As noted

minated the scene. Now two agencies are actively involved with negotiation of agreements, one with administration of the agreements, and two more with action on applications for licenses to export nuclear materials and equipment. The respective roles of these agencies still is changing as the long-term effects of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 begin to emerge. Today the Department of State appears to have the lead responsibility for negotiation of agreements and seems to be exercising this responsibility. * The Energy Research and Development Administration remains an active participant in negotiation and administration, backed by the strong intellectual and physical resources of its national laboratories. elsewhere, its influence as a world supplier of uranium enrichment services has been reduced with the booking up of its enrichment plants and the probable wait of five years or more before the U.S. enrichment capacity can be substantially increased by public or private investment. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is taking seriously its responsibilities for licensing the exports of nuclear materials and nuclear power reactors and their major parts. The Commission believes it has a de facto statutory veto power in those instances where it finds that the proposed export is inimical to the common defense and security and the public health and safety. The potential for divergent or contradictory action by the Administration and the Commission is real, although it is not clear whether the Administration itself could make an export to circumvent a denied license.

* During the regime of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, its chairman acted as U.S. spokesman for nuclear matters, particularly during the long chairmanship of Dr. Glenn T. Seaborg who was chairman from 1960 to 1971.

The situation 20 years hence. --What Congress may expect of agreements for cooperation in the years ahead depends upon what the most likely future appears to be and what is desired from U.S. policy and decisions. Assuming no major war or other events disruptive of society, it seems prudent to expect that because of dwindling world supplies of oil and natural gas, many nations will turn more to nuclear power and many national nuclear power industries will be expanded and diversified. Some plutonium probably will be used for nuclear fuel and the first generation of commercial breeder reactors will probably be in use. There will be facilities for reprocessing used fuels to recover plutonium. fuel fabrication plants and in transit will increase substantially. Some highly enriched uranium also may be present in the civil nuclear fuel cycle. All of these anticipated developments point to an increased probability that more nations will be able to make nuclear weapons if they choose to do so, and that subnational groups will have more places from which to try to steal

fissionable materials.

The amounts of plutonium in storage, in

What is not evident is whether new facilities to produce nuclear fuels-enrichment plants and fuel reprocessing plants--will be many, small and scattered among many nations, or whether they will be larger and fewer, perhaps one large plant per region; and whether such facilties will be national enterprises or will be owned and operated by international or regional organizations.

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This projection of the future could be substantially changed should nuclear weapons be used by non-weapons countries or by terrorist or other groups. What effects such an event would have are too conjectural to estimate here.

Future expectations of agreements for cooperation

What can be expected from agreements for cooperation in the fourth decade of the nuclear age?

First, the framework of agreements for cooperation can be expected to continue and to provide the basis for future U.S. commercial nuclear exports, assuming that efforts by some interests in the United States to bring about a nuclear moratorium do not prevail.

Second, the agreements for cooperation can be revised to provide more incentives for nations that have not ratified the Non Proliferation Treaty or at least to place all of their nuclear activities under international safeguards.

to do so,

Third, the agreements for cooperation can be administered to assure a demand for international or regional fuel reprocessing.

Fourth, the agreements for cooperation can be revised to require safeguarding of technology as well as material transfers, and to require declaration and safeguarding of facilities made by the agreement nation with personnel trained in and technology obtained from the United States.

Fifth, the agreements for cooperation can emphasize the importance of physical security for nuclear materials and facilities and require the meeting of specified minimum standards.

In summation, the agreements for cooperation can be used as one means, although not the only means, to reduce the desire of agreement nations to make nuclear weapons; to assure the world community that U.S. nuclear cooperation will not be so used; and to foster nuclear interdependence rather than nuclear independence of nations.