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minated the scene.
Now two agencies are actively involved with negotiation
of agreements, one with administration of the agreements, and two more with action on applications for licenses to export nuclear materials and equipment. The respective roles of these agencies still is changing as the long-term effects of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 begin to emerge.
Today the Department of State appears to have the lead responsibility for negotiation of agreements and seems to be exercising this responsibi
The Energy Research and Development Administration remains an
active participant in negotiation and administration, backed by the strong
services has been reduced with the booking up of its enrichment plants and the probable wait of five years or more before the U.S. enrichment capacity
can be substantially increased by public or private investment. The Nuclear
Regulatory Commission is taking seriously its responsibilities for licensing the exports of nuclear materials and nuclear power reactors and their major parts. The Commission believes it has a de facto statutory veto power in those instances where it finds that the proposed export is inimical to the
common defense and security and the public health and safety.
tential for divergent or contradictory action by the Administration and the
Commission is real, although it is not clear whether the Administration
itself could make an export to circumvent a denied license.
* During the regime of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, its chairman acted as U.S. spokesman for nuclear matters, particularly during the long chairmanship of Dr. Glenn T. Seaborg who was chairman from 1960 to 1971.
The situation 20 years hence. --What Congress may expect of agree
ments for cooperation in the years ahead depends upon what the most likely
future appears to be and what is desired from U.S. policy and decisions.
Assuming no major war or other events disruptive of society, it seems pru
dent to expect that because of dwindling world supplies of oil and natural
gas, many nations will turn more to nuclear power and many national nuclear power industries will be expanded and diversified. Some plutonium probably
will be used for nuclear fuel and the first generation of commercial breeder
reactors will probably be in use.
There will be facilities for reprocessing
used fuels to recover plutonium.
The amounts of plutonium in storage, in
fuel fabrication plants and in transit will increase substantially. Some highly
enriched uranium also may be present in the civil nuclear fuel cycle. All
of these anticipated developments point to an increased probability that more
nations will be able to make nuclear weapons if they choose to do so, and
that subnational groups will have more places from which to try to steal
What is not evident is whether new facilities to produce nuclear fuels-
enrichment plants and fuel reprocessing plants--will be many, small and scattered among many nations, or whether they will be larger and fewer,
perhaps one large plant per region; and whether such facilties will be nation
al enterprises or will be owned and operated by international or regional
This projection of the future could be substantially changed should nu
clear weapons be used by non-weapons countries or by terrorist or other
What effects such an event would have are too conjectural to esti
Future expectations of agreements for cooperation
What can be expected from agreements for cooperation in the fourth
decade of the nuclear age ?
First, the framework of agreements for cooperation can be expected
to continue and to provide the basis for future U.S. commercial nuclear
exports, assuming that efforts by some interests in the United States to bring about a nuclear moratorium do not prevail.
Second, the agreements for cooperation can be revised to provide more
incentives for nations that have not ratified the Non Proliferation Treaty
to do so,
or at least to place all of their nuclear activities under interna
Third, the agreements for cooperation can be administered to assure a demand for international or regional fuel reprocessing.
Fourth, the agreements for cooperation can be revised to require safe
guarding of technology as well as material transfers, and to require declaration and safeguarding of facilities made by the agreement nation with personnel trained in and technology obtained from the United States.
Fifth, the agreements for cooperation can emphasize the importance
of physical security for nuclear materials and facilities and require the
meeting of specified minimum standards.
notified by Austria that these pesons may undertake the necessary arrange
The agreement with Italy states that private individuals and organiza
tions in either nation may deal directly with private entities in the other na
tion. Arrangements for the transfer or export of materials, equipment and
evices, and for performance of services related thereto is subject to the limitations of this agreement, and the laws, regulations, and license re
quirements of the Parties.
Responsibility for information and materials
All of the agreements disclaim any responsibility for the accuracy and completeness of the information exhchanged. Additionally, the transferred material, equipment, and devices transferred are not warranted.
Responsibility for safe handling of materials
All of the agreements provide that after delivery of materials, the recipient nation is responsible for their safe handling and use. When special
nuclear material or fuel elements are leased by the United States, the
recipient nation indemnifies and holds harmless the United States against
any and all liability, including third party liability, for any cause arising out of the production, fabrication, ownership, lease possession and use of the
All of the agreements contain identical guarantees by the recipient
--No transferred material, equipment, devices or special nuclear