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course of such business, and at least five days | least five days before the consummation of the before the consummation of the sale notify them either personally or by registered letter of the intended sale, and declaring a purchaser not responsible to any creditor not mentioned in the seller's statement, is not invalid as being an unreasonable interference with the right of property.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Constitutional Law. Cent. Dig. §§ 156-171; Dec. Dig. 87; Fraudulent Conveyances, Cent. Dig. § 5; Dec. Dig. 3.]

4. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 240-EQUAL PRO TECTION OF LAWS-CLASSIFICATION-BULK SALES ACT.

sale, in good faith, for the purpose of giving the notice herein required, make inquiry of the seller as to the names and places of residence, or places of business of each and all of the creditors of the seller, arising out of said business, and unless the purchaser, at least five days before the consummation of the sale, shall notify, or use reasonable diligence to cause to be notified, personally, each of the seller's said creditors, or shall deposit in the mail a registered letter of notice, postage prepaid, addressed to each of the seller's said creditors at his post office address, according to the information furnished by the seller of said proposed sale. Said information shall be by written statement by Such act is not discriminatory within the the seller, and the purchaser shall not be refourteenth amendment to the federal Constitu-sponsible to any creditor not mentioned in said tion or any provision of the Kentucky Constitu- written statement. If the purchaser fail to tion, in that it applies only to merchants, since give such notice as herein required, he shall that classification is not an arbitrary one, but hold the merchandise so purchased for the use is based on a well-grounded distinction, and is and benefit of all the creditors of the seller, altogether reasonable. and shall be responsible to them for the fair value of such part thereof as he, the purchaser, may have transferred or conveyed to others. Nothing in this act shall be deemed or construed in anywise to authorize or validate any sale made with intent to delay, hinder or defraud creditors, purchasers or other persons, but such sales made with such intent shall be governed and controlled as provided by an act of the General Assembly, approved December 20, 1892, entitled, 'An act in relation to fraudulent and preferential conveyances, and entitled "Fraudulent and Preferential Conveyances, and the amendments thereto.'

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Constitutional Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 688, 692, 693, 697-699; Dec. Dig. 240.]

5. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES 314-SALES IN BULK ACT ACTION BY CREDITOR AMOUNT OF RECOVERY.

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Such act, declaring a sale of a merchant's stock in bulk void as against his creditors arising out of such stock, and providing that a purchaser failing to comply therewith shall hold the merchandise so purchased for the use and benefit of the creditors of the seller, and shall be responsible to them for the fair market value of such part thereof as he may have transferred to others, and providing by section 4 that nothing therein should be construed so as to give any manufacturer, etc., any lien on any part of the stock except upon goods sold and delivered by him, embraces all creditors who during the continuance of the particular business sold the seller any part of the stock, whether on hand at the time of the bulk sale or not, and a purchaser who had received of the goods sold by a creditor for $1,000 only $213 worth, and had disposed of $168 worth, and had on hand goods valued at $45, was liable to the extent of the entire stock to the satisfaction of the creditor's claim.

"2. * *

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*All civil actions brought under this act shall be instituted within ninety days of the consummation of the sale. "3. The seller shall make full and truthful answer to each and all of the inquiries made of him by the purchaser, as required in section 1, and if such seller shall knowingly and willfully make or deliver, or cause to be made or delivered, to said purchaser any false answer to such inquiries, or shall induce a sale by refusing to make answer to such inquiries, or by fraudulently claiming or pretending ignorance of the matters called for by such inquiries, then in each of said cases said seller shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon indictment and conviction thereof in the county where said cretion of the jury, by a fine of not less than one hundred nor more than five hundred dollars, or by confinement in the county jail not less than thirty days nor more than six months, or both so fined and imprisoned.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Fraudulent Conveyances, Cent. Dig. § 972; Dec. Dig. acts are done, he shall be punished, in the dis314.]

