I. Summary of observations and issues Matters of likely interest to Congress. 1. Organization for nuclear cooperation and 6. Safeguarding nuclear technology. 7. Reprocessing of spent fuels. 10. Preference for NPT adherents . . 11. Government -to-government transfers 12. NRC findings on defense and security III. Bilateral Agreements: what are they and why? Transfer of information: the prime mover for world use of atomic energy and nuclear power The era of restricted transfer: 1946-1954 The era of open exchange: 1954 to the present International cooperation in nuclear energy U.S. agreements for cooperation in nuclear energy Negotiation of agreements for cooperation. IV. Provisions of special relevance to proliferation. Transfer of materials and equipment. Supply of special nuclear materials Effects of the agreements upon proliferation. Accomplishments of the agreements for cooperation. The situation 20 years ago The situation today. The situation 20 years hence. Future expectations of agreements for cooperation. List of Tables I. Criteria for decisions affecting nuclear exports II. List of agreement nations and their NPT status III. Comparison of contents of three typical agreements for cooperation IV. Contents of research and power agreements VII. Provisions of agreements for cooperation that require additional negotiations and decisions II. Comparative texts of provisions for agreements for research and power, research only, and power only III. A selected chronology of international activities of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, 1955-1974 IV. Principles of EURATOM safeguards I. SUMMARY OF OBSERVATIONS AND ISSUES Summary of Factors Affecting Agreements for Cooperation At the request of the Senate Committee on Government Operations, the authors examined U.S. agreements for nuclear cooperation in relation to (1) proliferation of the ability to make nuclear weapons, and (2) to legislation before the Committee to reorganize certain export functions of the Federal Government. * This examination has produced a commentary on factors that Congress may wish to keep in mind while considering the pending legislation and an identification of 14 related issues which appear to merit consideration. The report identifies five overall factors relevant to negotiation and administration of the agreements for cooperation: 1. The agreements for cooperation and export licenses have fostered the substantial export of U.S. nuclear materials, equipment and technology since 1955 which have stimulated and strengthened the growth of nuclear energy industries abroad. This industrial growth probably would have occurred without U.S. nuclear cooperation, but at a slower pace. Nonetheless, the stronger and more diversified is the nuclear industrial base of a nation, the more readily it may, at its option, produce nuclear explosive materials and develop nuclear weapons. 2. The United States through the agreements for cooperation has obtained unprecedented modification of national sovereignty through * S. 1439, the Export Reorganization Act of 1976. commitments of agreement nations to safeguard U. S. -supplied nuclear materials and equipment and to permit inspection by inspectors of the United States or the International Atomic Energy Agency. Provisions in the agreements which require application of international safeguards in agreement nations gave the International Agency practical working experience that was important preparation for its responsibilities under the Non Proliferation Treaty. 3. The formulation of the functions, negotiation and administration of agreements for cooperation and export licenses was dominated by the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission for the period 1955-1974 and the pattern it established has changed little since the Energy Reorganization Act was passed in 1974. 4. Times and circumstances have changed markedly since U.S. muclear cooperation began in 1955. Concern about proliferation was then fo cused on the vertical proliferation of U. S. competition with the Soviet Union in production of nuclear weapons. Now concern has been extended to include horizontal proliferation of the ability to make nuclear weapons among many nations. In 1955 there was little thought of a chronic world shortage of oil and natural gas, although there should have been, so that use of nuclear power depended upon its economic competitiveness with cheap and plentiful fossil fuels. Now many nations are turning to nuclear power, rightly or wrongly, to relieve their dependence upon imported, high-priced oil from possibly unreliable suppliers. In 1955 one Federal agency, the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, dominated U.S. nuclear cooperation with |