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self from the attack of all.-Welborn v. State, 179 S. W. 1179.

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(E) Weight and Sufficiency. 228 (Ark.) Evidence as to circumstances under which deceased was called from his house and as to the subsequent finding of his dead body held to warrant a finding that there was an unlawful killing.-Johnson v. State, 179 S. W. 361.

evidence

116 (Tex.Cr.App.) Defendant had right to shoot decedent attacking him if from his viewpoint he was in danger of death or serious injury, whether other parties, decedent's friends, had anything to do with the trouble, or whenever they came into it.-Welborn v. State, 179233 (Tex.Cr.App.) Proof of motive is not S. W. 1179. It is defendant's viewpoint, and not the jury's, Rea v. State, 179 S. W. 706. essential to support a conviction for murder.they subsequently see a homicide, from which the appearance of matters, as giving de-234 (Tex.Cr.App.) Circumstantial fendant reasonable cause to believe he was in in a prosecution for homicide held to support a danger of injury, is to be estimated.-Id. verdict of guilty.-Rea v. State, 179 S. W. 706. 122 (Tex.Cr.App.) Where accused shot the 236 (Tex.Cr.App.) In a prosecution for murdeceased, who was attacking defendant's father, der, evidence held to show that decedent, a he was guilty of no offense if it reasonably three year old girl, received fatal injury when appeared to him at the time he shot that the flung into an adjoining room by defendant.life of his father was in danger, or that he was Galvan v. State, 179 S. W. 875. in danger of suffering serious bodily injury.Brod v. State, 179 S. W. 1189.

VI. INDICTMENT AND INFORMA-
TION.

142 (Ark.) An indictment charging one kind of first degree murder will not support an instruction and conviction on another kind, where the elements of the two are essentially different. -Sheppard v. State, 179 S. W. 168.

VII. EVIDENCE.

(A) Presumptions and Burden of Proof. 144 (Ark.) Notwithstanding Kirby's Dig. 1765, the burden on the whole case on a trial for homicide is on the state, and mitigating circumstances raising a reasonable doubt require an acquittal, by whichever party proved. -Johnson v. State, 179 S. W. 361.

(B) Admissibility in General, 157 (Tex.Cr.App.) Evidence of defendant's difficulty with a person who had won his money and whom he probably intended to kill was admissible to show his state of mind.-Williams v. State, 179 S. W. 710.

163 (Tex.Cr.App.) In a prosecution for uxoricide, defendant's evidence of his kindness to his children held inadmissible, since his kindness to them was not in issue.-Rea v. State, 179 S. W. 706.

164 (Tex.Cr.App.) Where defendant contended that deceased might have committed suicide on account of ill health, testimony of an employer that he lost no time while working for him held admissible.-Hand v. State, 179 S. W. 1155.

166 (Tex.Cr.App.) Evidence of defendant's difficulty with a person who had won his money and whom he probably intended to kill was admissible to show his motive.-Williams v. State, 179 S. W. 710.

166 (Tex.Cr.App.) Evidence as to defendant's false statements before deceased's death that he was a millionaire, and after his death that he was a pauper, and that she had a large amount of money in a bank, held admissible.Hand v. State, 179 S. W. 1155.

170 (Ark.) In a prosecution for homicide, evidence that shoes of the same last as those sold to accused, but only a little shorter, fitted tracks at the place of the crime, except as to length, is admissible.--Owens v. State, 179 S. W. 1014.

174 (Ky.) Letter by one defendant, written after commission of crime and threatening to kill the jailer, held not admissible upon joint trial.-Wilson v. Commonwealth, 179 S. W.

237.

181 (Tex.Cr.App.) In a trial for murder, contents of letter of deceased in reply to defendant's wife held inadmissible, but that deceased received a letter from her and the registry receipt for it to which his answer was in reply was admissible.-Vollintine v. State, 179 S. W.

250 (Tex.Cr.App.) In a prosecution for murder against a peace officer, evidence held to sustain conviction of manslaughter.-Moser v. State, 179 S. W. 104.

253 (Ark.) Evidence held to warrant a conviction of murder in the first degree.-Owens v. State, 179 S. W. 1014.

257 (Tex.Cr.App.) Evidence held to support a conviction for assault with intent to murder. -Freeman v. State, 179 S. W. 1157.

VIII. TRIAL.

(B) Questions for Jury.

268 (Ark.) Under Kirby's Dig. § 1765, as to burden of showing mitigating circumstances, where unlawful killing was established, and defendant admitted "knifing" deceased, directed verdict held properly refused.-Johnson v. State, 179 S. W. 361.

