Upper Chesapeak, or sent back to the Carolinas; and, consequently, that his Lordship's conduct and opinions were not the causes of the catastrophe which terminated the unfortunate campaign of 1781.'- That Sir H. Clinton is blameable, does not, however necessarily follow. Various other causes, which might be assigned out, and may be easily collected from this correspondence, contributed to the failure of our arms in that inauspicious war; in which we constantly seem, under every commander, however successful on other occasions, to have swum, as it were, against the stream. The stars in their courses fought against Sisera. One of these was the false hopes continually held forth by pretended or lukewarm friends. I have experienced the distresses and dangers (says Lord Cornwallis from Wilmington) of marching some hundreds of miles in a country chiefly hostile, without one active or useful friend.' In consequence of this his brilliant successes at Camden and Guildford were as unproductive and indeed ruinous as defeats. After the latter he says, 'Many of the inhabitants rode into camp, shook me by the hand, said they were glad to see us, and to hear that we had beat Greene, and then rode home

again.'-Another cause seems to have been the want of harmony and concurrence in the sea and land departments. Our Admiral,' says Sir Henry Clinton, 'is grown, if possible, more impracticable than ever' and afterwards he laments the want of ' a co-operating naval chief,' mentions his 'strange conduct,' &c. When the General wanted him to escort troops to the Chesapeak, he was determined, it seems, to cruize off Nantucket, thus reminding us of what Shakespeare's Richard the Third says of his 'cold friends': -What do they in the North,

'When they should serve their sovereign in the West ?'

The sailing of another convoy with stores, &c. he stopped, 'without assigning any reason,' &c. &c. A third, and perhaps principal, cause of failure was the want of a naval superiority, which Sir H. Clinton had reason to expect, and was promised by the minister. Thus, in one letter, he says, 'Sir Geo. Rodney will of course follow De Grasse hither'in another, 'I learn, from the minister, that three battalions are to accompany Sir Geo. Rodney, in case De Grasse comes on this coast.' Instead of which, Sir George went home, and detached Sir Samuel Hood with only fourteen ships, and two battalions, one of them serving as marines. Had he followed De Grasse (as expected) with his whole force, the disgraceful affair off the Chesapeak, and the consequent surrender at York-Town, would probably have been prevented. Adm. Digby also was expected in force. Instead of which, he brought only three ships, and that not till Sept. 24.-The second sailing of the fleet too was strangely delayed. 'There is every reason,' says Sir Henry Clinton, 'to hope we start from hence the 5th October.' Afterwards, I have reason to hope, from the assurances given me by Admiral Graves, that we may pass the bar by the 12th of October.' Lord Cornwallis did not capitulate till the 17th. But the fleet did not sail till the 19th. Too mean an opinion of the American prowess seems also to have prejudiced the commander in chief. Thus he speaks of a small body of ill-armed peasantry, full as spiritless as the militia of the Southern provinces.' But Lord Cornwallis, who knew more of those provinces, aptly replies, 'The list of British officers and soldiers killed and wounded by them since last June proves but too fatally that they are not wholly contemptible.' Other causes might be mentioned, independent of any misconduct in the Generals. And on the whole, of Earl Cornwallis, in whose sensibility, as a soldier and a man, we most sincerely sympathise, and of whose integrity and abilities we have a just opinion, we are disposed to say, with Virgil's Hector,

The ANSWER is also noticed in the Monthly Review March 1783 p. 266 as follows:-" From the tendency of Sir Henry Clinton's relation of facts, the appearance of an exculpatory state of transactions was naturally to be expected; the claim of which to the public attention, is now,

alas! merely on private considerations, that characters may, if possible, be fairly estimated. This answer consists of the chain of correspondence between the two Commanders, during the campaign referred to; which, as Lord Cornwallis has summed up the whole in his Introduction, is to shew, 'that our failure in North Carolina, was not occasioned by our want of force to protect the rising of our friends, but by their timidity, and unwillingness to take an active and useful part, that the move to Wilmington was rendered necessary from the distresses of the troops, and the sufferings of the numerous sick and wounded, that the march into Virginia was undertaken for urgent reasons, which could not admit of my waiting for the approbation of the Commander in Chief,—that I did not establish the station in Virginia, but only reinforce it, that I occupied the posts of York and Gloucester by order; and was induced to remain in them by the prospect of relief, uniformly held out to me by the Commander in Chief,—and that, during the considerable interval between my arrival at Petersburgh, and that of the French fleet in the Chesapeak, my corps was completely at the disposal of Sir Henry Clinton, either to be withdrawn, or employed in the Upper Chesapeak, or sent back to the Carolinas, and consequently, that my conduct and opinions were not the cause of the catastrophe which terminated the unfortunate campaign of 1781.'

"So far from pretending to decide on the complicated circumstances of difference between these noble Commanders, we shall leave them to the judgment of their military Peers, with only this remark; that the vicissitudes attending the joint operation of detached armies, will frequently furnish occasions for ill-humour, that would never have discomposed their minds had their endeavours been crowned with success."

To

3. "OBSERVATIONS on some parts of the Answer of Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton's Narrative. By Lieutenant General Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. which is added an Appendix; containing Extracts of Letters and other Papers, to which reference is necessary. London: Printed for J. Debrett, (Successor to Mr. Almon,) opposite Burlington House, Piccadilly. M.DCC.LXXXIII." 8vo. Half-title, title, PP. 35 & 113 and folding sheet "View of the Strength of the two Armies." A reprint limited to 200 copies 8°, 75, 4°, and 25, fo, was issued by John Campbell, Philadelphia, 1866.

The Monthly Review April 1783 p. 362 contains this notice of the OBSERVATIONS" After much rejoinder, about the times of sending orders, receiving dispatches, producing and withholding letters, &c.