groups so widely dissimilar in their views that it may almost be said that there are two political sciences.

As has been said, the conflict between the two groups of thinkers revolves most heartily about the question of the divisibility of sovereignty. It is, of course, absurd to charge the semi-sovereigntists with lack of logic by alleging that they deem it possible to divide a supreme will; for they do not define sovereignty as supreme will, but as supreme power, and for that reason are able to assert the validity of their conception of a "semi-sovereignty." There really is no question, then, of the logical possibility of semi-sovereignty, as that question is usually understood. The real question grows out of the two different conceptions of sovereignty as will and as power. These two different ideas of sovereignty go hand in hand with two different conceptions of the state, for the ideas of state and sovereignty are too closely knit together to separate the one from the other. It is, therefore, these two pairs of concepts that are considered in this inquiry: that is to say, on the one hand that theory of state and sovereignty from which is deduced the indivisibility of the latter, and, on the other hand, that theory which leads to the assertion of a divisible sovereignty.

A brief survey of political writings shows that the former of these theories has been developed and is held mainly by those authors who are most interested in the state from the internal point of view; and the latter theory, that of divisibility, by those who are chiefly concerned in the external relations of the state. Although this classification may be subject to many exceptions, it is nevertheless fair to attach the theory of indivisibility to analytical jurisprudence, which deals with municipal, or constitutional, law, and to attach the theory of divisibility to international law. . . .

The expounders of each of these theories are thus seen to have a different original province of interest to which they have primarily directed their inquiries. Each school seeks, however, to apply its own theory throughout the entire range of political speculation; each regards its central concepts as of exclusive validity. To no question, from the status of the meanest subject to the most delicate relations of the great powers with one another, does either school deem its respective theory inapplicable...

In consequence, the hypothesis is here advanced that each of these two theories has an exclusive sphere of utility and fundamental validity within the field of political phenomena. In order to restrict each theory to a limited sphere of operation it is necessary to discover elements inherent in the theory that properly negative its application within the sphere of the other. The endeavor is not to uphold either theory, even

within a given sphere, for each has ample authority behind it; but to exclude each from a given sphere which shall thus be left undisputed to the other. . .

The result of this critical consideration of the two theories is to show that that theory which has in anticipation been denominated the "constitutional theory" must be logically confined to the constitutional, or municipal, law of the state, and the international theory in like manner is limited to the domain of international law. . .

The preceding discussion of the two great political theories, in which is found asserted, in the one the indivisibility of sovereignty, in the other its divisibility, leads to the conclusion that the two theories are entirely congruous, in spite of their use of the same terms with different signification.

The applicability of the principles of each theory is confined to a distinct sphere. The analytical theory determines the nature of the internal c organization of the state, of its municipal, including its constitutional, law; the international theory explains the nature of the mutual relations of states, the nature of international law. The analytical theory with its sovereignty" and kindred concepts affords no explanation of international law, nor the international theory with its "independence" any explanation of constitutional law.

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It is, of course, a fact that principles of international law have by statute been adopted into municipal law, and are thus in very large part to be found in the municipal law of most of the various nations; that is, applied in their municipal courts. The fact that the same principle is recognized by the nation both by way of international law and of constitutional law does not merge the two distinct natures of that principle in its separate capacities. The nation may enact into law a rule of conduct taken from any source it may choose, but it cannot thereby alter its own essential nature. To illustrate, international law recognizes a specific territory as belonging to a nation; that nation, may or may not, as it sees fit, erect that international possession into constitutional possession, for the possession of land is inconsequential in the analytical theory. On the other hand, international law recognizes certain individuals as subjects of the nation, but, even if the definition by international law of subject" be adopted into the municipal law, that adoption is incapable of operating to change the nature of the "subject" of municipal law, for that is immutably fixed.

Thus it is plainly necessary to keep distinct the concepts of each theory, and there are a number of minor concepts the significance of which for the one theory or the other, for international or constitutional law, or for both, it is essential to determine.

IV. REVOLUTION

104. Moral right of revolution. The following paragraph argues a moral right of revolution, even in the most democratic states, and suggests certain conditions in which revolution is justifiable and desirable: 1

A legal or constitutional right of insurrection is an absurdity, if not a contradiction in terms; but, in the present period of political thought, few would contest the moral right to resist and overthrow established rulers in extreme cases of misrule, under most forms of government. . . Few, on the other hand, would deny that such attempts at resistance and revolution ought only to take place in extreme cases, when there appear to be no milder means available for remedying either grave practical misgovernment, or persistent deliberate violation of established and important guarantees for good government.

