uses, special nuclear material recovered or produced from special nuclear material and source material as a result of Agency activities, at such prices and on such other terms and conditions as may be agreed.

--The United States also has agreed that persons under U.S. jurisdiction will be permitted to make arrangements to transfer and export material, equipment or facilities and to perform services for the Agency or upon request of the Agency for a Member or group of Members in connection with an Agency activity. This commitment is subject to applicable laws, regu

lations and license requirements of the United States.

The Agency made three guarantees that resemble those typical of other agreements, but are slightly different. It guarantees, to the full extent of its statutory powers, that:

a. The safeguards set forth in the Agency statute shall be maintained and implemented as provided in the Agency statute with respect to material, equipment or facilities, made available by the United States or persons under its jurisdiction for use in Agency activities.

b. No material, equipment or facilities, transferred pursuant to this Agreement will be used for atomic weapons or for development of atomic weapons or for any other military purposes.

c. Material, equipment or facilities used, transferred or retransferred pursuant to this Agreement shall be used or transferred only in accordance with the Agency Statute and this Agreement.

*Note, the first Director General of the Agency attempted to get the United States to supply special nuclear materials at a special low price so that the Agency could fund some of its operations by a markup of the price of U.S. materials for Agency resale. This proposal was turned down and U.S. policy has been for the Agency to pay the same price as any other customer.

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The agreements with EURATOM. --The United States entered into its initial agreement for cooperation with the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) in 1958. The agreement has been revised several times, with the latest version signed on September 20, 1972. It is based upon both section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 as amended and the EURATOM Cooperation Act of 1958. *

Terms of the agreement for cooperation with the Community are similar to those of other agreements for cooperation for research and power. The agreement differs from these other agreements in two respects: establishment of a joint program of research and development and construction of several nuclear powerplants, and establishment of safeguards for the European Community.

The purpose of the joint program was twofold: to bring into operation nuclear powerplants with a total capacity of about 1,000 megawatts by the end of 1963, and to immediately initiate a joint research and development program centered on the types of reactors to be used. **

* Public Law 85-846, 72 Stat. 1084.

**The original agreement committed the United States and the Community to cooperate by establishing a joint program that would, in part, "...bring into operation within the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) large-scale powerplants using nuclear reactors of types on which research and development have been carried to an advanced stage in the United States, having a total installed capacity of approximately one million kilowatts of electricity by December 31, 1973 (except that two reactors may be selected to be in operation by December 31, 1965), and under conditions which would approach the competitive range of conventional energy costs in Europe."

The cooperative program reached an early peak and by 1968 had come to its end. In retrospect, the agreement for cooperation provided a foundation for a joint undertaking but could not assure the impetus to reach the desired goals. The agreement did not produce a truly joint undertaking in research and development but rather two parallel national programs in which each Party controlled its own funds. The agreement did culminate in the construction in Europe of several prototype nuclear powerplants that demonstrated U.S. nuclear technology for both the European and domestic U.S. nuclear markets. It also provided useful experience in the organization and operating of joint boards, experience that perhaps could be useful for future multinational ventures such as regional fuel reprocessing plants. It may be worth inquiring how much of this experience from the joint U. S. -EURATOM program was recorded and analyzed by the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission for future reference.*

The safeguards provisions are unusual for they provide for multinational rather than national safeguards. The Community committed itself to establish and maintain a mutually satisfactory system of safeguards and control to be applied to nuclear materials, equipment and devices. **

* A detailed account of U. S. cooperation with Euratom appears in chapter VIII of the report, Commercial nuclear power in Europe: the interaction of American diplomacy with a new technology, which was prepared for and issued by the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs in December 1972 as a committee print.

**The agreement provides for the Community to undertake the responsibility for "...establishing and implementing a safeguards and control system designed to give maximum assurance that any material, equipment or devices made available pursuant to this Agreement and any source or special nuclear material derived from the use of such material, equipment and devices, shall be utilized solely for peaceful purposes.

Safeguards for technology are not mentioned. The Community is also committed to consult with and exchange experiences with the International Atomic Energy Agency with the objective of establishing a system reasonably compatible with that of the Agency. In an unusual provision, the Community and the United States agreed upon principles to govern the establishment and operation of safeguards by the Community. The text of these principles appears in Appendix IV. The agreement is unusual too in that it includes no rights for United States inspection of materials and facilities and verification that their use complies with the agreement. The United States has some influence over safeguards in the U. S. commitment to provide assistance in establishing the Community's safeguards and control system and to provide continuing assistance in its operation. The Parties also agreed to frequent consultations and exchanges of visits to give assurance to both Parties that the Community's safeguards and control system effectively meet the responsibility and principles specified in the agreement, and that the standards of the materials accountability systems of the United States and the Community are kept reasonably compatible.

VI. COMMENTARY

The examination of U.S. agreements for nuclear cooperation has provided some background for their purpose, their general content and specific provisions. What remains to be discussed is the accomplishments of the agreements and their past, present and future implications for limiting further proliferation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons among nations of the world and the possibility that terrorists or other subnational groups might seek to get and to use nuclear devices.

The following discussion briefly assesses the accomplishments of the agreements for cooperation, their likely effect on proliferation, and the changing times and conditions as a factor affecting the use of agreements; and provides some commentary on specific provisions, or the lack thereof, for U.S. agreements for nuclear cooperation.

On the whole, the use of agreements for cooperation by the Department of State, the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission and the Energy Research and Development Agency has fulfilled the goal of Atoms for Peace of sharing United States nuclear technology with the other nations. Under their use, U.S. exports of nuclear materials and facilities apparently have not been directly used to make nuclear weapons, and U.S.-furnished nuclear materials have been accounted for and safeguarded. On the other hand, the use of nuclear power has not slowed the growth in nuclear arsenals by diverting fissionable materials to peaceful uses. Instead, a plateau in manufacture of weapons has opened up a major supply of fuel for civil nuclear