small state that they can only rely on a comparatively small area of unrestricted trade.

Further, North America may also illustrate the advantages of federalism from a different point of view; i.e. as a mode of political organization by which a nation may realize the maximum of liberty compatible with order: since, as we have already seen, the amount of governmental coercion is likely, ceteris paribus, to be less, in proportion as the powers of local governments are extended at the expense of the central government. . . . For the federal form of polity also diminishes—in proportion as the functions of the central legislature are restricted - the practical difficulties which extent of territory tends to throw in the way of good government; especially the difficulty of enforcing obedience if the inhabitants of distant districts are recalcitrant, and the difficulty of securing that the central government is sufficiently informed as to the needs of such districts. . .

The chief disadvantages of Federalism have been incidentally noticed in the preceding chapter, when we were discussing the proper limits of the powers of local government in a unitary state. I have there sufficiently dwelt on the drawbacks of localized legislation in a country whose parts are in active mutual communication. I also pointed out that the strength and stability which a state derives from internal cohesion tend to be somewhat reduced by the independent activity of local governments, if the latter can be effectively used as centers of local resistance to the national will. . . . On the other hand, if disorder and disruption are prevented, the federal form of polity, requiring as it does a rigid and stable constitution to secure the partial independence of the part states, is exposed to the general objections which may be urged against such a constitution as compared with a more flexible one.

In conclusion, it may be observed, that federalism is likely to be in many cases a transitional stage through which a society or an aggregate of societies - passes on its way to a completer union; since, as time goes on, and mutual intercourse grows, the narrower patriotic sentiments that were originally a bar to full political union tend to diminish, while the inconvenience of a diversity of laws is more keenly felt, especially in a continuous territory.

254. The weakness of the American confederation. Madison, in his notes on the debates in the Federal Convention, gives the following extracts from his speech against the "New Jersey Plan." The leading defects of the existing Confederation and the remedies expected from a stronger union are indicated.

Proceeding to the consideration of Mr. Patterson's plan, he stated the object of a proper plan to be twofold - first, to preserve the Union; secondly, to provide a government that will remedy the evils felt by the states, both in their united and individual capacities. Examine Mr. Patterson's plan, and say whether it promises satisfaction in these respects.

1. Will it prevent the violations of the law of nations and of treaties, which, if not prevented, must involve us in the calamities of foreign wars? The tendency of the states to these violations has been manifested in sundry instances. . .

2. Will it prevent encroachments on the federal authority? A tendency to such encroachments has been sufficiently exemplified among ourselves, as well as in every other confederated republic, ancient and modern.

3. Will it prevent trespasses of the states on each other? . . . We have seen retaliating acts on the subject, which threatened danger, not to the harmony only, but the tranquillity of the Union. . . .

...

4. Will it secure the internal tranquillity of the states themselves? The insurrections in Massachusetts admonished all the states of the danger to which they were exposed.

5. Will it secure a good internal legislation and administration to the particular states? In developing the evils which vitiate the political system of the United States, it is proper to take into view those which prevail within the states individually, as well as those which affect them collectively; since the former indirectly affect the whole. . . . Under this head he enumerated and animadverted on — first, the multiplicity of the laws passed by the several states; secondly, the mutability of their laws; thirdly, the injustice of them; and, fourthly, the impotence of them.

6. Will it secure the Union against the influence of foreign powers over its members? . . .

7. He begged the smaller states, which were most attached to Mr. Patterson's plan, to consider the situation in which it would leave them. In the first place, they would continue to bear the whole expense of maintaining their delegates in Congress. . . . In the second place, the coercion on which the efficacy of the plan depends can never be exerted but on themselves. The larger states will be impregnable, the smaller only can feel the vengeance of it.

