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fuel in the facilities of the Energy Research and Development Administration would interfere with production of plutonium for weapons and would require extensive modification of process equipment. The concept of regional plants, while supported by interested parties, has yet to attract enough concrete support to begin their construction. For a while the agreement nations Sooner or later,

probably could store used fuels in their own facilities. however, their storage capacity will be filled up. Used fuel could be collected and stored at regional centers awaiting reprocessing, but this concept too requires much more international commitment than is now on the horizon. Used fuels could be returned to the United States for indefinite storage or temporary storage pending reprocessing. This alternative, however, would require construction of storage facilities, for the present ones would be inadequate.

The world situation for reprocessing of nuclear fuels is likely to undergo fundamental changes within the coming decade. What these changes may be and how the agreements for cooperation can be modified in terms and administration to anticipate and to influence these changes appear to be likely matters for congressional interest.

8. International safeguards for all nuclear activities in an agreement nation

The agreements for cooperation with non-weapons nations do not require international safeguards on all nuclear materials and facilities of an agreement nation, whether or not supplied by the United States. U.S. attempts to have nuclear supplier nations agree upon prerequisites for exports have yet to succeed. What can be done to obtain such commitments collectively with other supplier nations, or unilaterally, and what the benefits and disadvantages might be, are matters for congressional attention.

The agreements for cooperation commit agreement nations to place U.S. -supplied nuclear materials and equipment under international safeguards but do not require the nations to place all of their nuclear materials and equipment from whatever source under these safeguards. According to recent press reports, the United States has been trying with little success to convince nuclear supplier nations to require such a commitment as a prerequisite for their nuclear exports. Whether the United States should unilaterally attempt to require an expanded safeguards commitment as a condition for U.S. nuclear cooperation is. a controversial question. Such a position might serve only to deny the U.S. nuclear industry access to the world market, with the advantage then going to the nuclear industries of other exporting nations. What measures the United States might take to convince other nuclear supplier nations of the desirability of the U.S. position is a matter worth congressional attention.

9. Physical security

The agreements for cooperation do not reflect the current importance attached to physical security and protection of U. S. nuclear exports against theft or sabotage. The relationships among the State Department, the Energy Research and Development Administration and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission should be considered if the Commission is directed by statute to consider physical security in issuing export licenses.

This concern has generated

The increase in terrorist acts over recent years has caused some observers to warn that terrorists might try to steal nuclear explosive materials and to make and use nuclear weapons. increasing attention in the United States to physical protection and security for nuclear materials and facilities. The greatest risks for terrorist theft

would appear to be at fuel reprocessing and fuel fabrication plants and for materials in transit. These risks of terrorist, or other subnational, theft will increase if plutonium and highly enriched uranium become widely used as nuclear fuels, particularly if and when breeder reactors come into general use. At present responsibility for protection of nuclear materials and equipment is that of the nations involved. There is no international nuclear security agency.

U.S. agreements for cooperation do not commit agreement nations to meet U.S. standards for physical security. Although the agreements place U.S. supplied materials and equipment under international safeguards, these do not extend to physical security. The furthest that the International Atomic Energy Agency has gone is to issue a security guide. If the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is required to decide whether physical security in an agreement nation is adequate to permit licensing of a proposed nuclear export, then some consideration is indicated of the relationships between the State Department, the Energy Research and Development Administration and the Commission in considering physical security in the negotiation and administration of agreements for cooperation and in the licensing of nuclear exports.

10. Preference for NPT adherents

Although encouraging nations to ratify the Non Proliferation Treaty is a goal of U.S. foreign policy, the agreements for cooperation do not include preferential terms for nations that have ratified the treaty. Whether such preferences should be provided, and in what forms, is an open question for the 1970s.

The Non Proliferation Treaty has been in effect for five years. During this time, none of the agreements for cooperation have been amended to give any preference to those agreement nations which ratify the treaty, or at least to agree to place all of their nuclear activities under international safeguards. Whether such preferences would affect the hard core of industrial nations opposed to the treaty is debatable, regardless of whether other, less determined nations might be influenced to ratify. Whether it would be feasible to offer some preferential treatment for agreement states that ratify the NPT and whether such preferences would be worth their cost and possible disadvantages are questions meriting congressional attention. 11. Government-to-government transfers

Although most nuclear exports are now made via export licenses issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to private parties, the Energy Research and Development Administration still may make government-to-government transfers. Two issues arise from this situation. First, to what extent could the executive branch use such transfers to circumvent export controls by the Commission? Second, what voice, if any, should the Commission have in the negotiation and administration of governmentto-government transfers?

In the early years of nuclear cooperation, the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission often transferred materials directly to agreement nations without export licenses. Such licensing was limited to exports by fledgling companies in the U.S. nuclear industry. In later years, direct government to government exports decreased as the USAEC withdrew from competition with the growing U.S. nuclear industry.

Now most nuclear exports are made via export licenses of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission issued to companies in the industry or to persons

who act as agents in the United States for foreign customers. However, government to government transfers remain possible and under

the Energy Reorganization Act still require no license.

Although there is little serious anticipation that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission would be continually at loggerheads with the State Department or the Energy Research and Development Administration over nuclear cooperation and exports, it appears that the executive branch could try to circumvent an obstinate Commission by reviving government to government transfers. If this loophole is real, then Congress may wish to consider the future use of government to government exports, limitations upon their use, and the relationships of the State Department, the Administration and the Commission in their arrangement.

Concerning information in the public record, the Commission's practices for domestic licenses would suggest full information in the dockets for export licenses. On the other hand, details of foreign policy matters usually are not open to the public. The extent to which the Commission's decisions on export licenses should be documented in the public docket is a question likely to be raised by public interest groups concerned about U.S. nuclear exports.

12. NRC findings on defense and security

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has to make findings involving the common defense and security, based largely upon information and analysis provided by the executive branch. Of likely congressional interest is the ability of the Commission to develop resources capable of arriving at sound findings, and the extent of documentation of these findings in the public record.

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