York, and in the following summer in Flushing, sued to restrain the collection of the tax in New York. Held, that as he was a resident of New York at the time the assessment was laid the assessment there was lawful. Douglas v. Mayor, etc., of New York, 2 Duer, 110 (1853).

The time" when the assessment is made" under 1 R. S. 389, § 5, relates to the binding and conclusive act of the board of assessors, which designates the taxpayers and the amount of taxable property. Mygatt v. Washburn, 15 N. Y. 316 (1857).

It seems that this time is the first day of July, the assessors being required to complete their preparatory inquiries in May and June. Id.

The relator, a resident of New York city, testified before the commissioners of taxes that his debts exceeded his personalty in this State, and that he had no other personal property except capital employed in business in another State, and farm stock and household furniture also in another State, but the commissioners refused to remit the assessment. Held, error, as the relator was not liable to taxation for his personal estate, having an actual situation without the State. Held, also, that this conclusion embraced only property which was visible and tangible, so as to be capable of a situs away from the owner or his domicile and did not include chattels in transit merely. People ex rel. Hoyt v. Commrs. of Taxes, 23 N. Y. 224 (1861); revg. 33 Barb. 116.

Peddlers who are nonresidents are liable to taxation in any town where they sell goods. If assessed in more than one town, the remedy is by appearing before the assessors and swearing off assessment. Hitt v. Crosby, 26 How. Pr. 413 (1864).

Residence by an owner of property in a town during June, July and August gives the assessors jurisdiction for the purpose of assessment for taxes. Boyd v. Gray, 34 How. Pr. 323 (1867).

When personal property is held in trust by taxable inhabitants of the State, it is to be taxed at their place of residence without regard to the residence of the person creating the trust, or that of the person benefited by it. This rule applies to the case of a sinking fund raised and owned by a foreign corporation. The cestui que trust in this case was the city of Albany. People ex rel. Western R. R. Co. v. Assessors of Albany, 40 N. 7. 154 (1869). This case was quoted approvingly in Price v. Hunter, 34 Fed. Repr. 355 (1888).

Where the plaintiff had removed his residence from the town where he still conducted his business, returning there at intervals and staying at a hotel, held, that the assessors of the town were liable in damages. for a sale of his property to satisfy a tax assessed by them, though they were not aware of his change of residence. Wade v. Matheson, 4 Lans. 158 (1870).

The plaintiff, during the whole of the year 1864, preceding June 20, resided with his family in his own house in Buffalo, where his only business was transacted. He also owned a house in West Seneca,

1

where he passed the summers with his family, attending meantime to his business in Buffalo, and staying there occasionally over night. The defendants assessed him in West Seneca upon his personal property, and the tax was collected. After the statutory notices no objection was made to the regularity of the assessment, and the defendants were not aware that the plaintiff claimed another residence until the delivery of the assessment-roll to the supervisor. Held, that as the plaintiff resided in West Seneca on July 1, the assessors had jurisdiction to assess him there, and were not liable in damages for so doing. Bell v. Pierce, 51 N. Y. 12 (1872).

For the purpose of assessment for personal property, the residence of the taxpayer will be presumed to continue to be where it has previously been shown to be until a change is affirmatively shown. Matter of Nichols, 54 N. Y. 62 (1873).

On change of residence, see People ex rel. Rosa v. Streeter, 24 W. Dig. 95 (1886).

Property in the hands of a receiver is subject to tax. Stevens v. New York & Oswego R. R. Co., 13 Blatchf. 104 (1875).

Where a testator had resided in Westchester his will was proved there, and letters testamentary issued to his sons, who resided there, as well as to other persons who resided in New York city, and the other persons had no actual possession or control of the property, held, that an assessment of the personalty in New York was erroneous. People ex rel. Caswell v. Commrs. of Taxes, 17 Hun, 293 (1879).

Personal estate in the hands of an agent is properly assessed to him without the addition to his name of his representative character. People ex rel. Hoffman v. Bug, 13 Abb. N. C. 169 (1883).

Upon a proceeding against administrators to collect a tax assessed upon them as such, it appeared that the intestate, who had been a resident of another State, died there, leaving personal property and debts here, and that, pending proceedings before the surrogate, the assessment had been made upon the valuation of the whole personalty, without deducting the indebtedness. Held, that the assessment was properly made upon the administrators; that it was no defense that they did not know of it; that in this proceeding the valuation could not be questioned, and that there was no ground for legal or equitable interference in their behalf. Matter of McMahon, 67 How Pr. 113; affirmed in 1 How. Pr. (N. S.) 270 (1885).

