representation is withheld from them, contrary to all just government, but, above all, contrary to the principle of democracy, which professes equality as its very root and foundation.

304. Objections to the principle of proportional representation. Some writers condemn proportional representation, believing that it leads toward confusion and anarchy, encourages class legislation, and weakens the legislative power.

The spread of the system of proportional representation during the last ten or fifteen years has been very encouraging to its advocates, but as yet it has not made good its claim to general acceptance. It is advocated by some visionary persons as a remedy for all the ills of society; and the more ultrademocratic element of the population demand it for the reason that it is a step in the direction of a more perfect democracy. Many able writers, however, condemn the principle of minority representation and maintain that the majority system is the true principle and is liable to fewer dangers. Sidgwick, for example, points out two "serious objections" to the system of minority representation. In the first place, the giving of representation to groups as such involves the loss of a valuable protection against demagogy by removing the "natural inducements which local divisions give for the more instructed part of the community to exercise their powers of persuasion on the less instructed." In the second place, representation of groups, he says, "will inevitably tend to encourage pernicious class legislation." In the third place, it will tend to reduce the standard of efficiency in the legislature by securing the election of men who represent one set of interests or opinions rather than all of them. "We want for legislators," says Sidgwick, "men of some breadth of view and variety of ideas, practiced in comparing different claims and judgments, and endeavoring to find some compromise that will harmonize them as far as possible,"1 which can hardly be secured under a system in which the community is not locally divided for electoral purposes. "To establish the system of proportional representation," says Esmein, "is to convert the remedy supplied by the bicameral system into a veritable poison; it is to organize disorder and emasculate the legislative power; it is to render cabinets unstable, destroy their homogeneity and make parliamentary government impossible." If applied to parliamentary elections, logic and consistency, he goes on to say, require that it shall be applied to the election of executives and administrative officers, and this is but the entering wedge to anarchy.

1 "Elements of Politics," p. 396.

305. Objection to representation of classes or interests. The dangers of minority representation based on classes or interests may be stated as follows:

There is also good reason for believing that a system of class representation or representation of interests would tend to lower the character of the legislature, since each member would in some measure be the exclusive representative of particular interests or opinions rather than the representative of the interests of the state as a whole. A legislative assembly composed of so many elements would tend to become a debating society instead of a lawmaking body, and its efficiency would be diminished in proportion to the number and variety of interests represented. One of the sources of strength in the governments of AngloSaxon countries has been the freedom of their legislative assemblies from the presence of numerous unstable and dissolving groups with their inevitable dissensions and deadlocks. Finally, the organization of the electorate upon the basis of class distinctions, whether economic, social, or professional, would inevitably tend to multiply artificial distinctions, divide the population into groups, array each against the others, and accentuate class antagonism generally. These evils in Austria led to the abolition of the class system in that country in 1907, and they are the source of widespread and increasing popular discontent in Prussia to-day.

CHAPTER XVII

SEPARATION AND DIVISION OF POWERS

I. THE ORDINARY GOVERNMENT

306. A broader definition of government. In his recent suggestive book Dealey shows that the government proper includes a considerable number of organs.

If one were to define the term government more exactly, in harmony with this explanation of governmental organization and differentiation, it might be said to be the sum total of those organizations that exercise or may exercise the sovereign powers of the state.

Since all the sovereign powers of the state may be exercised through the following departments, singly or collectively, the government may be thus tabulated:

1. The executive, from which is differentiating

2. The administrative.

3. The lawmaking department, from which should be distinguished 4. The legal sovereign.

5. The judicial system, from which is separating (in the United States) 6. A special court for the authoritative interpretation of the written constitution.

7. The electorate, which is steadily increasing its powers at the expense of the three historic departments of government.

Doubtless for many years to come textbooks and theorists will continue to discuss the threefold division of governmental organization, but in this age of governmental differentiation it is well-nigh impossible to get a clear understanding of government, unless one considers the electorate as a fourth department. Furthermore, much more exactness in theorizing would be attained by separating, mentally at least, the legal sovereign from the other departments of government. The differentiation of administration from the executive is almost an accomplished fact on the continent of Europe. The remaining specialization is peculiar to the United States of America and deserves special attention because of its political importance, for if the supreme court of the federal department ultimately devotes itself only to final interpretations of the constitution, the party affiliations of its bench will become a matter of increasing concern.

