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of the interests of the United States. The Act defines the term "common

defense and security" to mean the common defense and security of the United States. * "Health and safety" is not defined, nor are "interests of the United

States." In any event, the President has to determine whether a proposed

agreement for cooperation will "promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security" while the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has to consider whether certain licenses would be "inimical

to the common defense and security" and in some cases to the "public health and safety." The Energy Research and Development Administration has to

consider whether declassification of restricted data would constitute "undue

risk to the common defense and security", and whether authorizing certain activities by "persons" abroad would be "inimical to the interests of the

United States".

The variety of these statutory criteria and their use by different parts

of the Government suggests the possibility that strict adherence to the criteria can produce decisions on a common matter that could be inconsistent

or at cross purposes.

* The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 as amended, section 11(g).

IV. PROVISIONS OF SPECIAL RELEVANCE TO PROLIFERATION

The provisions of the agreements for cooperation relevant to prolifer

ation of the ability to make nuclear weapons are identified and discussed in

this chapter.

An examination of several types of agreements follows in

Chapter V.

Some provisions of agreements for cooperation relate to proliferation of the ability to make nuclear weapons through their effect upon the use of nuclear power and the nuclear industrial base of agreement nations. Other

provisions relate to proliferation through their effect upon the prevention

and detection of theft or diversion of nuclear materials, or the misuse of

equipment transferred from the United States. This chapter identifies and

briefly discusses the major provisions of each category that appear in agree

ments for cooperation.

Exchange of information

The agreements for cooperation establish the basis for virtually unre

stricted exchange of scientific information about nuclear energy between the United States and agreement nations, and for Restricted Data that has been

declassified. The opening up of exchange of information caused by the Atomic

Energy Act of 1954 was dramatic. Before then, information on the first U.S.

nuclear powerplant at Shippingport was kept almost as secret as information

on the powerplants for the atomic submarine. By 1955 declassification had progressed far enough for the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission to fully

describe Shippingport in Geneva at the first United Nations International

Conference on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy.

However, some restric

LIFERAT

tions remain.

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The agreements for cooperation specify that Restricted Data is not to

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be communicated, and that no materials, or equipment and devices are to

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be transferred and no services furnished if that transfer or furnishing in

volves the communication of Restricted Data. Since the Energy Research

to proberen

and Development Administration decides what information can be declas

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sified, in a sense it controls the information which can be transferred.

As for information which may be exchanged, the agreements commit

the Parties to exchange unclassified information (note, the term Restricted

Data is not used) with respect to the application of atomic energy to peace

er identitate

ful uses and the considerations of health and safety connected therewith.

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The agreements specify that the exchange will be accomplished through var

ious means including reports, conferences, and visits to facilities.

The

subjects of such exchange may include information on:

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(1) Development, design, construction, operation and use of re

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search, materials testing, experimental, demonstration power and
power reactors, and reactor experiments;

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(2) The use of radioactive isotopes and source material, special
nuclear material, and byproduct material in physical and biolo-

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gical research, medicine, agriculture and industry; and
(3) Health and safety considerations related to the foregoing.

It is notable that the agreements do not apply several anti-proliferation provisions to information transferred by the United States to other

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nations. These anti-proliferation provisions include (1) the safeguards rights

of the United States; (2) the guarantees not to use transferred materials,

including equipment and devices, for weapons or for military purposes; (3)

the commitments to use materials, equipment or devices transferred solely

for civil purposes; and (4) the application of international safeguards.

Access to special facilities

The agreements for research and development and for research commit

the Parties to make available for mutual use specialized research facilities

and reactor materials testing facilities, if terms and conditions can be

agreed upon at the time and if space, facilities and personnel "conveniently

available" permit.

At the outset these provisions were unilateral, for with the exception

of Canada, the agreement nations had few if any facilities of interest to

the United States.

The flow of scientists and engineers from other lands

to U.S. nuclear facilities has helped these nations to acquire a cadre of per

sonnel with practical training and working experience in nuclear science,

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technology and power.

There are now some prospects of reciprocal value to the United States

as the nuclear programs of major supplier nations diversify and move in

directions not of primary interest to the U.S. nuclear program.

For ex

ample, in the third decade of the nuclear age, specialized facilities in West

Germany could become of interest to the United States.

Cooperation between persons

The agreements for cooperation in addition to providing for cooperation

between governments and their agencies also opened the way to cooperation

between "persons" of the United States and

an agreement nation, *

The

agreements typically state the understanding of the Parties that arrange

ments may be made between either Party or authorized persons under its

jurisdiction for the transfer of equipment and devices and materials. Ar

rangements may also be made for the transfer of special nuclear material

and for the performance of services with respect thereto for uses specified

in the agreement.

In essence, these provisions permit companies in the U.S. nuclear in

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products and for performance of nuclear services such as fuel reprocessing.

Note, however, that performance of enrichment services by U.Ş. firms

is still moot, at least until privately owned enrichment facilities are li

censed and built in the United States,

Transfer of materials and equipment

The research and power,

and

research agreements provide for

the transfer of source material, heavy water, byproduct material, other

* Note, however, that the definition of "person" in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 is broad. The term means (1) any individual, corporation, partnership, firm, association, trust, estate, public or private institution, group, governmental agency other than the Commission, any State or any foreign government or nation or any political subdivision of any such government or nation, or other entity; and (2) any legal successor, representative, agent or agency of the foregoing.

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