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court upon the motion of appellee and over and appellee has only to go and possess himthe objection of the appellant, and is the in- self of it. The title to the property has not struction given which fixed the measure of changed. The appellee did not attempt to do damages by which the jury was to be guided anything to minimize his loss by having the in making its verdict, if it should find for machine repaired or otherwise. appellee, and is as follows:
To say that a secondhand automobile has "If your finding be for the plaintiff, you will not a market value would be the same as to find for the plaintiff the difference in value of hold that wagons and carriages, after a pe said automobile before and after it was injured, riod of use, have not a market value, because at the time of said injury of same, not to exceed, however, the sum of $650."
no two of them would be in exactly the
same condition, as to use, "wear, and tear." The contention of appellant is that the If an action was pending for destruction of measure of damages was the difference in the or injury to a wagon or carriage, after a market value of the automobile just before period of use, the owner would certainly be it received the injuries and just after it re- limited in his recovery to the reasonable ceived the injuries, while the appellee com- market value of the article immediately beplains of the action of the court in limiting fore its destruction, if the injury suffered by the amount of his recovery to $650, when the it was irreparable, or the difference between amount sought by him in his petition was its reasonable market value immediately be$750. The argument is advanced that the measure of damages fixed by the instruction if it was susceptible of being repaired. We
fore the injury and immediately thereafter is correct, because a secondhand automobile has no market value, although it has a real ! see no reason why the same rule should not
apply to injuries to an automobile.
It is a value for use. It becomes necessary to re
matter of common knowledge that automocite the evidence given upon the trial as to biles in all stages of use and repair are bethe value of the automobile and its injuries. ing daily exchanged in barter and sales. If The appellee gave evidence to the effect that the machine and its attachments cost him automobile suffers injuries, the damages to
an automobile is totally destroyed, or if an the sum of $750 nine months before the in- the owner from the destruction or injury of juries complained of; that he had used it, the machine, alone, cannot be more than his since he had owned it, in traveling about loss, which in the first instance is its value 1,600 miles ; that he had certain repairs immediately before its destruction, and, in made upon it, a short time before the in- the second instance, is the difference bejuries occurred, had tested the machine ful- tween its value in its injured condition and ly; that it had by reason of its use become its value before the injuries. To fix these " chine than when he purchased it. All of this values, the law refuses to leave it to the
imagination of the owner of the injured was competent evidence as tending to estab
property, or to the opinion which a jury lish its market value. Other evidence was
may set up as the criterion of value, and given tending to prove that the market value which may vary in different cases and with of the machine, at the time of the injuries each jury, but has adopted the market valto it, was $500; that the market price of a
ue, as the one most tangible and the one new machine of the kind and make of the which can be most easily and certainly laid appellee's, at the time of the injuries to it, hold of. This question has been definitely was $650 ; that the use of a machine of the settled by this court in former adjudicakind and make of appellee's, for the length tions, and is now beyond the sphere of conof time his had been used, in a proper and troversy. In the case of Weil v. Hagan, 161
, a machine from one-third to one-half of its Ky. 292, 170 s. W. 618, the rule was laid
down as follows: original value; that the machine in its in
“In the case of injury to personal property, the jured condition was of the value of $150; measure of damages is the diiference between its and that it was susceptible of being repair- market value before, and its market value after, ed. The appellee, after the injury, seems to the injury.” have abandoned the machine, and the appel
In the recent case of Southern Ry. Co. in lant caused it to be removed into one of its Ky. v. Kentucky Grocery Co., 166 Ky. 94, depots, where it has remained ever since. 178 S. W. 1162, the following was declared The appellee insists that he ought to recover to be the rule in the cases of destruction the full value of the machine, immediately or injury to personal property: before its injury, because the appellant had "Where an injury to personal property does converted the machine to its own use. The not effect its destruction-that is, where it is petition does not allege any conversion of it susceptible of repair—the measure of damages
is the difference between the reasonable market by appellant, and does not rely upon such a value of the property immediately before the incause of action, but is simply an action to jury at the place thereof, and its reasonable recover for the damages it suffered. Appel- market value immediately after the injury at lee has never made any demand for its pos.
