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the courts. A threat that depends upon the choice of the party affected to bring himself within that power hardly would be called law in the ordinary sense. We do not speak of blockade running by neutrals as unlawful. And the usages of speech correspond to the limit of the attempts of the lawmaker, except in extraordinary cases. It is true that domestic corporations remain always within the power of the domestic law, but in the present case, at least, there is no ground for distinguishing between corporations and men.

The foregoing considerations would lead in case of doubt to a construction of any statute as intended to be confined in its operation and effect to the territorial limits over which the lawmaker has general and legitimate power. “All legislation is prima facie territorial.” Ex parte Blain, In re Sawers, 12 Ch. Div. 522, 528; State v. Carter, 27 N. J. (3 Dutcher) 499; People v. Merrill, 2 Parker, Crim. Rep. 590, 596. Words having universal scope, such as “Every contract in restraint of trade," “Every person who shall monopolize," etc., will be taken as a matter of course to mean only every one subject to such legislation, not all that the legislator subsequently may be able to catch. In the case of the present statute the improbabilty of the United States attempting to make acts done in Panama or Costa Rica criminal is obvious, yet the law begins by making criminal the acts for which it gives a right to sue. We think it entirely plain that what the defendant did in Panama or Costa Rica is not within the scope of the statute so far as the present suit is concerned. Other objections of a serious nature are urged but need not be discussed.

For again, not only were the acts of the defendant in Panama or Costa Rica not within the Sherman Act, but they were not torts by the law of the place and therefore were not torts at all, however contrary to the ethical and economic postulates of that statute. The substance of the complaint is that, the plantation being within the de facto jurisdiction of Costa Rica, that state took and keeps possession of it by virtue of its sovereign power. But a seizure by a state is not a thing that can be

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complained of elsewhere in the courts. Underhill y. Hernandez, 168 U. S. 250. The fact, if it be one, that de jure the estate is in Panama does not matter in the least; sovereignty is pure fact. The fact has been recognized by the United States, and by the implications of the bill is assented to by Panama.

The fundamental reason why persuading a sovereign power to do this or that cannot be a tort is not that the sovereign cannot be joined as a defendant or because it must be assumed to be acting lawfully. The intervention of parties who had a right knowingly to produce the harmful result between the defendant and the harm has been thought to be a non-conductor and to bar responsibility, Allen v. Flood (1898), A. C. 1, 121, 151, etc., but it is not clear that this is always true, for instance, in the case of the privileged repetition of a slander, Elmer v. Fessenden, 151 Massachusetts, 359, 362, 363, or the malicious and unjustified persuasion to discharge from employment. Moran v. Dunphy, 177 Massachusetts, 485, 487. The fundamental reason is that it is a contradiction in terms to say that within its jurisdiction it is unlawful to persuade a sovereign power to bring about a result that it declares by its conduct to be desirable and proper. It does not, and foreign courts cannot, admit that the influences were improper or the results bad. It makes the persuasion lawful by its own act. The very meaning of sovereignty is that the decree of the sovereign makes law. See Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U. S. 349, 353. In the case of private persons it consistently may assert the freedom of the immediate parties to an injury and yet declare that certain persuasions addressed to them are wrong. See Angle v. Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha Ry. Co., 151 U. S. 1, 16-21; Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 87, 130, 131.

The plaintiff relied a good deal on Rafael v. Verelst, 2 Wm. Bl: 983; Ib. 1055. But in that case, although the Nabob who imprisoned the plaintiff was called a sovereign for certain purposes, he was found to be the mere tool of the defendant, an English Governor. That hardly could be listened to concerning a really independent state. But of course it is not alleged

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that Costa Rica stands in that relation to the United Fruit Company.

