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While enriched uranium gets most of the attention in agreements for cooperation, other special nuclear materials can be provided. The research and power agreements with Argentina and Brazil specifically mention for the transfer of plutonium to both nations for use in reactor and reactor experiments under terms and conditions to be agreed. The agreement with Greece permitted transfer of plutonium provided that the quantity within Greek jurisdiction not exceed 250 grams of plutonium in the form of fabricated foils and sources and 10 grams in other forms. The power agreements with India and the United Kingdom are silent about U. S. supply of plutonium. Reprocessing of irradiated special nuclear materials

A provision of special relevance to proliferation is that dealing with the reprocessing of used nuclear fuels to recover plutonium or U-233 and residual uranium. It is at the reprocessing plant that recovered plutonium or U-233 are in a form most usable for the making of nuclear weapons and most susceptible to deversion or theft.

The research and power, and research agreements require that reprocessing shall be performed in facilities acceptable to both Parties upon a joint determination that the safeguards requirements of the agreement may be effectively applied. The agreements go a step further and require that any alteration of irradiated fuel elements removed from a reactor be performed in mutually acceptable facilities. Under this commitment, the agreement nations can only remove and store spent fuel pending the required joint determination. It is not clear, however, whether the joint determination is

a one-time affair made once during the term of an agreement or whether it applies each time fuel reprocessing is required.

The power agreement with India provides that reprocessing may be performed in Indian facilities upon a joint determination of the Parties that safeguards may be effectively applied, or in such other facilities as may be mutually agreed. It is understood that except as may otherwise be agreed, the form and content of any irradiated fuel elements removed from the reactors are not to be altered before delivery to the reprocessing facility. The agreement with the United Kingdom is silent on reprocessing.

As for who owns plutonium produced in irradiated fuel supplied by the United States, if the agreement nation bought the original fuel material from the United States, the agreement nation has title. Also, if the special nuclear material is leased from the Energy Research and Development Administration, the lessee has title unless the Administration and the agreement nations otherwise agree.

The Indian agreement gives the United States a first option to purchase such nuclear material at the fuel value price of the Administration which may be in effect at the time. If the Administration does not exercise this option, India, with the approval of the United States, may transfer such excess special nuclear material to any nation or group of nations or international organizations. This agreement includes no limitation upon the nations to which special nuclear materials from reprocessed fuel can be transferred. In comparison, the research and power agreements require that

the receiving nation have an agreement for cooperation with the United States, and the research agreements require Administration approval.

Guarantees

Two guarantees included in agreements for cooperation apply to use of transferred items for atomic weapons or military purposes and transfer of items to unauthorized persons or beyond the jurisdiction of the agreement nation. Concerning use for nuclear weapons, the agreements typically pro

vide that:

No material, including equipment and devices, transferred to the government of...or authorized persons under its jurisdiction by purchase or otherwise pursuant to this Agreement or the superseded Agreements, and no special nuclear material produced through the use of such material, equipment and devices, will be used for atomic weapons, or for research on or development of atomic weapons, or for any other military purpose.

(Note: There is no specific prohibition of use of U. S. transfers
to make nuclear explosives.)

The commitment concerning transfers is designed to assure the United States
that items it supplies, or that are exported by the U.S. nuclear industry,
will not be transferred without the agreement of the Energy Research and
Development Administration to unauthorized persons or outside the juris-
diction of the agreement nations. Typically, the agreements provide that:
No material, including equipment and devices, transferred to the
Government of ... or to authorized persons under its jurisdiction
pursuant to this agreement or the superseded agreements will be
transferred to unauthorized persons or beyond the jurisdiction of
the Government of...except as the Commission [Administration]
may agree to such a transfer to the jurisdiction of another nation
or group of nations, and then only if, in the opinion of the Commis-
sion [Administration], the transfer is within the scope of an agree-
ment for cooperation between the Government of the United States
and the other nation or group of nations.

The power agreement with India contains a commitment not to use transferred material, equipment or devices for atomic weapons or for research on or development of atomic weapons or for any other military purpose. The word "material" is not defined but would seem to include special nuclear materials. In this agreement the United States likewise guarantees that no special nuclear material produced at the Tarapur Atomic Power Station and acquired by it, or an equivalent amount of the same type substituted therefor, shall be used for atomic weapons or for research on or development of atomic weapons, or for any other military purpose. It is not clear why the Indian commitment mentions only "materials" while the U.S. commitment specifies special nuclear materials.

The power agreement with the United Kingdom contains the atomic weapon commitment by both Parties and specifically extends to special nuclear material produced through the use of any transferred materials. As for transfers, the provisions are similar but somewhat changed in that neither Party is to transfer materials to any unauthorized person or beyond its jurisdiction without the written consent of the supplying party.

A commitment to civil use

In addition to commitments by agreement nations not to use transferred materials, equipment and devices for nuclear weaponry or military purposes, the agreements typically include an expression of common interest that any material, equipment or devices made available to the agreement nation or any person under its jurisdictionn shall be used solely for civil Whether civil purposes premit "peaceful nuclear explosives" is

purposes.

not usually not specified. The power agreement with India limits this commitment to items made available to the Government of India for use in the Tarapur Atomic Power Station, or in connection therewith. The Indian agreement indicates a difference of opinion between the Parties in the following observation included in the text:

...The Government of India emphasizes, in contrast to the position of the United States, that its agreement to the provisions of this Article in relation to equipment or devices transferred pursuant to this Agreement has been accorded in consideration of the fact that, as provided in this Agreement, the Tarapur Atomic Power Station will be operated on no other special nuclear material than that furnished by the Government of the United States of America and special nuclear material produced therefrom, in consequence of which the provisions of this Article in relation to equipment or devices in any case ensue from the safeguard on fuel.

The meaning of this qualification is not clear. The power agreement with the United Kingdom contains no commitment to civil use.

U.S. safeguards rights

The agreements for cooperation broke new ground in the guarantees and rights obtained for the United States concerning the safeguarding of nuclear materials, including an unusual right to send its inspectors into the sovereign territory of the agreement nation.

The agreements for cooperation in research and power, and for research onl, all contain commitments relating to review of the design and operation of facilities and to safeguarding of source and special nuclear materials. Typically, an agreement commits the agreement nation to permit the United States to review the design of any reactor and any other equipment and devices the design of which the Energy Research and Development Administration determines to be relevant to the effective application of safeguards,

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