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CLAY, C. This appeal involves both the constitutionality and proper construction of section 2651a, Kentucky Statutes 1915, known as the "Sales in Bulk Statute." The statute is as follows:

"4. * * * Nothing contained in this act shall apply to sales made under any order of a court, or to any sales made by executors, assignees, administrators, receivers, or any public officer in his official capacity, or by any officer of a court:

"Provided, that nothing in this act shall be sale merchant or jobber any right to or lien on so construed as to give any manufacturer, wholeany merchandise or article in any stock of goods, except goods sold and delivered by such manufacturer, wholesale merchant or jobber."

The controversy arose in the following J. W. Edwards owned and conducted a general merchandise store in the town of Boston, in Nelson county. The "1. A sale by a merchant engaged in business Dwiggins Wire Fence Company sold to Edin this state, of any portion of a stock of mer- wards certain merchandise, for which Edchandise, otherwise than in the ordinary course of his trade, and in the regular and usual pros- wards, on January 2, 1914, executed to the ecution of his business, or a sale of an entire company five promissory notes, amounting stock of merchandise in bulk by such merchant, to $200 each, payable in four, five, six, seven, shall be fraudulent and void, as against the creditors of the seller arising out of said stock of and eight months from date, with 6 per cent. merchandise, unless the purchaser shall, at interest. Each of the notes provided that in

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

case of default on any one of the notes all should become due. In the month of April, 1914, Edwards sold and transferred his entire stock of merchandise to G. S. Patterson. Neither Patterson nor Edwards complied with the provisions of the above statute. On May 20, 1914, this action was brought by the Dwiggins Wire Fence Company against G. S. Patterson to recover of Patterson and subject the stock of goods to payment of plaintiff's debt. On the trial it appeared that of the wire fence sold by plaintiff to Edwards, the purchaser, Patterson, received only $213.17 worth. Of this he had disposed of $168.28 worth, and still had on hand wire fence of the value of $44.89. It was stipulated that the value of the entire stock of merchandise exceeded $1,000. The trial court adjudged that plaintiff recover of Patterson the sum of $168.28, with interest, and further adjudged the plaintiff was entitled to recover in kind the remainder of the wire fence of the value of $44.89. So much of the petition as sought to subject the entire stock of goods or the value thereof to the satisfaction of plaintiff's claim, and so much of the petition as sought to have the merchandise, with the exception of the wire on hand at the time of the sale, held in trust for the benefit of plaintiff and the other creditors of Edwards, was dismissed. From a judgment so entered, plaintiff appeals, and defendant Patterson prosecutes a cross-appeal. The first question to be considered is the constitutionality of the statute. If resort be had to authority, it will be found that there is an irreconcilable conflict in the opinions of the courts. Similar statutes have been enacted in a number of states. In New York, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Utah they have been declared unconstitutional. Wright v. Hart, 182 N. Y. 350, 75 N. E. 404, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 338, 3 Ann. Cas. 263; Miller v. Crawford, 70 Ohio St. 207, 71 N. E. 631, 1 Ann. Cas. 558; McKinster v. Sager, 163 Ind. 671, 72 N. E. 854, 68 L. R. A. 273, 106 Am. St. Rep. 268; Off v. Morehead, 235 III. 40, 85 N. E. 264, 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 167, 126 Am. St. Rep. 184, 14 Ann. Cas. 434; Block v. Schwartz, 27 Utah, 387, 76 Pac. 22, 65 L. R. A. 308, 101 Am. St. Rep. 971, 1 Ann. Cas. 550. On the other hand, statutes of like import have been held valid in Mississippi, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Tennessee, Washington, Georgia, Michigan, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, and Oklahoma. Moore Dry Goods Co. v. Jas. H. Rowe et al., 97 Miss. 775, 53 South. 626; John P. Squire & Co. V. Tellier, 185 Mass. 18, 69 N. E. 312, 102 Am. St. Rep. 322; Young v. Lemieux, 79 Conn. 434, 65 Atl. 436, 600, 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 160, 129 Am. St. Rep. 193, 8 Ann. Cas. 452; Walp v. Mooar, 76 Conn. 515, 57 Atl. 277; Neas v. Borches, 109 Tenn. 398, 71 S. W. 50, 97 Am. St. Rep. 851; McDaniels v. J. J. Connelly Shoe Co., 30 Wash. 549, 71 Pac. 37, 60