I conceive, then, that a moral right of insurrection must be held to exist in the most popularly governed community. In saying this I do not mean to imply that this violent remedy ought to be frequently used, or that it is likely to be brought into operation frequently in a modern civilized society. In such a society, the interest of the citizens generally in the maintenance of order is so great, that the victims of democratic oppression will usually find resistance hopeless; they will have to submit or depart with the best terms that they can obtain from the triumphant majority. Still I think it important to dispel the illusion that any form of government can ever give a complete security against civil war. Such a security, if attained, must rest on a moral rather than a political basis; it must be maintained by the moderation and justice, the comprehensive sympathies and enlightened public spirit, of the better citizens, keeping within bounds the fanaticism of sects, the cupidities of classes, and the violence of victorious partisanship; it cannot be found in any supposed moral right of a numerical majority of persons inhabiting any part of the earth's surface, to be obeyed by the minority who live within the same district. . . .

...

I have already suggested that a democratic state will naturally be disposed to concede local autonomy to its parts, to the utmost extent compatible with the interests of the whole; and I conceive that there are cases in which the true interests of the whole may be promoted by disruption. For instance, where two portions of a state's territory are separated by a long interval of sea, or other physical obstacles, from any

1 By permission of The Macmillan Company.

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very active intercommunication, and when, from differences of race or religion, past history or present social conditions, their respective inhabitants have divergent needs and demands in respect of legislation and other governmental interference, it may easily be inexpedient that they should have a common government for internal affairs; while if, at the same time, their external relations, apart from their union, would be very different, it is quite possible that each part may lose more through the risk of implication in the other's quarrels, than it is likely to gain from the aid of its military force. Under such conditions as these, it is not to be desired that any sentiment of historical patriotism, or any pride in the national ownership of an extensive territory, should permanently prevent a peaceful dissolution of the incoherent whole into its natural parts.

105. Types of revolutions. Amos, considering a relocation of sovereignty from the internal standpoint only, distinguishes the following kinds of revolutions :

By way of preface, it is necessary to notice that revolution is of three kinds, each of which is usually strongly marked, so as to render it clearly distinguishable from either of the others.

A revolution may be, first, essentially anarchical, that is, it may proceed from a general undisciplined temper in the revolting population, and be directed to the upsetting of the existing government, or government and constitution combined, without those who conduct it having any views as to substitutes for one or the other, and being in fact other than indifferent as to the political prospect of the future. This form of revolution is likely to be chiefly manifested in a primitive stage of civilization, when the advantages of orderly and settled government have not been long experienced, and when these advantages, indeed, only exist in a moderate degree, from the political weakness of the government and from the imperfectly organized state of society.

A second form of revolution is when no thought is entertained of reverting to anarchy, but the object of those who take part in it is, primarily, either to change the personality of the government or to resist some legislative or executive measure. This measure may presumedly be in accordance with the constitution, in which case the movement is directed to bring about a new interpretation of constitutional rules, or a modification of the constitution, or a better use of discretionary powers on the part of the authorities complained of: or the measure complained of may be contrary to the rules or spirit of the constitution, in which case the object of the movement is to reënforce the constitution and establish it on surer foundations.

A third form of revolution is where the object, conscious or uncon scious, is to change the constitution itself from its foundations and to introduce a new form of government.

106. The right of revolution. The current belief in the right of revolution inherent in the "natural rights" theory is thus stated in the Declaration of Independence issued by the American colonies:

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness. Prudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and accordingly all experience hath shown, that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed. But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future security.

107. An ordinance of secession. On the basis of the theory that sovereignty lay in the component commonwealths of the United States, a convention, assembled at Columbia, South Carolina, on the 20th of December, 1860, adopted the following ordinance and declared South Carolina "an independent commonwealth":

We, the people of the State of South Carolina in convention assembled, do declare and ordain, and it is hereby declared and ordained, that the ordinance adopted by us in convention on the twenty-third day of May, in the year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and eighty-eight, whereby the Constitution of the United States of America was ratified, and also all acts and parts of acts of the general assembly of this State ratifying amendments of the said Constitution, are hereby repealed; and that the union now subsisting between South Carolina and other States, under the name of the "United States of America," is hereby dissolved.