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controversy is situate in the s. M. Harris ing appellant's contention is that the plat grant. In 1852 Sarah Noble became the own- of the addition shows that it adjoins the er of a 100-acre tract in the southwest corner northern tier of blocks in the Noble addition. of the grant. Its north line ran east and This was a manifest and evident error on the west 260 varas. Its east line ran north and part of the draftsman who drew the map of south 2,237 varas, and its west line was the Foster addition. It is quite apparent parallel thereto, and coincident with the that after preparing the plat he simply west line of the grant. Upon the south it undertook to indicate surrounding additions, was bounded by Buffalo bayou. In 1867 and in referring to the Noble addition failed all of the tract was platted and laid off into to indicate the unplatted portion in the north lots, blocks, and streets, except 7 or 8 acres end of the tract. A number of similar misof the north end; this unplatted portion be- takes were made with reference to other ading 260 varas east and west by 450 feet north jacent additions. Considering all the facts and south. On February 28, 1874, James E. and surrounding circumstances as reflected Foster became the owner of a 100-acre tract by the record, we have no doubt that the lying immediately north of and adjoining plat of the Foster addition was intended to the Noble tract. It was rectangular in shape, cover only the 100-acre tract which he owned, 260 varas wide and 2,759 varas in length; and that the south line thereof did not exits east and west lines being coincident with tend further south than the north line of prolongations of the corresponding lines of the Noble tract. the Noble tract. In November, 1874, there [2] If we correctly interpret the remaining was filed for record the map of said Foster's propositions of appellant, they are to the Second North addition. There is no state effect that he is entitled to recover the land ment thereon to indicate what particular in controversy as a purchaser without notice. tract of land was intended to be platted, but we cannot see how any such question can be it undoubtedly referred to the 100-acre tract involved in this case. The issue is one of which he had acquired lying north of the boundary alone, and, in the absence of recogNoble addition. From the distances indi- nition of line, or estoppel otherwise arising, cated on the map, it will be seen that the it is not apparent to us how the bona fides tract platted by said map was 6,030 feet in of appellant's purchase, or his want of notice, length by 7222/10 feet in width, or 2,1708/10 can in any wise arise or be material. varas in length by 260 varas in width, which

Affirmed. comprises exactly 100 acres in area.

The draftsman who prepared the plat of Foster's addition attempted to indicate there- MOORE et al. v. TOYAH VALLEY IRR. CO. on other additions which adjoin the same

et al. (No. 492.) on the south and west, and in such manner

(. El Paso. indicated that the north tier of blocks of the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas.

Oct. 14, 1915. Rehearing Denied Nov. 4, 1915. Noble addition, as platted, lay immediately On Motion to Reinstate, Nov. 4, 1915.) south of the Foster addition, The drafts- 1. APPEAL AND ERROR 76_JUDGMENTS APman made no indication on the plat of the PEALABLE-"FINAL JUDGMENT. unplatted strip of the Noble tract lying be

Where a judgment did not dispose of certween the Foster 100 acres and the Noble for by them, and there was no order of dismissal

tain interveners, nor of the subject-matter sued addition as platted, but indicated that the as to them, the judgment was not such a "final Foster addition came as far south as the judgment" as would support an appeal. Noble addition, which would place the Noble [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Appeal and unplatted acreage within the land covered by Error, Cent. Dig. $8 426-428, 430, 431, 435

443; Dec. Dig. Om76. the Foster addition plat.

For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, The controlling question in the case thus First and Second Series, Final Decree or Judga reduces itself: Was the Foster addition, as ment.] shown by the recorded map, located immedi- 2. PARTIES Ow40PROPER PARTIES. ately north of the Noble addition and cover- Where, in a suit for an injunction, certain ing the unplatted 7 or 8 acres in the northern parties filed a petition in intervention setting part of the Noble tract, as is claimed by ap- up that they were jointly interested with plain

tiff in the lands and waters in controversy, pellant, or was it located wholly upon and they were under the allegations of their petiwithin the 100-acre tract then owned by tion proper parties to the action. Foster immediately north of the Noble 100- [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Parties, Cent. acre tract?

