its attendant agreements and export licenses. Today four Federal agencies are involved, three of which are under direction of the President and one of which is an independent regulatory agency substantially, but not wholly, independent of the President and his influence, raising possibilities for divergent or conflicting decisions and actions.

5. The implementation of the Energy Reorganization Act has helped draw attention to several matters meriting congressional attention in connection with the pending export reorganization legislation, and also with oversight of the administration of U. S. nuclear cooperation. The report identifies and discusses 14 specific issues and matters meriting such attention. Matters of likely interest to Congress

During the examination of the agreements and writing of the commentary a number of matters became evident concerning negotiation and administration of the agreements for cooperation. There follows an identifi

cation of 14 such matters together with brief supporting discussion.

1. Organization for nuclear cooperation and negotiation of agreements for

cooperation.

Four Federal agencies participate in U. S. nuclear cooperation. Three of them answer to the President and one is an independent regulatory agency. This arrangement provides an independent check upon the executive branch actions, and could, there

fore, lead to divergent or conflicting policies and decisions.

Four Federal agencies participate in various aspects of U. S. nuclear cooperation with other nations. The Department of State and the Energy Research and Development Administration negotiate the agreements for cooperation. The Administration administers them and authorizes certain

activities of U.S. nationals abroad. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission licenses the export of nuclear materials and equipment by the U.S. nuclear industry, and the Department of Commerce licenses exports of nuclear components not licensed by the Commission. The three departments and agencies report directly to the President while the Commission is an independent regulatory agency with substantial independence from Presidential direction, although the President has means to exert powerful indirect influence. *

The present organization opens possibilities for divergent or conflicting action between the executive branch agencies on the one hand and the independent Commission on the other. However, this independence provides a separate check upon nuclear exports under agreements for cooperation. To what extent the Commission needs to consider U.S. foreign policy and how consideration of this factor in addition to consideration of national defense and security are coordinated with the departments with primary responsibility for these functions are matters likely to merit congressional attention.

2. Administration of agreements

The administration of agreements for cooperation appears largely the responsibility of the Energy Research and Development Administration which may make decisions for re-export of U.S. transfers or other decisions that could differ from or conflict with similar decisions of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The nature and extent of interagency coordination in administration of agreements merits congressional attention.

*The President designates the chairman, nominates Commissioners for appointment or reappointment, and controls the Commission's budget.

The Department of State has primary responsibility for negotiation of

agreements for cooperation.

However, the subsequent administration of

those agreements appears to be primarily up to the Energy Research and Development Administration. The agreements in many provisions name the Administration to make subordinate decisions, arrangements and judgments. Assuming that the lead role of the State Department in negotiation of agreements stems from the importance of the agreements to foreign policy, then it seems reasonable to expect that the Department also should have a substantial, perhaps the principal role in administration. For example, the re-export of transferred materials and equipment is subject to approval by the Administration although some such transactions could have substantial foreign policy implications.

The arrival upon the scene of the independent Nuclear Regulatory Commission makes the interaction of the Commission with the Department of State and the Energy Research and Development Administratation a whole new field of public administration. To what extent are consistent judgment

and action desirable in relation to the congressional desire for an independent check upon executive branch judgments and actions when nuclear materials or equipment are presented for export or re-export? Are informal contact and coordination, which now seem to be improving, sufficient or are statutory relations needed as insurance against a day when interagency relations may be strained or at odds?

Some examples. It seems likely that the Commission will take more of an interest in the physical security to be provided for U.S. exports

by agreement nations or international organizations. Yet administration of safeguards provisions of the agreements is the function of the Administration which thus also will be increasingly concerned with physical security. Consider also the export of enriched uranium. Many agreements limit the enrichment to 20 percent for U. S. exports unless the Administration decides otherwise.

Yet at the time and place of export it will be the Commission that decides whether to issue a license for the supply of enriched uranium already agreed to by the Administration. These examples involve considerations of foreign policy as well as national defense and security. It is not clear how consideration of these factors by the Commission and the Administration should be coordinated, if at all.

It should be noted that one interpretation of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 underscores the importance of the Commission as an independent check and balance upon executive branch decisions for nuclear exports. In essence, the Commission is seen as possessing a potential veto over executive branch export actions, a veto that Congress expects the Agency to use if it cannot make the required findings for defense and security. Since there are no statutory provisions for appeal or reconsideration, presumably this veto power is absolute. Considering the substantial impact of this veto power, what provisions should there be, if any, for coordination between the Commission, the Administration and the State Department in instances of controversy? What consideration, if any, should the Com

mission be required to give to U. S. foreign policy and views of the executive

branch? Also, to what extent should Congress be able to make a final determination on a controversial export?

3. Revision of agreements

The agreements for cooperation contain no provisions for updating which may be a disadvantage for the future. However, agreements have been modified without such provisions, indicating they can be changed as needed.

Many agreements for cooperation have been changed or superseded since 1955 although they contain no provision for formal revision or updating. Nonetheless, some agreements contain out-of-date provisions such as references to then pending agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency now long consumated, or to leasing of special nuclear materials. While the presence of out-of-date provisions probably does not impair the administration, they do become clutter. More important are prospects for future modification of the agreements to adapt them to changing times and conditions, particularly should the United States succeed in getting the nuclear exporting nations to agree upon common prerequisites for exports of sensitive nuclear technologies such as fuel reprocessing. It would seem desirable to have a right to reopen agreements as times change. Of course this implies a reciprocal right of an agreement nation to reopen an agreement and perhaps to seek to weaken present U. S. rights. So there are disadvantages as well as advantages to seeking provisions for routine updating. Nonetheless, the absence of such a provision is a matter of administration that Congress may wish to consider.