281 (Tex.Cr.App.) In a prosecution for homicide, evidence that accused was a principal held sufficient to go to the jury.-Taylor v. State, 179 S. W. 113.

(C) Instructions.

290 (Tex.Cr.App.) Instructions in prosecution for wife murder by poison held to sufficiently require the state to prove that arsenic was the poison used.-Rea v. State, 179 S. W. 706.

291 (Tex.Cr.App.) Evidence in a prosecution for wife murder by poison held not to require a charge on the issue of suicide.-Rea v. State, 179 S. W. 706.

300 (Ark.) Instruction that defendant could not plead self-defense if he was the aggressor or voluntarily entered into the difficulty held to properly present state's theory, and not erroneous for failure to charge as to defendant's withdrawal from the difficulty.-Yancey State, 179 S. W. 352.

v.

300 (Ark.) Instruction on self-defense in language of Kirby's Dig. § 1798, and another instruction given at defendant's request held not in conflict, but to correctly declare the law.Johnson v. State, 179 S. W. 361.

300 (Ky.) Where the evidence shows that deceased was shot from behind, precluding the possibility of altercation or struggle, failure to instruct on self-defense and manslaughter held not error.-Wilson v. Commonwealth, 179 S. W. 237.

300 (Tex.Cr.App.) Failure to instruct that two witnesses, when attacked by deceased, to whose aid defendant, a peace officer, came, were not bound to retreat, held not erroneous as not called for by evidence.-Moser v. State, 179 S. W. 104.

Failure to charge on law of retreat as applied to defendant peace officer and two brothers who were being attacked by deceased when the officer came up, the question being inapplicable to any theory of the case, held not erroneous. -Id.

300 (Tex.Cr.App.) In a trial for murder, instruction that defendant in self-defense might

629.

him at the time and place to be necessary to fin common.-Bennett v. Hutchens, 179 S. W. protect himself against unlawful violence was erroneous.-Vollintine v. State, 179 S. W. 108. Where the evidence in a trial for murder raised the issue of self-defense based on threats, the refusal to submit it was error.-Id.

300 (Tex. Cr.App.) In a prosecution for homicide, held, that a charge on self-defense should have been given.-Taylor v. State, 179 S. W. 113.

One charged as principal of the party who actually fired the fatal shot held not guilty, where he or the actual perpetrator reasonably believed it was necessary in self-defense.-Id.

300 (Tex.Cr.App.) In a prosecution for manslaughter, instruction held erroneous as improperly presenting issue of self-defense.-Welborn v. State, 179 S. W. 1179.

305 (Tex.Cr.App.) In prosecution for homicide, a charge on the question of principals held erroneous under the circumstances. Taylor v. State, 179 S. W. 113.

It is immaterial that a deed to a husband and wife does not show their relation, or the intention of their grantor. on its face, for their estate is required by the common law to be by the entireties.-Id.

Shannon's Code, § 3677, does not abolish estates by the entireties.-Id.

19 (Tex.Civ.App.) A wife, who purchased goods which were necessaries for her own use, was personally liable for their value.-Trammell v. Neiman-Marcus Co., 179 S. W. 271.

2334 (Tex.Civ.App.) In an action by an automobile dealer for the value of a car sold by one representing himself as agent, evidence held to warrant finding of agency in plaintiff's wife to employ salesman.-Holmes v. Tyner, 179 S. W. 887.

IV. DISABILITIES AND PRIVILEGES
OF COVERTURE.

(C) Contracts.

309 (Tex.Cr.App.) Instruction that adultery of defendant's wife with deceased would 87 (Tex.Civ.App.) A married woman cannot reduce the killing to manslaughter held not, even with the consent of her husband, legalerroneous as not fairly presenting the issues ly bind herself as surety on an appeal bond, and made by the evidence.-Mitchell v. State, 179 a bond on which she is a surety may be reS. W. 116. fused.-Wilson v. Dearborn, 179 S. W. 1102.

An instruction that adultery with the wife may be adequate cause which may reduce a homicide to manslaughter should be given if there is evidence to support it.-Id.

V. WIFE'S SEPARATE ESTATE. (A) What Constitutes.

113 (Tenn.) Laws 1913, c. 26, do not affect estates of married women held at the time of its passage.-Bennett v. Hutchens, 179 S. W. 629. VI. ACTIONS.