Dig. 88 60-63, 65-67; Dec. Dig. Om40.] [1] In the court below the issue was re

On Motion to Reinstate. solved against appellant, and the sufficiency

3. JUDGMENT 297 CORRECTION of the evidence to support this finding is

AMENDMENT-FAILURE OF ENTRY TO CONraised by the first three propositions sub- FORM TO JUDGMENT RENDERED. joined to the only assignment of error pre- Where the judgment actually rendered dissented in this court. An examination of the posed of the rights of all parties to an action,

but the judgment, as entered, did not correctly evidence bearing upon the issue abundantly reflect and evidence the judgment rendered and supports the finding. The only fact support- I failed to dispose of the rights of certain parties,

AND

the court had authority to correct its minutes [1] The decree entered by the trial court so as to show the judgment actually rendered. after hearing is not such a final judgment as

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Judgment, is required by law to confer jurisdiction upCent. Dig. $8 581, 584–586; Dec. Dig. On 297.]

on this court, in that it does not dispose of 4. JUDGMENT O 1—“RENDITION” AND “EN

the parties (intervener) nor the subject-matTRY” OF JUDGMENT.

ter sued for by such parties. The parties J. The "judgment" of a court is what the T., W. E., and E. A. Moore have not been court pronounces; its "rendition” is the judicial disposed of by the decree, nor by any order act by which the court settles and declares the of dismissal; nor has the subject matter of decision of the law upon the matters at issue; and its “entry” is the ministerial act by which their suit been disposed of as to them by the the enduring evidence of the judicial act is judgment. afforded.

[2] Under the allegations in their petition [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Judgment, in intervention, the said J. T., W. E., and E. Cent. Dig. $8 1, 3, 4; Dec. Dig. Oml. For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, (Foster v. G., C. & S. F. Ry. Co., 91 Tex.

A. Moore were proper parties to this action First and Second Series, Entry; Judgment; Rendition of Judgment.]

631, 45 S. W. 376), and, to make the decree 5. JUDGMENT Omw 299—AMENDMENT OR COR-final, there must be an order entered of RECTION-TIME FOR AMENDMENT.

record disposing of them as parties (MenUnder Rev. St. 1911, art. 2015, providing doza v. A., T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 62 S. W. that, where there shall be a mistake in the rec- 4181), and likewise the decree of the court, ord of any judgment, the judge may in open court, and after notice of the application there in order to be such final judgment as will for to the parties interested, amend the same, give this court jurisdiction to consider and and article 2016, providing that, where in the determine the questions involved, must disrecord of any judgment or decree there shall be a mistake, miscalculation, or misrecital of pose of the pleas and issues of law and fact any sum or sums of money, or any names, and (Railway Co. v. Weld & Neville, 95 Tex. 278, there shall be among the records any verdict 66 S. W. 1095). or instrument of writing whereby the judgment It is therefore ordered that this cause be may be safely amended, it shall be the duty dismissed at the cost of appellants. of the court and the judge thereof in vacation on application of either party, to amend the judgment, where the judgment actually rendered

On Motion to Reinstate. disposed of the rights of all of the parties, but the judgment, as entered, did not dispose of the

By motion appellants ask that their aprights of certain parties, the correction of the peal, dismissed for want of a final judgment, judgment entry to conform to the judgment ren- be reinstated, for the reason that since the dered could only be made at a subsequent term, order of dismissal was entered a final judgand not in vacation; as article 2016 is 'limited to the particular errors in the record of the ment has been entered nunc pro tunc in the judgment therein indicated.

trial court, and further asks for a writ of [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Judgment, certiorari to the clerk of the district court Cent. Dig. 88 583–586; Dec. Dig. Om 299.] of Reeves county, Tex., to certify the record Appeal from District Court, Reeves Cound of the judgment as corrected.

The record filed in support of the motion ty; S. J. Isaacks, Judge.

