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possession of persons under its jurisdiction.
The U.S. Government will
then compensate India for the material at currı nt domestic prices.
The following terms are defined in the Agreement: U.S.
Commission, Tarapur Atomic Power Station, equipment and devices, per
sons, reactor, atomic weapon, special nuclear material, source material,
parties, and reliable full power operation.
The United Kingdom
The agreement for nuclear power cooperation with
the United Kingdom is shorter and less detailed than that with India. Its
principal provisions follows.
The Parties agreed to assist each other in furthering the use
of atomic energy for civil power applications, including merchant marine
propulsion, subject to the availability of personnel and material, applicable laws, directives, regulations and license requirements in force in their re
spective countries. The assistance is to be on a reciprocal basis.
Restricted data and privately owned information are not to be com
municated under the Agreement.
The Parties are to exchange general in
formation on the development of atomic energy for civil power applications, Detailed and applied information in this field are to be exchanged to such
an extent and under such terms and conditions as may be agreed.
of any exchanged information or materials is the responsibility of the receiv
ERDA is to sell agreed upon quantities of enriched U-235
for fueling reactors in the U.K. civil nuclear power programs, including
search and power. There are no U.S. inspection rights and no commitment for supplying information on materials quantities. However the guarantee provisions of each agreement commit the parties to safeguard classified transfers, where the word "safeguard" appears to mean physical protection
rather than the meaning in other agreements.
Neither agreement provides for the IAEA to apply safeguards.
Responsibility for information and materials
Both agreements contain the same provisions for responsibility for
information and materials as appears in the other agreements for research
Responsibility for safe handling of materials
Neither agreement contains the provision for safe handling of materials that appears in other agreements for research and power.
Both agreements provide guarantees by the parties to safeguard
transferred classified material, equipment, devices and classified informa
tion; not to use transferred items for atomic weapons, or research and de
velopment of atomic weapons, or any other military use; and not to transfer items to unauthorized persons or beyond the jurisdiction of the receiving
The Canadian agreement ties the first guarantee to security safeguards and standards prescribed by the separate security arrangements be
tween the AEC and the Atomic Energy Control Board of Canada. The United
Cooperation by Persons - Arrangements may be made between ei
ther Party or authorized persons under its jurisdiction and authorized persons under the jurisdiction of the other Party for the transfer of materials,
etc. subject to limitations in this Agreement.
The Parties agreed to request the IAEA to assume re
sponsibility for applying safeguards to materials transferred.
In the event the Parties did not reach a mutually satisfactory agree
ment on the trilateral, either Party by notification, could terminate the
In the event of termination, the United Kingdom would at the
United States' request, return all special nuclear material received and still
in its possession or in the possession of persons under its jurisdiction. The United States would compensate the United Kingdom for its interest in these
material at current domestic prices.
Guarantees - Both Parties guaranteed that:
No material transferred pursuant to this Agreement will be used for atomic weapons or for research on or development of atomic weapons or
for any other military purpose.
No material transferred will be transferred to unauthorized persons
or beyond the jurisdiction of either receiving Party without the written con
sent of the transferring Party.
U.S. consent will not be given unless the
transfer is within the scope of an Agreement for cooperation.
No special nuclear material produced through the use of any material
transferred pursuant to this agreement may be used for atomic weapons or
for research on development of atomic weapons or for any other military
purpose. Further, they may not be transferred beyond the jurisdiction of the
Party in which they were produced.
nuclear material. In addition, the agreements with Indonesia, Ireland and Colombia include definitions for parties, byproduct material, and person. The agreements with Ireland and Indonesia also define safeguards. All de
finitions are identical to those in the research and power agreements.
Cooperation and Restricted Data
Concerning cooperation and Restricted Data, the Agreements with
Ireland and Indonesia are identical. In them, the parties agree to cooperate
in the achievement of the uses of atomic energy for peaceful purposes subject to the provisions of the Agreement, the availability of personnel and material, and the applicable laws, regulations, and license requirements in
force in their respective countries. Restricted data and information that the
permitted to communicate are outside the scope of this
The Agreements with Israel, Turkey, Iran, and Colombia state only
that restricted data shall not be communicated under the Agreement.
The Agreement with Greece does not mention restricted data.
Under the agreements with Colombia, Indonesia, Ireland, and Tur
key, the areas in which information will be exchanged are the same as the
research areas in the research and power agreements.
The agreements with Greece, Iran, and Israel outline the following areas as suitable for cooperation:
-design, construction, and operation of research reactors and their
use as research, development, and engineering tools and in me
selecting reactor projects, the technical and economic features were to
be considered and approved by both parties while other features were to
be considered and approved by the EURATOM.
The total capital cost, exclusive of fuel inventory of the nuclear power
plants to be constructed under the program was estimated not to exceed the
equivalent of $350 million to be financed by the U.S. and Euratom. The
U.S. offered guarantees designed to limit financial risks associated with the
The reactor R & D program aimed primarily at improving reactor
performance, lowering fuel cycle costs, and developing plutonium recycle.
Materials to be provided
The U.S. agreed to sell or lease up to
30,000 kilograms of Uranium enriched in U-235, for joint projects as the
Euratom Community requests. This net amount was
to be the gross quan
tity of contained U-235 in uranium sold of leased to the Community less the quantity of contained U-235 in recoverable uranium resold or returned to
the U.S., or transferred to another nation or group of nations
ith U.S. ap
proval. By agreement, the United States could also sell additional quanti
ties of SNM to the Community. Any lease of SNM by the U.S. Commission
could be converted to a sale of material upon Euratom request, if such a
sale was consistent with U.S. laws and policy.
Details of the leasing ar
rangements are included in the Agreement.
The uranium supplied for use in power reactors may be enriched to 20% U-235. Upon request and at its discretion, the United States could
supply part of the enriched uranium as material enriched up to 90% for use