255. Probable future of federalism. Numerous recent publicists believe that present tendencies indicate a further development of the principle of federal union among states.1

1 By permission of The Macmillan Company.

The future of constitutional monarchy I was unwilling to prophesy : but I feel more disposed to predict a development of federality, partly from the operation of the democratic tendency just noticed, partly from the tendency shown throughout the history of civilization to form continually larger political societies as Spencer would say, to "integration which seems to accompany the growth of civilization. This tendency we traced in the early history of the Græco-Italian city states; Rome and Athens were obviously formed by the aggregation of elements between which a state of hostility had previously existed. We noticed also that the history of the German tribes showed them gradually combining in larger and larger aggregates. And especially we noticed how, in the third century B.C., after the Greek cities had been for forty years tossed helpless in the strife among the successors of Alexander against whose armies they were, from mere size, unable effectively to contend the revival and extension of the Achæan league, uniting several important city states into one body with the old, comparatively insignificant Achæan towns, gave them a brief interval of real independence. We have seen the same tendency in recent times in the formation of Germany and Italy and we have in North America an impressive example of a political society maintaining internal peace over a region larger than Western Europe. I therefore think it not beyond the limits of a sober forecast to conjecture that some further integration may take place in the West European states: and if it should take place, it seems probable that the example of America will be followed, and that the new political aggregate will be formed on the basis of a federal polity.

When we turn our gaze from the past to the future, an extension of federalism seems to me the most probable of the political prophecies relative to the form of government.

CHAPTER XV

CONSTITUTIONS

I. NATURE OF CONSTITUTIONS

256. Meanings of the term "constitution." In the Introduction to his recent work on "The Government of England," Lowell points out the different meanings of the word "constitution." 1

De Tocqueville declared that the English Constitution did not really exist, and he said so because in his mind the word "constitution" meant a perfectly definite thing to which nothing in England conformed. An examination of modern governments shows, however, that the thing is by no means so definite as he had supposed.

The term "constitution" is usually applied to an attempt to embody in a single authoritative document, or a small group of documents, the fundamental political institutions of a state. But such an attempt is rarely, if ever, completely successful; and even if the constitution when framed covers all the main principles on which the government is based, it often happens that they become modified in practice, or that other principles arise, so that the constitution no longer corresponds fully with the actual government of the country.

De Tocqueville had more particularly in mind another meaning which is commonly attached to the term "constitution." It is that of an instrument of special sanctity, distinct in character from all other laws; and alterable only by a peculiar process, differing to a greater or less extent from the ordinary forms of legislation. . . . A separation between the constituent and lawmaking powers does not, in fact, always exist in written constitutions. . . . From countries which can change their fundamental constitution by the ordinary process of legislation we pass by almost imperceptible degrees to those where the constitutional and lawmaking powers are in substantially different hands. . . .

The separation of constituent and lawmaking powers has been rendered of much less practical importance in some countries not only by making the process of amending the constitution more simple, but also 1 Copyright, 1908, by The Macmillan Company.

by making the enactment of laws more complex. . . . It would seem, therefore, that the distinction between constitutions which are flexible and those which are rigid, while valuable, has ceased to mark a contrast between widely separated groups; and that it might be well to regard the distinction as one of degree rather than of kind. . . .

If the term "constitution" does not necessarily imply that the so-called constituent and lawmaking powers are in different hands, still less does it imply the existence of a law of superior obligation which controls legally the acts of the legislature. . . . The conception of a constitution as a law of superior obligation, which imposes legal restraints upon the action of the legislature, is really confined to a very few countries, chiefly to America and the English self-governing colonies. In Europe it has no proper place, for whether a constitution in continental states be or be not regarded as a supreme law, no body of men has, as a rule, been intrusted with legal authority to enforce its provisions as against the legislature.

257. Definitions of the term "constitution." The following definitions indicate the general nature of the constitution of a state:

T. D. Woolsey: There must in every state be some leading principles according to which the relations of the organs and functions of the state are adjusted; work is distributed, powers are assigned in such sort that there shall be as little interference as possible, and all the active powers of the state shall know their places. There must also be some understanding as to what are the relations of the governing parts to the governed, and what may be done in the exercise of lawful authority. There will of necessity, therefore, be some limitations on the action of the several organs, and some rights guaranteed to the people. . . . The collection of principles according to which the powers of the government, the rights of the governed, and the relations between the two are adjusted is called a constitution.

J. Q. Dealey: Every state from the moment when it begins its existence has a constitution, which may be defined as that fundamental law or body of laws, written or unwritten, in which may be found (a) the form of the organization of the state, (b) the extent of power intrusted to the various agencies of the state, and (c) the manner in which these powers are to be exercised.

S. Amos: All the Laws and all the customary practices which, taken together, determine the person or persons who shall constitute the Supreme Political Authority of a State, and which ascertain the modes of Legislation, and the method of appointing and restricting the Executive Authority, are compendiously styled the Constitution of that State.