X. APPEAL AND ERROR. 340 (Tex.Cr.App.) Where jury assessed lowest punishment for manslaughter, charge on murder and manslaughter held, in view of the verdict not so general as to mislead jury.-Lock-205 (Tenn.) Common-law rule that one ett v. State, 179 S. W. 716.

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HUSBAND AND WIFE. See Bigamy; Curtesy; Death, 31; Descent and Distribution, 52; Disorderly House, 9; Divorce; Evidence, 248; Fraudulent Conveyances, 299, 300; Homestead; Marriage; Witnesses, 60.

I. MUTUAL RIGHTS, DUTIES, AND
LIABILITIES.

spouse cannot sue the other for tort committed during the marriage held not abrogated by Shannon's Code, § 6470, or Pub. Acts 1913, c. 26.-Lillienkamp v. Rippetoe, 179 S. W. 628.

209 (Tenn.) Notwithstanding the Married Women's Act, a husband may, as at common law, recover for loss of the services of his wife by reason of her personal injuries.-City of Chattanooga v. Carter, 179 S. W. 127.

235 (Tex.Civ.App.) In action for alleged necessaries, instruction to find the goods to be necessaries as against the wife held calculated to impress the jury that they were necessaries as against the husband.-Trammell v. NeimanMarcus Co., 179 S. W. 271.

Submission of issue whether goods were necessaries, considering husband's financial circumstances and station in life at "and prior" to the time of the purchase, held erroneous.-Id.

In action for necessaries, in which plaintiff pleaded estoppel, held, that question whether the husband knew the goods were being charged to him should have been submitted to the jury.

-Id.

VII. COMMUNITY PROPERTY.

257 (Tex. Civ.App.) Rev. St. 1911, art. 4621, as amended by Acts 33d Leg. c. 32, § 1 (Vernon's Sayles' Ann. Civ. St. 1914, art. 4621), and Rev. St. 1911, art. 4622 (Vernon's Sayles' Ann. Civ. St. 1914, art. 4622), do not change the rule that 6 (Ark.) Where one conveys his property property acquired by the use of the wife's septo deprive an intended husband or wife of rights arate property becomes that of the community. arising from marriage, equity will avoid such-First Nat. Bank of Plainview v. McWhorter, conveyance, or compel the grantee to hold the 179 S. W. 1147. property in trust for the defrauded husband or wife.-West v. West, 179 S. W. 1017.

IX. ABANDONMENT.

right to prosecute for abandonment after seduction and marriage that the marriage shall have taken place after indictment.-Coleman v. State, 179 S. W. 1172.

1 (Ky.) Under the law in 1864, before the 302 (Tex.Cr.App.) It is not essential to the Married Women's Act of 1894, a husband, taking his wife's personal property and using it in the purchase of a farm, and taking title in her name with reversion to his heirs, thereby reduced it to possession.-Neel's Ex'r v. Noland's Heirs, 179 S. W. 430.

14 (Tenn.) A conveyance to husband and wife creates an estate by the entireties, and not

313 (Tex.Cr.App.) In a prosecution for abandonment after seduction and marriage, held error to exclude testimony of a witness that he saw a woman, whom he believed to be

INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS.

See Witnesses, 379, 396.
INDEMNITY.

See Guaranty; Mechanics' Liens,

313.

prosecutrix, and a third person in compromising acts, where there was evidence that her child resembled the third person rather than defendant.-Coleman v. State, 179 S. W. 1172. Defendant's evidence that he married prosecutrix under duress, and almost immediately sued to annul the marriage for duress, was admissible to rebut the presumption arising from 6 (Tex. Civ.App.) Where indorsers of a note the marriage that he was guilty of seduction. paid it, they were entitled to judgment upon an -Id. indemnity note given them by the maker and A decree divorcing defendant from prosecu- to a foreclosure of the trust deed securing it. trix, not being binding on the state, was not ad--Grubbs v. Eddleman, 179 S. W. 91. missible in evidence.-Id.

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IMPRISONMENT.

See False Imprisonment; Habeas Corpus.

IMPROVEMENT DISTRICTS.

See Municipal Corporations, 265, 747.

IMPROVEMENTS.

III. FORMAL REQUISITES OF IN.
DICTMENT.

34 (Tex.Cr.App.) The indorsement of names of witnesses upon the back of an indictment for murder after its return into court was not an alteration invalidating it.-Galvan v. State, 179 S. W. 875.

V. REQUISITES AND SUFFICIENCY
OF ACCUSATION.

110 (Ark.) Indictment for keeping a gambling table, in the words of the statute, held to charge a public offense, under Kirby's Dig. § 1732.-Riley v. State, 179 S. W. 661.

