PART III

THE ENDS OF THE STATE

CHAPTER XXIV

THE PROVINCE OF GOVERNMENT

I. THE AIMS OF THE STATE

464. The state an end or a means. Bluntschli criticizes the onesidedness of viewing the state as either a means or an end and gives his conception of the purpose of the state as follows:

The question is often raised whether the State is an end or a means, i.e. whether the State has an end in itself, or simply serves as a means to enable individuals to attain their ends.

The ancient theory of the State, especially that of the Greeks, regarded the state as the highest aim of human life, as perfect humanity, and was therefore inclined to regard the State as an end in itself. As compared with the State, individual men appeared only as parts, not as beings with separate personal rights. .

In complete opposition to this fundamental theory of the ancients is the opinion, which has been often maintained by English and American writers, that the State is not an end in itself, but is simply a means to secure the welfare of individuals. . . .

It seems to me that both the ancient and the modern view contain a germ of truth; but both commit the error of regarding only one side of the matter and of overlooking or denying the other side. . . .

But all these objections are avoided if we formulate the proper and direct end of the State as the development of the national capacities, the perfecting of the national life, and, finally, its completion; provided, of course, that the process of moral and political development shall not be opposed to the destiny of humanity. This formula includes everything that can be regarded as a proper function of the State, and excludes everything that lies outside the State's range. It regards the idiosyncrasies and the special needs of different nations, and thus, while it firmly maintains the unity of the end of the State, it secures the variety of its

development. The life task of every individual is to develop his capacities and to manifest his essence. So, too, the duty of the State person is to develop the latent powers of the nation, and to manifest its capacities. Thus the State has a double function. Firstly, the maintenance of the national powers; and, secondly, their development. It must secure the conquests of the past, and it must extend them in the future.

465. The primary, secondary, and ultimate purposes of the state. Burgess attempts to separate the proximate and ultimate ends of the state, and to distinguish state and government in the methods used in attaining these ends.

First, then, as to state ends. An exhaustive examination of this subject will reveal the fact that there are three natural points of division. There is a primary, a secondary, and an ultimate purpose of the state; and, proceeding from the primary to the ultimate, the one end or class of ends is means to the attainment of the next following. Let us regard the ultimate end first. This is the universal human purpose of the state. We may call it the perfection of humanity; the civilization of the world; the perfect development of the human reason, and its attainment to universal command over individualism; the apotheosis of man. . . .

The state cannot, however, be organized from the beginning as world state. Mankind cannot yet act through so extended and ponderous an organization, and many must be the centuries, and probably cycles, before it can. Mankind must first be organized politically by portions, before it can be organized as a whole. I have already pointed out the natural conditions and forces which direct the political apportionment of mankind. I have demonstrated that they work toward the establishment of the national state. The national state is the most perfect organ which has as yet been attained in the civilization of the world for the interpretation of the human consciousness of right. It furnishes the best vantage ground as yet reached for the contemplation of the purpose of the sojourn of mankind upon earth. The national state must be developed everywhere before the world state can appear. Therefore I would say that the secondary purpose of the state is the perfecting of its nationality, the development of the peculiar principle of its nationality.

...

But now, how shall the state accomplish this end? The answer to this question gives us finally the proximate ends of the state. These are government and liberty. The primary activity of the state must be directed to the creation and the perfecting of these. When this shall have been fairly accomplished, it may then, through these as means, work out the national civilization, and then the civilization of the world.

First of all, the state must establish the reign of peace and of law; i.e. it must establish government, and vest it with sufficient power to defend the state against external attack or internal disorder. This is the first step out of barbarism, and until it shall have been substantially taken every other consideration must remain in abeyance. If it be necessary that the whole power of the state shall be exercised by the government in order to secure this result, there should be no hesitation in authorizing or approving it. This latter status must not, however, be regarded as permanent. It cannot secure the development of the national genius. If continued beyond the period of strict necessity, it will rather suppress and smother that genius. So soon as, through its disciplinary influence, the disposition to obey law and observe order shall have been established, it must, therefore, suffer change. The state must then address itself to the establishment of its system of individual liberty. It must mark out, in its constitution, a sphere of individual autonomy; and it must command the government both to refrain from encroachment thereon itself and to repel encroachment from every other quarter. At first this domain must necessarily be narrow, and the subjects of the state be permitted to act therein only as separate individuals. As the people of the state advance in civilization, the domain of liberty must be widened, and individuals permitted to form private combinations and associations for the accomplishment of purposes which are beyond the powers of the single individual and which could be otherwise fulfilled only by the power of the government. . . . It may, also, be good policy for the state to aid them in the accomplishment of work which they could not, without such aid, perform, instead of authorizing the government itself to undertake and execute such enterprises. This all signifies, however, only a readjustment by the state, from time to time, of the relation of government to liberty.