Action by Mrs. J. L. Moore against the shows that since the order of dismissal the Toyah Valley Irrigation Company and an- appellants filed a motion in the district court other in which J. T. Moore and others inter-containing the following: vened as plaintiffs. Judgment for defend- * * * said cause was tried, and final judg

"That * * * at the November term, 1914, ants, and plaintiffs appeal. . Appeal dis- ment rendered, as appears from the docket enmissed.

tries and papers filed in said cause, disposing of

the parties to said cause and the issues of law Hefner & Cooke and J. W. Parker, all of and fact raised by the parties thereto, that Pecos, for appellants. Ross & Hubbard, W. thereafter, and during the same term of said A. Iludson, E. C. Canon, J. A. Buck, and J. court, said judgment was duly recorded, but E. Starley, all of Pecos, Capps, Cantey, Hang- there was a clerical error in the record of said

, er & Short, of Ft. Worth, and J. A. Drane judgment does not dispose of the interveners, and Harry MacTier, both of Pecos, for ap- Mrs. J. L. Moore, as guardian, and the said pellees.

J. T., W. E., and E. A. Moore, and does not dispose of the issues made by the pleading of

said interveners, in that the record of said judgHARPER, J. This suit for injunction was ment omits the names of said interveners and instituted by Mrs. J. L. Moore, originally, omits reference to the issues made by their against the Toyah Valley Irrigation Company

pleadings.” and A. J. Carpenter. Afterwards J. T., W. And by prayer they asked the court to E., and E. A. Moore intervened in the case, amend or correct the judgment as indicated. in person or through Mrs. J. L. Moore, who Thereafter the judge in vacation, October 15, is alleged to be their guardian (the petition 1915, caused the judgment to be corrected does not exactly reveal which), setting up as indicated. that they were jointly interested with plain- [3, 4] It appears from the record that the tiff Moore in the lands and waters in controversy, and they filed pleadings and adopt- reported as a memorandum decision without opinjudgment originally rendered actually dis-, Taylor v. Doom, 43 Tex. Civ. App. 59, at posed of the rights of the interveners, and page 63, 95 S. W. 4. as a matter of fact, a final judgment was The statute which controls is article 2015, rendered. But the judgment, as entered, which reads that, where there is a mistake does not correctly reflect and evidence the in the record of any judgment or decree, the judgment actually rendered. The distinction judge may, in open court, and after notice between the rendition of a judgment, and of the application therefor has been given the entry thereof is stated by Judge Phillips to the parties interested in such judgment or in Coleman v. Zapp, 105 Tex. 491, at page decree, amend the same according to the 494, 151 S. W. 1040, at page 1041, as follows: truth and justice of the case, and thereafter

1 Reported in full in the Southwestern Reporter; ed those filed by Mrs. J. L. Moore.

ion in 94 Tex. 650.

"The judgment of a court is what the court the execution shall conform to the judgment pronounces. Its rendition is the judicial act as rendered. This statute is a very much by which the court settles and declares the de- broader one than article 2016, and gives the cision of the law upon the matters at issue. Its entry is the ministerial act by which the trial judge unlimited authority to correct enduring evidence of the judicial act is af- any mistake in the record of any judgment forded.'

or decree, but it must be made in open court. In the same case, 105 Tex. on page 496, As has been indicated, article 2016 has ref151 S. W. on page 1042, it is said by Judge erence to corrections which may be made in Phillips:

vacation, and is limited to the particular er"To correct in the trial court, after adjourn- rors in the record of the judgment therein ment of the term, a judgment as rendered, an indicated. So it is plain that the remedy of independent action is necessary, as its jurisdic- the parties in this case is to have the judgtion of the case is at an end. In the latter in- ment entry corrected by an order made in stance [i. e., a proceeding to correct or supply the minutes of the court so as to have them open court nunc pro tunc at a subsequent truly recite a judgment actually rendered] the term, under article 2015. court may, at a subsequent term, of its own mo- It appears from the motion in this case tion or upon the application of parties, order the that all parties would prefer to have this proper entry, because the inherent power that it possesses as a court over its own records case disposed of upon the present appeal. endures for the sake of their verity.”

We at this time see no reason why it should It is thus seen that the trouble in this not be done after a nunc pro tunc entry is case is not that the court did not render a made in the trial court, properly correcting final judgment, but that it failed to enter a the entry of the judgment, so as to dispose

of all issues and parties, upon a motion final judgment. The latter being the case, it is clear, under numerous authorities, that which may be thereafter seasonably presentthe court has authority to correct its minutes ed to reinstate the appeal.

