JUSTICES OF THE PEACE. See Constitutional Law, 102. III. CIVIL JURISDICTION AND AU- 58 (Mo.App.) The jurisdiction of a justice of the peace must appear affirmatively from the record.-Graves v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 179 S. W. 947. IV. PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES. 80 (Tenn.) In a suit against a railroad for personal injury on or near its tracks, begun before a justice of the peace, the warrant must sufficiently advise the defendant of the nature of the suit.-Whittaker v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 179 S. W. 140. 98 (Mo.App.) Under Rev. St. 1909, §§ 7413 7414, in action before justice of the peace on insurance policy, where no affidavit as to its destruction was filed, held, that there could be no recovery.-Graves v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 179 S. W. 947. 119 (Mo.App.) Judgments of a justice of the peace as entered speak for themselves and import verity.-State ex rel. Gardiner v. Wurdeman, 179 S. W. 964. sale of land, damages for failure to deliver possession held limited to difference between agreed rent and rental value up to time judicial sale was confirmed.-Id. Lessee, suing for failure to deliver possession, held entitled to show value of land for pasturage purposes, but not to show probable profits, -Id. VIII. RENT AND ADVANCES. (B) Actions. 231 (Tex. Civ.App.) In action for rent, evidence held to show that defendant made a contract to subrent for a month, with option to extend the contract to cover term of plaintiff's lease.-Postal Telegraph Cable Co. of Texas v. De Krekko, 179 S. W. 525. IX. RE-ENTRY AND RECOVERY OF 291 (Mo.App.) In a suit in unlawful detainer, question whether the premises occupied by defendant were verbally rented to him by. plaintiffs' predecessor, or by the latter's lessee, held for the jury under the evidence.-McCracken v. Schuster, 179 S. W. 757. 126 (Mo.App.) Under Const. art. 4, § 23; See Public Lands. his predecessor's entries of judgment, not con- See Wills, 775. To insert in the judgment of a justice of the peace an amount in dollars and cents in place of the blank left therein would be to amend or correct the judgment.-Id. 135 (Ark.) Return indorsed on execution issued by justice and subsequently found among his official papers held sufficiently to show that it was returned by the constable within the prescribed 30 days after issuance.-Peery v. Mauldin, 179 S. W. 652. V. REVIEW OF PROCEEDINGS. (A) Appeal and Error. LANDS. LAPSE. LARCENY. See Criminal Law, 200, 508, 511, 722, 814, I. OFFENSES AND RESPONSIBILITY 27 (Tex.Cr.App.) A person not connected with the original taking of property is not guilty of theft, even though he received the stolen property knowing it to have been stolen.-Whitfield v. State, 179 S. W. 558. II. PROSECUTION AND PUNISH MENT. (A) Indictment and Information. 141 (Mo.App.) Where a justice of the peace had no jurisdiction, the circuit court had no jurisdiction on appeal, as its jurisdiction is derivative.-Graves v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 17940 (Tex.Cr.App.) Under a complaint allegS. W. 947. ing defendant's theft of 500 asperine tablets, it was not incumbent on the state to prove that the bottle contained 500 tablets and no less.Rice v. State, 179 S. W. 876. (B) Evidence. 45 (Tex.Cr.App.) On a trial for larceny, testimony of a conversation with accused and a third person held properly admitted on issue of identity of property stolen.-Park v. State, 179 S. W. 1152. 55 (Tex.Cr.App.) Evidence held insufficient to show that defendants, who participated in the butchering of the animal and the carrying away of the meat, were guilty of stealing it.Reyna v. State, 179 S. W. 568. 55 (Tex.Cr.App.) Evidence held to sustain a conviction of theft.-Park v. State, 179 S. W. 1152. 65 (Ark.) Evidence in a prosecution for grand larceny held sufficient to sustain a conviction.-Anderson v. State, 179 S. W. 158. 65 (Ark.) Unexplained possession of a portion of property recently stolen may be considered in corroboration of testimony of accomplices in a prosecution for grand larceny, although the value of the property so found does not exceed $10.