346. Relation of the executive to Congress in the United States. In the national government of the United States the constitutional adjustment of executive and legislature and their customary relations in practice may be stated as follows: The only provisions contained in the Constitution concerning the relation of the President to Congress are these: that "he shall, from time to time, give to the Congress information of the state of the union, and recommend to their consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient"; and that "he may, on extraordinary occasions, convene both houses, or either of them," in extra session, "and, in case of disagreement between them, with respect to the time of adjournment, he may adjourn them to such time as he shall think proper. . . Washington and John Adams interpreted this clause to mean that they might address Congress in person, as the sovereign in England may do: and their annual communications to Congress were spoken addresses. But Jefferson, the third President, being an ineffective speaker, this habit was discontinued and the fashion of written messages was inaugurated and firmly established. Possibly, had the President not so closed the matter against new adjustments, this clause of the Constitution might legitimately have been made the foundation for a much more habitual and informal, and yet at the same time much more public and responsible, interchange of opinion between the Executive and Congress. Having been interpreted, however, to exclude the President from any but the most formal and ineffectual utterance of advice, our federal executive and legislature have been shut off from coöperation and mutual confidence to an extent to which no other modern system furnishes a parallel. In all other modern governments the heads of the administrative departments are given the right to sit in the legislative body and to take part in its proceedings. The legislature and executive are thus associated in such a way that the ministers of state can lead the houses without dictating to them, and the ministers themselves be controlled without being misunderstood, -in such a way that the two parts of the government which should be most closely coördinated, the part, namely, by which the laws are made and the part by which the laws are executed, may be kept in close harmony and intimate coöperation, with the result of giving coherence to the action of the one and energy to the action of the other. 347. Classes of presidential candidates in the United States. Bryce divides the candidates for the American presidency into the following classes: 1 1 By permission of The Macmillan Company. Aspirants hoping to obtain the party nomination from a national convention may be divided into three classes, the two last of which, as will appear presently, are not mutually exclusive, viz: FAVORITES DARK HORSES FAVORITE SONS A Favorite is always a politician well known over the Union, and drawing support from all or most of its sections. He is a man who has distinguished himself in Congress, or in the war, or in the politics of some State so large that its politics are matter of knowledge and interest to the whole nation. He is usually a person of conspicuous gifts, whether as a speaker, or a party manager, or an administrator. The drawback to him is that in making friends he has also made enemies. A Dark Horse is a person not very widely known in the country at large, but known rather for good than for evil. He has probably sat in Congress, been useful on committees and gained some credit among those who dealt with him in Washington. Or he has approved himself a safe and assiduous party man in the political campaigns of his own and neighboring States, yet without reaching national prominence. Sometimes he is a really able man, but without the special talents that win popularity. Still, speaking generally, the note of the Dark Horse is respectability, verging on colorlessness; and he is therefore a good sort of person to fall back upon when able but dangerous Favorites have proved impossible. That native mediocrity rather than adverse fortune has prevented him from winning fame is proved by the fact that the Dark Horses who have reached the White House, if they have seldom turned out bad presidents, have even more seldom turned out distinguished ones. A Favorite Son is a politician respected or admired in his own State, but little regarded beyond it. He may not be, like the Dark Horse, little known to the nation at large, but he has not fixed its eye or filled its ear. He is usually a man who has sat in the State legislature; filled with credit the post of State governor; perhaps gone as senator or representative to Washington, and there approved himself an active promoter of local interests. Probably he possesses the qualities which gain local popularity - geniality, activity, sympathy with the dominant sentiment and habits of his State; or while endowed with gifts excellent in their way, he has lacked the audacity and tenacity which push a man to the front through a jostling crowd. More rarely he is a demagogue who has raised himself by flattering the masses of his State on some local questions, or a skillful handler of party organizations who has made local bosses and spoilsmen believe that their interests are safe in his hands. Anyhow, his personality is such as to be more effective with neighbors than with the nation. . . . A Favorite Son may be also a Dark Horse; that is to say, he may be well known in his own State, but so little known out of it as to be an unlikely candidate. But he need not be. The types are different, for as there are Favorite Sons whom the nation knows but does not care for, so there are Dark Horses whose reputation, such as it is, has not been made in State affairs, and who rely very little on State favor. 