that God has given to me the power to bind and to loose in heaven and in earth. Confident of my integrity and authority, I now declare in the name of omnipotent God, the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, that Henry, son of the emperor Henry, is deprived of his kingdom of Germany and Italy.

The Pope's claim that the spiritual power is superior to the temporal is expressed, as early as 494 A.D., in the following letter of Gelasius I to the Emperor Anastasius :

There are two powers, august Emperor, by which this world is chiefly ruled, namely, the sacred authority of the priests and the royal power. Of these, that of the priests is the more weighty, since they have to render an account for even the kings of men in the divine judgment. You are also aware, dear son, that while you are permitted honorably to rule over human kind, yet in things divine you bow your head humbly before the leaders of the clergy and await from their hands the means of your salvation. In the reception and proper disposition of the heavenly mysteries you recognize that you should be subordinate rather than superior to the religious order, and that in these matters you depend on their judgment rather than wish to force them to follow your will.

The bull Unam Sanctum, issued by Boniface VIII in 1302, is the most noted assertion of papal supremacy.

In this Church and in its power are two swords, to wit, a spiritual and a temporal, and this we are taught by the words of the Gospel; for when the apostles said, " Behold, here are two swords" (in the Church, namely, since the apostles were speaking), the Lord did not reply that it was too many, but enough. And surely he who claims that the temporal sword is not in the power of Peter has but ill understood the word of our Lord when he said, "Put up again thy sword into his place." Both the spiritual and the material swords, therefore, are in the power of the Church, the latter indeed to be used for the Church, the former by the Church, the one by the priest, the other by the hand of kings and soldiers, but by the will and sufferance of the priest.

75. Dante's conception of the imperial power. In the following selection Dante maintains the independence of the empire, and urges universal monarchy as the ideal form of government :

The question pending investigation, then, concerns two great luminaries, the Roman Pontiff and the Roman Prince; and the point at issue

is whether the authority of the Roman monarch, who, as proved in the second book, is rightful monarch of the world, is derived from God directly, or from some vicar or minister of God, by whom I mean the successor of Peter, indisputable keeper of the keys of the kingdom of heaven.

Those men assert that the authority of the Empire depends on the authority of the Church. . . . They are drawn to this by divers opposing arguments, some of which they take from Holy Scripture, and some from certain acts performed by the chief pontiff, and by the Emperor himself. . . .

For, first, they maintain that, according to Genesis, God made two mighty luminaries, a greater and a lesser, the former to hold supremacy by day and the latter by night. These they interpret allegorically to be the two rulers-spiritual and temporal. Whence they argue that as the lesser luminary, the moon, has no light but that gained from the sun, so the temporal ruler has no authority but that gained from the spiritual ruler. . . .

I proceed to refute the above assumption that the two luminaries of the world typify its two ruling powers. The whole force of their argument lies in the interpretation; but this we can prove indefensible in two ways. First, since these ruling powers are, as it were, accidents necessitated by man himself, God would seem to have used a distorted order in creating first accidents, and then the subject necessitating them. It is absurd to speak thus of God, but it is evident from the Word that the two lights were created on the fourth day, and man on the sixth.

Secondly, the two ruling powers exist as the directors of men toward certain ends, as will be shown further on. But had man remained in the state of innocence in which God made him, he would have required no such direction. These ruling powers are therefore remedies against the infirmity of sin. Since on the fourth day man was not only not a sinner, but was not even existent, the creation of a remedy would have been purposeless, which is contrary to divine goodness. . . .

That ecclesiastical authority is not the source of imperial authority is thus verified. A thing nonexistent, or devoid of active force, cannot be the cause of active force in a thing possessing that quality in full measure. But before the Church existed, or while it lacked power to act, the Empire had active force in full measure. Hence the Church is the source, neither of acting power nor of authority in the Empire, where power to act and authority are identical. . .

Omniscient Providence has thus designed two ends to be contemplated by man: first, the happiness of this life . . . and then the blessedness of life everlasting...

Wherefore a twofold directive agent was necessary to man, in accordance with the twofold end; the Supreme Pontiff to lead the human race to life eternal by means of revelation, and the Emperor to guide it to temporal well-being by means of philosophic instruction. .

It is established, then, that the authority of temporal monarchy descends without mediation from the fountain of universal authority. . . .

But the truth of this final question must not be restricted to mean that the Roman Prince shall not be subject in some degree to the Roman Pontiff, for well-being that is mortal is ordered in a measure after wellbeing that is immortal. Wherefore let Cæsar honor Peter as a first-born son should honor his father, so that, brilliant with the light of paternal grace, he may illumine with greater radiance the earthly sphere over which he has been set by Him who alone is Ruler of all things spiritual and temporal.