the place thereof." , ,
If the destruction of personal property is there has been no conversion of it, and no so complete that it is not susceptible of re
session, and, so far as the record shows,
able market value immediately before its and specific performance denied. The Tay- . destruction.
lors appeal.  With regard to the fact of the court The case turns on the proper construction fixing the maximum amount which appellee of a deed dated March 26, 1892, and executed could be allowed to recover at $650, instead and delivered by Phil B. Thompson and wife of $750, the amount sued for, it was not er- to Mollie Young and Missie Passmore, which, ror for the court to fix the maximum amount omitting the description of the property conat the greatest, which any evidence conduced veyed, is as follows: to show was the difference between the mar- "This indenture made and entered into this ket value of the machine immediately be- 26th day of March, 1892, between Phil B. fore the injuries to it and its market value parties of the first part, and Mollie Young and
Thompson, Sr., and Mat. A. Thompson, his wife, immediately thereafter.
Missie Passmore, daughter of Mollie Young, For the error embraced in the instruction, of the second part. Witnesseth: That parties supra, the judgment will have to be re of the first part, in consideration of three hun
dred and thirty-six dollars and eighteen cents versed, and it will not be necessary to dis- ($336.18), payable one day after date, for which cuss the other grounds of reversal relied up- sum the said Mollie Young has this day executon, as upon another trial other facts may ed her note, and for the payment of which said be in evidence which the present record note a lien is hereby retained on the house and
lot hereby conveyed, have this day by their fails to show.
presents do bargain, sell, and convey unto the The judgment is reversed, and cause re- party of the second part, the following describmanded for further proceedings consistent ed property, situated in the town of Harrodswith this opinion.
burg, county of Mercer, and state of Kentucky, and bounded as follows: [Here follows description.) To have and to hold to the parties of the second part, their heirs and assigns forever, with
clause of general warranty, provided that the TAYLOR et al. v. DEDMAN.
property hereby conveyed shall not be subject
to the debts now owing or that may be here(Court of Appeals of Kentucky. Oct. 22, 1915.) after contracted by said parties of either. The DEEDS 129-CONSTRUCTION-ESTATE Con- right of the said Mollie to use and occupy the VEYED.
same as a home shall not be liable in law or Where it appeared from the terms of a deed equity to be sold or rented out. * * * The that the intention of the parties thereto was right of said Missie Passmore to occupy the that the grantees should each have a life estate same as a home shall not be liable in law or which should not be subject to their debts or equity to be sold or rented out. The said propto the control of their husbands, and which was erty on the death of said Mollie Young shall be not to be incumbered, and that upon the death the absolute property of Missie Passmore, proof both the grantees the property should go to vided Missie Passmore should outlive the said the children of one of them, if she had any, the Mollie Young. grantees took a life estate merely, and not the
“Should said Mollie Young outlive the said fee-simple title, although the granting part of Missie Passmore, then the property to be the the deed conveyed the property to the grantees the said Missie Passmore have any child or
absolute property of Mollie Young. Should jointly without limitation.
children, upon the death of Mollie Young and [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Deeds, Cent. said Missie Passmore, the property to be the Dig. &$ 351, 360–365, 416-430, 434, 435; Dec. property absolutely of said child or children, Dig. Om 129.]
nor shall the right of said child or children to Appeal from Circuit Court, Mercer County. or equity for any debts of said Mollie Young or
use and occupy the same be held liable in law Suit by Missie Taylor and her husband Missie Passmore, or child or children. The against J. 0. Dedman for specific perform- right of said Mollie Young or Missie Passmore ance.
to use and occupy said property as a home not Judgment for defendant, and plain to be subject to the control of any husband said tiffs appeal. Affirmed.
Mollie Young or Missie Passmore has or may R. W. Keenon, of Harrodsburg, for appel- have any right or title to said property as to
have. Nor shall the husband of either of them lants. C. E. Rankin, of Harrodsburg, for use or possession of the same. The property appellee.
in no event to be subject to the debts of said Mollie Young or Missie Passmore, or both.