348. Utility of the crown in England. Lowell states the advantages of the English hereditary monarchy as follows: 1 Bagehot's views upon the utility of the monarchy have become classic. Recognizing the small chance that any hereditary sovereign would possess the qualities necessary to exert any great influence for good upon political questions, he did not deem the Crown of great value as a part of the machinery of the state; and he explained at some length how a parliamentary system of government could be made to work perfectly well in a republic, although up to that time such an experiment had never been tried. But he thought the Crown of the highest importance in England as the dignified part of the government. . . . According to his conception of English polity the lower classes believed that the government was conducted by the Queen, whom they revered, while the cabinet, unseen and unknown by the ignorant multitude, was thereby enabled to carry on a system which would be in danger of collapsing if the public thoroughly understood its real nature. . . . To-day the social and ceremonial functions of the Crown attract quite as much interest as ever; but as a political organ it has receded into the background, and occupies less public attention than it did formerly. The stranger can hardly fail to note how rarely he hears the name of the sovereign mentioned in connection with political matters; and when he does hear it the reference is only too apt to be made by way of complaint. . . . In general the growth of the doctrine of royal irresponsibility has removed the Crown farther and farther out of the public sight, while the spread of democracy has made the masses more and more familiar with the actual forces in public life.. One may dismiss, therefore, the idea that the Crown has any perceptible effect to-day in securing the loyalty of the English people, or their obedience to the government. On the other hand, the government of England is inconceivable without the parliamentary system, and no one has yet devised a method of working that system without a central figure, powerless, no doubt, but beyond the reach of party strife. European countries that had no kings have felt constrained to adopt monarchs who might hold a scepter which 1 Copyright, 1908, by The Macmillan Company. they could not wield; and one nation, disliking kings, has been forced to set up a president with most of the attributes of royalty except the title. If the English Crown is no longer the motive power of the ship of state, it is the spar on which the sail is bent, and as such it is not only a useful but an essential part of the vessel. The social and ceremonial duties of the Crown are now its most conspicuous, if not its most important, functions. There can be no question that the influence of the Queen and her court was a powerful element in the movement that raised the moral tone of society during the first half of the last century. In its relation to the masses royalty may be considered in another aspect. Within a generation there has been a great growth of interest in ceremony and dress. Antiquated customs and costumes have been revived, and matters of this kind are regarded by many people as of prime importance. A kindred result of the same social force has been a marked increase in what Bagehot called the spirit of deference, and what those who dislike it call snobbishness a tendency by no means confined to the British Isles. All this has exalted the regard for titles and offices, and enhanced the attractiveness of those who bear them. . . . A century or more ago people who had learned nothing from the history of Greece or Rome, and above all of Venice, were wont to assert that the sentiment of loyalty requires a person for its object. No one pretends that the English would be less patriotic under a republic; and yet with the strengthening conception of the British Empire, the importance of the Crown as the symbol of imperial unity has been more keenly felt. . . . Whatever the utility of the Crown may be at the present time, there is no doubt of its universal popularity. 349. Position of the president in France. The following extract indicates the conditions in France that make the position of her president difficult: 1 Unlike the President of the United States, the French President is not free to use his powers according to his own judgment, for in order to make him independent of the fate of cabinets, and at the same time to prevent his personal power from becoming too great, the constitutional laws declare that he shall not be responsible for his official conduct, except in case of high treason, and that all his acts of every kind, to be valid, must be countersigned by one of the ministers; and thus, like the British monarch, he has been put under guardianship and can do no wrong. 1 By permission of Houghton Mifflin Company. Sir Henry Maine makes merry over the exalted office and lack of power of the President. "There is," he says, "no living functionary who occupies a more pitiable position than a French President. The old kings of France reigned and governed. The Constitutional King, according to M. Thiers, reigns, but does not govern. The President of the United States governs, but he does not reign. It has been reserved for the President of the French Republic neither to reign nor yet to govern." At first sight the situation does, indeed, appear somewhat irrational. When the head of the state is designated by the accident of birth it is not unnatural to make of him an idol, and appoint a high priest to speak in his name; but when he is carefully selected as the man most fit for the place, it seems a trifle illogical to intrust the duties of the office to some one else. By the constitution of Sieyès an ornamental post of a similar character was prepared for the first Consul, but Napoleon said he had no mind to play the part of a pig kept to fatten. In government, however, the most logical system is not always the best, and the anomalous position of the President has saved France from the danger of his trying to make himself a dictator, while the fact that he is independent of the changing moods of the Chambers has given to the Republic a dignity and stability it had never enjoyed before. It is a curious commentary on the nature of human ambition, that in spite of the small power actually wielded by the President in France, the presidential fever seems to have nearly as strong a hold on public men as in this country. II. HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS 350. Members in modern cabinets. The cabinets in leading modern states are composed of the following heads of departments. The general similarity in administrative organization is at once evident. England 1. Prime Minister and First Lord of the Treasury 2. Lord President of the Council 3. Lord High Chancellor 4. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs 5. Secretary of State for India 6. Secretary of State for the Home Department 7. Chancellor of the Exchequer 8. Secretary of State for the Colonies and Lord Privy Seal 9. Secretary of State for War |