of the interests of the United States. The Act defines the term "common defense and security" to mean the common defense and security of the United States. * "Health and safety" is not defined, nor are "interests of the United States." In any event, the President has to determine whether a proposed agreement for cooperation will "promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security" while the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has to consider whether certain licenses would be "inimical to the common defense and security" and in some cases to the "public health and safety." The Energy Research and Development Administration has to consider whether declassification of restricted data would constitute "undue risk to the common defense and security", and whether authorizing certain activities by "persons" abroad would be "inimical to the interests of the United States". The variety of these statutory criteria and their use by different parts of the Government suggests the possibility that strict adherence to the criteria can produce decisions on a common matter that could be inconsistent or at cross purposes. * The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 as amended, section 11(g). IV. PROVISIONS OF SPECIAL RELEVANCE TO PROLIFERATION The provisions of the agreements for cooperation relevant to prolifer ation of the ability to make nuclear weapons are identified and discussed in this chapter. An examination of several types of agreements follows in Chapter V. Some provisions of agreements for cooperation relate to proliferation of the ability to make nuclear weapons through their effect upon the use of nuclear power and the nuclear industrial base of agreement nations. Other provisions relate to proliferation through their effect upon the prevention and detection of theft or diversion of nuclear materials, or the misuse of equipment transferred from the United States. This chapter identifies and briefly discusses the major provisions of each category that appear in agree ments for cooperation. Exchange of information The agreements for cooperation establish the basis for virtually unre stricted exchange of scientific information about nuclear energy between the United States and agreement nations, and for Restricted Data that has been declassified. The opening up of exchange of information caused by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 was dramatic. Before then, information on the first U.S. nuclear powerplant at Shippingport was kept almost as secret as information on the powerplants for the atomic submarine. By 1955 declassification had progressed far enough for the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission to fully describe Shippingport in Geneva at the first United Nations International Conference on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy. However, some restric LIFERAT tions remain. The agreements for cooperation specify that Restricted Data is not to and diacast be communicated, and that no materials, or equipment and devices are to be transferred and no services furnished if that transfer or furnishing in volves the communication of Restricted Data. Since the Energy Research to proberen and Development Administration decides what information can be declas uporte sified, in a sense it controls the information which can be transferred. As for information which may be exchanged, the agreements commit the Parties to exchange unclassified information (note, the term Restricted Data is not used) with respect to the application of atomic energy to peace er identitate ful uses and the considerations of health and safety connected therewith. appear 14 The agreements specify that the exchange will be accomplished through var ious means including reports, conferences, and visits to facilities. The subjects of such exchange may include information on: (1) Development, design, construction, operation and use of re search, materials testing, experimental, demonstration power and ta that has ed by the (2) The use of radioactive isotopes and source material, special gical research, medicine, agriculture and industry; and It is notable that the agreements do not apply several anti-proliferation provisions to information transferred by the United States to other nations. These anti-proliferation provisions include (1) the safeguards rights of the United States; (2) the guarantees not to use transferred materials, including equipment and devices, for weapons or for military purposes; (3) the commitments to use materials, equipment or devices transferred solely for civil purposes; and (4) the application of international safeguards. Access to special facilities The agreements for research and development and for research commit the Parties to make available for mutual use specialized research facilities and reactor materials testing facilities, if terms and conditions can be agreed upon at the time and if space, facilities and personnel "conveniently available" permit. At the outset these provisions were unilateral, for with the exception of Canada, the agreement nations had few if any facilities of interest to the United States. The flow of scientists and engineers from other lands to U.S. nuclear facilities has helped these nations to acquire a cadre of per sonnel with practical training and working experience in nuclear science, technology and power. There are now some prospects of reciprocal value to the United States as the nuclear programs of major supplier nations diversify and move in directions not of primary interest to the U.S. nuclear program. For ex ample, in the third decade of the nuclear age, specialized facilities in West Germany could become of interest to the United States. Cooperation between persons The agreements for cooperation in addition to providing for cooperation between governments and their agencies also opened the way to cooperation between "persons" of the United States and an agreement nation, * The agreements typically state the understanding of the Parties that arrange ments may be made between either Party or authorized persons under its jurisdiction for the transfer of equipment and devices and materials. Ar rangements may also be made for the transfer of special nuclear material and for the performance of services with respect thereto for uses specified in the agreement. In essence, these provisions permit companies in the U.S. nuclear in products and for performance of nuclear services such as fuel reprocessing. Note, however, that performance of enrichment services by U.Ş. firms is still moot, at least until privately owned enrichment facilities are li censed and built in the United States, Transfer of materials and equipment The research and power, and research agreements provide for the transfer of source material, heavy water, byproduct material, other * Note, however, that the definition of "person" in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 is broad. The term means (1) any individual, corporation, partnership, firm, association, trust, estate, public or private institution, group, governmental agency other than the Commission, any State or any foreign government or nation or any political subdivision of any such government or nation, or other entity; and (2) any legal successor, representative, agent or agency of the foregoing. |