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are being observed.

To the extent relevant to the accomplishment thereof,

personnel designated by the Government of the United States, following consultations with the Government of India, have full access to the Station and

to conversion, fabrication and chemical processing facilities in India at such

time as special nuclear material transferred to the Govenment of India for,

or received from, the Station is located at such facilities, and at such other

times as may be relevant.

Personnel so designated are to be afforded ac

cess to other places, and data, and to persons, to the extent relevant. The personnel designated by either Party, accompanied by personnel of the other

Party, if the latter so request, may make such independent measurements

as either Party considers necessary.

Nothing in the Agreement is intended

to impede the ability of either Party to have prompt access to data, places

and persons to the extent relevant to the objective of civil use.

The United

States commits itself to keep such access to a minimum consistent with the

need for effective verification that the objectives are being observed.

Another interesting provision unique to the Indian power agreement deals

with substitution of nuclear materials. The agreement provides that:

Notwithstanding anything contained in this Agreement, the Government of India shall have the right, upon prior notice to the Government of the United States, to remove from the scope of this Agreement quantities of special nuclear material, provided it has, pursuant to mutually acceptable measurement arrangements, placed agreed equivalent quantities of the same type of special nuclear material under the scope of this Agreement.

Concerning noncompliance, the Indian agreement gives the United States the right to suspend or terminate the agreement, within a reasonable time,

and require the return of any equipment and devices transferred under it

and any special nuclear material safeguarded pursuant to the agreement.

The power agreement with the United Kingdom, a nuclear weapons coun

try, has no specification of U.S. rights.

The Atomic Energy Commission exercised these rights of inspection

until the safeguards functions were transferred to the International Atomic

Energy Agency through tripartite agreements.

As late as 1969, AEC in

spectors made 52 inspections of facilities in five countries.

The end of the

era of AEC inspections was signalled in 1963 when the AEC, Japan and the

International Atomic Energy Agency entered into the first tripartite agree

ment.

IAEA safeguards

One early purpose of the U.S. agreements for cooperation was to pro

vide the International Atomic Energy Agency with working experience in the

application of safeguards.

This was done by including in the agreements a

commitment by the agreement nations to apply the Agency's safeguards to

materials, equipment and facilities transferred from the United States. The

international safeguards are carried out either under a trilateral agreement

among the Parties and the Agency, or as provided in an agreement between

the agreement nation and the Agency pursuant to the Non Proliferation

Treaty. During the time the international safeguards apply, the safeguards

rights of the United States are suspended to the extent that the United States

agrees that the need to exercise such rights is satisfied by the international

safeguards. Should the international safeguards be terminated, the United

States reassumes its full safeguards rights. At that time the Parties are

to examine the situation so that appropriate measures can be taken, if neces

sary, to satisfy any obligations of the United States under the Treaty.

The agreement for cooperation for power with the United Kingdom provides for termination of international safeguards by either Party. In that case, the United Kingdom upon request will return all special nuclear material received and still under its jurisdiction. The United States, in turn, is to compensate the United Kingdom for its interest in returned materials

at the schedule of prices then in effect.

The power agreement with India likewise provided for application of international safeguards to such special nuclear material produced in the Ta

rapur Atomic Power Station as may be received in the United States, or to

equivalent material substituted therefor. The agreement provided for termi

nation of the agreement for cooperation if there was not mutually satisfac

tory agreement on the terms of the contemplated trilateral agreement.

If

such termination was invoked, India would return all special nuclear mate

rials under the agreement and the United States would compensate India for

such material at current prices.

Each Party further agreed not to invoke

its termination rights before carefully considering the economic effects of such termination. Neither was to terminate until the other party had been given sufficient advance notice to permit arrangements by the Government of India for an alternative source of power and to permit adjustment of pro

duction schedules for nuclear materials by the United States.

It appears that these termination rights and conditions applied only at the time the

trilateral agreement was pending.

The agreement is silent on what would

happen if the trilateral agreement which is in effect were to be terminated

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V. PRINCIPLE FEATURES OF AGREEMENTS FOR COOPERATION

The agreements for cooperation, as noted earlier, provide a framework

for cooperation in civil use of nuclear energy between the United States and

other countries and international organizations. This framework initially supported a great unilateral outflow of nuclear science and technology from the United States in the late 1950s and now supports a web of commercial

nuclear transactions and exports of the U.S. nuclear industry in the world

market.

The agreements are notable in that although not treaties, they deal

with matters of substantial international importance, particularly with re

spect to the further spread of national manufacture of nuclear weapons.

They contain unusual assurances of the agreement nations, assurances in

tended to bar the possibility that nuclear materials and facilities supplied

by the United States will be used to make nuclear weapons or for other mili

tary purposes.

Additionally, they are unique in the rights obtained for the

United States or the International Atomic Energy Agency to send inspectors

into the agreement nations to verify compliance with the agreements.

Types of agreements

The U.S. agreements for cooperation with individual countries can be conveniently divided into three categories. Twenty agreements are for co

operation in nuclear research and power, eight for nuclear research only,

and two for power only. The United States also has three agreements for

cooperation with international organizations:

one with the International

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