the qualifications imposed upon it, were correct. They simply follow what has been understood to be the law for many years. Clough v. Wing, 2 Arizona, 371.

The right to use water is not confined to riparian proprietors. Gutierres v. Albuquerque Land and Irrigation Co., 188 U. S. 545, 556; Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colorado, 443, 449, 450; Willey v. Decker, 73 Pac. Rep. 210, 220. Such a limitation would substitute accident for a rule based upon economic considerations, and an effort, adequate or not, to get the greatest use from all available land. Whether there are any limits of distance is a question not arising in this case.

A final objection urged is that the plaintiff's land is taken without compensation. It would seem that this is merely technical in this case. There does not appear to have been any discussion of the point below, and it is probable that the water is the only thing that has substantial value or really is cared for. But the plaintiff is authorized to have his damages assessed if he desires by ch. 55, § 4 (now Rev. Stat., § 3202), as we have mentioned. We think that it would be unjust to disturb the decree on this ground, although in other circumstances the objection might be grave.

Decree affirmed.

AMERICAN BANANA COMPANY v. UNITED FRUIT

COMPANY.

ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT.

No. 686. Argued April 12, 13, 1909.-Decided April 26, 1909.

While a country may treat some relations between its own citizens as governed by its own law in regions subject to no sovereign, like the high seas, or to no law recognized as adequate, the general rule is that the character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the country where it is done.

Argument for Plaintiff in Error.

213 U.S.

Law is a statement of the circumstances in which the public force will be brought to bear upon men through the courts; but the word commonly is confined to such prophecies or threats when addressed to persons living within the power of the courts.

A statute will, as a general rule, be construed as intended to be confined in its operation and effect to the territorial limits within the jurisdiction of the lawmaker, and words of universal scope will be construed as meaning only those subject to the legislation.

The prohibitions of the Sherman Anti-Trust Law of July 2, 1890, c. 647, 26 Stat. 209, do not extend to acts done in foreign countries even though done by citizens of the United States and injuriously affecting other citizens of the United States.

Sovereignty means that the decree of the sovereign makes law; and foreign courts cannot condemn the influences persuading the sovereign to make the decree. Rafael v. Verelst, 2 Wm. Bl. 983, 1055, distinguished.

Acts of soldiers and officials of a foreign government must be taken to have been done by its order.

A conspiracy in this country to do acts in another jurisdiction does not draw to itself those acts and make them unlawful if they are permitted by the local law.

166 Fed. Rep. 261, affirmed.

THE facts are stated in the opinion.

Mr. Everett P. Wheeler, with whom Mr. Horace E. Deming was on the brief, for plaintiff in error:

The Circuit Court should have taken jurisdiction of this action. Section 7 of the Sherman Act expressly provides for the bringing of suits like the present one, "in any Circuit Court of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found." See also § 2, Art. VI, Const. U. S. The suit at bar is a civil suit, arising under the laws of the United States and a treaty made under its authority. It is brought to recover for injuries done by defendant, and declared unlawful by the Sherman Act. The Circuit Court is a court of the United States and is bound to administer the jurisdiction conferred upon it.

No considerations of public policy or comity forbid the courts of the United States to exercise jurisdiction and decide this controversy on the merits.

213 U. S.

Argument for Plaintiff in Error.

The acts complained of were done in violation of an express statute of the United States. Costa Rica cannot give immunity to defendant for this offense, nor can exceptions be read into the Sherman Act not expressed in the act itself. United States v. Union Pacific, 91 U. S. 72, 91; French v. Spencer, 21 How. 238; Demarest v. Wynkoop, 3 Johns. Ch. 129, 142; S. P. Chamberlain v. The Western Transportation Co., 44 N. Y. 305, 309; Bank of Republic v. City of St. Joseph, 21 Blatch. 436, 439.

Whatever value the principles of comity may have, they cannot be extended so far as to cloak a violation of the laws of the nation whose comity is appealed to. The Santissima Trinidad, 7 Wheat. 283, 354; The Bello Corrunes, 6 Wheat. 152, 169; The Marianna Flora, 11 Wheat. 1; The Merino, 9 Wheat. 391, 405; La Jeune Eugenie, 2 Mason, 409; Underhill v. Hernandez, 65 Fed. Rep. 577, affirmed 168 U. S. 250, discussed as not being in point. See also People v. McLeod, 25 Wend. 483.

The courts of this country can consider and collaterally pass upon the legality of acts of a foreign nation, in a suit between its own citizens. Vasse v. Ball, 2 Dall. 270, 275; 3 Kent's Comm. 303, 304; The Santissima Trinidad, 7 Wheat. 283, 351, 354; The Estrella, 4 Wheat. 298; Angle v. Chicago, St. Paul &c. R. Co., 151 U. S. 119.

