« 이전계속 »
Denhardt, 138 Ky. 238, 127 S. W. 785, Ann. | for an amount not within the jurisdiction of Cas. 1912A, 1199.
this court, no appea] can be prosecuted from In the cases relied on by the plaintiff, no fact, no ruling to the contrary can be found,
his judgment. It has long been held, and in such state of facts as here presented will be that such a writ issued only to prevent the infound. That of Equitable Life Insurance Co.ferior tribunal from exercising, or attempting to v. Hardin, 166 Ky. 53, 178 S. W. 1155, deals exercise, a jurisdiction that does not belong to wholly with the writ of prohibition, and the provides that this court "shall have power to is
Section 110 of the Constitution writ was granted because the wrong com- sue such writs as may be necessary to give it plained of would have resulted in irreparable general control of inferior jurisdictions.” Under injury to the plaintiff, and there was no oth- this provision it is claimed this court may righter adequate remedy to which he could have the question of jurisdiction in the inferior court,
fully exercise the power of determining, not only resorted.
but may go so far as to determine questions In Carey v. Sampson, Judge, 150 Ky. 460, that necessarily belong to courts of original ju150 S. W. 531, Carey sought from this court risdiction, and over which they have complete a writ of prohibition to prevent Sampson, control, subject to an appeal to this court where
. judge of the circuit court, from trying him circuit court is without jurisdiction to try these under an indictment for practicing medicine indictments, and it must be conceded it has full without a license, the punishment for which and complete power to determine all questions offense is a fine not exceeding $50.
pertaining to the trial made by counsel on either The
side. With such a latitudinous construction grounds chiefly urged by Carey for the writ given this provision of the Constitution as we were that, as Sampson had said in advance are asked to give, this court would convert itself of a trial that he intended to find him guilty into a tribunal of original jurisdiction, and in and would fine him, and there could be no of the sufficiency of any pleading in a civil ac
every case, as to the validity of indictments, or appeal from the maximum fine to be assessed tion, this court could interfere and direct the inagainst him, in the absence of the writ offerior court as to what the judgment should be. prohibition asked, he would be left without If the statute imposing the penalty in such cases any adequate remedy. In denying the writ diction to so decide, or if the indictment or pro
has been repealed the court below has the juriswe held that the fact that no appeal is given ceeding is defective the same power exists, so by law from the judgment of an inferior that there can be no reason for this court to incourt cannot affect the question of the pro- terfere with the exercise of the rightful jurisdic
tion of priety of the Court of Appeals' granting a
are prosecuted, and it is only in cases where writ of prohibition, since the legislative de- the inferior tribunal is beyond the bounds of its partment of the state has the power of lim- jurisdiction that this writ should go. The fact iting the jurisdiction of this court as to ap- that no appeal is given cannot affect the quespeals; the right of appeal being not an in- tion, because the legislative department of the
state has the power of limiting the jurisdiction herent right, but one that may be granted as of this court as to appeals.'” a matter of grace, or withheld by the Legis
Here the question whether the plaintiff, in lature, in the exercise of its discretion. In case of a refusal of the mandamus, has any the opinion it is, among other things, said : other adequate means of relief cannot be
"In determining whether there is an adequate considered, for there was a hearing of proof remedly, each case must be adjudged upon its merits.' In Rush v. Denhardt, 138 Ky. 245 (127 by the circuit court and decision that the S. W. 787, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 11991, this court service of process was not sufficient to bring said: 'If we should once lay down the rule that the Old Dominion Steamship Company beapplication by original proceeding might be fore the court. If correct in this decision, made to us to stay the hand of the inferior jurisdictions, whenever in the opinion of counsel the court could not proceed to try the case, the ruling was prejudicial, although it might not owing to its not having obtained jurisdiction leave the complainant without adequate remedy, of the person of the defendant. The queswe would have much of our time occupied in the tion determined was jurisdictional, in the desettlement of questions that could be brought before us in the regular way by appeal. În- cision of which there was a complete exercise ferior courts would be obstructed in the hearing of the discretion of the court, which cannot and disposal of cases, and much confusion and be interfered with by the writ of mandamus; uncertainty would follow.'