-White v. State, 179 S. W. 160. (C) Trial and Review. (B) Possession, Enjoyment, and Use. 129 (Ky.) Ordinarily, where a lessor refuses to comply with the terms of a lease, the measure of damages is the difference between the agreed rent and the rental value of the premises.-Geary v. Taylor, 179 S. W. 426. 70 (Tex.Cr.App.) Instruction on cattle theft Where lease was subject to termination upon to acquit defendant if he received the cow in IV. ACTIONS. (B) Parties, Preliminary Proceedings, and Pleading. trade or sale, or upon reasonable doubt thereof, held not objectionable for failure to define completed theft, and to charge that defendant must have participated in acts constituting offense.-100 (Ky.) In an action for slander, plainMcAninch v. State, 179 S. W. 719. In prosecution for cattle theft, a charge to acquit unless defendant was connected with the original taking held not insufficient for failure to instruct that defendant must be acquitted if he was the receiver of stolen cow.-Id. he is of good character and reputation, though (C) Evidence. 77 (Tex. Cr. App.) Instruction pertinently104 (Ky.) Ky. St. 1915, § 2438b, prescribapplying the law to the identical explanation of ing effect of retraction in libel cases, held to his possession of stolen property given by ac- confer no right on plaintiff to prove failure to cused held the safest and best instruction.- retract, but only on defendant to prove retracWhitfield v. State, 179 S. W. 558. tion for purpose of defeating punitive damages. -Reid v. Nichols, 179 S. W. 440. LAST CLEAR CHANCE. (D) Damages. 120 (Ky.) Charge libelous per se held to raise presumption of malice, authorizing punitive damages, until rebutted by proof of contrary motive or truth of charge.-Reid v. Nichols, 179 S. W. 440. (E) Trial, Judgment, and Review. See Landlord and Tenant; Principal and Agent, apparently innocent on its face, the question mm 100, 166. 123 (Ky.) Where the language of letters is whether, under the facts disclosed by the inducement and colloquium, it is fairly susceptible of the defamatory meaning sought to be impressed by the innuendo is one of law.-Louisville Gas & Electric Co. v. Wulf, 179 S. W. 232. 123 (Ky.) It was a question for the jury, in an action for slander, whether the word "rob" was used in its colloquial or technical sense.-Deitchman v. Bowles, 179 S. W. 249. Failure to define "robbery" after an instruction in an action for slander that, if the defendant meant the plaintiff had committed the crime of robbery, the verdict should be for plaintiff, was error.-Id. VI. CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY. (A) Offenses. 34 (Ark.) Under Acts 1909, p. 724, § 5, relating to issue of interest-bearing certificates in emergency, act of board of directors of levee district in declaring existence of an extraordinary emergency, not arbitrary, capricious,_or fraudulent, cannot be challenged.-Board of Directors of St. Francis Levee Dist. v. Williford, originator at request of party slandered with Williford.144 (Tex.Cr.App.) Repetition of slander by assertion of truth is slander.-Robison v. State, 179 S. W. 1157. 179 S. W. 665. Under Acts 1909, p. 724, § 5, and Acts 1909, p. 717, the amount of interest-bearing certifi cates which the board of directors of the St. Francis levee district may issue in extraordinary emergencies is strictly limited to an aggregate of $21,000.-Id. LIBEL AND SLANDER. See Trial, 2. statement 148 (Tex.Cr.App.) Slanderous made and sworn to before a justice at request of brother of the slandered girl, held not a privileged communication.-Robison v. State, 179 S. W. 1157. Malice by person publishing slander held to destroy his privilege.-Id. (B) Prosecution and Punishment. I. WORDS AND ACTS ACTIONABLE, 152 (Tex.Cr.App.) An information for slanAND LIABILITY THEREFOR. der, stating what the accused said "in sub7 (Ky.) Letters from gas company to its stance and effect" and using the third person, patrons who had paid their bills through plain-held not defective as not setting forth substantiff, stating that their bills were unpaid, held tially the language used, in view of Pen. Code, not libelous as charging plaintiff with embez- art. 10, and Code Cr. Proc. arts. 452, 453, 460, zling the money so paid.