Nor shall the said Mollie Young or Missie PassCLAY, C. On November 24, 1914, Missie more, or either or both of them, incumber said Taylor and her husband, James N. Taylor, property by any lien of any kind.” entered into a written contract with J. 0. In construing deeds it was formerly held Dedman, whereby, in consideration of the that, in case of clear repugnance between the sum of $450 to be paid upon execution and nature of the estate granted and that limited delivery of the deed, they agreed to convey in the habendum, the latter yields to the forto him the fee-simple title to certain prop- mer. Ratliffe, etc., v. Marrs, etc., 87 Ky. erty located in Mercer county. On November 26, 7 S. W. 395, 8 S. W. 876, 10 Ky. Law Rep. 25, 1914, the Taylors tendered to Dedman 134. But in the more recent decisions of this a deed to the property and demanded pay- court the tendency has been to relax the ment of the purchase price. Dedman refus- strictness of the technical rule of construced to accept the deed on the ground that Mis- tion above announced, and to construe a deed sie Taylor owned only a life estate in the according to the intention of the grantor property. Thereupon this suit was brought as gathered from the whole instrument. to enforce the contract. The contention of Thus in Dinger v. Lucken et al., 143 Ky. 850, Dedman was sustained by the chancellor, I 137 S. W. 776, the court said:
“The rule is that where by a deed a fee is clearly intended that Mollie Young and Misgranted, and the deed as a whole shows an in-sie Passmore should each have a life estate tention to vest the grantee with a fee, an at- in the property, which would not be subject tempted limitation upon the fee will be disregarded. But in all cases the effect of the deed to their debts or the control of their husturns upon its proper construction when read bands, and which should not be incumbered as a whole; and if upon the whole instrument in any manner whatsoever, and upon the death it appears that the grantor's intention was to vest a less estate than a fee in the grantee, that of both Mollie Young and Missie Passmore intention will be carried into effect; for deeds, the property should go to Missie Passmore's like other instruments, must be construed ac:children, if she had any. That being true, that intention is sufficiently expressed in the in- Missie Passmore and her husband are unable strument."
to convey the fee-simple title to the property So it is held that technical words in the to Dedman, and the chancellor properly so
adjudged. granting or habendum clause importing a fee
Judgment affirmed. must yield to subsequent clauses limiting the interest of the grantee to a life estate. Atkins v. Baker, 112 Ky. 877, 66 S. W. 1023, 23 Ky. Law Rep. 2224; Lawson, etc., v. Todd,
GNAU et al. v. ACKERMAN. * etc., 129 Ky. 133, 110 S. W. 412, 33 Ky. Law (Court of Appeals of Kentucky. Oct. 19, 1915.) Rep. 557; Wilson v. Moore, 146 Ky. 679, 143 1. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS Om788 – OBS. W. 431.
STRUCTIONS OF STREETS-LIABILITY OF CITY With these rules of construction in mind, -NOTICE. let us examine the provisions of the deed in
A city which authorized a part of its street question. The parties of the second part are to take notice of the nature and character of the
to be obstructed by building material was bound Mollie Young and Missie Passmore. By the obstruction, and notice that a bed of slaking granting clause the property is conveyed to lime had been placed in the street was not necesthem jointly without limitation. The first sary to render it liable for injuries to a child
who fell in the lime. part of the habendum clause imports a fee,
[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Municipal as evidenced by the use of the words “their Corporations, Cent. Dig. $8 1641-1643, 1646, heirs and assigns forever." Then follow cer- 1652; Dec. Dig. Om788.] tain provisions protecting both the right of 2. EVIDENCE Om32-JUDICIAL NOTICE-MUMollie Young and Missie Passmore to occupy NICIPAL ORDINANCES. the premises as a home. It is further pro- to the city of Louisville, that the court shall
Under Ky. St. $ 2775, providing, relative vided that, if Missie Passmore outlive Mollie take judicial cognizance of the ordinances of Young, the property shall be the "absolute such city, it was not necessary to offer an ordiproperty of Missie Passmore.” On the other nance of such city in evidence. hand, if Mollie Young survived Missie Pass
[Ed. Note.-For_other cases, see Evidence, more, the property was to be the “absolute Cent. Dig. § 42; Dec. Dig. 32.] property of Mollie Young.” If the deed con- 3. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS Ow763-DEFEC
TIVE STREETS–LIABILITY OF CITY. cluded here, there would be no question as to A city is under the duty of exercising ordithe estate which Missie Passmore would take, nary care to keep its streets in a reasonably but the deed further provides that, should safe condition for public travel by children as the said Missie Passmore have any child or maintaining its streets in a reasonably safe con
well as adults, and does not perform its duty by children, upon the death of Mollie Young and dition for the use of adults, but leaving them in said Missie Passmore the property should be an unsafe condition for use by children. the property absolutely of said child or chil- [Ed. Note.--For other cases, see Municipal dren. Then follow certain provisions for the Corporations, Cent. Dig. $$ 1612–1615; Dec.