ques & T. Co. v. Carstarphen Warehouse Co., 131 Ga. 1, 62 S. E. 82; Spurr v. Travis, 145 Mich. 721, 108 N. W. 1090, 116 Am. St. Rep. 330, 9 Ann. Cas. 250; Thorpe v. Pennock Mercantile Co., 99 Minn. 22, 108 N. W. 940, 9 Ann. Cas. 229; Wilson v. Edwards, 32 Pa. Super. Ct. 295; Feingold v. Steinberg, 33 Pa. Super. Ct. 39; Williams v. Fourt Nat. Bank, 15 Okl. 477, 82 Pac. 496, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 334, 6 Ann. Cas. 970; Noble v. Fort Smith Wholesale Grocery Co., 34 Okl. 662, 127 Pac. 14, 46 L. R. A. (N. S.) 455. In Wisconsin and Maryland the courts did not consider the question of constitutionality, but assumed the acts to be valid. Fisher v. Herrmann, 118 Wis. 424, 95 N. W. 392; Hart v. Roney, 93 Md. 432, 49 Atl. 661. Those courts courts holding such acts unconstitutional proceed on the theory that they unduly restrict the right of property and constitute class legislation of the most vicious kind. To sustain their contention, the burdens imposed by the acts are set out at great length, and a long record is given of the classes of business men to which they do not apply. With all due respect for their views, it seems to us that the objections which they raise to the constitutionality of such acts are matters relating to questions of expediency rather than of power.

[1] If there be one question of constitutional law well settled, it is that the courts will not declare an act unconstitutional unless plainly so, and, in case of doubt, will resolve the doubt in favor of its validity. Eubank v. Richmond, 226 U. S. 137, 33 Sup. Ct. 76, 57 L. Ed. 156, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1123, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 192; Johnson v. Higgins, 3 Metc. 566; Henderson v. State, 137 Ind. 552, 36 N. E. 257, 24 L. R. A. 469, 6 R. C. L. 73.

[2] From time out of mind the state has had power to regulate the acquisition, enjoyment, and disposition of property. Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U. S. 86, 11 Sup. Ct. 13, 34 L. Ed. 620. The prevention of fraud is equally within the power of the state. People v. Freeman, 242 Ill. 373, 90 N. E. 366, 17 Ann. Cas. 1098; People v. Wagner, 86 Mich. 594, 49 N. W. 609, 13 L. R. A. 286, 24 Am. St. Rep. 141. And the state may protect the people against the consequences of fraud. Hawker v. People of New York, 170 U. S. 189, 18 Sup. Ct. 573, 42 L. Ed. 1002. Police regulations are not rendered invalid by the fact that they may incidentally affect the exercise of some right guaranteed by the Constitution. State v. Gurry, 121 Md. 534, 88 Atl. 546, 47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1087, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 957. It is only where such regulations are unreasonable or constitute an unjustifiable inpairment or abridgment of the right that the courts will declare them invalid. Henderson v. New York, 92 U. S. 259, 23 L. Ed. 543; People v. Budd. 117 N. Y. 1, 22 N. E. 670, 682, 5 L. R. A. 559, 15 Am.

[5] The next question concerns the propriety of the trial court holding that plaintiff was confined in its recovery to the amount of its property which passed into the hands of Patterson by virtue of the sale. It is insisted that this is the correct construction of the statute, because the word "creditors" is qualified by the clause "arising out of said stock of merchandise," and that this position is further fortified by the following language of the last section of the act:

"Provided, that nothing in this act shall be so construed as to give any manufacturer, wholesale merchant or jobber any right to or lien on any merchandise or article in any stock of goods, except goods sold and delivered by such manufacturer, wholesale merchant or jobber."