An assessment against the only one of three executors who was a resident, for the whole of testator's estate, consisting of railroad bonds registered in the name of the three-held, proper. People ex rel. Neustadt v. Coleman, 42 Hun, 581 (1886).

The personal estate of a testator who died and whose will was admitted to probate in New York city - held, to be taxable there, though one of the executors who had actual possession and control of the prop

erty resided in another State, the other executors being residents of, though temporarily absent from, New York. People ex rel. Campbell v. Commrs. of Taxes, 38 Hun, 536 (1886).

The term "trustee," in section 5, must be limited in its application to a person expressly authorized by statute to hold the legal title to property in trust for some specific purpose. The treasurer of a county is not such a "trustee," through the legal depositary of trust funds, nor can the assessment be made to the court. People ex rel. Brodie v. Cox, 14 N. Y. St. Repr. 632 (1888), S. T.

Where the whole of an infant's estate is vested in executors and trustees, and neither of them reside in the county, and the property is assessed and pays taxes in another county, no assessment can be made against the guardian in the former county. Douglass v. Bd. Supervisors, 1 N. Y. Supp. 126 (1888), G. T.

Where one's principal place of business is in a city and he has residences both there and on a farm in another town, he is properly taxable for personalty in the city ward in which he resides. Bowe v. Jenkins, 69 Hun, 458; S. C., 53 N. Y. St. Rep. 138; 23 N. Y. Supp. 548 (1893).

Where a person was not engaged in business in New York, though he lived there in a rented house during the winter, but lived the rest of the year in a house he owned outside the State, he was held not to be a resident of New York under Laws 1883, chap. 392, and not liable to personal tax. People v. Barker, 70 Hun, 397; S. C., 54 N. Y. St. Repr. 107; 24 N. Y. Supp. 63 (1893).

If a person has two residences, the place where his family lives, where he votes and stays the greater part of the time, and where he is assessed for personal taxes, is his residence for the purposes of taxation. People v. Barker, 44 N. Y. St. Repr. 695; S. C., 17 N. Y. Supp. 788; reversing Same v. Tax Commrs., 16 N. Y. Supp. 834 (1892).

The mere fact that a person happens to be at a place on the second Monday of January does not make him liable for personal taxation there. People v. Barker, 44 N. Y. St. Repr. 695; S. C., 17 N. Y. Supp. 788; revg. Same v. Tax Commrs., 16 N. Y. Supp. 834 (1892).

A person who occasionally sold real estate and who was director of a corporation whose meetings he attended, did not do business within meaning of the statute, for purpose of fixing his residence for purpose of taxation. People v. Barker, 44 N. Y. St. Repr. 698; S. C., 17 N. Y. Supp. 789; revg. Same v. Tax Commrs., 16 N. Y. Supp. 834 (1892).

It is essential to a valid assessment of personal property that the person assessed be a resident of the assessment district, and the fact that the assessors act for the whole city and have jurisdiction of all the taxable inhabitants will not validate an assessment made in a wrong ward or render it merely irregular. Wilcox v. Rochester, 129 N. Y. 247; S. C., 41 N. Y. St. Repr. 511 (1891).

The provisions of Laws 1850, chap. 92; Laws 1851, chap. 176, relating to the assessment of personal property, were not repealed by Laws 1883, chap. 392. (See section 2, subdivision 4 of revision.) Bowe v. Jenkins, 69 Hun, 458; S. C., 53 N. Y. St. Repr. 138; 23 N. Y. Supp. 548 (1893).

The rule in People v. Colman, 119 N. Y. 137, avoiding an assessment of securities deposited in an adjoining State by consent of trustees, although part of them were bonds secured by real estate mortgages, applied. People ex rel. Day v. Barker, 135 N. Y. 656; S. C., 48 N. Y. St. Repr. 558 (1892).

The fact that securities held outside the State are liens upon property within it does not make them taxable within it. People v. Barker, 44 N. Y. St. Repr. 573; S. C., 17 N. Y. Supp. 944 (1892).

Securities held in trust by executors as trustees were by their formal resolution given to the custody of two of their number who retained them out of New York city of which they were not residents. Held, that a resident executor and trustee did not have them in his possession and control so as to make them taxable in New York city, under 2 R. S. (7th ed.), p. 989, § 5. People ex rel. v. Barker, 8 Misc. 32; S. C., 58 N. Y. St. Repr. 748; 28 N. Y. Supp. 651 (1894).

