« 이전계속 »
of the interests of the United States. The Act defines the term "common
defense and security" to mean the common defense and security of the United States. * "Health and safety" is not defined, nor are "interests of the United
States." In any event, the President has to determine whether a proposed
agreement for cooperation will "promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security" while the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has to consider whether certain licenses would be "inimical
to the common defense and security" and in some cases to the "public health and safety." The Energy Research and Development Administration has to
consider whether declassification of restricted data would constitute "undue
risk to the common defense and security", and whether authorizing certain activities by "persons" abroad would be "inimical to the interests of the
The variety of these statutory criteria and their use by different parts
of the Government suggests the possibility that strict adherence to the criteria can produce decisions on a common matter that could be inconsistent
or at cross purposes.
* The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 as amended, section 11(g).
IV. PROVISIONS OF SPECIAL RELEVANCE TO PROLIFERATION
The provisions of the agreements for cooperation relevant to prolifer
ation of the ability to make nuclear weapons are identified and discussed in
An examination of several types of agreements follows in
Some provisions of agreements for cooperation relate to proliferation of the ability to make nuclear weapons through their effect upon the use of nuclear power and the nuclear industrial base of agreement nations. Other
provisions relate to proliferation through their effect upon the prevention
and detection of theft or diversion of nuclear materials, or the misuse of
equipment transferred from the United States. This chapter identifies and
briefly discusses the major provisions of each category that appear in agree
ments for cooperation.
Exchange of information
The agreements for cooperation establish the basis for virtually unre
stricted exchange of scientific information about nuclear energy between the United States and agreement nations, and for Restricted Data that has been
declassified. The opening up of exchange of information caused by the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954 was dramatic. Before then, information on the first U.S.
nuclear powerplant at Shippingport was kept almost as secret as information
on the powerplants for the atomic submarine. By 1955 declassification had progressed far enough for the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission to fully
describe Shippingport in Geneva at the first United Nations International
Conference on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy.
However, some restric
The agreements for cooperation specify that Restricted Data is not to
be communicated, and that no materials, or equipment and devices are to
be transferred and no services furnished if that transfer or furnishing in
volves the communication of Restricted Data. Since the Energy Research
and Development Administration decides what information can be declas
sified, in a sense it controls the information which can be transferred.
As for information which may be exchanged, the agreements commit
the Parties to exchange unclassified information (note, the term Restricted
Data is not used) with respect to the application of atomic energy to peace
ful uses and the considerations of health and safety connected therewith.
The agreements specify that the exchange will be accomplished through var
ious means including reports, conferences, and visits to facilities.
subjects of such exchange may include information on:
(1) Development, design, construction, operation and use of re
search, materials testing, experimental, demonstration power and
ta that has
ed by the
(2) The use of radioactive isotopes and source material, special
gical research, medicine, agriculture and industry; and
It is notable that the agreements do not apply several anti-proliferation provisions to information transferred by the United States to other
nations. These anti-proliferation provisions include (1) the safeguards rights
of the United States; (2) the guarantees not to use transferred materials,
including equipment and devices, for weapons or for military purposes; (3)
the commitments to use materials, equipment or devices transferred solely
for civil purposes; and (4) the application of international safeguards.
Access to special facilities
The agreements for research and development and for research commit
the Parties to make available for mutual use specialized research facilities
and reactor materials testing facilities, if terms and conditions can be
agreed upon at the time and if space, facilities and personnel "conveniently
At the outset these provisions were unilateral, for with the exception
of Canada, the agreement nations had few if any facilities of interest to
the United States.
The flow of scientists and engineers from other lands
to U.S. nuclear facilities has helped these nations to acquire a cadre of per
sonnel with practical training and working experience in nuclear science,
technology and power.
There are now some prospects of reciprocal value to the United States
as the nuclear programs of major supplier nations diversify and move in
directions not of primary interest to the U.S. nuclear program.
ample, in the third decade of the nuclear age, specialized facilities in West
Germany could become of interest to the United States.
Cooperation between persons
The agreements for cooperation in addition to providing for cooperation
between governments and their agencies also opened the way to cooperation
between "persons" of the United States and
an agreement nation, *
agreements typically state the understanding of the Parties that arrange
ments may be made between either Party or authorized persons under its
jurisdiction for the transfer of equipment and devices and materials. Ar
rangements may also be made for the transfer of special nuclear material
and for the performance of services with respect thereto for uses specified
in the agreement.
In essence, these provisions permit companies in the U.S. nuclear in
products and for performance of nuclear services such as fuel reprocessing.
Note, however, that performance of enrichment services by U.Ş. firms
is still moot, at least until privately owned enrichment facilities are li
censed and built in the United States,
Transfer of materials and equipment
The research and power,
research agreements provide for
the transfer of source material, heavy water, byproduct material, other
* Note, however, that the definition of "person" in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 is broad. The term means (1) any individual, corporation, partnership, firm, association, trust, estate, public or private institution, group, governmental agency other than the Commission, any State or any foreign government or nation or any political subdivision of any such government or nation, or other entity; and (2) any legal successor, representative, agent or agency of the foregoing.