[3] The plain purpose of the enactment was | Constitution. We may further add that the to prevent fraudulent sales. The necessity Supreme Court of the United States has for such legislation grew out of the fact that held that similar statutes were not violamany merchants in failing circumstances tive of the fourteenth amendment to the fedwould dispose of their entire stock of goods, eral Constitution. Kidd, Dater & Price Co. pocket the money, and leave their creditors v. Musselman Grocer Co., 217 U. S. 461, 30 without remedy. To avoid such conse- Sup. Ct. 606, 54 L. Ed. 839; Lemieux v. quences, the statute provides that sales in Young, 211 U. S. 489, 29 Sup. Ct. 174, 53 L. bulk shall be fraudulent and void, unless Ed. 295. certain things are done. In order that the purchaser may escape the consequences of the statute, all that he has to do is to make inquiry of the seller as to the names and places of residence or places of business of each and all of the creditors of the seller arising out of said business, and at least five days before the consummation of the sale notify them, either personally or by registered letter, of the intended sale. The seller must furnish the information in writing, and the purchaser is not responsible to any creditor not mentioned in the written statement. All that the seller is required to do is to make true answers to the inquiries of the purchaser under the penalty of fine and imprisonment, if he knowingly and willfully make false answers, or induce the sale by refusing to answer, or by fraudulently claiming or pretending ignorance of the matters inquired about; in other words, the only effect of the statute is to postpone the consummation of the sale for at least five days and to require of the seller and purchaser certain duties which would, perhaps, not consume more than two or three hours' time. From a practical standpoint, there is no ground for distinction between the statutes declaring prohibited sales void and fraudu-nonymously with the words "arising out lent and those making them presumptively fraudulent. The effect is the same. A sale is merely voidable at the option of the creditor, who pursues his remedy within the statutory period. Manifestly, a seller without debts can make a valid sale. A seller who is indebted can make a valid sale after the required notice, or he may validate a sale made without notice by paying or otherwise satisfying his creditors. Considering these privileges in connection with the requirements of the statute, it seems to us that the restrictions imposed fall far short of constituting an unreasonable interference with the right of property.

[4] But it is argued that the act is discriminatory, in that it applies only to merchants, and excludes from its operation all other sellers. As a matter of fact, however, the offending class is composed principally of merchants. The classification, therefore, is not an arbitrary one, but, being based on a well-grounded distinction, is altogether reasonable, and does not violate the provisions of the fourteenth amendment to the federal Constitution or any provision of our own

In our opinion, this view of the statute is entirely too narrow. It expressly provides that the purchaser who fails to comply with the statute shall hold the merchandise so purchased "for the use and benefit of all the creditors of the seller," and shall be responsible to them for the fair value of such part thereof as he, the purchaser, may have transferred or conveyed to others. It is clear, we think, that the qualifying words "arising out of said stock of merchandise" are used sy

of said business," and that the statute embraces all creditors who, during the continuance of the particular business, sold the seller any part of his stock of merchandise, whether on hand at the time of the sale to the purchaser or not; the liability of the purchaser in no event to exceed the value of the merchandise purchased. The manifest purpose of the act was to provide that the entire stock of merchandise so purchased should be held in trust for all such creditors of the seller, to be distributed in proportion to their respective claims. In case the purchaser disposed of any part of the stock, he was to be personally liable. The effect of the proviso at the end of the fourth section of the act is merely to provide that no creditor should have any superior right to or lien on any merchandise or article in any stock of goods sold, unless such merchandise or articles of goods were sold by the creditor to the seller, and were embraced in the stock of goods or merchandise disposed of by the seller.

Judgment affirmed on cross-appeal and reversed on original appeal for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

ROBERTS et al. v. SANDY VALLEY & ELKHORN RY. CO. (Court of Appeals of Kentucky. Oct. 21, 1915.) 1. APPEAL AND ERROR ~1058 REVIEW HARMLESS ERROR.

1

The exclusion of evidence which was supplied by the testimony of later witnesses is harmless, though erroneous.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 4195, 4200-4204, 4206; Dec. Dig. 1058.]

2. RAILROADS 114-CONSTRUCTION-ACTIONS EVIDENCE.

In an action for damages sustained to plaintiffs' lands by the improper construction of defendant's roadbed, which caused a creek to cut the lands, evidence held to warrant a finding that the damage was only temporary. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Railroads, Cent. Dig. §§ 365-371; Dec. Dig. 114.] 3. RAILROADS 113-CONSTRUCTION-DAM

AGES.