-Louisville Gas & and 25, relating to sufficiency of indictments Electric Co. v. Wulf, 179 S. W. 232. generally.-Martin v. State, 179 S. W. 121. a prosecution for 156 (Tex.Cr.App.) In slander, evidence held to show that the slander was uttered maliciously.-Robison v. State, 179 S. W. 1157. 7 (Ky.) The word "rob" may be used to import a felony, or colloquially, and in the latter sense it is not actionable per se.-Deitchman v. Bowles, 179 S. W. 249. III. JUSTIFICATION AND MITIGA TION. 62 (Ky.) Belief that plaintiff was person accused of crime held not to rebut the presumption of malice raised by publication of matter libelous per se.-Reid v. Nichols, 179 S. W. 440. 63 (Ky.) In an action for slander, defendant is entitled to show, in mitigation, that the language was used in the heat of a political campaign and in retaliation for charges made by plaintiff.-Deitchman v. Bowles, 179 S. W. 249. Malice by person publishing slander may be shown by style and tone of statement, or that it was made without careful and diligent inquiry as to truth.-Id. LICENSES. See Intoxicating Liquors, 46; Negligence, I. FOR OCCUPATIONS AND PRIVI- (Tex.Civ.App.) Annual license fee for privilege of operating motor bus in streets of a city held a charge based upon the cost of regula- | of the land, after her husband's death, in maktion, and not a tax.-Booth v. City of Dallas, 179 ing permanent improvements on a farm, to that S. W. 301. extent satisfied the requirement as to reinvestment.-Id. 52 (Tex.Civ.App.) City of Dallas, under its charter, held to have the right to fix an annual 25 (Tenn.) Under Shannon's Code, § 4184, license of $75 for privilege of operating a motor a life tenant cannot create a lease which will bus over its streets.-Booth v. City of Dallas, extend beyond his holding; the remainderman 179 S. W. 301. having the right to ratify or reject the lease.Turner v. Turner, 179 S. W. 132. remainderman sought to recover possession of Where, after the death of a life tenant, the the land and compensation from lessees for use, there was no ratification of the lease, within Shannon's Code, § 4184, authorizing an apportionment of rent.-Id. 7 (Tex.Cr.App.) An ordinance prescribing a license fee of $50 for each jitney with a seating capacity of five or less held not objectionable as a tax for revenue for city purposes, instead of a police regulation.-Ex parte Bogle, 179 S. W. 1193. 7 (Tex.Civ.App.) Ordinance imposing annual fee of $75 for privilege of operating motor bus, in comparison with ordinance licensing and regulating rent cars, held not discriminatory, since they were engaged in different classes of street traffic.-Booth v. City of Dallas, 179 S. W. 301. Where a life tenant dies, and the remainderman does not affirm a lease contract, the life tenant's lessee may collect the emblements without payment of any compensation.—Id. LIFE INSURANCE. That an ordinance requiring procurement of a See Insurance, 515. license as a condition to the right to operate a jitney gave the city authorities discretionary power to grant or refuse a license did not render it void.-Id. 14 (Ark.) An ordinance requiring a license "for transportation within city limits" held not to apply to transportation from points within the city to points outside, and vice versa.-McDonald v. City of Paragould, 179 S. W. 335. 15 (Tenn.) One who merely displays samples and takes orders, which he forwards to his employer for approval, collecting no money and delivering no goods, is a mere solicitor, and not liable for a merchant's license fee.-Lowenthal v. Underdown, 179 S. W. 129. 29 (Tex.Civ.App.) A city, authorized to enact ordinance for licensing and regulating motor busses, held authorized to make an additional charge of $1 for a new certificate, for a change of route, or for an increase in the seating capacity. Booth v. City of Dallas, 179 S. W. 301. 