original Ideas; Ideas immediately derived from the Things themfelves, (which fingle Confideration will be an infuperable Bar to all Pretenfions of a Demonftration against this Doctrine) or because our Capacities are not able to take in the whole Extent of this Subject.

Demonstration being excluded, you know our Conclufions must be the Sum total of our Reasoning. And as a Sum can never be exactly stated, when any Particulars, which fhould be taken into the Account, are dropt; no more can the Sum total of our Reasoning be juft, when any intermediate Ideas are wanting. And what other intermediate Ideas fuperior Intelligences may have, which have other Inlets of Knowledge, we cannot tell. You tell me, you think you perceive an Abfurdity in it: So did Doctor CLARKE think he had demonftrated, that Infinite Space (or Emptiness) was a Property of the Deity. The Manner of the Divine Subfiftence being placed beyond the Boundaries of clear and diftinct Perception; and the Doctrine of the Satisfaction having an immediate Connexion with it, you cannot perceive an Abfurdity in the latter without perceiving the former. If we will not stop, where it becomes us, both you and I may imagine we perceive Abfurdities: And I know no Remedy for it. But, is not THIS to plunge us into Scepticism? No: Because we fee a plain

Reafon

Reafon à priori, why Creatures, who can hardly guess aright at Things before them, fhould not irreverently, from the abstract Nature and Reafon of the Thing (of which they know little or nothing) pass a decifive Judgment upon the deep Things of God; humbly content to fee through a Glass darkly, till the Time comes when they can fee Face to Face: And judging, that in such Points Human Reafon is but human Conjecture. But we cannot fee a Reason either à priori, or à pofteriori, why we ought not to judge of plain Matter of Fact, and the Proofs of God's Existence.

This is the chief Stand we can make against Atheism. The Partitions, you know, between Deifm and Atheism are very thin, and the Transition from the one to the other eafy and infenfible. A Perfon, that is an Half-Thinker, may ftop at Half-way. But he who will be at any Expence of Thought, muft fee, that for the very fame Reasons, for which he disbelieves the Three Perfons in the Godhead, and the Redemption; he fhould, if confiftent with himself, difbelieve the One God and the Creation. There is fuch a mutual Harmony and Correfpondence in the Compages of Truth, that, if one Member fuffers, all the Members fuffer with it; and, if one Member be honoured, all the Members rejoice with it.

Pray,

Pray, Sir, what do you think of the Divine Omniprefence? If the Deity is unextended, He cannot be fubftantially present here, there, every-where; (except you will fay, that He is in ubi, but not in loco; every-where, but in no Place) and where there is no Subftance, there can be no Virtue, or Power of acting. Well then; is He extended? But can you confider a Being of infinite Wisdom, etc. under the grofs Idea of Length, Breadth and Height? At that Rate we might properly fay, a Foot, or Yard of the Deity; and if effential Attributes are co-extended with an extended Subject, a Foot or Yard of Wisdom, etc.

If effential Attributes are not co-extended with the Subject, then the whole Divine Wisdom will be in that Subftance, which fills Heaven, and yet the whole in that which fills Earth, and foon: The whole in the whole, and whole in every Part. Do not you think you fee a Contradiction here? Again, the Notion of Eternity, whether you admit the eternal Succeffion, or the eternal Now, labours under a Complication of appearing (I was going to fay, for it is all one with you, real) Abfurdities. The latter is a Contradiction in Terms; and for the former, fee the Eighth Volume of Spectators, BENTLEY'S Boylean Lectures, and COLLIBER'S Enquiry. To clear up my Notions about apparent and real Contradictions,

dictions, I mentioned, in my former Letter, the feeming Repugnancy between Prefcience in God and Free-will in Man; of which you take no Notice. You like not my Distinction between real and apparent; and you dare not be fo irreverent as to affert, there is a real, Contradiction between that Power in God and that Faculty in Man; and yet you cannot prove but there is a feming one between them. Does it not feem to imply a Contradiction, that God fhould infallibly foreknow Contingents; that He fhould certainly fore-fee uncertain Events? Be pleafed then to put the Doctrine of the Trinity and Satisfaction (two Doctrines nearly allied) upon the fame Foot of Favour with Omniprefence, Eternity, Prefcience, etc. or, to be of a piece, reject them all alike.

All that I can fay is, as before. That though we cannot punctually adjuft the Boundaries between Knowledge and Igno-. rance, and precifely determine where the one ends, and the other begins; yet we fee in general, that there is a determinate Province for our Reafon to expatiate in: Within the Verge of which the Proofs of the Attributes, Revelation and Redemption confist. But when we would enlarge the Scene of our Knowledge beyond That, we take a mighty and desperate Leap into the Dark: Where numerous, unfubftantial Phantoms and Apparitions of Abfurdities (which we

think stand confeft and manifeft to our View) difturb our Brain, and unhinge our labouring Faculties.

But enough of this.I beg Leave to wave the Confideration of your next Topick till I have dispatched what seems to me more material. I will not knowingly leave any Part of your Letter that affects me unanfwered, except the handsome Things you are pleased to interfperfe, which are indeed unanswerable by me. Let who will get the better in Point of Argument, you will gain the Conqueft (a much nobler Conqueft!) in Good-Breeding, Civility, and your endearing Manner of treating me. The weakest Things you fay in your Letter are, when (an amiable Weakness!) your Friendship biaffes your Judgment in Favour of me.

You fay; that if the Divine Nature be Strictly One, a Satisfaction made by the Divine Nature to the Divine Nature, must be a Satisfaction made by the Deity to Himfelf.

You either mean, that where there are three intelligent Agents in the fame Nature, yet one cannot fatisfy the other, because their Nature is ftrictly, without Diftinction, one; or I do not understand you. For it is no more proper to fay the Divine Nature fatisfied the Divine Nature, than it is to say, that the Human Nature in fuch a Sufferer, fatisfied the Human Nature of the Lawgiver. And I do not know but fome acute Perfons

may