appearance; if you do not agree to do this, your special appearance will be deemed to be general. We think it was beyond the power of the Circuit Court to make and enforce a rule which imposes upon defendants such conditions, and transforms an objection to the jurisdiction into a waiver of the objection itself. The jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts is fixed by statute. In certain cases a defendant may waive an objection to the jurisdiction over his person. But he cannot be compelled to waive the objection if he chooses seasonably to insist upon it, and any rule of court which seeks to compel a waiver is unauthorized by law and invalid. So it has been held that, under the act which requires the practice in the courts of the United States to conform as near as may be to the practice of the courts of the States in which they are held, state statutes which give a special appearance to challenge the jurisdiction, the force and effect of a general appearance must not be followed by the courts of the United States. Southern Pacific Company v. Denton, 146 U. S. 202; Mexican Central Railway v. Pinkney, 149 U. S. 194; Galveston &c. Railway v. Gonzales, 151 U. S. 496. The reasoning in these cases is pertinent to the case at bar.

To sum up, the Circuit Court for the Northern District of California had no jurisdiction to entertain this suit against these defendants, who are not inhabitants of that district, but, on the contrary, inhabitants of the State of Illinois. The defendants appeared specially, as they had a right to do, solely for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction. They were not bound to agree to submit their objection to the final decision of the judge of the Circuit Court, and the rule of court which treated the special appearance, without such an agreement, as a general appearance, was invalid.

For these reasons the judgment is reversed and the case remanded to the Circuit Court, with instructions to dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction, and

It is so ordered.

MR. JUSTICE MCKENNA dissents.

MARTINEZ v. LA ASOCIACION DE SENORAS DAMAS DEL SANTO ASILO DE PONCE.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR PORTO RICO.

No. 83. Argued January 21, 1909.-Decided February 23, 1909.

All relations between Spain and Porto Rico having been severed by the cession of that Territory by the Treaty of Paris, a corporation organized under the laws of Spain for purely local and charitable purposes in Porto Rico is not to be regarded as a citizen of Spain within the meaning of the provisions of the act of April 12, 1900, c. 191, 31 Stat. 77, as amended by the act of March 2, 1901, c. 812, 31 Stat. 953, relating to the jurisdiction of the District Court of the United States for Porto Rico, nor is such a corporation a citizen of the United States within the meaning of such provision; if it is a citizen of any country it is a citizen of Porto Rico.

The people of Porto Rico have been created by Congress and exist as a body politic subject only to the usual reserved power of annulment of territorial legislation; and the government of Porto Rico under the organic act is charged with the creation and control of corporations strictly local in character, and corporations of that nature organized prior to the cession of the island are to be regarded for jurisdictional purposes as citizens of Porto Rico.

While by Article IX of the Treaty of Paris between Spain and the United States provision is made for Spanish subjects, natives of the peninsula, to preserve their allegiance to Spain, that article has no reference to corporations; nor is there any other provision of the treaty providing therefor. Quare and not decided, what the citizenship now is of Spanish corporations doing business in Porto Rico prior to its cession by the Treaty of Paris to the United States.

THE facts are stated in the opinion.

Mr. Fritz von Briesen, with whom Mr. Charles M. Boerman was on the brief, for appellants.

Mr. John W. Yerkes, with whom Mr. George E. Hamilton,

Mr. M. J. Colbert and Mr. John J. Hamilton were on the brief, for appellee.

MR. JUSTICE MOODY delivered the opinion of the court.

The appellee, alleging itself to be "a charitable corporation, organized and existing under the laws of the Kingdom of Spain," brought a bill in equity in the District Court of the United States for Porto Rico against the appellants, alleging them to be citizens of Porto Rico. The object of the suit, generally described, is to assert title to certain lands in Porto Rico, and its determination turns upon the construction of the will of Juan Bautisti Silva, an inhabitant of Porto Rico, who died in 1875. The suit, therefore, does not arise under the Constitution, laws or a treaty of the United States. A decree was entered in favor of the plaintiff, and the defendants appealed to this court.