110 (Tex.Cr.App.) An indictment for arson following Pen. Code 1911, art. 1200 et seq., See Life Estates, 17; Mechanics' Liens; held sufficient.-Tinker v. State, 179 S. W. 572. Municipal Corporations, 265-567; Ten-110 (Tex.Cr.App.) In view of Rev. St. arts. ancy in Common, 29. 7435, 7446. Code Cr. Proc. arts. 453, 460, 464, and Pen. Code, art. 614, an information charging sale of intoxicants without a license, following article 611, held sufficient, while not averring the particular place in the county or that accused was licensed to sell elsewhere.Winterman v. State, 179 S. W. 704.

IMPUTED NEGLIGENCE.

See Negligence, 93, 96.

INCEST.

10 (Ark.) An indictment stating in tech-121 (Ky.) An indictment being too general, nical language that adultery was committed by and not sufficiently describing the thing condefendant, a married man, with his niece, suf-verted, bill of particulars is the remedy.-Comficiently alleged the offense of incest.-Carmen monwealth v. Holliday, 179 S. W. 235. v. State, 179 S. W. 183.

An indictment for incest which failed to allege that defendant was a married man when he committed the adultery with his niece was insufficient to sustain a conviction.-Id.

13 (Ark.) On trial for incest, conduct and acts prior to period of limitation held admissible to show relations of parties.-Carmen v. State, 179 S. W. 183.

Bond and orders in bastardy proceeding in which defendant admitted that he was the father of the child held admissible.-Id.

14 (Ark.) On a trial for incest, evidence held sufficient to support a verdict of guilty.

122 (Tex.Cr.App.) A complaint charging an assault with "knucks, commonly known as brass knucks," and an information charging the assault with "knucks," do not show a fatal variance.-Chisom v. State, 179 S. W. 103.

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125 (Ky.) Considering the accusative and descriptive parts of an indictment, held, it was not duplicitous, but only charged the offense denounced by Ky. St. § 1358a, and not that denounced by section 1202.-Commonwealth v.

not raised in the circuit court.--Talbott v. Commonwealth, 179 S. W. 621.

128 (Tex.Cr.App.) Indictment charging in
two counts theft from two persons and theft
from one of such persons held good, and not to
charge a felony, though aggregate value of prop-
erty, as stated in both counts, was $55.-Whit-57
field v. States, 179 S. W. 558.

VII. MOTION TO QUASH OR DISMISS,
AND DEMURRER.

133 (Tex. Cr.App.) An indictment cannot be shown to be defective by evidence, but is tested as a pleading under the law applicable.-Tinker v. State, 179 S. W. 572.

137 (Ark.) Disqualification of grand juror held not to affect indictment on motion to quash under the express provisions of Kirby's Dig. § 2245.-Calloway v. State, 179 S. W. 356.

137 (Tex.Cr.App.) Where an indictment was in two counts, and one of them was good, there was no error in denying a motion to quash, where the conviction was general.-Hyroop v. State, 179 S. W. 878.

137 (Tex.Cr.App.) That an indictment charges the same offense charged in another indictment under which accused had been convicted is not ground for quashing the indictment. -Park v. State, 179 S. W. 1152.

IV. CONTRACTS.

(Mo.App.) Sale of small value from stock of drugs, and retention of possession of store until trial of action for rescission of contract, whereby plaintiff, when an infant, had purchased the stock, held not a ratification of such contract.-Moser v. Renner, 179 S. W. 970.

58 (Mo.App.) Action for decree, rescinding contract entered into during minority, and requiring defendants to surrender the consideration paid, commenced within proper time, held in itself a disaffirmance of such contract.— Moser v. Renner, 179 S. W. 970.

Action for rescission of contract of sale and cancellation of the several notes secured by chattel mortgage held maintainable for plaintiff's protection on ground of avoiding a multiplicity of suits on the notes.-Id.

Plaintiff, who while a minor purchased the capital stock of a drug company which was action after majority to rescind sale, held not wholly owned by defendants individually, in required to make tender of stock to himself, as representing the corporation.-Id.

INHERITANCE TAX.

137 (Tex.Cr.App.) That an indictment for knowingly permitting his house to be used for purposes of prostitution did not put defendant's See Taxation, 860-895. name after the words "upon their oaths in said court present that, * or that it did not allege particularly where the premises were located in the county, held not grounds for quashing.-Lawson v. State, 179 S. W. 1186.

