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minated the scene.

Now two agencies are actively involved with negotiation

of agreements, one with administration of the agreements, and two more with action on applications for licenses to export nuclear materials and equipment. The respective roles of these agencies still is changing as the long-term effects of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 begin to emerge.

Today the Department of State appears to have the lead responsibility for negotiation of agreements and seems to be exercising this responsibi

lity. *

The Energy Research and Development Administration remains an

active participant in negotiation and administration, backed by the strong

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services has been reduced with the booking up of its enrichment plants and the probable wait of five years or more before the U.S. enrichment capacity

can be substantially increased by public or private investment. The Nuclear

Regulatory Commission is taking seriously its responsibilities for licensing the exports of nuclear materials and nuclear power reactors and their major parts. The Commission believes it has a de facto statutory veto power in those instances where it finds that the proposed export is inimical to the

common defense and security and the public health and safety.

The po

tential for divergent or contradictory action by the Administration and the

Commission is real, although it is not clear whether the Administration

itself could make an export to circumvent a denied license.

* During the regime of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, its chairman acted as U.S. spokesman for nuclear matters, particularly during the long chairmanship of Dr. Glenn T. Seaborg who was chairman from 1960 to 1971.

The situation 20 years hence. --What Congress may expect of agree

ments for cooperation in the years ahead depends upon what the most likely

future appears to be and what is desired from U.S. policy and decisions.

Assuming no major war or other events disruptive of society, it seems pru

dent to expect that because of dwindling world supplies of oil and natural

gas, many nations will turn more to nuclear power and many national nuclear power industries will be expanded and diversified. Some plutonium probably

will be used for nuclear fuel and the first generation of commercial breeder

reactors will probably be in use.

There will be facilities for reprocessing

used fuels to recover plutonium.

The amounts of plutonium in storage, in

fuel fabrication plants and in transit will increase substantially. Some highly

enriched uranium also may be present in the civil nuclear fuel cycle. All

of these anticipated developments point to an increased probability that more

nations will be able to make nuclear weapons if they choose to do so, and

that subnational groups will have more places from which to try to steal

fissionable materials.

What is not evident is whether new facilities to produce nuclear fuels-

enrichment plants and fuel reprocessing plants--will be many, small and scattered among many nations, or whether they will be larger and fewer,

perhaps one large plant per region; and whether such facilties will be nation

al enterprises or will be owned and operated by international or regional

organizations.

64-626 0.76.7

This projection of the future could be substantially changed should nu

clear weapons be used by non-weapons countries or by terrorist or other

groups.

What effects such an event would have are too conjectural to esti

mate here.

Future expectations of agreements for cooperation

What can be expected from agreements for cooperation in the fourth

decade of the nuclear age ?

First, the framework of agreements for cooperation can be expected

to continue and to provide the basis for future U.S. commercial nuclear

exports, assuming that efforts by some interests in the United States to bring about a nuclear moratorium do not prevail.

Second, the agreements for cooperation can be revised to provide more

incentives for nations that have not ratified the Non Proliferation Treaty

to do so,

or at least to place all of their nuclear activities under interna

tional safeguards.

Third, the agreements for cooperation can be administered to assure a demand for international or regional fuel reprocessing.

Fourth, the agreements for cooperation can be revised to require safe

guarding of technology as well as material transfers, and to require declaration and safeguarding of facilities made by the agreement nation with personnel trained in and technology obtained from the United States.

Fifth, the agreements for cooperation can emphasize the importance

of physical security for nuclear materials and facilities and require the

meeting of specified minimum standards.

IL

notified by Austria that these pesons may undertake the necessary arrange

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The agreement with Italy states that private individuals and organiza

tions in either nation may deal directly with private entities in the other na

tion. Arrangements for the transfer or export of materials, equipment and

evices, and for performance of services related thereto is subject to the limitations of this agreement, and the laws, regulations, and license re

quirements of the Parties.

Responsibility for information and materials

All of the agreements disclaim any responsibility for the accuracy and completeness of the information exhchanged. Additionally, the transferred material, equipment, and devices transferred are not warranted.

Responsibility for safe handling of materials

All of the agreements provide that after delivery of materials, the recipient nation is responsible for their safe handling and use. When special

nuclear material or fuel elements are leased by the United States, the

recipient nation indemnifies and holds harmless the United States against

any and all liability, including third party liability, for any cause arising out of the production, fabrication, ownership, lease possession and use of the

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All of the agreements contain identical guarantees by the recipient

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--No transferred material, equipment, devices or special nuclear

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