concerning expansion of enrichment service, low-price and reliable nuclear fuel reprocessing and low-price supply of special materials such as heavy water. Reducing the potential of other nations to acquire nuclear weapons materials by creating a United States or perhaps a world monopoly of supply, maintained by uneconomic pricing, could be effective, but would surely re

quire expensive subsidy.

Agreements to agree

Many provisions of agreements for cooperation call for or imply future negotiation of contracts or other arrangements and in some cases determinations or judgments. These subordinate arrangements cover detailed terms and conditions for supply of materials, equipment, special nuclear materials, enrichment of uranium, ceilings upon amounts of special nuclear materials held by agreement nations, transfers to other nations, and various safeguards provisions. Some of the arrangements are subject to joint agreements of the Parties, some are unilateral determinations by the Energy Research and Development Administration. Table VII identifies such subordinate arrangements found in the examination of the agreements.

Note the anomoly presented by some of these arrangements. For special nuclear materials, the Energy Research and Development Administration is authorized to permit reexport of U.S. -supplied special nuclear material, whereas the initial export probably required a license from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Accomplishment of the agreements for cooperation

Using the authority of section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to support the goals for Atoms for Peace, the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission

returned to the U.S. or transferred to any other approved nation, or group

of nations.

The agreements

with Argentina, Brazil and Japan also limit the

quantity of plutonium that may be transferred. The net amount transferable to Argentina and Brazil may not exceed 20 kilograms. The net amount transferable to Japan may not exceed 365 kg. The net amount transferable is the gross quantity transferred minus the quantity which has been returned to the U. S. or transferred to another approved nation or group of nations.

Reprocessing, conversion, and fabrication

The agreements with Austria, China, Korea, Portuga, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Thailand and Venezuela provide that when the SNM received under an agreement requires reprocessing, or when the irradiated fuel elements containing fuel material received from the United States need to be removed from a reactor or altered in form or content, the reprocessing or alteration shall be performed in facilities acceptable to both Parties under a joint determination that safeguards will be effectively applied. Special nuclear material produced by irradiatation of leased fuel is to be credited to the lessee and after reprocessing, title to this material is with the lessee unless ERDA and the lessee agree otherwise.

The agreement with Spain specified that irradiated SNM of U.S. origin may be transferred from third countries to Spain for chemical reprocessing and subsequent applications in Spain or other nations. These transfers are under terms and conditions that are to be agreed to.

Table VII (cont.). Provisions of Agreements for Cooperation that Require Additional Negotiations and Decisions

Reprocessing of irradiated U.S. materials

U.S. nuclear fuel materials irradiated in the agreement nation may be altered or reprocessed only in facilities acceptable to both Parties upon a joint determination that safeguards may be effectively applied. Title to produced nuclear fuel materials

Title to nuclear fuel materials produced by irradiation of U.S. -supplied fuel materials shall be for the account of the lessee and title to it shall be in the lessee unless ERDA and the lessee otherwise agree.

Transfer of U.S. supplied items

An agreement nation may not transfer U.S. supplied materials, including equipment and devices, beyond its jurisdiction except as ERDA may agree and then only if in the opinion of ERDA the transfer is within the scope of an agreement for cooperation between the United States and the other nation or group of nations.

U.S. safeguards rights

The United States has the right to review the design of any reactor and other equipment and devices the design of which ERDA determines to be relevant to the effective application of safeguards.

The United States has the right to require the deposit in storage facilities designated by ERDA of any U.S.-supplied special nuclear material not in current use for civil purposes.

U.S. safeguards rights apply to any source or special nuclear materials used in, recovered from, or produced as a result of the use of, among other things, any other equipment or devices designated by the ERDA.

their removal from the reactor and prior to delivery at the reprocessing

facilities.

Norway, under terms and conditions agreed to for each transfer, may receive special nuclear material for the performance of conversion and/ or fabrication services for subsequent transfer to a nation or group of nations with which the United States has an applicable agreement for cooperation. The United States, in event of the transfer of title of enriched uranium to Norway, has the option of limiting the arrangements to undertakings described in the agreement.

Disposition of SNM produced from U. S. supplied materials

All the agreements place restrictions on the transfer of materials produced through the use of material supplied by the United States.

In the agreements with Austria, Japan, Korea, Portugal, South Africa, Sweden, and Thailand, no special nuclear material produced through the use of transferred material may be transferred to another nation or group of nations unless the recipient has an agreement for cooperation with the United States Government or guarantees the use of such SNM for peaceful purposes under safeguards acceptable to the parties.

The agreements with Argentina,

Brazil, China, Finland, Spain,

Switzerland, and Venezuela state that no SNM produced through the use of transferred material may be transferred to any other nation or group of nations, except as ERDA may agree.

The agreements with Australia, Italy, Norway, and the Philippines have similar provisions. With respect to any SNM not owned by the United States which is produced in reactors fueled with materials obtained from the United States by means other than lease which is in excess of the needs

the agreements has served to diminish this source of influence as

nations abroad have found other supplier nations, or have developed their

own nuclear capabilities.

Changing times and goals

The agreements for cooperation authorized by the revision of the Atomic Energy Act in 1954 reflect the circumstances of the mid 1950s. Now, 20 years later, the agreements are little changed but the circumstances are markedly different. Twenty years hence it is reasonable to expect that circumstances will be different still. So at this point in time it is appropriate for Congress to consider both what was expected of the agreements in 1955 and what can and should be expected of them in 1975 and for the future.

The situation 20 years ago. --Twenty years ago the architects of U.S. nuclear cooperation began their conceptual design of the present framework of cooperative agreements. At that time expanding cooperation in peaceful uses of atomic energy offered attractive prospects for reducing some of the tensions of the cold war. There was even hope, stillborn though it proved to be, that this cooperation could divert nuclear materials from weapons to civil purposes.

In the mid 1950s the proliferation problem was the vertical one of everexpanding nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union. While it was recognized that fostering peaceful uses of atomic energy and nuclear power ultimately might provide more nations with the means to make their own nuclear weapons, the realization was more academic than real. The