Dig. On 763.] protection of the right of the children to use
4. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS Ow763 DEand occupy the premises. There also follow
FECTIVE STREETS–LIABILITY OF CITY. additional provisions protecting Mollie Young If a higher degree of care is required to and Missie Passmore against their husbands keep streets safe for use by children than to keep and providing that neither Mollie Young nor cise such degree of care, since, while it is not
them safe for use by adults, the city must exerMissie Passmore should incumber the prop-obliged to do more than to exercise ordinary erty by any lien of any kind. With the care, it must exercise ordinary care in respect validity of all these restrictions we are not to all who have the right to use the streets, and now concerned. We mention them merely necessity of taking greater precautions as to one
this measure of care may impose upon it the for the purpose of showing how carefully the class than would be required as to another parties were looking after the interest of class. Missie Passmore's children by not only pro
[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Municipal viding that upon the death of both Mollie Corporations, Cent. Dig. $S 1612-1615; Dec.
Dig. On 763.] Young and Missie Passmore the property
5. NEGLIGENCE Cm 23—THINGS ATTRACTIVE would be theirs, but by further providing
TO CHILDREN STREETS — OBSTRUCTIONS — that it should not be liable in their hands for LIABILITY. any debts incurred by either Mollie Young or If a city places in its streets an attractive Missie Passmore. Considering the instru-nuisance dangerous to children of immature ment as a whole, the conclusion cannot be able for any injury they sustain in consequence
years and thoughtless habits, it will be answerescaped that the parties to the instrument of its failure to exercise ordinary care to keep
Om For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes
its streets in reasonably safe condition for their account of smallness of the damages in an acuse.
tion for injury to the person, the trial court is [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Negligence, not authorized to grant a new trial in personal Dec. Dig. Om 23.]
injury cases on the sole ground that the recov6. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
ery is inadeguate, if the inadequacy of the ver
On 762 STREETS-OBSTRUCTIONS-LIABILITY.
dict is attributable to errors committed during A city granting permission to a property the trial, or if a new trial is granted for other owner to place an OTstruction or nuisance at I errors, the mere fact that the damages are intractive to children in the streets occupied pre- for granting a new trial does not affect the
adequate or that this may be one of the causes cisely the same attitude as if it had placed the obstruction in the street itself, and was bound right of the court to set aside the verdict. to see that the obstruction did not make the
[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see New Trial, street unsafe for use by the public, as it could Cent. Dig. $$ 151, 152; Dec. Dig. Om75.] not delegate to others the duty of keeping its 13. APPEAL AND ERROR 933_REVIEWstreets safe and thereby excuse itself.
PRESUMPTIONS. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Municipal Where grounds other than the inadequacy Corporations, Cent. Dig. 88 1605–1611; Dec. of the verdict are relied on to obtain a new trial Dig. On 762.]
of a personal injury action, and are sufficient to 7. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS Om 808 justify the trial court in directing a new trial, STREETS-OBSTRUCTIONS-LIABILITY.
and the record does not show what reasons inThat a property owner who placed a bed fluenced the trial court in ordering a new trial, of slaking lime in the street had secured from it will not be assumed that the new trial was the city the right to do so did not excuse him granted solely because the recovery was inadefrom the duty of not leaving the street in such quate contrary to Civ. Code Prac. & 341. condition as to be unsafe for street purposes. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Appeal and
[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Municipal Error, Cent. Dig. 88 3425, 3426, 3772-3776; Corporations, Cent. Dig. 88 1684-1687, 1690- | Dec. Dig. 933.] 1694; Dec. Dig. Om 808.]
