veyances are good, in many cases, when made to a grantee by a certain designation, without the mention of either the christian or surname, as to the wife of I. S., or to his eldest son, for id est certum, quod potest reddi certum.a (3.) Of the consideration. A consideration is generally held to be essential to a good and absolute deed; though a gift, or voluntary conveyance will be effectual as between the parties, and is only liable to be questioned in certain cases, when the rights of creditors and subsequent purchasers are concerned. The English statutes of 13 Eliz., c. 5, and 27 Eliz., c. 4, against fraudulent gifts and conveyances, being made before the settlement of this country, and being in affirmance *of the principles and rules of the *463 common law," may be considered as part of the common law which accompanied the emigration of our ancestors. They have been re-enacted in many of the states in nearly the same terms. The first of these statutes relates to creditors, and it has been already alluded to in a former volume.d The last statute relates Co. Litt. 3, a. Lord Mansfield, Cowp. Rep. 434, and see supra, vol. ii. 440. • North Carolina Revised Statutes, vol. i. 287. The Statutes of Kentucky of 14th December, 1796, and February 15th, 1838, relate to creditors, and apply equally to debts due and not due. The territorial act of Michigan, of April 12, 1827. Those English statutes are in force in Pennsylvania, except certain sections, which are inapplicable; and the rule that a deed void in part by statute, is void in toto, does not apply to contracts and deeds fraudulent under those statutes by construction only. 1 Ashmead, 12. The general court of the old Plymouth colony in 1682, provided by statuto against fraudulent conveyances, with remarkable precision and brevity, by enacting that "all deceitful or fraudulent alienations of lands or other estate, shall be of no validity to defeat any man from any due debts, just claims, title or possession." Plymouth Colony Laws, edit. 1836, by Brigham, p. 200. Supra, vol. ii. p. 440.442. only to purchasers of lands, and it is settled, in England, that a voluntary conveyance, though for a meritorious purpose, will be deemed to have been made with fraudulent views, and set aside in favour of a subsequent purchaser for a valuable consideration, even though he had notice of the prior deed. But this is a severe construction of the statute; and it has been supposed to be more reasonable and just to sustain bona fide voluntary conveyances, as against purchasers with actual notice, and who are intentionally defeating the fair claims and expectations of a prior grantee. The English doctrine was applied in the case of Sterry v. Arden, to the case of a voluntary conveyance as against a subsequent purchaser, with implied notice only of the prior deed; and it was there held, that such a conveyance might be made binding by matter subsequent and intervening between the voluntary conveyance and the purchase. It is a settled principle that a deed voluntary or even fraudulent in its creation, and voidable by a purchaser, may become good by matter ex post facto. Thus, a voluntary deed may be made good by a subsequent marriage, and marriage is held to be a high consideration in law, and fixes the interest in the grantee. In Cathcart v. Robinson,f the construction of the statute came into discussion Doe v. Manning, 9 East's Rep. 59, where all the cases are elaborately reviewed. Master of the Rolls, in Buckle v. Mitchell, 18 Ves. 110. See, also, ibid. 88, 89. Hudnal v. Wilder, 4 M'Cord's Rep. 294. 1 Johns. Ch. Rep. 261. In North Carolina before the act in that state of 1840, the English law as declared in Doe v. Manning was held to be the law in that state, and the English rule was the same in equity as against voluntary settlement, even though the title of the purchaser vested in articles, and he was a purchaser with notice. Clanton v. Burgess, 2 Dev. Eq. Rep. 13. Freeman v. Eatman, 3 Iredell's Eq. Cases, 81. е Prodgers v. Langham, 1 Sid. 133. Kirk v. Clark, Prec. in Ch. 275. Lord Eldon, 9 Vesey, 193. Sterry v. Arden, 1 Johns. Ch. Rep. 261. Huston v. Cantril, 11 Leigh's Rep. 136. 15 Peters' U. S. Rep. 264. before the supreme court of the United States; and it was held that the principle of the construction of the statute of 27 Eliz., which prevailed in England at the commencement of the American revolution, went no further than to hold the subsequent sale to be presumptive, and not conclusive evidence of a fraudulent intent in making the prior voluntary conveyance; and the court declined to adopt and follow the subsequently established construction *at Westminster Hall. *464 The English statutes have with us undergone some alteration in their language and operation. By the statute law of New-York, it is declared," that every conveyance of any estate or interest in lands, made with intent to defraud prior or subsequent purchasers for a valuable consideration, are void as against them, unless they had actual or legal notice of the fraud, at the time of the purchase; and even then the conveyance is void as against such purchaser, if the grantee in the voluntary conveyance, or the person to be benefitted by it, was privy to the fraud. So, every conveyance, with a power of revocation or alteration reserved to the grantor, is equally fraudulent and void, as against such purchasers. It is even made a misdemeanor to be a party or privy to any conveyance or assignment of any interest in lands, goods, or things in action, or of any rents or profits issu a The better American doctrine seems now to be, that voluntary conveyances of land, bona fide made, and not originally fraudulent are valid against subsequent purchasers. Jackson v. Town, Cowen, 603, 604. Ricker v. Ham, 14 Mass. Rep. 139. Cathcart v. Robinson, 5 Peters' U. S. Rep. 280. New-York Revised Statutes, vol. ii. 134. • If a vendee be guilty of actual fraud in procuring a title to land, no title passes to him, whether the sale be private or judicial. The sale is absolutely null and void to all intents and purposes. Sands v. Codwise, 4 Johns. Rep. 536. 