39 (Tex.Civ.App.) Damages sustained from defendant's failure to furnish electric current for theater building before plaintiff commenced business held recoverable, although he did not then have license for such business.-City of Brownsville v. Tumlinson, 179 S. W. 1107. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS. See Adverse Possession: Criminal Law, I. STATUTES OF LIMITATION. 37 (Tex.Civ.App.) Action to recover money paid under mistake of fact held not barred by Vogelsang, 179 S. W. 58. the two-year statute of limitations.-Lindsay v. II. COMPUTATION OF PERIOD OF LIMITATION. (A) Accrual of Right of Action or Defense. 46 (Mo.App:) The statute of limitations began to run on a guaranty of a bond secured by a corporate mortgage incorporating in the bond the provision of the mortgage that the debt should mature in case of default in interest at the option of the trustee when the trustee exercised such option irrespective of the due date of the bond.-Brinsmade v. Johnson, 179 S. W. 967. The statute of limitations began to run on such guaranty by virtue of a provision in the mortgage that the debt should mature in case of sale by the trustee when such sale took place. Id. lands through negligence in allowing ditch to 55 (Tenn.) Where a railroad overflows fill up, the overflow depositing gravel and cinders, it constitutes recurrent or continuing damages under which a distinct right of action arises with each wrongful act.-Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. Ry. Co. v. Roddy, 179 S. W. 143. through filling up of railroad ditch held only Damages recoverable for overflowing lands such as accrued within the period of the statute of limitations, based on the condition of the land at the beginning of such period.-Id. (H) Commencement of Action or Other Proceeding. 121 (Ky.) Under Civ. Code Prac. § 134, a petition in an action against a corporation may be amended by inserting the correct name of the corporation, where the name as given was incorrect and service of summons on such petition will toll limitations.-Imperial Jellico Coal Co. v. Neff, 179 S. W. 829. 23 (Ky.) In absence of evidence, no pre-124 (Ky.) Where a widow's action for the sumption would be indulged that money from wrongful death of her husband, brought under wife's sale of her separate realty, with the hus- Ky. St. § 4, had been begun within a year from band's consent, was received or spent by her, his death, an application of his infant children or was reinvested under the terms of her deed. to come into the case as parties plaintiff was -Neel's Ex'r v. Noland's Heirs, 179 S. W. 430. not barred by the one-year statute of limitaUnder the terms of her deed, wife's expendi- tions, though not made until after one year. 177 (Ky.) In action for reformation of deed, See Libel and Slander, 62; Torts, 4. complaint held not defective for failure to negative the running of the statute of limitation.Kirk v. Kirk's Ex'r, 179 S. W. 1065. LIMITATION OF LIABILITY. See Carriers, 159-163, 218; Telegraphs and Telephones, 54. LIQUIDATED DAMAGES. See Damages, 78. LIQUOR SELLING. See Intoxicating Liquors. LIVE STOCK. See Animals; Carriers, 205-230. LOAN ASSOCIATIONS. See Building and Loan Associations. LOGS AND LOGGING. 2 (Ark.) Evidence held to show that defendant bought land with notice of plaintiff's prior purchase of the standing timber.-Cooksey v. Hartzell, 179 S. W. 506. Subsequent conduct of the purchaser of land held corroboration of the vendor's testimony that he was informed before the purchase of prior sale of standing timber.-Id. 3 (Ark.) Under a provision for removal of standing timber in a conveyance thereof, held, that the grantee must remove as expeditiously as possible.-Louis Werner Sawmill Co. v. Sessoms, 179 S. W. 185. A logging company required by its deeds to remove timber as expeditiously as possible could grant to another company no greater rights than it possessed, and the limitation in its conveyances to another was measured by its own capacity, and not by the capacity of its grantee. -Id. MALICIOUS PROSECUTION. II. WANT OF PROBABLE CAUSE. 