The extent of the rule is that a court cannot sit in judgment on the act of a foreign power where that act is directly drawn in question in a suit directly against such foreign power, or against an officer acting within its territory under its commands. Nabob of Arcot v. East India Co., 4 Brown Ch. 131 (180); The Duke of Brunswick v. The King of Hanover, 6 Beav. 1 (affirmed 2 H. of L. 1); Hatch v. Baez, 7 Hun, 596; Rafael v. Verelst, 2 Wm. Blackstone, 1055.

The supposed government authority under which the act is done is in itself invalid. The Costa Rican officers, in destroying plaintiffs' property and business, were acting outside the territory of Costa Rica, and were making an usurping inroad on the territory of an adjoining friendly power. 1 Kent's Comm. 120. In considering the defense that an act was done under authority

Argument for Plaintiff in Error.

213 U. S.

of government, the courts have uniformly held that such authority must be valid or lawful. Suit against an officer for an unlawful act is not a suit against his sovereign. Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U. S. 270, 290; Osborn v. The Bank, 9 Wheat. 738; Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123, 159; Litchfield v. Bond, 186 N. Y. 66; People v. McLeod, 25 Wend. 483.

An injury to the private property of a citizen by an officer of government is justiciable in the courts of the country of which he is a citizen, even if it be an act of state. Baird v. Walker, L. R. (1892) App. Cas. 491, overruling upon this point, Buron v. Denman, 2 Ex. 167, if susceptible of the interpretation put upon it by the District Judges. That case, however, is an authority for plaintiff; and see Feather v. The Queen, 6 Best & Smith, 257, 296. See also Little v. Barreme, 2 Cranch, 170, 179; Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U. S. 270; Entick v. Harrington, 19 State Trials, 1043; Money v. Leach, 3 Burr. 1742, 1762.

It is never a defense, even to an officer who has committed a tort, that he has acted on behalf of his government under circumstances like those in this case. A fortiori it can be no defense to the citizens of the country against whose laws the tort was committed that it was done through the agency of such officer. Duke of Brunswick's Case, 2 H. of L. 1; Musgrave v. Pulido, L. R. 5 App. Cas. 102, 112; 1 Goodnow, Comparative Administrative Law, 35, 36; Moodaly v. Moreton & East India Co., 2 Dickens, 652.

Damage sustained by the plaintiff was inflicted in pursuance of defendant's illegal combination, and is therefore actionable under the statute. United States v. Patterson, 55 Fed. Rep. 605; Shawnee Compress Co. v. Anderson, 209 U. S. 423.

Defendant cannot complain because it alone is sued. Any member of such combination is liable for the acts of the combination, or any member of it, done in furtherance thereof. Atlanta v. Chattanooga Foundry Co., 127 Fed. Rep. 23; Chicago Coal Co. v. People, 214 Illinois, 421, 453.

Acts done in pursuance of a combination are none the less done in pursuance thereof because done by only one member.

213 U. S.

Argument for Plaintiff in Error.

United States v. Standard Oil Co., 152 Fed. Rep. 290; Tobacco Trust Case, 149 Fed. Rep. 823; Cooley on Torts (3d ed.),

213.

The statute applies to acts done in a foreign country. The objection that the acts complained of were done abroad is entitled to no weight. The parties to the suit are American citizens. The commerce restrained by defendant's acts was foreign commerce of the United States. Congress has full power to legislate in respect to that and has exercised the power in this statute. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1; United States v. Knight, 156 U. S. 1.

Acts done abroad by citizens of the United States are subject to its jurisdiction and legislative powers.

The commerce of the United States may by its statutes be protected from injury by acts done beyond its boundaries. Both of these powers have been frequently exercised and their validity is established in both criminal and civil cases. United States v. Gordon, 5 Blatch. 18; The Slavers (Kate), 2 Wall. 350; United States v. Pirates, 5 Wheat. 184; United States v. Rauscher, 119 U. S. 407, 433; Carib Prince, 170 U. S. 655; The Silvia, 171 U. S. 462; The Chattahoochee, 173 U. S. 540.

The language of the Sherman Act is as comprehensive as that of the Harter Act. It is a rule prescribed by Congress for interstate and international commerce. It guards such commerce against acts which threaten it, no matter where they are done, and more especially if they are done by citizens of the United States. Northern Securities Case, 193 U.S. 337; Thomsen v. Union Castle Co., 166 Fed. Rep. 251.

This court has uniformly held in suits against common carriers that it would, in determining the validity of contracts made with them, or their liability for torts committed by them, apply the American and not the foreign law; and enforce the policy of American law. Liverpool & G. W. Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co., 129 U. S. 397.

A State has the right to attach whatever consequences it chooses within its own territory to acts of its subjects. wherever