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of isotopes of uranium, or equipment or components especially designed for any of the foregoing; or

or

(ii) Constructing, fabricating, or operating such facilities;

(iii) Furnishing information not available to the public in published form for use in the design, construction, fabrication, or operation of such facilities or equipment or components especially designed therefore.

The regulations appear to require, for example, authorization for a U. S. engineering firm to design a fuel reprocessing plant for a foreign country, or to send its engineers abroad to help in such design. By so controlling the activities of experts and companies in the nuclear industry, the Administration controls some export of technology. Note that if a company

proposes to export a fuel reprocessing plant, it has to get a Commission license. How these respective authorities will interact in the future is not clear. For example, could ERDA insist that it must authorize the design part of an export while the Commission licenses the physical part? Which agency would control follow-on technical assistance and servicing associated with a major export of U. S. nuclear equipment?

Differing criteria for decisions. --Under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 as amended, the President, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Energy Research and Development Administration all make decisions of one kind or another concerning nuclear cooperation and exports, some of which involve statutory criteria for decision. Table I identifies eight such decisions and the associated statutory criteria. Criteria for five decisions require consideration of national defense and security, two require consideration of risk to the public health and safety, and one consideration

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of the interests of the United States. The Act defines the term "common defense and security" to mean the common defense and security of the United

States. "Health and safety" is not defined, nor are "interests of the United States." In any event, the President has to determine whether a proposed agreement for cooperation will "promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security" while the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has to consider whether certain licenses would be "inimical to the common defense and security" and in some cases to the "public health and safety." The Energy Research and Development Administration has to consider whether declassification of restricted data would constitute "undue risk to the common defense and security", and whether authorizing certain activities by "persons" abroad would be "inimical to the interests of the United States".

The variety of these statutory criteria and their use by different parts of the Government suggests the possibility that strict adherence to the criteria can produce decisions on a common matter that could be inconsistent or at cross purposes.

* The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 as amended, section 11(g).

IV. PROVISIONS OF SPECIAL RELEVANCE TO PROLIFERATION

The provisions of the agreements for cooperation relevant to proliferation of the ability to make nuclear weapons are identified and discussed in this chapter. An examination of several types of agreements follows in Chapter V.

Some provisions of agreements for cooperation relate to proliferation of the ability to make nuclear weapons through their effect upon the use of nuclear power and the nuclear industrial base of agreement nations. Other provisions relate to proliferation through their effect upon the prevention and detection of theft or diversion of nuclear materials, or the misuse of equipment transferred from the United States. This chapter identifies and briefly discusses the major provisions of each category that appear in agreements for cooperation.

Exchange of information

The agreements for cooperation establish the basis for virtually unrestricted exchange of scientific information about nuclear energy between the United States and agreement nations, and for Restricted Data that has been declassified. The opening up of exchange of information caused by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 was dramatic. Before then, information on the first U.S. nuclear powerplant at Shippingport was kept almost as secret as information on the powerplants for the atomic submarine. By 1955 declassification had progressed far enough for the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission to fully describe Shippingport in Geneva at the first United Nations International

Conference on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy. However, some restric

tions remain.

The agreements for cooperation specify that Restricted Data is not to be communicated, and that no materials, or equipment and devices are to be transferred and no services furnished if that transfer or furnishing involves the communication of Restricted Data. Since the Energy Research and Development Administration decides what information can be declassified, in a sense it controls the information which can be transferred.

As for information which may be exchanged, the agreements commit the Parties to exchange unclassified information (note, the term Restricted Data is not used) with respect to the application of atomic energy to peaceful uses and the considerations of health and safety connected therewith. The agreements specify that the exchange will be accomplished through various means including reports, conferences, and visits to facilities. The subjects of such exchange may include information on:

(1) Development, design, construction, operation and use of re-
search, materials testing, experimental, demonstration power and
power reactors, and reactor experiments;

(2) The use of radioactive isotopes and source material, special
nuclear material, and byproduct material in physical and biolo-
gical research, medicine, agriculture and industry; and

(3) Health and safety considerations related to the foregoing.

It is notable that the agreements do not apply several anti-proliferation provisions to information transferred by the United States to other

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