Where a railroad company builds its line on the right of way purchased from a landowner, it is liable to the landowner for damages to his remaining land only when guilty of negligence in construction.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Railroads, Cent. Dig. §§ 230, 351-357, 359-361, 363, 364; Dec. Dig. 113.]

describing the locality, is not in the record,
although we have time and again, in other
opinions requested counsel to make a part.
of the record in cases like this diagrams and
maps used on the trial of the case. If, how-
ever, counsel see proper not to furnish us.
this material aid, they should not complain
if the opinion does not describe accurately
the situation.
the situation. As aptly illustrating the dif-
ficulty we labor under in getting at the facts
of a case like this, in the absence of the dia-
gram used on the trial, we quote from the
testimony of Roberts the following. Asked
if he had a diagram of the premises, he said
yes, and then, using the diagram before the
jury, he said:

"Now right here is what we are talking about now. Here is Mr. Osborne's line running off there. That is a straight line. Here is the bend I spoke to you about. Here is the center line of the Sandy Valley & Elkhorn Railroad. This heavy line here is the fill. Here is where they put the water over on me on that corner there and cut the land and fence away. Then they come on down here to the old meadow bottom, and they put a bridge in there. And when there was any water in the creek it divided there and part went around one side of the island and part on the other, and they filled it up there and put it all in one channel. The water here strikes an abutment on the righthand side of the creek as you go down and on the dark line is the county road. It crosses Com-shoots it across on the rye field bottom. Here the creek above my house, and right there that little square represents my house. Here is the county road going between my house and the coal house that I had, and here across the creek. they made the fill in there and filled nearly onethird of the channel in the creek opposite my

Appeal from Circuit Court, Pike County. Action by W. J. Roberts and wife against the Sandy Valley & Elkhorn Railway Company. There was a judgment for plaintiffs, and plaintiffs, deeming damages inadequate, appeal. Affirmed.

J. S. Cline, of Pikeville, for appellants. Auxier, Harman & Francis, of Pikeville, and Hager & Stewart, of Ashland, for appellee.

CARROLL, J. The appellants, Roberts and his wife, brought this suit, to recover damages in the sum of $1,000, against the appellee railway company, growing out of damages alleged to have been sustained to the lands of the appellants by the construction of the roadbed of the railway company. On a trial before a jury there was a verdict in favor of the appellants for $50, and, deeming this assessment of damages inadequate, they have appealed.

The petition charged that the railway company, in the construction of its line of road, placed on each side of Shelby creek the piers of a bridge, and by the erection of these piers and embankments connecting therewith caused the channel of Shelby creek to leave its natural bed and flow over and against the land of appellants, thereby washing away and otherwise injuring their land. was a traverse of the aver

ments of the petition.

On the trial of this case the witnesses used a diagram in explaining to the court and the jury the course of the creek and the location of the bridge piers and the land over which the water, as alleged, was diverted. This diagram, which would be equally, if not more, useful to us than to the court and jury in

house and orchard."

All of the evidence of the witness along

this line was made very plain to the jury and the court by the diagram on which he pointed out the various objects and places; but, in the absence of the diagram, it is impossible for us to get an accurate idea of the situation. It, however, appears from the evidence that the strip of land which was washed away by the diversion of the water from the natural bed of the creek was about 140 feet long and 20 feet wide, and that about 60 panels of fence were washed away. It also appears that the railway was constructed on land purchased from the appellants. Osborne, a witness for appellants said that he thought it would take $50 to protect the ground against further overflow. Other witnesses place the cost of protecting the land against further overflows at from $100 to $300. In the instructions the court told the jury that, in view of the fact that the railway company had purchased its right of way from the appellants, there could be no recovery in their behalf unless they believed from the evidence that in constructing the road it negligently diverted the water course of the creek in such a way as to cause the injury complained of. They were further instructed that if they found for the plaintiffs, to say whether they awarded damages for tempo

rary or permanent injury. The appellants | courts which have not been vacated are public did not offer any instructions, and the jury in their verdict said that the damages assessed were for temporary injury.