The motion is in all things overruled. so as to show the judgment actually rendered. Hamilton v. Joachim, 160 S. W. 645, at page 647, and authorities there cited, and also Yarbrough v. Etheredge, 163 S. W.

LOCKNEY STATE BANK V. DAMRON. at page 999.

(No. 829.) [5] It remains therefore only to be determined whether the correction of the minutes (Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Amarillo.

Oct. 23, 1915.) can be made in vacation, or must it be made

UNAUby a nunc pro tunc order entered during 1. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT Eww171 –

THORIZED ACTS-ACCEPTANCE OF BENEFITS. term time. The only authority to amend a

A person or corporation cannot retain an judgment entered in vacation is contained in advantage secured by fraud of one of its agents articles 2016 and 2017, where it is provided and accept the benefits of his act, without also that:

adopting the means by which the advantage

was procured, though the principal had no “Where in the record of any judgment or de- knowledge at the time what those means were. cree of any court there shall be any mistake, miscalculation, or misrecital of any sum or sums and Agent, Cent. Dig. 88 644-655; Dec. Dig.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Principal of money, or of any name or names, * *

Ow171.] it shall be the duty of the court in which such judgment or decree shall be rendered” to amend 2. CANCELLATION OF INSTRUMENTS 47 same.

GROUNDS FOR DENIAL OF RELIEF-FRAUD BY

PLAINTIFF. Plainly, this cause does not fall within the

A woman suing for the cancellation of a terms of that article, because it is not any note for $3,300 given to a bank, who at the mistake, miscalculation, or misrecital of any norant, uneducated, and practically unable to

time it was signed was about 70 years old, igname or names; but it is a plain case of read and write, testified that the cashier of the failure to incorporate in the judgment entry bank, who accompanied her grandson to her a disposition of the rights of interveners. home to obtain her signature to the note, repConstruing article 2016, our courts in several resented that it was for $1,700; that he had

also signed the note; that if she would sign it cases have, in effect, held that only clerical he would stand between her and all danger; errors may be corrected in vacation by virtue that she had confidence in him, knew his posiof this statute. See Mansel v. Castles, 54 s. tion as cashier, and thought he was reliable and W. 299; Railway Co. v. Haynes, 82 Tex. possessed property; that she understood he

was representing the bank; and that she told 448, 18 S. W. 605; Hinzie v. Kempner, 82 them when she signed the note that she would Tex. 617, at page 621, 18 S. W. 659; and not pay it, and they took it with the understand

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ing that she was not to pay it. Held that, as-, it he would stand between her and all dansuming that an agreement that she would not ger, and that if such representations had be legally bound as a maker of the note would be fraudulent as to the bank and preclude equi- not been made by Mr. Garrison she would table relief, the testimony was open to the con- not have executed the paper, that they (evistruction that she understood that she was not dently meaning Jones and Garrison) repreto pay the note because of the cashier's agree-sented to her that this was an extension of ment and representations that he would stand between her and all danger, in connection with another note, and that they simply wanted her belief in his solvency, and, if such was the a little longer time upon the obligation and understanding, the contract was not fraudulent had plenty of cattle to settle the same. She as to the bank, especially as, had it not been said that she had confidence in Mr. Garrison, for the cashier's fraudulent representations, her obligation to the bank would not have been af- knew the position that he held in the bank at fected by this agreement, and the bank could not Lockney as cashier, and thought he was rehave been injured thereby.

liable and possessed of some property, that [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Cancellation she understood that Mr. Garrison was repreof Instruments, Cent. Dig. $$ 102, 103; Dec. Dig. 47.]

senting the bank, and that she signed the 3. EVIDENCE 441 PAROL EVIDENCE TO

note in order that Mr. Garrison could get VARY WRITING.

the amount of money represented by the note The terms of a promissory note are con- from the bank, and further testified: clusive of the contract, and cannot be changed by parol evidence that the note was executed I would not pay it at all, and they took it

“I told them when I signed it [the note) that with an understanding between the parties that with that understanding-that I was not to pay it was never to be paid.

for it.” [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Evidence, Cent. Dig. $8 1719, 1723-1763, 1765-1845, The trial court, without the assistance of 2030-2047; Dec. Dig. Om 441.]

a jury, canceled the note, and the assignment 4. BILLS AND NOTES 103 VALIDITY which we will discuss is one, in effect, that, FRAUD.