* * ""

138 (Tex.Cr.App.) Overruling of motion containing exception to indictment on ground that it had been altered after return into court held proper.-Galvan v. State, 179 S. W. 875.

INJUNCTION.

See Courts, 189; Easements, 61; Execution, 172; Highways, 64; Municipal Corporations, 697; Trial, 11.

I. NATURE AND GROUNDS IN GEN

ERAL.

(B) Grounds of Relief.

147 (Ky.) An indictment being too general, and not sufficiently describing the thing converted, bill of particulars, and not demurrer, is 9 (Tenn.) An injunction will not be granted the remedy.-Commonwealth v. Holliday, 179 to protect an alleged right, except upon a clear S. W. 235. case.-Memphis St. Ry. Co. v. Rapid Transit Co., 179 S. W. 635.

XI. WAIVER OF DEFECTS AND OB- II. SUBJECTS OF PROTECTION AND

JECTIONS, AND AIDER BY
VERDICT.

202 (Mo.) An information for embezzlement not assailed before the trial held good after verdict, under Rev. St. 1909, § 5115.-State v. Wilcox, 179 S. W. 479.

INDORSEMENT.

See Indictment and Information, 34.

INFANTS.

See Death, 44; Equity, 39; Guardian and Ward; Judges, 22; Jury, 14; Municipal Corporations, 762, 763; Negligence, 96; Parent and Child.

II. CUSTODY AND PROTECTION.

12 (Tenn.) Laws 1911, c. 58, declaring in fants violating the criminal laws delinquent children who may be committed to the state reformatory, held not penal, but reformatory, and not contrary to Const. art. 1, § 14, prohibiting prosecution except by presentment, indictment, or impeachment.-Childress v. State, 179 S. W. 643.

13 (Ark.) Father, owning pool tables, who employed his son, under 15 years, to operate the pool room under an agreement that the boy should have half the proceeds, held not guilty of a violation of Acts 1911, p. 63, § 1.Halliday v. State, 179 S. W. 1004.

RELIEF.

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64 (Tenn.) The franchise of a street railway company is a property right, which enables it to maintain an action for injunction against competing carriers, who have not been granted similar rights by legislative sanction, and to that extent its franchise is exclusive.-Memphis St. Ry. Co. v. Rapid Transit Co., 179 S. W. 635.

65 (Tenn.) Where the city council fails to act under a statute authorizing it to regulate jitbill of the street railway company, since its rights ney busses, the jitneys may be enjoined on the may be materially invaded through failure of the council to act.-Memphis St. Ry. Co. v. Rapid Transit Co., 179 S. W. 635.

compel a grantee of a franchise, where there 67 (Ky.) Citizens of a municipality may are provisions therein for their benefit, to exercise the franchise.-City of Princeton v. Princeton Electric Light & Power Co., 179 S. W.

1074.

(E) Public Officers and Boards and Municipalities.

80 (Ky.) Precinct election officers can be compelled to perform the omitted duty of returning statement with contested ballots showing whether and how counted.-Graham v. Treadway, 179 S. W. 1029.

Mandatory injunction is proper remedy to require performance of ministerial duties by precinct election officers.-Id.

18 (Ky.) Under Ky. St. § 331e, subsec. 5, held, that circuit court had no jurisdiction of juvenile delinquent of 16 who had not been brought before the county court, which want of jurisdiction might be raised on appeal, though-Id.

The exercise of discretion by election officers will not be controlled by mandatory injunction.

(H) Criminal Acts, Conspiracies, and

Prosecutions.

III. INSURANCE AGENTS AND

BROKERS.

(A) Agency for Insurer.

105 (Tenn.) Equity cannot enjoin criminal proceedings under a statute, though it be charg-74 (Mo.App.) A contract between an ined that the act is invalid and that a multiplicity surance company, its general agent and the genof actions will result in irreparable damage, eral manager of its burglary and surety departwhen complainant's defense at law is adequate. ments, held several and not joint.-United -Alexander v. Elkins, 179 S. W. 310. States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Ridge, 179 S. W. 791.

An equity court will enjoin the father of a girl and a justice of the peace from indulging in prosecutions of the girl's husband for nonsupport, under a statute declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, calculated to continue until such husband paid money for the support of his wife.-Id.

III. ACTIONS FOR INJUNCTIONS.

109 (Tex.Civ.App.) In suit to enjoin trespasses, held, that defendant might assert ownership in himself and set up a claim for damages for being unlawfully dispossessed by plaintiff.-Harper v. Stewart, 179 S. W. 277.