76. The "Prince" of Machiavelli. Some of the attributes which, under the prevailing conditions in the Italian cities, a good ruler should possess, are thus stated by Machiavelli :

It remains now to see what ought to be the rules of conduct for a prince towards subject and friends. . . . Hence it is necessary for a prince wishing to hold his own to know how to do wrong, and to make use of it or not according to necessity. . . . And I know that every one will confess that it would be most praiseworthy in a prince to exhibit all the above qualities that are considered good; but because they can neither be entirely possessed nor observed, for human conditions do not permit it, it is necessary for him to be sufficiently prudent that he may know how to avoid the reproach of those vices which would lose him his state; and also to keep himself, if it be possible, from those which would not lose him it; but this not being possible, he may with less hesitation abandon himself to them. And again, he need not make himself uneasy at incurring a reproach for those vices without which the state can only be saved with difficulty, for if everything is considered carefully, it will be found that something which looks like virtue, if followed, would be his ruin; whilst something else, which looks like vice, yet followed brings him security and prosperity...

Coming now to the other qualities mentioned above, I say that every prince ought to desire to be considered clement and not cruel. Nevertheless he ought to take care not to misuse this clemency. . . . Therefore a prince, so long as he keeps his subjects united and loyal, ought not to mind the reproach of cruelty; because with a few examples he will be more merciful than those who, through too much mercy, allow

disorders to arise, from which follow murder or robbery; for these are wont to injure the whole people, whilst those executions which originate with a prince offend the individual only. . .

Upon this a question arises: whether it be better to be loved than feared or feared than loved? It may be answered that one should wish to be both, but, because it is difficult to unite them in one person, it is much safer to be feared than loved, when, of the two, either must be dispensed with.

...

Every one admits how praiseworthy it is in a prince to keep faith, and to live with integrity and not with craft. Nevertheless our experience has been that those princes who have done great things have held good faith of little account, and have known how to circumvent the intellect of men by craft, and in the end have overcome those who have relied on their word.

But it is necessary to know well how to disguise this characteristic, and to be a great pretender and dissembler; and men are so simple, and so subject to present necessities, that he who seeks to deceive will always find some one who will allow himself to be deceived.

77. Puritan principles of government. The doctrines of Calvin, as modified by his later followers, gave an impetus to revolution and democracy. The following extract indicates Calvin's attitude toward civil government:

Having already stated that man is the subject of two kinds of government, and having sufficiently discussed that which is situated in the soul, or the inner man, and relates to eternal life; we are, in this chapter, to say something of the other kind, which relates to civil justice, and the regulation of the external conduct.

But the perspicuity of order will assist the readers to attain a clearer understanding of what sentiments ought to be entertained respecting the whole system of civil administration, if we enter on a discussion of each branch of it. . . . These are three: The Magistrate, who is the guardian and conservator of the laws: The Laws, according to which he governs: The People, who are governed by the laws, and obey the magistrate. Let us, therefore, examine, first, the function of a magistrate, whether it be a legitimate calling and approved by God, the nature of the duty, and the extent of the power: secondly, by what laws Christian government ought to be regulated: and lastly, what advantage the people derive from the laws, and what obedience they owe to the magistrate.

The Lord hath not only testified that the function of magistrates has his approbation and acceptance, but hath eminently commended it to us, by dignifying it with the most honorable titles. . . .

Indeed, if these three forms of government, which are stated by philosophers, be considered in themselves, I shall by no means deny, that either aristocracy or a mixture of aristocracy and democracy far excels all others. . . .

From the magistracy we next proceed to the laws, which are the strong nerves of civil polity. No observation therefore can be more correct than this, that the law is a silent magistrate, and the magistrate a speaking law. . . .

The first duty of subjects towards their magistrates is to entertain the most honorable sentiments of their function, which they know to be a jurisdiction delegated to them from God, and on that account to esteem and reverence them as God's ministers and vicegerents.

But it will be said that rulers owe mutual duties to their subjects. That I have already confessed. . . .

But in the obedience which we have shown to be due to the authority of governors, it is always necessary to make one exception, and that is entitled to our first attention, that it do not seduce us from obedience to him, to whose will the desires of all kings ought to be subject, to whose decrees all their commands ought to yield, to whose majesty all their scepters ought to submit.

IV. THE DIVINE-RIGHT THEORY

78. Speech of James I of England. In a speech made before the Court of Star Chamber on June 20, 1601, the doctrine of divine right was thus stated by James I:

I am next to come to the limits wherein you are to bound yourselves, which likewise are three. First, encroach not upon the prerogative of the crown: if there falls out a question that concerns my prerogative or mystery of state, deal not with it, till you consult with the king or his council, or both; for they are transcendent matters and must not be deliberately carried out with overrash willfulness. . . . That which concerns the mystery of the king's power is not lawful to be disputed; for that is to wade into the weakness of princes, and to take away the mystical reverence that belongs unto them that sit on the throne of God. . . .

It is atheism and blasphemy to dispute what God can do: good Christians content themselves with his will revealed in his word, so it is