(d). to require the deposit in storage facilities designated by ERDA

of any special nuclear material which is not currently utilized for civil power in the recipient nation, or transferred pursuant to the agreement, or disposed of pursuant to an arrangement mutually acceptable to both parties.

(e). to designate, after consultation with the recipient, personnel who shall have access in the recipient nation "to all places and data necessary to account for the source and special nuclear materials to determine whether there is compliance with the agreement" and to make the necessary independent measurements. If either party so requests, the personnel so designated may be accompanied by personnel designated by the recipient

nation.

(f). to suspend or terminate the agreement and to require the return of any material, equipment and devices supplied in the event of non-compliance with the guarantees and the failure of the recipient nation to carry out the provisions of this article within a reasonable time.

safety.

(g). to consult with the recipient nation in matters of health and

The agreements with Argentina, Brazil, China, and Japan include a U.S. commitment to direct persons designated by it to have access to the items in the recipient country not to reveal any industrial secrets, or confidential information to other than persons in the U. S. Government authorized to receive such information.

The agreements with Portugal, South Africa, and Spain each include a note on nuclear explosive devices. The notes state the "long held U.S. understanding" that no material, subject to the agreement for cooperation

attempt to steal nuclear materials to make and use crude weapons, or to release plutonium as a radiological weapon, or to so sabotage nuclear facilities as to cause dangerous releases of radioactive materials. The concern over terrorism has generated pressure for measures to increase physical security of nuclear materials and installations as well as the security of vital energy, communications and transportation facilities.

The changes of the past two decades have changed the character of nuclear cooperation and the prospects for proliferation. Now cooperation appears to be shaped more by a desire to assure national nuclear industries a growing share of the world nuclear market and so is moving more toward commercial relationships and away from the open exchange among scientists contemplated by agreements in 1955. Likewise the concern over proliferation has changed from dealing with the escalating vertical proliferation of weapons production by the United States and the Soviet Union to preventing, or limiting, or delaying further horizontal proliferation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons among nations of the world. In 1955 nuclear power was seen as an alternative energy source for the future, but the United States was still an exporter of fuels and had little current need for nuclear power. In 1975, two years after the oil embargo, many nations, including the United States, now look to nuclear power as a way to relieve their dependence upon scarce oil the price of which is determined abroad by political rather than economic criteria.

In terms of negotiation and administration of agreements and related actions, twenty years ago the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission largely do

As noted

minated the scene. Now two agencies are actively involved with negotiation of agreements, one with administration of the agreements, and two more with action on applications for licenses to export nuclear materials and equipment. The respective roles of these agencies still is changing as the long-term effects of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 begin to emerge. Today the Department of State appears to have the lead responsibility for negotiation of agreements and seems to be exercising this responsibility. * The Energy Research and Development Administration remains an active participant in negotiation and administration, backed by the strong intellectual and physical resources of its national laboratories. elsewhere, its influence as a world supplier of uranium enrichment services has been reduced with the booking up of its enrichment plants and the probable wait of five years or more before the U.S. enrichment capacity can be substantially increased by public or private investment. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is taking seriously its responsibilities for licensing the exports of nuclear materials and nuclear power reactors and their major parts. The Commission believes it has a de facto statutory veto power in those instances where it finds that the proposed export is inimical to the common defense and security and the public health and safety. The potential for divergent or contradictory action by the Administration and the Commission is real, although it is not clear whether the Administration itself could make an export to circumvent a denied license.

* During the regime of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, its chairman acted as U.S. spokesman for nuclear matters, particularly during the long chairmanship of Dr. Glenn T. Seaborg who was chairman from 1960 to 1971.

Termination of IAEA safeguards

The agreements with Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Finland, Japan, Norway, Spain, and Switzerland contain similar provisions for termination of IAEA safeguards. If an IAEA safeguards agreement should be terminated prior to the expiration of an agreement and the parties failed to agree promptly (within three months in the Brazilian Agreement) upon a resumption of IAEA safeguards, either Party could, by notification, terminate the Agreement ("upon adequate notice and with an accompanying statement of reason" in the Agreement with Argentina). Before either Party acts to

terminate an agreement they are committed to carefully consider the economic effects of such termination. Neither Party is to invoke termination until the other Party has been given sufficient advance notice to permit arrangements by the recipient nation for an alternative source of power and to permit adjustment by the United States of production schedules. In the event of termination by either Party, the recipient nation is to return to the United States all special nuclear material received and still in its possession or in the possession of persons under its jurisdiction. The U. S. Government is to compensate the recipient Government or the persons under its jurisdiction for their interest in the returned material.

The agreements with Australia, China, Korea, Philippines, South Africa, Sweden, Thailand, and Venezuela provide a variation. If a trilateral safeguards agreement is terminated prior to the expiration of an agreement and the Parties fail to promptly agree to a resumption of IAEA safeguards, either Party may, by notification, terminate the agreement. In the event of termination by either party, the recipient government shall,

This projection of the future could be substantially changed should nuclear weapons be used by non-weapons countries or by terrorist or other groups. What effects such an event would have are too conjectural to estimate here.

Future expectations of agreements for cooperation

What can be expected from agreements for cooperation in the fourth decade of the nuclear age?

First, the framework of agreements for cooperation can be expected to continue and to provide the basis for future U.S. commercial nuclear exports, assuming that efforts by some interests in the United States to bring about a nuclear moratorium do not prevail.

Second, the agreements for cooperation can be revised to provide more incentives for nations that have not ratified the Non Proliferation Treaty or at least to place all of their nuclear activities under international safeguards.

to do so,

Third, the agreements for cooperation can be administered to assure a demand for international or regional fuel reprocessing.

Fourth, the agreements for cooperation can be revised to require safeguarding of technology as well as material transfers, and to require declaration and safeguarding of facilities made by the agreement nation with personnel trained in and technology obtained from the United States.

Fifth, the agreements for cooperation can emphasize the importance of physical security for nuclear materials and facilities and require the meeting of specified minimum standards.