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parately because of their status as wartime partners of the United States in development of the atomic bomb and their strong postwar nuclear programs.
The principal articles of the research and power agreements are
shown in Table I together with indications of their similarities and differences
for 18 agreements.
All of the bilaterals contain a section of definitions.
definitions for: parties, atomic weapons, byproduct material, equipment and devices, person, reactor, restricted data, safeguards, source material,
and special nuclear material.
Of special interest are the definitions for
"atomic weapon", "safeguards", "restricted data", and "special nuclear ma
All of the bilaterals use the following definition for atomic wea
pon: "Atomic weapon means any device utilizing atomic energy, exclusive
of the means for transporting or propelling the device (where such means is
a separable and divisible part of the device), the principle purpose of which
is for use as,
or for development of, a weapon, a weapon prototype, or a
weapon test device.
All of the bilaterals, except for Australia, Italy, South
Africa, and Venezuela, contain the following definition of safeguards: Safe
guards means a system of controls designed to assure that any materials,
equipment and devices committed to the peaceful uses of atomic energy are not used to further any military purpose. Restricted data means "all data
concerning (a) design, manufacture, or utilization of atomic weapons, (b)
the production of special nuclear material, or (c) the use of special nuclear
material in the production of energy". The definition does not include data which has been removed from the restricted category by declassifica
tion. Special nuclear materials mean (1) plutonium, uranium enriched in
the isotype 233 or in the isotope 235, and any other material which the
United States or the other party determines to be special nuclear material,
or (2) any material artifically enriched by any of the foregoing.
finition is essentially that of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954* with the added
feature that the other party to the agreement may also define special nuclear
The absence of a definition of safeguards in the agreements with Aus
tralia, Italy, South Africa and Venezuela is hard to understand.
also that all of the agreements would be improved by adding definitions of
peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and for nuclear explosive devices.
Commmunication of restricted data
Although the agreements provide for exchange of nuclear materials and equipment, all of them specify that restricted data shall not be com
This limitation in essence limits the exchange of unclassified
or declassified information.
This distinction can be important for some
new developments in nuclear power, such as laser separation of isotopes, probably would be considered as "born classified" by the United States and
thus not available for transfer under agreements as written.
Scope of agreements
All of the agreements contain a specification of the fields in which information, other than restricted data, may be exchanged. These fields
*The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 as amended, section 11(aa).
(1) Development, design, construction, operation, and use of re-
(2) The use of radioactive isotopes and source material, special nu
clear material, and byproduct material in physical and biological re
search, medicine, agriculture, and industry; and
(3) Health and safety considerations related to the foregoing.
The Agreement with South Africa also provides that inclassified information on geology, exploration techniques, chemistry and technology of ex
tracting uranium and thorium from their ores and concentrates, purification and fabrication of uranium and thorium compounds and metals, including de
sign, construction, and operation of plants will be exchanged.
The information exchange is to be accomplished by various means in
cluding reports, conferences, and visits to facilities.
In the 13 agreements with Argentina, Austria, Brazil, China, Finland, Japan, Korea, Norway, the Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and
Thailand, a companion article specifies mateials which may be transferred
between the parties for defined purposes when they are not available com
mercially. These materials include source material, heavy water, byproduct material, other radioisotopes, stable isotopes, and special nuclear material
for purposes other than fueling reactors and reactor experiments. These agreements also state that specialized research facilities may be made available for mutual use consistent with limits of space, facilities, and
Equipment and devices related to the subjects of agreed information exchange may be transferred from one party to another under agreed terms
physics, reactor engineering, properties of reactor materials, specifica
tion for reactor materials, reactor components and overall design and oper
tailed drawings and applied technology for such reactors and related com
ponents, equipment and devices is not to be exchanged except as may be
Both agreements provide for maintenance of mutually agreed classifi
cation policies with respect to all information, materials, equipment and
devices exchanged. The Parties are committed to continue periodic consul
tation with each other on the classification of atomic energy information.
terials of interest in connection with the subjects of information specified
in the agreements are to be exchanged for research purposes in such quanti
ties and under such terms and conditions as may be agreed. The agreements
list materials including source materials, special nuclear materials, by
product material, other radioisotopes, and stable isotopes. As for specia
lized research facilities and reactor testing facilities, these are to be made
available for mutual use upon such terms and conditions as may be agreed.
The agreements note that such use must be consistent with limits of space,
facilities and personnel conveniently available.
The Canadian agreement
commits ERDA not to permit access by Canadian personnel facilities which
in ERDA's opinion are primarily of military significance. The agreement
with the United Kingdom specifies the understanding that neither Party will
be able to permit access by personnel of the other Party to facilities which
are of primarily military significance.
s may be
Military for power and other non-research uses
** IS to
Both agreements contain detailed provisions for supply of special auclear materials and other mateials for power and other non-research uses. The provisions are similar to those for other research and power agreements, but in more detail. The two agreements are also somewhat different.
The Canadian agreement commits ERDA to sell, lease, or loan to
Canada, under such terms and conditions as may be agreed, such quantities of enriched uranium as may be required in the Canadian power reactor pro
are subject to any limitations of quantities
available for distribution by ERDA and subject to the limitations that the quantity of enriched uranium of weapons quality transferred to Canada shall not, in the opinion of ERDA, be of military significance. It is agreed that
the enriched uranium which ERDA will sell, lease or loan will be limited
in enrichment to a maximum of 20 , :rcent. However, ERDA may, upon
request, and in its discretion, make part of the enriched uranium available
at a higher enrichment when there is a technical or economic justification
for such a transfer.
The Canadian agreement gives ERDA a first refusal of any special nuclear materials derived from U.S. supplied enrichment uranium which
Canada may desire to transfer outside of that nation.