14. APPEAL AND ERROR 977 REVIEW 8. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS Omw 762, 808 GRANTING OF NEW TRIAL. STREETS-OBSTRUCTIONS-LIABILITY.
The discretion of the trial court in granting Where an obstruction placed in a street a new trial will not be interfered with unless it by a property owner with the permission of the appears to have been abused, or unless it apcity made the street unsafe, the city and the pears that the court transcended its authority property owner were jointly and severally liable under the Code. for resulting injuries.
[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Appeal and [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Municipal Error, Cent. Dig. 88 3860–3865; Dec. Dig. Om Corporations, Cent._Dig._$$ 1605–1611, 1684-977.] 1687, 1690-1694; Dec. Dig. 762, 808.]
15. EVIDENCE C5 JUDICIAL NOTICE-MAT9. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS Om 808-LIABIL- TERS OF COMMON KNOWLEDGE. ITY FOR NEGLIGENCE OF CONTRACTOR.
In an action for injuries to a boy two or A property owner granted permission by three years old who fell into a bed of slaking the city to place building material in the street lime in the center of a bed of sand in the street, was responsible for any negligence on the part where there was evidence that other children had of the contractors employed by him, as he could been playing in the sand pile for several days, not excuse himself from his duty or liability by direct evidence that the injured boy was atemploying other persons to do what he had been tracted to the sand pile or that it was an atgranted permission to do.
tractive nuisance was not required, as it is a [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Municipal matter of such common knowledge that courts Corporations, Cent. Dig. 88 1684–1687, 1690- and juries may take notice of it without evidence 1694; Dec. Dig. Om 808.]
that a sand pile is attractive to children. 10. DAMAGES Om 132-PERSONAL INJURIES- [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Evidence, EXCESSIVENESS.
Cent. Dig. $ 4; Dec. Dig. Om5.] A boy between two and three years old fell into a bed of slaking lime, and was so badly Appeal from Circuit Court, Jefferson Counburned as to be made a cripple for life. His ty, Common Pleas Branch, Third Division. left hand and arm were dreadfully disfigured and their use totally destroyed, and his right
Action by John L. Ackerman, by next hand, as well as other parts of his body, were friend, against P. J. Gnau and others. Judgalso badly burned. Held, that a verdict for ment for plaintiff, and defendants appeal. $10,000 was not excessive.
Affirmed. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, _see Damages, Cent. Dig. 88 372–385, 396; Dec. Dig. Om
Pendleton Beckley and W. J. O'Connor, 132.]
both of Louisville, for appellant city. 11. APPEAL AND ERROR Cw1004—REVIEW— O'Doherty & Yonts, of Louisville, for appelAMOUNT OF DAMAGES.
The damages allowable in personal injury lant P. J. Gnau. Arthur H. Mann and Kohn, cases cannot be carefully measured or computed, Bingham, Sloss & Spindle, all of Louisville, but must be left to the judgment and discretion for appellee. of the jury, with which the court is not authorized to, and will not, interfere, unless it appears that their assessment of damages was in
CARROLL, J. In August, 1911, John
, is reasonable as to appear at first 'blush entirely Ackerman, a little boy between two and disproportionate to the injuries.
three years of age, sustained severe, painful, [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Appeal and and permanent personal injuries by falling Error, Cent. Dig. 8$ 3944–3947; Dec. Dig. Om into a bed of slaking lime, commonly known
as a mortar bed, which had been placed in 12. NEW TRIAL Om75 GROUNDS INADE- the carriageway of Magnolia avenue, one QUACY OF DAMAGES.