Mrs. Damron having testified that she had That the cashier of a bank to which a woman 70 years old, ignorant, uneducated, and an understanding that she was not to pay practically unable to read and write, executed the note when they took it, and knowing that à note for $3,300, represented to her that it said note was being executed for the purpose was for $1,700, that he had also signed the of securing money from the bank for Garrinote, and that if she would sign it he would stand between her and all danger, constituted son, she was guilty of such fraud as to presufficient grounds for the cancellation of the clude a recovery. The authorities principalnote.

ly cited to sustain this view are Jines V. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Bills and Astle, 170 S. W. 1081, Rushing v. Bank, 162 Notes, Cent. Dig. 88 233-240; Dec. Dig. Ons S. W. 469, and Hawkins v. Bank, 175 S. W. 103.]

166, with the additional case of Cotton v. Appeal from District Court, Motley Coun- Rand, 93 Tex. 7, 51 S. W. 842, 53 S. W. 343, ty; Jo A. P. Dickson, Judge.

decided by the Supreme Court; the first Suit by Mrs. S. A. Damron against the three cases having been decided by this court. Lockney State Bank. Decree in favor of

Appellant also, as a subsidiary proposition plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.

under the above assignment, contends that Crudgington & Works, of Amarillo, for Garrison having an interest in the appellant appellant. T. T. Bouldin, of Matador, for bank, that no representations or fraud of appellee.

Garrison could be imputed to the bank.

[1] There may be a phase of this case that HENDRICKS, J. The appellee, Mrs. S. A. Garrison, reckoning it upon the representaDamron, instituted this suit against the ap- tions he made to Mrs. Damron, if he inpellant, the Lockney State Bank, for the pur- formed her, and she so believed, that this pose of canceling a note on its face for the was his note to the bank, and he was insum of $3,300, which at the time of the in- dividually obtaining the money, such antagstitution of the suit had not matured. Mrs. onism of interest, if it were true, might exDamron, who signed the note, with her mark ist. However, in passing upon appellant's as signature, at the time was about 70 years secondary proposition, there exists the apof age, ignorant, uneducated, and practically plicable principle that a person or a corpounable to read and write. At the time of ration cannot retain an advantage secured the execution of the note D. F. Jones, the by fraud of one of its agents and accept the grandson of Mrs. Damron, was indebted to benefits of his act without also adopting the the Lockney State Bank, and, with Garrison, means by which the advantage was procashier of the bank, visited the home of Mrs. cured, although the principal may have had Damron, several miles in the country, for no knowledge at the time what those means the purpose of obtaining the signature of his were. American Nat. Bank v. Cruger, 91 grandmother upon the particular note. Mrs. Tex. 446, 44 S. W. 278; Allen v. Garrison, Damron testified that antecedent to the ex- 92 Tex. 546, 50 S. W. 335; Cowboy State ecution of the note Mr. Garrison, the cash- Bank & Trust Co. v. Guinn, 160 S. W. 1105; ier of the bank, represented to her that the Commonwealth Bonding & Casualty Co. v. note was for $1,700, and that he had also Bomar, 169 S. W. 1063. signed the note, and that if she would sign [2] Assuming argumentatively only that an agreement, as construed by appellant to been injured in law. If the representations have been made in this case, is one the had not been made, the mere agreement, if tendency of which is to permit the perpetra- it existed as the appellant construes it, that tion of a fraud as to preclude equitable con- she was not to be bound upon the note, would sideration of rights by a participant, how-be unavailing as to deprive the bank of any ever, we think, resolving the testimony pre- rights whatever in law. If so, how could sumptively as the trial court resolved it, such contract have a tendency to operate as and the transaction, considering the evidence a fraud in law upon the bank? Without deas a whole, that the authorities cited and ciding it upon the consideration last sugthe principle attempted to be held applicable gested, we think, upon an interpretation of are not pertinent. Appellant's construction the record, susceptible of two meanings, and and theory is, as we view it, that Mrs. Dam- resolving it presumably as the trial court ron agreed with Garrison, and Garrison with construed it, the assignment should be overher, that she would not be bound, in so far ruled. Other assignments we think unnecesas any legal obligation is concerned, as a sary to discuss and are overruled. maker of the note. Such a construction is [4] The trial court resolved the testimony deducible from the testimony. However, as to representations of Garrison against the there is another construction that Mrs. Dam- bank which constitute sufficient grounds for ron understood that she was not to pay said the cancellation. Stacy v. Ross, 27 Tex. 3, note on account of the agreement and rep-84 Am. Dec. 604. resentations by Garrison with her belief in Affirmed. his solvency that he would stand between her and all danger upon the obligation, and for that reason she would not pay it.

