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are being observed.
To the extent relevant to the accomplishment thereof,
personnel designated by the Government of the United States, following consultations with the Government of India, have full access to the Station and
to conversion, fabrication and chemical processing facilities in India at such
time as special nuclear material transferred to the Govenment of India for,
or received from, the Station is located at such facilities, and at such other
times as may be relevant.
Personnel so designated are to be afforded ac
cess to other places, and data, and to persons, to the extent relevant. The personnel designated by either Party, accompanied by personnel of the other
Party, if the latter so request, may make such independent measurements
as either Party considers necessary.
Nothing in the Agreement is intended
to impede the ability of either Party to have prompt access to data, places
and persons to the extent relevant to the objective of civil use.
States commits itself to keep such access to a minimum consistent with the
need for effective verification that the objectives are being observed.
Another interesting provision unique to the Indian power agreement deals
with substitution of nuclear materials. The agreement provides that:
Notwithstanding anything contained in this Agreement, the Government of India shall have the right, upon prior notice to the Government of the United States, to remove from the scope of this Agreement quantities of special nuclear material, provided it has, pursuant to mutually acceptable measurement arrangements, placed agreed equivalent quantities of the same type of special nuclear material under the scope of this Agreement.
Concerning noncompliance, the Indian agreement gives the United States the right to suspend or terminate the agreement, within a reasonable time,
and require the return of any equipment and devices transferred under it
and any special nuclear material safeguarded pursuant to the agreement.
The power agreement with the United Kingdom, a nuclear weapons coun
try, has no specification of U.S. rights.
The Atomic Energy Commission exercised these rights of inspection
until the safeguards functions were transferred to the International Atomic
Energy Agency through tripartite agreements.
As late as 1969, AEC in
spectors made 52 inspections of facilities in five countries.
The end of the
era of AEC inspections was signalled in 1963 when the AEC, Japan and the
International Atomic Energy Agency entered into the first tripartite agree
One early purpose of the U.S. agreements for cooperation was to pro
vide the International Atomic Energy Agency with working experience in the
application of safeguards.
This was done by including in the agreements a
commitment by the agreement nations to apply the Agency's safeguards to
materials, equipment and facilities transferred from the United States. The
international safeguards are carried out either under a trilateral agreement
among the Parties and the Agency, or as provided in an agreement between
the agreement nation and the Agency pursuant to the Non Proliferation
Treaty. During the time the international safeguards apply, the safeguards
rights of the United States are suspended to the extent that the United States
agrees that the need to exercise such rights is satisfied by the international
safeguards. Should the international safeguards be terminated, the United
States reassumes its full safeguards rights. At that time the Parties are
to examine the situation so that appropriate measures can be taken, if neces
sary, to satisfy any obligations of the United States under the Treaty.
The agreement for cooperation for power with the United Kingdom provides for termination of international safeguards by either Party. In that case, the United Kingdom upon request will return all special nuclear material received and still under its jurisdiction. The United States, in turn, is to compensate the United Kingdom for its interest in returned materials
at the schedule of prices then in effect.
The power agreement with India likewise provided for application of international safeguards to such special nuclear material produced in the Ta
rapur Atomic Power Station as may be received in the United States, or to
equivalent material substituted therefor. The agreement provided for termi
nation of the agreement for cooperation if there was not mutually satisfac
tory agreement on the terms of the contemplated trilateral agreement.
such termination was invoked, India would return all special nuclear mate
rials under the agreement and the United States would compensate India for
such material at current prices.
Each Party further agreed not to invoke
its termination rights before carefully considering the economic effects of such termination. Neither was to terminate until the other party had been given sufficient advance notice to permit arrangements by the Government of India for an alternative source of power and to permit adjustment of pro
duction schedules for nuclear materials by the United States.
It appears that these termination rights and conditions applied only at the time the
trilateral agreement was pending.
The agreement is silent on what would
happen if the trilateral agreement which is in effect were to be terminated
V. PRINCIPLE FEATURES OF AGREEMENTS FOR COOPERATION
The agreements for cooperation, as noted earlier, provide a framework
for cooperation in civil use of nuclear energy between the United States and
other countries and international organizations. This framework initially supported a great unilateral outflow of nuclear science and technology from the United States in the late 1950s and now supports a web of commercial
nuclear transactions and exports of the U.S. nuclear industry in the world
The agreements are notable in that although not treaties, they deal
with matters of substantial international importance, particularly with re
spect to the further spread of national manufacture of nuclear weapons.
They contain unusual assurances of the agreement nations, assurances in
tended to bar the possibility that nuclear materials and facilities supplied
by the United States will be used to make nuclear weapons or for other mili
Additionally, they are unique in the rights obtained for the
United States or the International Atomic Energy Agency to send inspectors
into the agreement nations to verify compliance with the agreements.
Types of agreements
The U.S. agreements for cooperation with individual countries can be conveniently divided into three categories. Twenty agreements are for co
operation in nuclear research and power, eight for nuclear research only,
and two for power only. The United States also has three agreements for
cooperation with international organizations:
one with the International