Bonds and mortgages originally owned by a resident of this State but assigned by him to his daughter, a resident of a foreign State, the securities, however, not being delivered to her nor the assignments recorded, held, assessable against him as her agent. People ex rel. v. Sawyer, 56 N. Y. St. Repr. 790; S. C., 27 N. Y. Supp. 202 (1893). Laws 1851, chap. 176, was only designed to protect foreign capitalists who send funds into this State for investment. People ex rel. v. Sawyer, (1893).

56 N. Y. St. Repr. 790; S. C., 27 N. Y. Supp. 202 The provisions of Laws 1883, chap. 392, do not authorize the assessment of a tax upon personal securities belonging to trustees, two of whom reside within this State, while the third, who has possession of the securities, resides without the State and the beneficiaries are also nonresidents. People ex rel. Darrow v. Coleman, 119 N. Y. 137; S. C., 28 N. Y. St. Repr. 937; 53 Hun, 482; 6 N. Y. Supp. 285 (1890).

For cases, generally, on the taxation of individuals, see Williams v. Holden, 4 Wend. 226 (1830); Lord v. Arnold, 18 Barb. 105 (1854); People ex rel. Mygatt v. Supervisors Chenango, 11 N. Y. 571 (1854); People ex rel. Parker Mills v. Commrs. Taxes, 23 id. 242 (1861); Miner v. Fredonia, 27 id. 155 (1863); British Com. Life Ins. Co. v. Commrs. of Taxes, 1 Abb. Ct. App. Dec. 202 (1864); S. C., 28 How. Pr. 57 (1864); People ex rel. Jefferson v. Gardner, 51 Barb. 355 (1868); Bailey v. Buell, 59 id. 168 (1871); Clark v. Norton, 58 id. 436 (1871); Bell v. Pierce, 51 N. Y. 16, 19 (1872); People ex rel. Bay State Shoe Co. v. McLean, 17 Hun, 205 (1879); Williams 7. Supervisors Wayne County, 78 N. Y. 561 (1879); People ex rel. Hoffman v. Bug, 13 Abb. N. C. 169 (1883); People ex rel. Smith v. Asten, 36 Hun, 359 (1885); People ex rel. Smith v. Commrs. of New York, 100 N. Y. 215.

Tax on Rents Reserved.

See Youmans v. Supervisors Delaware County, 47 How. Pr. 25 (1873); People ex rel. Youmans v. Supervisors Delaware County, 60 N. Y. 381 (1875).

The statute (Laws 1846, chap. 327, p. 466) is not repugnant to the Constitution as impairing the obligation of contracts. One entitled to rents subjected to taxation by such act has a right to avail himself of his own affidavit to correct the assessment thereon. Livingston v. Hollenbeck, 4 Barb. 9 (1847).

A lease for a term of thirty years, executed prior to Laws 1846, chap. 327, p. 466, held to be within that act, and the rents reserved taxable, although at the passage of the act the lease had less than twenty-one years to run. Le Couteulx v. Supervisors of Erie, 7 Barb. 249 (1849); approved in City of Buffalo v. Le Couteulx, 15 N. Y. 451 (1857). And see Livingston v. Hollenbeck, 4 Barb. 9 (1847).

Rents not due on leases for years are not taxable as personal property. People ex rel, Thompson v. McComber, 24 N. Y. St. Repr. 902; S. C., 7 N. Y. Supp. 71. The fact that relator changed mortgages and other securities into real estate, and then gave leases to avoid personal taxation, is not material on the question of his liability so long as he violated no law. Id.

§ 9. Place of taxation of real property.-When real property is owned by a resident of a tax district in which it is situated, it shall be assessed to him. When real property is owned by a resident outside the tax district where it is situated, it shall be assessed as follows:

1. When the property is occupied it must be assessed to the occupant.

An assessment in the name of the husband, living with his family, on property the title to which was in his wife, is not void, he being occupant as head of the family. Powell v. Jenkins, 14 Misc. 83; S. C., 69 N. Y. St. Repr. 582; 35 N. Y. Supp. 265 (1895).

2. If the occupant resides out of the tax district or if the land is unoccupied, it shall be assessed as nonresident, as hereinafter provided by article two.

[Revisers' Note.-R. S., pt. I, chap. 13, tit. II, §§ 1-3; 8th ed., 1094.]

The only fact necessary to give assessors jurisdiction as to real estate is that it be situated within the town or ward of the assessor's office. In making an assessment upon such land they have jurisdiction of the subject-matter, and while an error committed by them may be subject to review, it will not make their proceedings void. Van Rensselaer v. Cottrell, 7 Barb. 127 (1849); affirmed in Seld. Notes, 25.