MORRIS v. McSPADDEN et al. (No. 825.)* "It is a well-established rule of construction

Amarillo. that language in a contract which is susceptible (Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. of two constructions, one of which would render

Oct. 16, 1915. On Motion for Rethe contract illegal, and the other would make

hearing, Nov. 6, 1915.) it lawful, that contract which would conform the 1. JUDGMENT 256–CONFORMITY TO SPECIAL contract to the law must be adopted.” Foard

FINDINGS-IMMATERIAL FINDINGS. County v. Sandifer, 105 Tex. 424, 151 S. W.

The issue found by the jury must or should 524.

respond to the issues presented by the pleadChief Justice Brown also said in that ings, and, if they do not so respond, the issues

so found should be regarded as immaterial, and case, quoting from Clark on Contracts:

not be considered in rendering the judgment. "Where a particular word, or the contract as [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Judgment, a whole, is susceptible of two meanings, one of Cent. Dig. 88 446-454; Dec. Dig. 256.] which will render the contract valid, and the other of which will render it invalid, the former 2. TRIAL 366-SPECIAL ISSUES—REQUESTS will be adopted so as to uphold the contract." -EXCEPTIONS BAD IN PART.

Where five special issues were requested on It is clear to us that, if Garrison agreed one paper, and refused as a whole, and an exwith Mrs. Damron that she would not have ception taken to the refusal of all five, and three to pay the note, on account of the assump- of such issues were given substantially as re tion by him, as between them, of the whole fusal of the other two would not be considered.

quested, an assignment complaining of the reliability for the paper, such contract had not

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Trial, Cent. a fraudulent tendency, nor, as far as this Dig. 88 875-878; Dec. Dig. Om 366.] record suggests, would violate any rule of 3. TRIAL 366-SPECIAL ISSUES-REQUESTS public policy to the extent that the same --EXCEPTIONS BAD IN PART. would be void, and constitute fraud upon

A general exception to the refusal to give

special charges en masse will be overruled, where the bank.

[3] Again, as presented in this record, part of them were embraced in the main charge could such a contract operate as a fraud [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Trial, Cent. upon the Lockney State Bank? The terms Dig. $8 875-878; Dec. Dig. Om 366.] of a promissory note are conclusive of the

On Motion for Rehearing. contract and cannot be changed by parol evi

4. JUDGMENT O 256-SUIT FOR ACCOUNTINGdence that the note was executed with an

CONFORMITY TO FINDINGS. understanding between the parties that it Where, in a suit for an accounting between was never to be paid. Dolson v. De Ganahl, partners, the jury found the expenses paid out, 70 Tex, 620, 8 S. W. 321; Roundtree v. Gil- who paid them, and what each paid, the losses roy, 57 Tex. 176, 180; Self v. King, 28 Tex. and that' defendant had received $11,196.8343,

sustained, the amounts received by each partner, 552, 553; Bailey v. Rockwall County Nat., which had not been accounted for, and further Bank (Civ. App.) 61 S. W. 530, 531.

found that there was $6,820.98 belonging to the If it were not for fraudulent representa- partnership that had not been divided by agreetions Mrs. Damron could not impeach this specifically pleaded that the partners had by

rs. Damron could not impeach this ment of the parties, though it had not been note upon the character of agreement which agreement divided part of the funds, thereby reappellant claims was made. Her obligation quiring a division only of the remainder, the isto the bank would be unequivocal, and strip- sue as to the amount not divided by agreement

was immaterial, and the finding thereon could ped of the fraud that permits the woman to not defeat a verdict or recovery upon the amount cancel the note, the bank could not have I found by a true accounting, and a judgment Om For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER ir all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

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