466. The ends of the state. Garner, agreeing in the main with Burgess, adds one more to the numerous theories as to the proper function of the state.

If one more attempt to formulate a general statement of the function of the state may be permitted, I would offer the following: The original, primary, and immediate end of the state is the maintenance of peace, order, security, and justice among the individuals who compose it. This involves the establishment of a régime of law for the definition and protection of individual rights and the creation of a domain of individual liberty, free from encroachment either by individuals, or by associations, or by the government itself. No state which fails to secure these ends can justify its existence. Whatever else it may ignore, it cannot neglect these considerations without failing in its greatest and most essential

purpose. Secondly, the state must look beyond the needs of the individual as such to the larger collective needs of society- the welfare of the group. It must care for the common welfare and promote the national progress by doing for society the things which the common interests require, but which cannot be done at all or done efficiently by individuals acting singly or through association. . . . This may be called the secondary end of the state. The services embraced under this head are not absolutely essential to the existence of society but they are desirable and are in fact performed by all modern states.

Finally, the promotion of the civilization of mankind at large may be considered the ultimate and highest end of the state. . . Thus the state has a triple end: first, its mission is the advancement of the good of the individual; then it should seek to promote the collective interests of individuals in their associated capacity; and, finally, it should aim at the furthering of the civilization and progress of the world, and thus its ends become universal in character.

467. The functions of the state. The following is a suggestive discussion of the general principles that determine the sphere of state action :

The primary right of the State, as of the individual, is, to be. Now, war, not peace, is the law of life; and the struggle for existence is a universal fact. Obviously, the first function of the State is to maintain, in a condition of the utmost efficiency, such fleets and armies, and other preparations for war, as its security against rival States demands. . Equally obvious is its function to maintain its internal tranquillity by its magistrates and police.

Again. The right of the State, as we have seen, is not merely to existence, but to complete existence, noble and worthy existence, an existence in accordance with the dignity of human nature. Hence, among its functions must be reckoned the promotion of civilization. It is the guardian of the ideal and of the material interests of the people whose personalities it incorporates. . . .

The real difficulty is to determine what are the proper limits of the State's interference with individual action.

The true principle would appear to be that the State should leave free all interests and faculties of its subjects. . . so far as is consistent with the maintenance of its own rights. It is no part of its functions to do for them what they can do for themselves better, or even as well. It is a part, and a very important part, of its functions to allow them to develop their own personality, to become more and more men, to make

the most and the best of themselves, for their own and the common welfare. And not only to allow, but prudently to aid, whether by direct encouragement or by the removal of hindrances. This is the just mean of State action in respect of the subject. It is equally removed from a false paternalism and a false individualism.

The false paternal theory of the State's functions makes it not merely a high, but the only factor of human development, as the creator and arbiter of the rights of its subjects. The sufficient condemnation of this doctrine is that it is utterly unethical: that it is altogether fatal to that human freedom which is the essence of personality. It is expounded, in different forms, by two very different schools. The one is what we may call the German school of political mysticism: a philosophical travesty of the old very unphilosophical legitimism, which invests the State - the monarchical State- with theocratic attributes, and imposes on the subject the one duty, to obey.

The other a far more influential school in contemporary Europe — is the Jacobin or ultra-Radical school which, consciously or unconsciously, represents the sophisms of Rousseau. This school insists that man belongs wholly to the State: the falsely democratic State resting upon a fictitious universal suffrage.

The opposite error to this false paternalism is the false individualism professing the doctrine of laissez faire, which sees in civil society nothing more than a struggle for existence among millions of human atoms; which regards the function of the State as nothing more than to keep the ring while they fight.

II. INDIVIDUALISM

468. Anarchism. The nature of anarchism, the extreme form of individualism, is stated in the following:

Anarchy means, in its ideal sense, the perfect, unfettered self-government of the individual, and, consequently, the absence of any kind of external government. This fundamental formula, which in its essence is common to all actual and real Theoretical Anarchists, contains all that is necessary as a guide to the distinguishing features of this remarkable movement. It demands the unconditional realization of freedom, both subjectively and objectively, equally in political and in economic life. In this, Anarchism is distinct from Liberalism, which, even in its most radical representatives, only allows unlimited freedom in economic affairs, but has never questioned the necessity of some compulsory organization in the social relationships of individuals; whereas Anarchism would extend the Liberal doctrine of laisser faire to all human action, and would