aware that legal educators, generally, will perhaps disagree with this statement.

It seems to me the ideal method, preserving all of the advantages of the case system and the other methods of instruction, is the concurrent study of a small text book, or rather full outline, and a selection of cases, making all assignments for class work from the latter, so that it is really made the basis of instruction, while the student has the advantage of the coherence in his knowledge on the subject coming from the use of the text in conjunction with it.

No one familiar with legal education today, I suppose, would seriously contend that any other system compares in general efficiency with the case method of instruction, but its friends should recognize that it has its limitations and should be supplemented in certain respects in order to meet fully the needs of the students, who expect actually to practice at the Bar,, and are not taking the course as a means of general culture or as a preparation for work as mere legal teachers.

Pardon me, if I mention an example of what I regard as a splendid illustration of the ideal method; the use of the two volumes of Keener's Cases on Contracts and Harriman on Contracts as a collateral text. After an observation of the work of scores of teachers in various courses in many of the leading law schools I have seen no more effective work done than with such a combination under a competent instructor in the Northwestern University.

The Chairman:

Is there any further discussion on this paper? If not, new business is in order.

Lucien H. Alexander, of Pennsylvania:

I have a suggestion to throw out, not in the form of a motion, but rather to ascertain the views of the Section. There is great lack of uniformity in the various states with reference to rules of admission. Some states have excellent rules on some points, while on others they are totally deficient

in important particulars. Now, it has occurred to me that it might be advisable to have a committee of this Section draft a set of what might be called ideal or standard admission rules, with explanatory notes emphasizing important provisions, and which when finally approved and adopted may eventually be recommended by the American Bar Association as a guide to states desirous of securing the best possible system for admission to the Bar.

The Secretary:

The remarks of Mr. Alexander and those of Mr. Keysor and these two papers on the State Bar Examiners all suggest the very great importance of the State Bar Examiners and the law school teachers coming to a clear understanding of what each of them is trying to do. I believe the state board of law examiners in any one state can do more to uplift the cause of legal education in that state than all its law schools together. It seems to me that it would be well if Mr. Alexander would put his suggestion into the form of a motion and possibly broaden its scope a little. I think that we should move towards getting into touch with the various boards of State Bar Examiners and arriving at some understanding as to the common ideals in legal education.

Lucien H. Alexander:

Then I will move that a committee of seven be appointed by the Chair for the purpose of drafting a set of rules for admission, which, if adopted and approved by this Section, may be regarded as standard rules.

The Secretary:

I will second that motion.

The motion was adopted.

The Chairman:

I presume that the appointment of this committee will be referred to the incoming Chairman of the Section.

The committee was subsequently appointed as follows:

Mr. Lucien H. Alexander, of Pennsylvania.

Mr. Lawrence Maxwell, Jr., of Ohio.
Mr. Wesley W. Hyde, of Michigan.

Mr. George W. Wall, of Illinois.
Mr. L. H. Perkins, of Kansas.
Mr. Frank Irvine, of New York.
Mr. H. H. Ingersoll, of Tennessee.

The Section then adjourned sine die.

CHARLES M. HEPBURN,

Secretary.

LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE FAILURE OF THE BAR TO PERFORM ITS PUBLIC DUTIES.

CHAIRMAN'S ADDRESS

BY

WILLIAM DRAPER LEWIS,

OF THE UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF LAW.

The function of a profession as such is to perform some service vital to the well being of the community. The function of the legal profession is to administer justice. Whether at any particular time in any particular country that service is being efficiently performed must be tested by the answer of the facts to three questions. First: Are the ethical standards of the members of the profession clear and tending to improve? Second: Does the law, whether expressed in the development of "cases" or legislation tend to correspond to the felt sense of right in the community? Third: Is the law administered with reasonable certainty and dispatch?

If the first question is answered in the negative, it means that a large and increasing number of the profession are preying on the weaker members of the community. If the law does not satisfy the community's ideal of justice, class hatred and the instability of the whole social organization is the result; while the evils which flow from uncertain or long delayed administration of the law are of a similar character.

How does our profession answer these three tests of efficiency? Can any of us say that, taken as a whole, we have clear cut ideals of professional right conduct, or purge ourselves of those who fail to live up to proper professional standards? The universal presence among us of the ambulance chaser, unrebuked by our courts, and the fact that we practically never disbar a lawyer, except after he has been indicted and

convicted for a criminal offense, are significant commentaries on our ethical standards and the way in which we guard what we are pleased to call the traditions of the profession. The question is not whether the Bar is worse from a moral point of view than it was; it is enough to make the answer we must give to the first test of efficiency doubtful, that we do not insist upon a high standard of conduct among our members, and that in this respect the observer finds few, if any, signs of improvement.

On the other hand, if we turn to the law as found in our decided cases, we can with pardonable pride maintain that our courts meet with ability the new conditions as they arise. For instance, the way in which legal questions arising out of trade and labor disputes have been dealt with show that we do possess the capacity to mold our common law to new conditions. In this respect, I believe, the present compares favorably with any period of English or American legal history. In legislation on legal subjects we have not as a profession shown any marked ability, either to initiate useful reforms in substantive law or to express the existing law in statutory form. Whether a beneficial civil code can be formed is doubtful, and it is therefore no reflection on the profession that, with one or possibly two exceptions, the attempts at such codification have apparently failed to prove satisfactory; but it may fairly be a subject of adverse comment that in the last fifty years we have not in America initiated a single legislative reform in substantive law.

On the side of the administration of the law, both civil and criminal, our failure to perform the service which the community may of right expect is almost complete. The two fatal words "uncertainty " and "delay" are interwoven in all our methods of doing legal business. The practical result of our antiquated systems in the complicated conditions of our social and business life would disgrace the early part of the nineteenth century, when practically all business was performed in a cumbersome way, but to a modern business man,