The acts of the soldiers and officials of Costa Rica are not alleged to have been without the consent of the government and must be taken to have been done by its order. It ratified them, at all events, and adopted and keeps the possession taken by them; O'Reilly de Camara v. Brooke, 209 U. S. 45, 52; The Paquete Habana, 189 U. S. 453, 465; Dempsey v. Chambers, 154 Massachusetts, 330, 332. The injuries to the plantation and supplies seem to have been the direct effect of the acts of the Costa Rican government, which is holding them under an adverse claim of right. The claim for them must fall with the claim for being deprived of the use and profits of the place. As to the buying at a high price, etc., it is enough to say that we have no ground for supposing that it was unlawful in the countries where the purchases were made. Giving to this complaint every teasonable latitude of interpretation we are of opinion that it alleges no case under the act of Congress and discloses nothing that we can suppose to have been a tort where it was done. A conspiracy in this country to do acts in another jurisdiction does not draw to itself those acts and make them unlawful, if they are permitted by the local law.

Further reasons might be given why this complaint should not be upheld, but we have said enough to dispose of it and to indicate our general point of view.

Judgment affirmed.

MR. JUSTICE HARLAN concurs in the result.

Opinion of the Court.

213 U. 8.

SAND FILTRATION CORPORATION OF AMERICA v.

COWARDIN.

APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE DISTRICT OF

COLUMBIA.

No. 123. Argued April 6, 1909.—Decided April 26, 1909.

In the absence of a clear showing of its incorrectness this court accepts

the finding of the lower courts. The object of construction of a contract is to effectuate the intention

of the parties in making it; and it should be interpreted in the light of the circumstances surrounding the parties at the time when it was

made. Although contracts relating to the same subject may be dated the same

day they need not be construed together as one instrument if all the

parties to both are not in privity. An agreement to pay a sum out of profits of a contract held, in this case,

not to depend on whether profits were or were not realized by a subcontractor but only on whether such profits were realized by the party

making the contract. 29 App. D. C. 571, affirmed.

The facts are stated in the opinion.

Mr. A. S. Worthington, with whom Mr. Charles L. Frailey was on the brief, for appellant.

Mr. Charles Cowles Tucker and Mr. Reginald S. Huidekoper, with whom Mr. J. Miller Kenyon was on the brief, for appellees May and Jekyll.

Mr. J.J. Darlington filed a brief in behalf of appellees Cowardin, Bradley, Clay and Stagg.

MR. JUSTICE Day delivered the opinion of the court.

This case presents a question as to the proper construction of a certain contract. It arises as follows: Cowardin, Bradley, Clay

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& Company, hereinafter called the Cowardin Company, had a contract with the Government of the United States for the construction of a filtration plant in the city of Washington. In the partial performance of the contract they had expended about $1,300 in money and had contracted debts somewhat in excess of $14,000. Afterwards, on May 26, 1903, the Cowardin Company sublet the contract to the appellees May and Jekyll. By this contract May and Jekyll agreed to reimburse the Cowardin Company for their expenditures; to pay the liabilities incurred by them, and to complete the work for 90 per cent of the contract price, permitting the Cowardin Company to have 10 per cent thereof as its profit. And further, May and Jekyll agreed to lend the Cowardin Company $10,000, and to furnish $50,000 for the purchase of a plant for doing the work. On August 25, 1903, May and Jekyll made a new contract with the Cowardin Company, surrendering their subcontract, executed a bill of sale to the Cowardin Company of the plant by which the work was being done, and as to the debts which May and Jekyll had contracted the Cowardin Company agreed to assume the same, and to procure the assumption thereof by any one who might undertake to complete the contract. The plant, including that purchased with the $50,000, was to be transferred to the Cowardin Company, and all the property to be conveyed in trust to certain trustees to secure the payment of the debts of May and Jekyll. As to the $10,000 advanced by May and Jekyll under the contract of May 26, 1903, of which $8,000 remained unpaid, the following stipulation was made:

“Inasmuch as the parties of the second part (May and Jekyll] have heretofore advanced to the parties of the first part [Cowardin Company] the sum of $10,000 under the eighth paragraph of said contract of May 26, 1903, and there now remains due to the said parties hereto of the second part $8,000 thereof, $2,000 having been paid thereon, the parties of the first part hereby covenant and agree to repay the parties of the second part, or to their order, the said sum of $8,000 out of the net profits which may be realized by the parties of the first part

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