with the objective of assuring design and operation are for civil purposes and permit effective application of safeguards.

The United States also has unusual rights for source and special nuclear material made available to the agreement nation or individual to any person under its jurisdiction, and any source of special nuclear material"...utilized in, recovered from, or produced as a result of the use of..." specified materials, equipment or devices. These rights are: to require records and reports, to require that materials be subject to all safeguards provided in the agreement, to require deposit of materials in storage facilities designated by the Administration, and to designate inspectors after consultation with the agreement government.

The agreements typically specify the rights of the United States as follows:

To designate, after consultation with the Government of..., personnel who, accompanied, if either Party so requests, by personnel designated by the Government of ... shall have access in...to all places and data necessary to account for the source material and special nuclear material which are subject to...this Article to determine whether there is compliance with this Agreement and to make such independent measurements as may be deemed necessary.

In case of noncompliance with these safeguards provisions, or the commitment for application of safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the United States has the right to suspend or terminate the agreement and to require the return of any materials, equipment and devices under the agreement.

The power agreement with India has similar provisions, with enough differences to be worth noting here. Concerning design review rights, the

agreement notes the Parties had reviewed the design of the Tarapur Atomic Power Station and made a review of any significant modification in design for the sole purpose of "...determining that the arrangements provided in this Article can be effectively applied. "For the same purpose, the Parties may review the design of other facilities which will use, fabricate, or process any special nuclear material made available under the agreement or produced in the Station. The agreement contains an interesting exemption to the design review for India. The Indian agreement specifies that:

... Such a review of the design of these other facilities will not be required if the Government of India, pursuant to mutually acceptable measurement arrangements, has placed an agreed equivalent amount of the same type of special nuclear material under the scope of this Agreement.

It is not clear what this substitution provision accomplishes. The Indian agreement provides for a system of records and reports to be established to assure the complete accountability of any special nuclear material which is made available to that Government pursuant to the agreement, or which is produced in the Tarapur Atomic Power Station. Any special nuclear material provided under the agreement or produced in the Tarapur Atomic Power Station which is surplus to the current needs of the fuel cycle for the Station and which is not transferred by the Government of India shall, unless otherwise mutually agreed, be stored at the Tarapur Atomic Power Station.

Concerning inspections, the Indian agreement provides for consultations and periodic exchanges of visits to give assurance that the objectives of limiting Tarapur to peaceful purposes and the provisions concerning transfers

are being observed. To the extent relevant to the accomplishment thereof, personnel designated by the Government of the United States, following consultations with the Government of India, have full access to the Station and to conversion, fabrication and chemical processing facilities in India at such time as special nuclear material transferred to the Govenment of India for, or received from, the Station is located at such facilities, and at such other times as may be relevant. Personnel so designated are to be afforded access to other places, and data, and to persons, to the extent relevant. The personnel designated by either Party, accompanied by personnel of the other Party, if the latter so request, may make such independent measurements as either Party considers necessary. Nothing in the Agreement is intended to impede the ability of either Party to have prompt access to data, places and persons to the extent relevant to the objective of civil use. The United States commits itself to keep such access to a minimum consistent with the need for effective verification that the objectives are being observed.

Another interesting provision unique to the Indian power agreement deals with substitution of nuclear materials. The agreement provides that:

Notwithstanding anything contained in this Agreement, the Government of India shall have the right, upon prior notice to the Government of the United States, to remove from the scope of this Agreement quantities of special nuclear material, provided it has, pursuant to mutually acceptable measurement arrangements, placed agreed equivalent quantities of the same type of special nuclear material under the scope of this Agreement.

Concerning noncompliance, the Indian agreement gives the United States the right to suspend or terminate the agreement, within a reasonable time,

and require the return of any equipment and devices transferred under it and any special nuclear material safeguarded pursuant to the agreement.

The power agreement with the United Kingdom, a nuclear weapons country, has no specification of U.S. rights.

The Atomic Energy Commission exercised these rights of inspection until the safeguards functions were transferred to the International Atomic Energy Agency through tripartite agreements. As late as 1969, AEC inspectors made 52 inspections of facilities in five countries. The end of the era of AEC inspections was signalled in 1963 when the AEC, Japan and the International Atomic Energy Agency entered into the first tripartite agree

ment.

IAEA safeguards

One early purpose of the U.S. agreements for cooperation was to provide the International Atomic Energy Agency with working experience in the application of safeguards. This was done by including in the agreements a commitment by the agreement nations to apply the Agency's safeguards to materials, equipment and facilities transferred from the United States. The international safeguards are carried out either under a trilateral agreement among the Parties and the Agency, or as provided in an agreement between the agreement nation and the Agency pursuant to the Non Proliferation Treaty. During the time the international safeguards apply, the safeguards rights of the United States are suspended to the extent that the United States agrees that the need to exercise such rights is satisfied by the international safeguards. Should the international safeguards be terminated, the United

States reassumes its full safeguards rights. At that time the Parties are to examine the situation so that appropriate measures can be taken, if necessary, to satisfy any obligations of the United States under the Treaty.

The agreement for cooperation for power with the United Kingdom provides for termination of international safeguards by either Party. In that case, the United Kingdom upon request will return all special nuclear material received and still under its jurisdiction. The United States, in turn, is to compensate the United Kingdom for its interest in returned materials at the schedule of prices then in effect.

If

The power agreement with India likewise provided for application of international safeguards to such special nuclear material produced in the Tarapur Atomic Power Station as may be received in the United States, or to equivalent material substituted therefor. The agreement provided for termination of the agreement for cooperation if there was not mutually satisfactory agreement on the terms of the contemplated trilateral agreement. such termination was invoked, India would return all special nuclear materials under the agreement and the United States would compensate India for such material at current prices. Each Party further agreed not to invoke its termination rights before carefully considering the economic effects of such termination. Neither was to terminate until the other party had been given sufficient advance notice to permit arrangements by the Government of India for an alternative source of power and to permit adjustment of production schedules for nuclear materials by the United States. It appears that these termination rights and conditions applied only at the time the