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TABLE W.

POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF AGREEMENT PROVISIONS ON PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR VEAPARS

Erfect on Civil Use Erfect on Nuclear Eyfect on Production of locales
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+ = Positive effect (1.e. enhances use of nuclear power or Increases the probability of proliferation.)

0 = Uncertain or little effect

• = Negative effect (1.e. Inhibits the use of nuclear power, or decreases the probability of proliferation.)

concerning expansion of enrichment service, low-price and reliable nuclear

fuel reprocessing and low-price supply of special materials such as heavy water. Reducing the potential of other nations to acquire nuclear weapons materials by creating a United States or perhaps a world monopoly of supply, maintained by uneconomic pricing, could be effective, but would surely re

quire expensive subsidy.

Agreements to agree

Many provisions of agreements for cooperation call for or imply future negotiation of contracts or other arrangements and in some cases determi

nations or judgments. These subordinate arrangements cover detailed terms

and conditions for supply of materials, equipment, special nuclear materials, enrichment of uranium, ceilings upon amounts of special nuclear ma

terials held by agreement nations, transfers to other nations, and various

safeguards provisions. Some of the arrangements are subject to joint agreements of the Parties, some are unilateral determinations by the Energy Re

search and Development Administration. Table VII identifies such subordi

nate arrangements found in the examination of the agreements.

Note the anomoly presented by some of these arrangements. For special

nuclear materials, the Energy Research and Development Administration

is authorized to permit reexport of U.S. -supplied special nuclear material, whereas the initial export probably required a license from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Accomplishment of the agreements for cooperation

Using the authority of section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to

support the goals for Atoms for Peace, the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission

Table VII. Provisions of Agreements for Cooperation that Require

Additional Negotiations and Decisions

The following provisions in a typical agreement for cooperation for research and power indicate the many negotiations of subordinate arrangements and contracts and exercises of judgment and decisions required by the Energy Research and Development Administration.

Supply of materials

Certain listed materials may be transferred for defined applications in such quantities and under such terms and conditions as may be agreed when such materials are not commercially available.

Specialized research facilities and reactor materials testing facilities may be made available under such terms and conditions as may be agreed.

Equipment and devices may be transferred under such terms and conditions as may be agreed.

Supply of enriched uranium

ERDA at its option and under terms and conditions to be agreed may sell enriched uranium for transfer for use as fuel in power applications.

Under such terms and conditions as may be agreed, ERDA may transfer enriched uranium (including inter alia supply through enrichment services contracts) to the agreement or authorized persons under its jurisdiction.

Enrichment of transferred uranium

Some uranium transferred may be enriched to more than 20 percent when ERDA finds there is a technical or economic justification for such a transfer.

Limitations on quantities of enriched uranium transferred

The quantity of enriched uranium transferred for the fueling of reactors or reactor experiments shall not at any time be in excess of the quantity thereof necessary for the loading of such reactors or reactor experiments plus such additional quantity as, in the opinion of the Parties, is necessary for the efficient and continuous operation of such reactors or reactor experiments.

Table VII (cont.). Provisions of Agreements for Cooperation that Require

Additional Negotiations and Decisions

Reprocessing of irradiated U.S. materials

U.S. nuclear fuel materials irradiated in the agreement nation may be altered or reprocessed only in facilities acceptable to both Parties

upon a joint determination that safeguards may be effectively applied. Title to produced nuclear fuel materials

Title to nuclear fuel materials produced by irradiation of U.S. -supplied fuel materials shall be for the account of the lessee and title to it

shall be in the lessee unless ERDA and the lessee otherwise agree. Transfer of U.S. supplied items

An agreement nation may not transfer U.S. supplied materials, including equipment and devices, beyond its jurisdiction except as ERDA may agree and then only if in the opinion of ERDA the transfer is within the scope of an agreement for cooperation between the United States and the other nation or group of nations.

U.S. safeguards rights

The United States has the right to review the design of any reactor and other equipment and devices the design of which ERDA determines to be relevant to the effective application of safeguards.

The United States has the right to require the deposit in storage facilities designated by ERDA of any U.S. -supplied special nuclear material not in current use for civil purposes.

U.S. safeguards rights apply to any source or special nuclear materials used in, recovered from, or produced as a result of the use of, among other things, any other equipment or devices designated by the ERDA.

and the Department of State established a durable framework of agreements for nuclear cooperation with many nations and internationl organizations. The agreements enabled the Commission, its contractors, companies in the U.S. nuclear industry and individuals to deal directly with government or

ganizations and other parties in the agreement nations.

The agreements

carried a great outward flowing surge of U.S. nuclear science and techno

logy into the world. Initially the agreements enabled other nations to quickly learn the progress of U.S. development of civil nuclear power through visits, meetings, conferences, training and some use of U.S. nuclear faci

lities, plus a development and demonstration program with Euratom.

Now

the web of agreements provides the U.S. muclear industry with access to the

free world nuclear market where it can compete for sales of nuclear power plants, nuclear steam supply systems and parts thereof, and nuclear fuels-primarily enriched uranium from the factories of the Energy Research and Development Administration. In the future, the U.S. nuclear industry may offer fuel reprocessing services.

It is reasonable to conclude that through the agreements for cooperation

and the export licenses, the United States has contributed to the growth

abroad of a nuclear industrial base in many countries, although this base appears limited mainly to manufacture of nuclear power reactors and as

sociated parts and fabricated fuel.

The transfers of nuclear technologies,

materials and equipment worked towards the goals of Atoms for Peace and

probably provided the United States with more than a decade of influence

over foreign development of nuclear power. Unfortunately, the success of

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