21 (Ky.) Advice of counsel, where there is a complete disclosure to the attorney, is a defense to an action of malicious prosecution.Carrigan v. Graham, 179 S. W. 198. II. SUBJECTS AND PURPOSES OF (A) Acts and Proceedings of Courts, 34 (Ky.) Under Const. § 110, a writ of mandamus will not lie to compel the circuit judge to reverse his decision, quashing service of summons on the ground that defendant was not duly served.-Speckert v. Ray, 179 S. W. 592. MANDATORY INJUNCTION. Evidence in a suit to reform timber conveyances as to the time of removal, with a crossbill claiming forfeiture and a cancellation of See Injunction, 80. the deeds, held to sustain a finding for the cross-complainants.-Id. 3 (Ark.) The time limited to a purchaser of standing timber to remove it does not run during interference with his operations by the owner of the land.-Cooksey v. Hartzell, 179 S. W. 506. 3 (Ky.) In an action for the balance advanced on a timber contract, alleged to have been paid by an order on cross-defendants, in which the measurement of logs sold by defendants to cross-defendants was the issuable fact, evidence held to sustain verdict for defendants against cross-defendants.-Ramey v. Ironton Lumber Co., 179 S. W. 207. In an action to recover the balance of money advanced on a timber contract, with cross-actions by defendants against parties to whom they had sold the timber, instruction held to properly submit the only issue involved.-Id. 3 (Ky.) A conveyance of land held to reserve to the grantors an estate in the timber MANSLAUGHTER. See Homicide. MARKET VALUE. See Evidence, 323. MARRIAGE. See Bigamy; Breach of Marriage Promise; 13 (Tex.Cr.App.) A real common-law marriage, properly agreed to and consummated, is a legal marriage.-Nye v. State, 179 S. W. 100. 40 (Ky.) Presumption of marriage from 50 years' cohabitation under claim of marriage held not overthrown by testimony of woman's child, an interested witness, that his mother and stepfather began cohabiting without marriage when witness was 5 years old.-Rockcastle Mining, Lumber & Oil Co. v. Baker, 179 S. W. 1070. Presumption of marriage from cohabitation in apparent matrimony is less easily overthrown than other presumptions of fact.-Id. 47 (Tex.Cr.App.) In determining whether there was a valid common-law marriage, the acts of the man in subsequently celebrating a ceremonial marriage with another, without divorce, are admissible.-Nye v. State, 179 S. W. 100. MARRIED WOMEN. See Husband and Wife. MASONIC SOCIETIES. See Beneficial Associations, 4. MASSEURS. See Physicians and Surgeons, 6. MASTER AND SERVANT. ble to the issues as developed by the evidence. -Morris v. Z. T. Briggs Photographic Supply Co., 179 S. W. 783. Complaint alleging express contract for servant's compensation is not supported by proof of implied contract.-Id. III. MASTER'S LIABILITY FOR INJURIES TO SERVANT. (A) Nature and Extent in General. 89 (Ky.) Plaintiff employed by defendant as a car repairer while walking upon its track under foreman's order to repair the house of a son of defendant's superintendent held not within scope of his employment, and a trespasser.Cumberland R. Co. v. Walton, 179 S. W. 245. 89 (Ky.) Employé held not a volunteer, but under protection of safe place doctrine while assisting another to prepare the place for plaintiff's work.-Moses v. Proctor Coal Co., 179 S. W. 1043. Servant going to and from work is within protection of safe place doctrine.-Id. (B) Tools, Machinery, Appliances, and Places for Work. See Appeal and Error, 1064; Commerce, 8, 27; Death, 43; Evidence, 258, 352; False Imprisonment, 15; Limita-101, 102 (Ky.) A master operating a boiler tion of Actions, 130; Negligence, 101; is required to exercise ordinary care to prevent Pleading, 369, 403; Railroads, 281; injury.-Mason & Hurst Co. v. Feltner, 179 Removal of Causes, 47; Telegraphs and S. W. 222. Telephones, 48; Trial, 255, 296. I. THE RELATION. (A) Creation and Existence. 