Bank of V. 1874, with his plea of tender, because of the order of Judge Septem'r Term. Underwood; but because, as Mr. Barton states, that he (Marshall) was confident that this court would hold the Valley that the debtors to the bank could pay their indebtfor &c. edness with the depreciated notes of the bank. There Marshall. is nothing in the record to show that Mr. Marshall ever saw or heard of the order of Judge Underwood authorizing his receiver to take the notes of the bank. But if he had, this was an erroneous order, so declared by Judge Bond of the Circuit court and revoked by him. He certainly could acquire no rights under an order confessedly erroneous, and revoked by the court which made it. When the plea of tender was filed (July 2d, 1872,) this court had decided that a debtor of the bank could not pay his debt by notes of circulation acquired after notice of the assignment by the bank of its assets; and the Circuit court of the United States had, on the 23d November, 1871, revoked the order of Judge Underwood, and after referring in its order to the decision of this court in Exchange Bank v. Knox, and Farmers' Bank v. Anderson, 19 Gratt. 739, and adopting these decisions as the law of the land, had prohibited the receiver "from receiving any circulating notes of the Bank of the Valley, except in cases where such circulating notes were acquired by the debtors before any assignment was made by the Bank of the Valley to a trustee for the benefit of its creditors." The Circuit court of Frederick, however, notwithstanding the decision of the court above referred to, and the order of Judge Bond in accordance therewith, appears to have felt itself constrained, by the original order of Judge Underwood, authorizing its receiver to take the depreciated notes of the bank in payment of debts due the bank. 1874. Septem'r, Term. Bank of for &c. V. No doubt this conclusion was adopted by the learned judge upon the theory that the Circuit court of the United States having jurisdiction of the subject, and having settled the mode of payment of debts due to the Valley the bank, the parties who acted under this order were fully discharged when they complied with it. But it Marshall. must be remembered, that when the plea of tender was filed, the order referred to had been declared erroneous, and had been revoked by the same court which had entered it. The notes tendered by the defendant were not a legal tender in any sense; but, on the contrary, were such notes as both the court and the Circuit court of the United States had declared should not be received in payment of debts due the bank, because they (it is conceded) were acquired after notice of the assignment by the bank of its assets for the benefit of its creditors. The court is therefore of opinion that the judgment of the said Circuit court of Frederick, declaring that "the defendant has paid the debt and interest in the writ mentioned, by his payment of money into court since the institution of this suit," is erroneous, and that the same be reversed and annulled; and that a judgment be entered for the plaintiff in conformity with the principles herein declared. STAPLES, J., dissented. The judgment is as follows: This day came again the parties by their attorneys, and the court, having maturely considered the transcript of the record of the judgment aforesaid and the arguments of counsel, is of opinion, for reasons stated in writing and filed with the record, that the said judgment is erroneous. Therefore it is considered Bank of the Valley for &c. V. 1874. that the same be reversed and annulled, and that the Septem'r Term. plaintiff in error recover against the defendant in error its costs by it expended in the prosecution of its writ of error and supersedeas aforesaid here. And this court now proceeding to render such judgment as the Marshall. said Circuit court ought to have rendered, it is further considered that the plaintiff recover against the defendant the sum of eleven hundred dollars ($1,100), the debt, and $5.56, the costs of protest in the declaration mentioned, with legal interest on $900, part thereof, and $2.76 costs of protest, from the 26th day of June 1861, and on $200, the residue, and $2.80 costs of protest, from the 26th day of April 1861, till payment, and the costs expended by the said plaintiff in the prosecution of the suit in the said Circuit court. Which is ordered to be certified to the said Circuit court of Frederick county. JUDGMENT REversed. Staunton. HOOVER V. MITCHELL & als. October I. 1. The judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, dismissing a suit agreed, upon the ground that it had been agreed by the parties, is at least prima facie, a final determination as to those parties of the matters litigated in that suit. This was an action on the case in the Circuit court of Augusta county, brought by Joseph T. Mitchell against George F. Hoover and Robert G. Bickle, to recover the amount which Mitchell had paid as endorser of a note made by John D. Fairbairn, and on which the defendants were also endorsers. The plaintiff charged that the defendants were to endorse the note before him, and had fraudulently placed their names after his on the paper. The defendants appeared and pleaded not guilty," and the Statute of Limitations, and also tendered a special plea of a former judgment of the court for the same cause of action between the same parties; and they set out the judgment as follows: "This day came again the parties by their attornies, and this suit having been agreed, on motion it is ordered that this suit be dismissed agreed." And they vouched the record. The plaintiff objected to the plea, and the court excluded it: Whereupon the defendants excepted. There were other exceptions taken by the defendants, but they need not be stated. The parties dispensed with a jury, and submitted the case to the court: and the court rendered a judg 1874. Septem'r Term. 1874. ment against Hoover for $319.12, with interest from Septem'r Term. April 12th, 1859, till paid, and in favor of the defendant Bickle. And thereupon Hoover applied to this court for a supersedeas; which was allowed. Hoover V. Mitchell & als. Fultz, for the appellant. G. M. Cochran, for the appellees. ANDERSON, J. delivered the opinion of the court. The court is of opinion that the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, dismissing a suit agreed, upon the ground that it had been agreed by the parties, is a final determination, as to those parties, of the matters litigated in that suit. It is virtually an acknowledgment by the plaintiff in open court, as in retraxit, that the plaintiff has no cause of action, or rather, no further cause of action. It is not merely an abandonment of his suit by the plaintiff, as in a non-suit; it is the concurrent action of both parties. It is a representation by the plaintiff to the court, that the suit has been agreed, which is assented to by the defendant; and thereupon the suit is dismissed agreed by the judgment of the court, without costs to either party. To say that a suit is agreed by the parties is, in effect, to say that the cause of the suit has been agreed. It is a declaration of record sanctioned by the judgment of the court, that the cause of action has been adjusted by the parties themselves, in their own way, and that the suit is dismissed agreed. An agreement to compound civil rights, or forego or settle an action that has been commenced, is valid, and may be enforced. Addison on Contracts, p. 96, § 2. A compromise itself, or the loss by the defendant of the costs he has expended in his defense, is a |