5. Separable provisions; when constitutionality of separable provision not
considered.
Where, as in this instance, the provision for penalties is separable from

the provisions for regulations, the court will not consider the ques-
tion of the constitutionality of the penalty provisions in a suit
brought by the Government to enjoin carriers from violating the
regulations and in which no penalties are sought to be recov-
ered. Ib.

6. Ambiguity resolved-Restraint of provisions for purposes of accord.
Where ambiguity exists it is the duty of a court construing a statute to
restrain the wider and doubtful provisions so as to make them
accord with the narrow and more reasonable provisions and thus
harmonize the statute. Ib.

7. Limitation of operation and effect.

A statute will, as a general rule, be construed as intended to be confined
in its operation and effect to the territorial limits within the juris-
diction of the lawmaker, and words of universal scope will be con-
strued as meaning only those subject to the legislation. American
Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 347.

8. Of state statute; strained implication avoided.

A state statute will not, by strained implication, be construed as a
divestiture of rights of property, or as authorizing administration
of the assets of a governmental agency, without the presence of
the State, and so held as to the statute of South Carolina providing
for winding up the State Liquor Dispensary. Murray v. Wilson
Distilling Co., 151.

9. Penal statutes without the power of Congress to enact cannot be sus-
tained by the courts.

Notwithstanding the offensiveness of the crime the courts cannot sus-
tain a Federal penal statute if the power to punish the same has not
been delegated to Congress by the Constitution. Keller v..United
States, 138.

10. Of charter granted under general act-Effect on Federal courts of state
court's construction.

The construction of a general act and a charter granted thereunder
pertain to the state court just as if the charter were granted by a
special act; and in a suit by the holder of a policy, executed at the
home office, the meaning and construction of the charter as held
by the state court will be binding on the Federal courts, and, in the
absence of any Federal question, the construction of the contract

by the state court will be of most persuasive influence even if not
of binding force. Equitable Life Assurance Soc. v. Brown, 25.

11. Prospective effect of act of February 24, 1905, c. 280.

U. S. Fidelity Co. v. Struthers Wells Co., 209 U. S. 306, followed to effect
that the act of February 24, 1905, c. 778, 33 Stat. 811, amending
the act of August 13, 1894, c. 280, 28 Stat. 278, is prospective and
does not control actions based on rights of material-men already
accrued, but that such actions are controlled by the act of 1894.
Davidson Marble Co. v. Gibson, 10.

12. Limitation of operation amounting to judicial legislation.
Although a limitation to its operation might be reasonable and thus
assuage the radical results of a prohibitory statute, if it is not ex-
pressed in the statute, to engraft such a limitation would be pure
judicial legislation. United States v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 366.
See BOUNDARIES, 2;
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 5,

CERTIORARI, 2;

INTERSTATE COMMERCE, 1, 4;

8, 10;

RATE REGULATION, 2.

B. STATUTES OF THE UNITED STATES.

See ACTS OF CONGRESS.

C. STATUTES OF THE STATES AND TERRITORIES.
See LOCAL LAW.

STOCK AND STOCKHOLDERS.

See ACTIONS, 1;

CORPORATIONS;

RECEIVERS, 2.

SUITS AGAINST STATES.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 3, 4, 7, 8.

SURETIES.

See JURISDICTION, C 2;
STATUTES, A 11.

TAXES AND TAXATION.

Tax on warehouse receipt as tax on goods represented.

A tax upon warehouse receipts for goods amounts in substance and
effect to a tax upon the goods themselves. (Fairbanks v. United
States, 181 U. S. 283.) Selliger v. Kentucky, 200.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 8, 9;

INJUNCTION, 1, 2, 3..

TELEGRAMS.

See JURISDICTION, A 3;
STATES, 2.

TERRITORIES.

1. Legislative power concerning personal injuries and rights of action.
Where Congress confers on a Territory legislative power extending to
all rightful subjects of legislation the Territory has authority to
legislate concerning personal injuries and rights of action relating
thereto; and so held in regard to the legislative power of New
Mexico under act of Sept. 9, 1850, c. 49, 9 Stat. 446. Atchison,
Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Sowers. 55.

2. Legislative act an exercise of authority under United States.
The passage of a legislative act of a Territory is the exercise of authority
under the United States. (McLean v. Railroad Co., 203 U. S. 38,
47.) Ib.

3. Legislative powers-Revisory power of Congress.

Congress has only reserved a revisory power over territorial legislation,
and a statute duly enacted, and within the legislative power of the
Territory, remains in full force until Congress annuls it by exerting
such power. (Miner's Bank v. Iowa, 12 How. 1, 8.) Ib.

1. Force and effect of treaty with foreign government.

A treaty between the United States and a foreign government within
the constitutional limits of the treaty-making power is, by the ex-
press words of the Constitution, the supreme law of the land bind-
ing alike on national and state courts and must be enforced by
them in the litigation of private rights. Maiorano v. Baltimore &
Ohio R. R. Co., 268.

2. Treaty with Italy of 1871; giving of actions for injury and death not
within contemplation of.

While undoubtedly the giving of actions for injury and death results
in care and security against accidents to travelers the protection
and security thus afforded are too remote to be considered as ele-

ments in contemplation of the contracting powers to the treaty of
1871 between Italv and the United States. Ib.

3. Same.

By a fair construction, Articles 2, 3 and 23 of the treaty with Italy of
1871, 17 Stat. 845, do not confer upon the non-resident alien rela-
tives of a citizen of Italy a right of action for damages for his death
in one of the States of this Union although such an action is afforded
by a statute of that State to native resident relatives, and although
the existence of such an action might indirectly promote his safety;
and so held as to the statute of Pennsylvania, it having been so con-
strued by the highest court of that State. Ib.

See PORTO RICO, 2.

TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY.

See BANKRUPTCY, 7.

TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES.
See INSURANCE COMPANIES, 1.

UNITED STATES.

See APPEAL AND ERROR, 2;
CERTIORARI, 2;

VERDICT.

VENDOR AND VENDEE.

1. Fraud of vendor invalidating sale made through agent.

Where a sale made through an agent of the vendor has been effected by

the fraud and deceit of the vendor, the sale cannot stand whether or
not the vendor's agent had power to sell. Strong v. Repide, 419.

2. Fraud to avoid sale-Method of payment as evidence of fraudulent intent
and scheme.

While the method of payment cannot have induced the vendor's con-
sent to a sale, where that method tended to conceal the identity
of the purchaser and was part of a scheme to conceal facts, the
knowledge of which would have resulted in vendor's refusal to sell,
evidence as to the payment is admissible to show the fraudulent
intent and scheme of the purchaser. Ib.

See CORPORATIONS, 1-5.

VERDICT.

Direction of verdict for Government in action to recover penalty prescribed
by Alien Immigration Act of 1903.

A suit brought by the United States to recover the penalty prescribed

by §§ 4 and 5 of the Alien Immigration Act of March 3, 1903, c. 1012,
32 Stat. 1213, is a civil suit and not a criminal prosecution, and
when it appears by undisputed testimony that a defendant has
committed an offense against those sections the trial judge may
direct a verdict in favor of the Government. Hepner v. United
States, 103.

Law is a statement of the circumstances in which the public force will
be brought to bear upon men through the courts; but the word
commonly is confined to such prophecies or threats when addressed
to persons living within the power of the courts. American Banana
Co. v. United Fruit Co., 347.