[1] It is complained that the court erred in refusing to permit the appellant to testify that the railway company, in the construction of this road, threw a large rock in the creek near the land of the appellant, which diverted the water of the creek. Other witnesses, however, were permitted to say that they noticed large rocks that had been thrown in the bed of the creek, and we think this evidence cured whatever error there might have been in the refusal to let appellant answer the question indicated.

[2] It is also contended that the verdict of

the jury, finding that the diversion of the water was caused by a temporary condition, was erroneous. We do not think so, as several witnesses were asked what it would cost to protect the land against further overflow, and these witnesses gave evidence as to what, in their opinion, it would cost, the estimates varying from $50 to $200 and $300, and it also appears from the evidence of these witnesses that the condition that caused the

damage could be easily remedied.

roads, without regard to any informality in the clares that every public road established and order of establishment, while section 4295 deopened pursuant to law which has not been vacated and every road used and occupied as a public highway shall be deemed a public road whenever the establishment may come in question. A way used by the public for over 15 years was not ordered worked by the county court. Held that, such way not having been accepted, the county court was not bound to order it worked.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Highways, Cent. Dig. §§ 174, 229, 323, 326; Dec. Dig. 992.]

Appeal from Circuit Court, Whitley County.

Petition by James Nolen and others for a writ of mandamus against B. F. Rose, Judge. From a judgment issuing the writ, respondent appeals. Reversed.

Tye, Siler & Gatliff, of Williamsburg, for appellant. Bryant & Lawson, of Williamsburg, for appellees.

CARROLL, J. The appellee Nolen, for himself and other citizens of Whitley county, brought this action for a mandamus against [3] It is also urged that the court erred in the appellant, Rose, as judge of the Whitley instructing the jury that they could not find county court. The petition alleged, in subfor the plaintiffs unless they believed that the stance, that the fiscal court of Whitley counroad was negligently constructed and this ty had, by order of court, directed the public roads of the county to be worked by negligent construction caused the overflow citizens in accordance with the statute; that complained of. We think that when a right the judge of the county court had divided of way is purchased by a railway company, Whitley county into road precincts, fixing and on this right of way it builds its line of road, it is only liable to the party from whom the boundaries for the same, allotting the road, it is only liable to the party from whom citizens subject to roadwork to work in their it purchased the right of way for negligence in the construction or operation of the road. Madisonville R. Co. v. Renfro, 127 S. W. Madisonville R. Co. v. Renfro, 127 S. W.

508.

respective precincts, also appointing overSeers for the roads; that there was a public road in Whitley county about two miles in length leading from the Jane Lay crossing to the mining camps of the Proctor Coal Company; that the judge, in dividing the county into road precincts, fixing the boundaries thereof, and allotting hands and ap

The failure of the court to instruct the jury as to the measure of damages is also pointed out as an error, but a careful examination of the evidence satisfies us that the jury were fully authorized to find for a tem-pointing overseers thereon, did not include porary injury; and, while they might have assessed the damages in a larger sum than they did, the damages are not so inadequate as to justify us in reversing the case on this

ground.

Wherefore the judgment is affirmed.

ROSE, Judge, v. NOLEN et al.* (Court of Appeals of Kentucky. Oct. 21, 1915.) 1. HIGHWAYS 6-COUNTY ROADS-PUBLIC

USE.

The peaceable, continuous, and open public use of a fenced way for a period of 15 years will constitute the way a public highway.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Highways, Cent. Dig. §§ 8, 9; Dec. Dig. 6.]

this road in any of the road precincts or appoint an overseer therefor or allot hands thereto, and refused to do any of these things. A writ of mandamus was prayed against the judge directing him, as county judge, to assign the road to a precinct, appoint an overseer therefor, and allot hands thereto. The answer of the judge was merely a traverse of the averments of the petition.

There was an agreed stipulation of facts showing that this road, which, it appears, had never been accepted by the county as a road, was fenced on both sides for nearly all of its entire distance, and had been used peaceably, continuously, and openly by the public generally for more than 15 years next 2. HIGHWAYS 992-COUNTY ROADS-IM- before the commencement of this suit; that Ky. St. § 4287, declares that all public in fixing road precincts, appointing road overroads heretofore established by the county seers for each precinct, and allotting hands For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

PROVEMENT.

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