While, under Civ. Code Prac. § 341, pro- of the streets of the city of Louisville. To viding that a new trial shall not be granted on recover damages for the injuries so sustained, he brought this suit by his father, as next stroyed, and his right hand was badly friend, against P. J. Gnau, the owner of the burned, as were other parts of his body. adjacent building in which it was intended The only substantial dispute in the evito use the mortar that was being prepared dence grows out of the widely differing tesfor use, T. F. House, who had the contract timony as to whether this sand pile was for building the house, and the city of barricaded or protected in any manner after Louisville. The petition, after making the the lime bed had been made. Witnesses for usual averments in cases of this kind, fur- the plaintiff said that there were no boards ther set out:
or other barriers around the pile, or any “That the mortar bed was in a depression covering on top of it, and that the sand pile, made in the center of a pile of sand, and had the center of which had been hollowed out the appearance to children of an ordinary sand pile, and in its nature was attractive and allur. for the purpose of containing the lime to be ing to, and did attract, children of tender years, slaked, was about 18 inches high around the including the infant plaintiff, all of which was edges; while witnesses for the defendants or could, by the exercise of ordinary care, have said that the sand pile with the lime in the been known by the defendants and each of them, but nevertheless they failed to guard or barri- center was inclosed by boards and also covcade the mortar bed so as to exclude children ered by boards. therefrom."
If the precautions described by witnesses On the first trial of the case there was a for appellants had been taken, it seems very verdict in favor of appellee for $1,000, which improbable that the child could have gotten was subsequently on motion of appellee set in the bed of slaking lime, and the weight aside by the trial court, and on the second of the evidence tends to support the view trial of the case there was a judgment in that there was no barrier of any kind placed favor of appellee for $10,000 against Gnau, around the sand pile or any covering placed the city, and House, one-third, as found by on top of it. There was an electric street the jury, to be paid by each of them. It ap- light near by, and some of the witnesses say a pears that House is insolvent, and so no ap- red lantern had been put up at the sand pile, peal is prosecuted from the judgment against but, whether the lantern was there or not, the him.
electric light was sufficient to plainly disclose The facts are substantially as follows: to any adult person using the street the presThe defendant Gnau, who was the owner of ence of the mortar bed; but, of course, this a lot on Magnolia avenue, obtained a permit little boy gave no heed to either the red from the city to erect a house thereon, which light, if there was one, or the electric light. permit carried with it the right to make He only knew, in his childish way, that use of the adjacent street in accordance with there was a sand pile there, and into that the city ordinance on the subject. This sand pile he wanted to and did go, totally ordinance provided that when a building per- ignorant of the burning lime in the middle mit was issued the applicant therefor might of the sand and unconscious of the danger of
a designated portion of the street in playing in or about it. front of the premises being improved for the
 The city moved the court to direct a purpose of placing thereon building material: verdict in its favor because the evidence and in accordance with this permit and the showed that it did not have any notice of ordinances of the city, the mortar bed in the fact that lime had been put in the sand question was placed in the carriageway of bed for the purpose of slaking between the Magnolia avenue. The pile of sand had been time it was placed there and the time of the placed in the street some days before the accident, a few hours afterwards. There
, lime bed was made, and the children of the would be much force in this position if it neighboruood had been playing in this sand were necessary to bring notice home to the from the time it was placed in the street un-vity in order to charge it with liability for til a few hours before the plaintiff fell into the accident. But it is well settled in this it. The lime bed, however, was not made in state that, where a city authorizes work to be the sand nor had the lime commenced to be done and a part of its street to be obstructed slaked until late in the afternoon of the day by material while the work is in progress, it on which the plaintiff was injured. The i must take notice of the nature and characparents of the plaintiff lived in a house about ter of the obstruction which it has author100 feet from this mortar bed, which con- ized. City of Louisville v. Keher, 117 Ky. sisted of a bed of sand probably 12 inches 841, 79 S. W. 270, 25 Ky. Law Rep. 2003; deep and about 9 feet long and 12 feet wide, Blocher v. Dieco, 99 S. W. 606, 30 Ky. Law with a bed of slaking lime in the center. Be- Rep. 689; De Garmo v. Vogt, 151 Ky. 847, tween 7 and 8 o'clock at night the plaintiff 152 S. W. 969; Town of Bellevue v. Rentz, ran out of his mother's house into the street 152 Ky. 426, 153 S. W. 732. and went immediately, as any child would,  The further argument is made for the to this bed of sand, and in a moment after-city that, although the plaintiff introduced wards his screams were heard by Jacob in evidence a permit issued by the city to Loeb, who was passing, and he at once went Gnau, the ordinance of the city granting to to the bed, took the child out, and carried persons having permits to build the right to him to his mother. The little boy was hor- use portions of the street for the purpose