307. Historical evolution of the separation of governmental powers. As the functions of the state became more extensive, its organization became more complex and the powers of government were distributed among distinct organs.

In every state, be it monarchic, aristocratic, or democratic, there is a tendency to distribute the principal powers of government among distinct governmental organizations.

The earliest dawn of civilization discloses, as the most primitive form of political organization, a warfaring society grouped about a victorious chief. This powerful personage is supposed to represent the fittest product of the period of barbaric liberty and self-help, which immediately preceded the period of governmental organization. The chieftain's superiority in valor convinces his superstitious admirers, as well as himself, that he is of divine descent. This superstition invests him with a halo of glory and clothes him with sovereign power. The religious sanction secures reverence for his person and obedience for his laws. He experiences no opposition in immediately exercising all governmental powers. He is priest, war chief, judge and legislator.

As war begets the king, so peace begets the judge and legislator. As his followers become peaceable and civilized, the king is appealed to for the enforcement of internal order and justice rather than for protection against external force. As these appeals grow numerous and the duty of satisfying them becomes more intricate, the sovereign, either as a matter of convenience, or in order to secure greater sanction for his acts and decisions, calls about him a council of wise and powerful men to hear, and to assist in determining, the questions presented, and also to advise him in the administration of his government.

This royal council, owing to the fact that the functions required in determining individual appeals differ from those required in formulating. rules to be observed in the administration of government, soon develops into two distinct bodies, the legislature and the judicial court.

Notwithstanding the existence of these two advisory bodies, the king continues to execute his own will, which is still the supreme law. But the intimacy necessarily arising between the king and his advisers soon breeds contempt. The shortcomings of the sovereign disclose to the wise and powerful men whom he has invited to assist him the pious fraud which he has been exercising upon them. As they assert themselves, the Sovereignty passes from the king to the lords; the state passes from the monarchic to the aristocratic form. The nobles, possessed of the sovereign power of the state, can now themselves assume, or can delegate to such authorities as they deem proper, the powers which the government

may be called upon to exercise. They generally satisfy themselves by exercising or participating in the exercise of an unlimited legislative authority. Self-interest, if not convenience, prevents them from asserting with impunity all governmental authority. They dare not abolish the courts or the kingship, lest by so doing they may reveal to the masses their own discovery of the humble origin of their king. They fear lest in the absence of a general belief in the divine source of authority, the people may be led to consider their own right to assume sovereign powers. The barons, therefore, of their own accord now employ the king as their agent to execute their laws, and they likewise employ the courts to construe them.

When at last enlightenment and education have sufficiently spread state-consciousness among the masses, and the sovereign power in fact has passed from the nobility to the people, the latter resent the power of the few to concentrate or distribute at their pleasure all governmental authority. They know that where executive, legislative and judicial power may be assumed by a single person, or body of persons, there can be no guarantee against the exertion of dreaded despotic power. Hence, in delegating and distributing governmental power, and in creating and organizing governmental agencies, they endeavor to secure themselves as far as possible against the exercise of despotic power by the government which they establish, or by any part thereof.

Whereas, in a monarchic form of state, the sovereign power is generally identified in some manner with the executive department of its government, and, in the aristocratic form of state, in some manner with the legislative department of its government, the conditions materially change when the state has become democratic, that is, when the sovereign power has passed from the nobility to the masses. Owing to the great numbers of which the democratic state is composed, it is impracticable in fact, if possible in theory, for such state to exercise governmental authority immediately, or even to be identified in any manner whatsoever with any of the departments exercising governmental powers. The democratic state accordingly delegates the powers of government to organizations distinct from its own original sovereign organization. It generally delegates the principal powers of government to the already naturally and historically developed departments, the executive, legislative and judicial departments; and it organizes and employs each of these departments as its agent. But, since neither of these departments any longer exercises sovereign powers, but only delegated authority, and since each owes its existence to the will of the state only, and not to the will of any of the other departments, each is now independent of and coördinate with the others.