IV. PRELIMINARY AND INTERLOCUTORY INJUNCTIONS.

(A) Grounds and Proceedings to Procure. 136 (Tex.Civ.App.) The court, in granting a temporary injunction should require a case of probable right and probable danger to the right without the injunction.-Whitaker v. Hill, 179 S. W. 539.

(B) Continuing, Modifying, Vacating, or Dissolving.

163 (Tex.Civ.App.) The court, in refusing to dissolve a temporary injunction, should require a case of probable right and probable danger to the right without the injunction.-Whitaker v. Hill, 179 S. W. 539.

Whether a contract between an insurance company and its agents creates a joint or several agency does not depend upon the number of agents contracted with nor on the form of the agreement.-Id.

76 (Tex.Civ.App.) Insurance agent's testimony that his authority had not terminated when he issued a policy held to support finding for plaintiff, though circumstantial evidence tended to show that it had been terminated.International Fire Insurance Co. v. Black, 179 S. W. 534.

78 (Tex. Civ.App.) Person dealing with inof authority held entitled to assume that he was surance agent without knowledge of limitation authorized to issue particular policy and company was estopped to assert the contrary.-International Fire Insurance Co. v. Black, 179 S. W. 534.

Notwithstanding secretary's testimony as to custom, court held entitled to determine territorial extent of insurance agent's authority from correspondence, and it did not limit him to a particular county.—Id.

79 (Mo.App.) A contract between an insurance company, its general agent and the general manager of its burglary and surety departments, held not terminated by the retirement of the general manager.-United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Ridge, 179 S. W. 791.

164 (Mo.App.) A United States Circuit 83 (Ark.) Bond of local agent of insurance Court entering a temporary injunction order in force only "until the further order of the court" had inherent power at any time to vacate or set aside such order.-Danciger v. American Express Co., 179 S. W. 797.

INSANE PERSONS.

See Criminal Law, 570.

INSOLVENCY.

See Corporations, 553–566.

INSPECTION.

company held not to bind himself and sureties to reimburse the company for losses occurring on policies issued on prohibited risks by such local agent.-Security Ins. Co. v. Jaggers, 179 S. W. 1008.

93 (Ark.) A fire policy, payable to mortgagee as interest might appear, held not void merely because, unknown to insurer, its agent was president of the mortgagee.-Milwaukee Mechanics' Ins. Co. v. Fuquay, 179 S. W. 497.

IV. INSURABLE INTEREST.

114 (Ky.) Where deceased procured an accident policy and paid all the premiums, held, that the beneficiary named was entitled to the amount

See Insurance, 549; Master and Servant, due under the policy, though she had no insura124.

INSTRUCTIONS.

To jury, see Criminal Law, 775-844; Trial, 191-296.

INSURANCE.

See Appeal and Error, 909; Constitutional Law, 206, 229, 283; Evidence, 128; Judgment, 559; Justices of the Peace, 98; Pleading, 236, 433; Principal and Agent, 143; Taxation, 113, 387; Trial, 191, 296.

II. INSURANCE COMPANIES.
(B) Mutual Companies.

55 (Ky.) Person held not to become member of co-operative insurance company by signing application, notwithstanding Ky. St. § 702, and hence agreement that insurance should be in force from the date of the application was invalid.-Bracken County Ins. Co. y. Murray, 179 S. W. 842.

57 (Ky.) There could be no valid contract of insurance between a co-operative or assessment insurance company and a person not a member of the company.-Bracken County Ins.

ble interest in deceased's life.-Allen's Adm'r v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 179 S. W. 581.

V. THE CONTRACT IN GENERAL. (A) Nature, Requisites, and Validity.

131 (Ky.) A valid and enforceable oral contract of insurance may be made between insured and the company, or between him and its authorized agent.-Bracken County Ins. Co. v. Murray, 179 S. W. 842.

136 (Mo.App.) Insurance company held not liable to beneficiary on life policy undelivered to insured before his death, where the negotiations provided that there should be no contract until the policy had been delivered to insured in good health.-Yount v. Prudential Life Ins. Co., 179 S. W. 749.

141 (Mo.App.) Actual manual delivery of life policy made a condition precedent to liability by the terms of the insurance contract, as embodied in the application, may be waived by the insurer. Yount v. Prudential Life Ins. Co., 179 S. W. 749.

(B) Construction and Operation.

146 (Mo.App.) All doubts appearing on the

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