598. Gilbert v. Hoffman, 2 Watts, 66. The Connecticut statute of fraud is short and comprehensive, and declares void all fraudulent conveyances of lands or chattels, and all bonds, suits, judgments, or contracts, with intent to avoid any debt or duty, as against the party injured. Statutes of Connecticut, 1838, ch. 300. ing therefrom, or to any charge on any such estate or interest, with intent to defraud prior or subsequent purchasers, or to delay, hinder, or defraud creditors." But it is declared, that no conveyance or charge shall be deemed fraudulent, as against creditors or purchasers, solely on the ground that it was not founded on a valuable consideration. It is now the settled American doctrine, that a bona fide purchaser for valuable consideration, is protected under the statutes of 13 and 27 Eliz., as adopted in this country, whether he purchases from a fraudulent grantor, or a fraudulent grantee; and that there is no difference in this respect between a deed to defraud subsequent creditors, and one to defraud subsequent purchasers. They are voidable only and not absolutely void. New-York Revised Statutes, vol. ii. 690, sec. 3. Bean v. Smith, 2 Mason, • Anderson v. Roberts, 18 Johns. Rep. 515. 252. Bridge v. Eggleston, 14 Mass. Rep. 245. Battle, 29. Somes v. Brower, 2 Pick. 184. Ashmead, 129. Violett v. Violett, 2 Dana's Ken. Rep. 324. Price v. Jenkin, 4 Watts, 85. Blanchard v. Castille, 19 Louis. Rep. 362. Oriental Bank v. Harkins, 3 Metcalf's Rep. 332. The bona fide purchase for a valuable consideration from a fraudulent grantee, operates, say the court, to purge the fraudulent grant of the fraud. If the grantee, however, knows when he takes his deed, that the object of the grantor is to defraud others, the deed is void, though he may give a full consideration. Edgall v. Lowell, 4 Vermont Rep. 405. Trotter v. Watson, 6 Humphrey's Tenn. Rep. 509. By the English statute of 3 and 4 William IV., c. 27, sec. 26, property is not recoverable on account of fraud from a bona fide purchaser for valuable consideration who has not assisted in such fraud, and had no notice of it. But if a purchaser gives a full and fair price, and takes possession, yet, if it be done for the purpose of defeating creditors or their pending execution, it is an act fraudulent and void. Lord Mansfield, in Worseley v. De Mattos, 1 Burr. 474, 475. In Jones v. Powles, 3 Mylne & Keen, 581, the master of the rolls, held, that the rule that a purchaser for valuable consideration, without notice, was protected by the legal estate, extended to cases where the title was impeached by secret acts of vendor, or by false assertions of vendor, provided the purchased title was clothed with possession, and the falsehood could not be detected by reasonable diligence. The position that a bona fide purchaser from a fraudulent grantee acquired no title against the creditors of the fraudu The consideration of a deed must be good or valuable, and not partaking of any thing immoral, illegal, or fraudulent. It is a universal rule, that it is unlawful to contract to do that which it is unlawful to do; and every deed and every contract are equally void, whether they be made in violation of a law which is malum in se or only malum prohibitum. A good consideration is founded upon natural love and affection between near relations by blood; but a valuable one is founded on something deemed valuable in a pecuniary sense, *as *465 money, goods, services, and to these must be added, though depending on a different idea, marriage. There are some deeds, to the validity of which a consideration need not have been stated. It was not required, at common law, in feoffments, fines, and leases, in consideration of the fealty and homage incident to every such conveyance. The law raised a consideration from the tenure itself, and the solemnity of the act of conveyance. The necessity of a consideration came from the courts of equity, where it was held requisite to raise a use; and when uses were introduced at law, the courts of law adopted the same idea, and held, that a consideration was necessary to the validity of a deed of bargain and sale. It has been long the settled law, that a consideration expressed or proved, was necessary to give effect to a modern conveyance to uses. The consideration need not be ex lent grantor, though supported by the cases of Preston v. Croful, 1 Day's Conn. Rep. N. S. 527, and Robert v. Anderson, 3 Johnson's Ch. Rep. 371, was gainsaid and overruled by the case of Anderson v. Roberts, 18 Johnson, 515. Bean v. Smith, 2 Mason's Rep. 252. Oriental Bank v. Haskins, 3 Metcalf's Rep. 332. Aubert v. Maze, 2 Bos. & Pull. 371. Ribbans o. Crickett, ibid. 264. Watts v. Brooks, 3 Ves. 612. Bank of the United States v. Owens, 2 Peters' Ú. S. Rep. 527. The relation of grandfather and granddaughter is within the requisite relation. Stovall v. Barnett, 4 Lit. Ken. Rep. 207. Lloyd v. Spillet, 2 Atk. Rep. 148. Jackson v. Alexander, 3 Johns. Rep. 491. Preston on Abstracts, vol. iii. 13, 14. |