101, 102 (Ky.) That a master gives a servant an assurance of safety does not impose absolute liability, regardless of negligence, but only deprives the master of the advantage of the pleas of assumption of risk and contributory negligence, unless the defect was obvious.-Thomas v. National Concrete Const. Co., 179 S. W. 9 (Mo.App.) Where an employé remains in employment after expiration of employment contract and without new agreement, the original contract is presumed to continue.-Morris v. Z. T. Briggs Photographic Supply Co., 179103 (Ky.) Whatever was done in attemptS. W. 783. (C) Termination and Discharge. 31 (Mo.App.) Plaintiff, employed as a music teacher under a contract for one year, held not entitled to recover as for a wrongful discharge. Lemaire v. Strassberger Conservatories of Music Co., 179 S. W. 959. 40 (Ky.) In an action for damages for breach of a contract, to pay plaintiff to pump water from a mine, evidence held sufficient to support the verdict for plaintiff.-Trosper Coal Co. v. Rader, 179 S. W. 1023. 439. ing to replace a log, whereby the sawyer was killed, being actually done by him, or supervised and directed by him, the men working with him obeying his signals or orders, the master was not liable.-Lucas Land & Lumber Co. v. Cook's Adm'r, 179 S. W. 582. 103 (Ky.) The master's duty to provide reasonably safe tools and appliances for work and exercise ordinary care to keep them reasonably safe is one which he cannot escape by delegating to another.-Phillips v. Corbin & Fannin, 179 S. W. 586. 107 (Ky.) Railway signal torpedoes, placed 41 (Mo.App.) In a sales' agent's action for on tracks as signals, are not within the rule breach of his contract of employment, measure requiring explosives to be handled with greatest of damages was salary earned, plus expenses, care.-Gordon v. Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co., 179 and a sum deposited by agent to cover the S. W. 210. price of goods delivered to him.-Watkins v.112 (Ky.) Railway company is not negligent Donnell, 179 S. W. 980. II. SERVICES AND COMPENSATION. (A) Performance of Services. in placing signal torpedo on track, and hence is dinary care in providing reasonably safe place not liable, when so doing, for failing to use orto work. Gordon v. Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co., 179 S. W. 210. 48 (Mo.App.) Under contract of employment for year as music instructor, held, that defend-113 (Ky.) For an engineer and conductor ant did not bind itself to assign plaintiff any in charge of switching operations to leave a car particular number of pupils or hours of instruc- on the siding so close that it endangered traintion, or to compensate plaintiff except for the men on passing trains is gross negligence.actual number of hours devoted to the employ- Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. v. Shamblen, 179 S. ment.-Lemaire v. Strassberger Conservatories W. 837. of Music Co., 179 S. W. 959. (B) Wages and Other Remuneration. 70 (Mo.App.) Separable express contract for employment and commissions held not abrogated as to commissions by increase of salary. Morris v. Z. T. Briggs Photographic Supply Co., 179 S. W. 783. 79 (Mo.App.) Acceptance by a servant of check for "all salary to date" does not waive right to commissions under separable covenant. Morris v. Z. T. Briggs Photographic Supply Co., 179 S. W. 783. 80 (Mo.App.) Instruction, in action for commissions under contract of employment by an employé against employer, held inapplica 115 (Ky.) There is no failure to furnish a sawyer a reasonably safe place to work, the mill being built in the way sawmills are usually and generally built, and containing no dangerous places beyond such as are necessarily found in all sawmills.-Lucas Land & Lumber Co. v. Cook's Adm'r, 179 S. W. 582. 118 (Ky.) Ky. St. 1909, § 2739b, subsec. 7, relative to furnishing props to miners, held inapplicable where by custom or rule the duty of propping or timbering did not devolve upon the miner.-Carter Coal Co. v. Hill, 179 S. W. 2. Duty of propping roof of room neck imposed by custom on coal company held not evaded by a contract requiring a contractor whom an in |