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the receiving nation have an agreement for cooperation with the United States, and the research agreements require Administration approval.

Guarantees

Two guarantees included in agreements for cooperation apply to use of

transferred items for atomic weapons or military purposes and transfer of

items to unauthorized persons or beyond the jurisdiction of the agreement

nation.

Concerning use for nuclear weapons, the agreements typically pro

vide that:

No material, including equipment and devices, transferred to the government of... or authorized persons under its jurisdiction by purchase or otherwise pursuant to this Agreement or the superseded Agreements, and no special nuclear material produced through the use of such material, equipment and devices, will be used for atomic weapons, or for research on or development of atomic weapons, or for any other military purpose. (Note: There is no specific prohibition of use of U.S. transfers

to make nuclear explosives.) The commitment concerning transfers is designed to assure the United States that items it supplies, or that are exported by the U.S. nuclear industry, will not be transferred without the agreement of the Energy Research and Development Administration to unauthorized persons or outside the jurisdiction of the agreement nations. Typically, the agreements provide that:

No material, including equipment and devices, transferred to the Government of or to authorized persons under its jurisdiction pursuant to this agreement or the superseded agreements will be transferred to unauthorized persons or beyond the jurisdiction of the Government of... except as the Commission (Administration) may agree to such a transfer to the jurisdiction of another nation or group of nations, and then only if, in the opinion of the Commission (Administration), the transfer is within the scope of an agreement for cooperation between the Government of the United States and the other nation or group of nations.

The power agreement with India contains a commitment not to use trans

ferred material, equipment or devices for atomic weapons or for research

on or development of atomic weapons or for any other military purpose.

The word "material" is not defined but would seem to include special mu

clear materials.

In this agreement the United States likewise guarantees

that no special nuclear material produced at the Tarapur Atomic Power

Station and acquired by it, or an equivalent amount of the same type sub

stituted therefor, shall be used for atomic weapons or for research on or

development of atomic weapons, or for any other military purpose.

It is

not clear why the Indian commitment mentions only "materials" while the

U.S. commitment specifies special nuclear materials.

The power agreement with the United Kingdom contains the atomic weap

on commitment by both parties and specifically extends to special nuclear

material produced through the use of any transferred materials.

As for

transfers, the provisions are similar but somewhat changed in that neither

Party is to transfer materials to any unauthorized person or beyond its jurisdiction without the written consent of the supplying party.

A commitment to civil use

In addition to commitments by agreement nations not to use transferred

materials, equipment and devices for nuclear weaponry or military pur

poses,

the agreements typically include an expression of common interest

that any material, equipment or devices made available to the agreement

nation or any person under its jurisdictionn shall be used solely for civil

purposes.

Whether civil purposes premit "peaceful nuclear explosives" is

not usually not specified. The power agreement with India limits this commit

ment to items made available to the Government of India for use in the

Tarapur Atomic Power Station, or in connection therewith. The Indian agree

ment indicates a difference of opinion between the Parties in the following

observation included in the text:

... The Government of India emphasizes, in contrast to the position of the United States, that its agreement to the provisions of this Article in relation to equipment or devices transferred pursuant to this Agreement has been accorded in consideration of the fact that, as provided in this Agreement, the Tarapur Atomic Power Station will be operated on no other special nuclear material than that furnished by the Government of the United States of America and special nuclear material produced therefrom, in consequence of which the provisions of this Article in relation to equipment or devices in any case ensue from the safeguard on fuel.

The meaning of this qualification is not clear. The power agreement

with the United Kingdom contains no commitment to civil use,

U.S. safeguards rights

The agreements for cooperation broke new ground in the guarantees and

rights obtained for the United States concerning the safeguarding of nuclear

materials, including an unusual right to send its inspectors into the sovereign

territory of the agreement nation.

The agreements for cooperation in research and power, and for research

on), all contain commitments relating to review of the design and operation

of facilities and to safeguarding of source and special nuclear materials.

Typically, an agreement commits the agreement nation to permit the United

States to review the design of any reactor and any other equipment and de

vices the design of which the Energy Research and Development Adminis

tration determines to be relevant to the effective application of safeguards,

with the objective of assuring design and operation are for civil purposes and permit effective application of safeguards.

The United States also has unusual rights for source and special nuclear material made available to the agreement nation or individual to any person under its jurisdiction, and any source of special nuclear material"... utilized in, recovered from, or produced as a result of the use of ..." specified materials, equipment or devices. These rights are: to require records and

reports, to require that materials be subject to all safeguards provided in the agreement, to require deposit of materials in storage facilities desig

nated by the Administration, and to designate inspectors after consultation

with the agreement government.

The agreements typically specify the rights of the United States as

follows:

To designate, after consultation with the Government of..., personnel who, accompanied, if either Party so requests, by personnel designated by the Government of ..., shall have access in... to all places and data necessary to account for the source material and special nuclear material which are subject to... this Article to determine whether there is compliance with this Agreement and to make such independent measurements as may be deemed necessary.

In case of noncompliance with these safeguards provisions, or the com

mitment for application of safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the United States has the right to suspend or terminate the agree

ment and to require the return of any materials, equipment and devices

under the agreement.

The power agreement with India has similar provisions, with enough

differences to be worth noting here.

Concerning design review rights, the

agreement notes the Parties had reviewed the design of the Tarapur Atomic

Power Station and made a review of any significant modification in design

for the sole purpose of

determining that the arrangements provided in

this Article can be effectively applied. " For the same purpose, the Parties

may review the design of other facilities which will use, fabricate, or process any special nuclear material made available under the agreement or

produced in the Station. The agreement contains an interesting exemption to the design review for India. The Indian agreement specifies that:

... Such a review of the design of these other facilities will not be required if the Government of India, pursuant to mutually acceptable measurement arrangements, has placed an agreed equivalent amount of the same type of special nuclear material under the scope of this Agreement.

It is not clear what this substitution provision accomplishes. The Indian

agreement provides for a system of records and reports to be established to assure the complete accountability of any special muclear material which is made available to that Government pursuant to the agreement, or which is produced in the Tarapur Atomic Power Station. Any special nuclear material provided under the agreement or produced in the Tarapur Atomic

Power Station which is surplus to the current needs of the fuel cycle for

the Station and which is not transferred by the Government of India shall,

unless otherwise mutually agreed, be stored at the Tarapur Atomic Power

Station.

Concerning inspections, the Indian agreement provides for consultations and periodic exchanges of visits to give assurance that the objectives of limiting Tarapur to peaceful purposes and the provisions concerning transfers

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