Before entering upon a consideration of the merits of the cause the jurisdiction of the court below to entertain it, which is questioned, must be passed upon. The District Court of the United States for Porto Rico was created, and its jurisdiction. defined, by the act of April 12, 1900, establishing a civil government for Porto Rico, 31 Stat. 77, chapter 191, as amended by the act of March 2, 1901, 31 Stat. 953, chapter 812. By § 34 of the first act it was provided that—

"Porto Rico shall constitute a judicial district to be called the District of Porto Rico, the District Court for

said district shall be called the District Court of the United States for Porto Rico and shall have, in addition to the ordinary jurisdiction of District Courts of the United States, jurisdiction of all cases cognizant in the Circuit Courts of the United States, and shall proceed therein in the same manner as a Circuit Court."

The jurisdiction was further defined in § 3 of the last act, which provided that "the jurisdiction of the District Court of the United States for Porto Rico in civil cases shall, in addition

to that conferred by the act of April 12, 1900, extend to and embrace controversies where the parties, or either of them, are citizens of the United States, or citizens or subjects of a foreign State or States, wherein the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of interest or costs, the sum or value of one thousand dollars."

If the court below had jurisdiction, it must be under the amending act and because the plaintiff was either a citizen of the United States or a citizen or subject of a foreign state. No other ground of jurisdiction has been or can be suggested. It was found by the District Court that the plaintiff was a citizen or subject of Spain and the jurisdiction was sustained upon that theory. Counsel in this court have attempted to sustain the jurisdiction on the ground that the plaintiff, if not a citizen or subject of Spain, is a citizen of the United States. If the plaintiff was neither a citizen of the United States, nor a citizen or subject of Spain, it is clear that the court was without jurisdiction.

We assume, in favor of the plaintiff, that it was a corporation organized in 1863 by a decree of the Spanish Crown. That decree incorporated an asylum of charity in Ponce. The purposes of the incorporation are described in article 1 of the bylaws, which follows;

"This association recognizes as its principal object the alleviation of human suffering, and for this purpose it will establish an asylum for the poor of the district. When its resources permit it to give its attention to other objects related to its purpose it will establish schools for poor children of both sexes, under the supervision of Sisters of Charity."

The incorporators were all residents of Ponce, and all the purposes of the corporation were to be accomplished and all its business done in that locality.

The first question is, whether, after the ratification of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, the plaintiff corporation continued to be a citizen or subject of Spain.

It is assumed, in passing upon this question, that Congress :

in employing the word citizen in this connection intended to include corporations, in view of the decisions of this court that the word has that meaning when used in the definition of the jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts of the United States. St. Louis & San Francisco Railway v. James, 161 U. S. 545.

By the treaty of peace (30 Stat. 1754), Spain ceded Porto Rico to the United States and thereby parted with all sovereignty over that island. Careful provision was made that the cession should not impair the property or rights of corporations, associations or individuals. Article VIII. It is clear, however, that thereafter the duty to protect property and rights within the ceded territory rested upon the United States. An opportunity was afforded to Spanish subjects, natives of the peninsula, to preserve their allegiance to the crown of Spain by making within a limited time a declaration to that effect. Article IX. This article obviously had no reference to corporations. No other provisions of the treaty seem relevant to the question before us.

We are of opinion that the cession of Porto Rico by Spain to the United States severed all relations between Spain and this corporation, and that thereafter it cannot be regarded in any sense as a citizen or subject of Spain. Spain has no duty to or power over it. We confine this statement to a corporation like the one before us, formed for charitable purposes and limited in its operations to the ceded territory. A different question (which need not be decided) would be presented if the corporation had other characteristics than those possessed by the one under consideration, as, for instance, if it were a Spanish trading corporation, with a place of business in Spain but doing business by comity in the island of Porto Rico.

The next question is whether the plaintiff corporation is a citizen of the United States. Its status during the period between the cession and the passage of the act to provide a civil government for the island need not be determined. That act created a form of government for Porto Rico and its adjacent islands, in which there was exhibited, with some modifications,