nor can the decision itself be reviewed by In the case before us the only element enter this court on an application for such writ. ing into the charge that plaintiff has no adequate remedy is the fact that no appeal will lie
If, as claimed by the plaintiff, the circuit from the judgment which the circuit judge will judge erred in the decision rendered, that render against him, because the fine will be for fact would not authorize the granting of the an amount not within the jurisdiction of this mandamus; or if, as further claimed by her, court. The case, therefore, is on all fours with that of the Standard Oil Co. v. Linn, Judge 132 she were without right of appeal from the S. W. 932] 17 Ky. Law Rep. 833, where the decision, or other adequate remedy, the Oil Company, having been proceeded against un- granting of the mandamus would be equally der 65 separate indictments for buying and re- unauthorized; as in either event we would ceiving empty coal oil barrels without having first erased therefrom the inspector's brand, be confronted with the fact that the circuit which had been placed on them as required by judge had a discretion over the subject-matlaw, applied to this court for a writ of prohibi- ter involved in the question decided, and tion to arrest the proceedings. In overruling that, in making the decision, he exercised the application, this court, speaking through Chief Justice Pryor, said: “The basis of the mo- such discretion, for which reasons no power tion rests upon the ground that his decision may exists in this court to compel, by mandamus,
We are unconvinced of the soundness of M. J. Holt and A. Scott Bullitt, both of the plaintiff's contention that she has no oth- Louisville, for appellant. Helm Bruce and er adequate remedy than the one here ap- Bruce & Bullitt, all of Louisville, for appelplied for. If, after the quashing of the re- lee. turn on the summons, she had advised the judge of the circuit court that she proposed MILLER, C. J.  The commonwealth taking no further step in the case, he doubt- brought this action to have the Kenyon Buildless would have entered judgment dismissing ing, in the city of Louisville, assessed for the action for want of jurisdiction of the taxation for the years 1906 to 1910, both person of the defendant, from which judg- included. The Kenyon Building is a modern, ment, upon reserving the necessary exception, up-to-date office building, containing 87 offices. she could have taken an appeal to this court, One of these offices is occupied by the appeland thereby obtained a review of the rul- lee's agent in charge of the building, and the ings of the circuit judge complained of. remaining 86 offices are rented to business
Our conclusion that the plaintiff has not men. The property is worth about $200,000, shown herself entitled to the writ of man- and brings a gross annual rental of from damus asked renders unnecessary and, in- $16,000 to $18,000. It was devised to the deed, improper the decision of the second appellee, the Board of Education of the question urged by her, viz., whether the serv- Kentucky Annual Conference of the Methoice of summons was legally had upon the dist Episcopal Church, by Mrs. Fannie Speed. Old Dominion Steamship Company; so that the appellee is a corporation, having in question is not passed on.
charge the educational work of the Methodist For the reasons indicated, the demurrer to Episcopal Church in Kentucky. The corpothe petition is sustained, the writ of man-ration was created by a special charter of the damus refused, and the action dismissed.
General Assembly, approved January 15, 1867. Acts 1867, vol. 2, p. 622. Its governing board is made up of laymen and Methodist ministers.
By the eighth clause of appellee's charter COMMONWEALTH v. BOARD OF EDUCA- it is given control of all property constitutTION OF METHODIST EPISCOPAL
ing the educational fund of the Kentucky CHURCH.
Annual Conference; and by the tenth section (Court of Appeals of Kentucky. Nov. 10, 1915.) the administration of the fund is provided 1. TAXATION Om 242 - EXEMPTIONS - EDUCA- for in the way usual in charitable institu
tions of this character. By the eleventh An office building owned by a board of edu- clause of the charter it is directed that all cation of a church conference and used in part for offices for the owner, the rent from the re- the net interest, dividends, and rent arising mainder being employed in the partial support from said fund shall be used by the appellee, of a college maintained by the conference in an- under the general direction of the conference, other city, such college not being a religious in the payment of the salaries of teachers school, and no preference being given to the children of parents who were members of the and the cost of administration of any school church owning the office building, and having no or schools that may have been established theological course, nor requiring doctrinal or or maintained by the board, or in aid of religious qualifications from the teachers, is exempt from taxation under Const. § 170, provid-worthy youths of either sex struggling to ing that institutions of education not used or acquire an education, preference being given employed for gain by any person or corporation, in the case of such aid-afforded students and the income of which is devoted solely to the to such licentiates or candidates for the mincause of education, shall be exempt from taxation.
istry as may be properly recommended by [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Taxation, the quarterly conference of the circuit or Cent. Dig. $$ 394-403; Dec. Dig. Om 242.] station where they hold membership. 2. TAXATION Om 242-EXEMPTIONS-INSTITU- The defendant corporation conducts a TIONS OF LEARNING.
school called Union College, at Barbourville, The fact that a college operated and maintained by a church gives preference to students in Knox county, and uses the rents derived who are candidates for the ministry in the from the Kenyon Building in its support. church, the college being otherwise nonsectarian, Union College is not a religious school, but does not deprive it of its character as an institu- is a regular educational school, and no preftion of education within Const. $ 170, providing that institutions of education when used erence is given to children of parents who or employed for gain shall be exempt from taxa- are members of the Methodist Church. It tion.
has no theological course, but is a secular [Ed. Note. For other cases, see_Taxation, school of the character indicated by its name. Cent. Dig. $$ 394-403; Dec. Dig. Om 242.]
And, although Union College charges a tuAppeal from Circuit Court, Jefferson Coun-ition fee, it appears from the proof that this ty, Chancery Branch, Second Division.
fee is far from covering the operating expenAction by the Commonwealth of Kentucky ses of the school, which are supplemented by against the Board of Education of the Meth- funds derived from other sources. The inodist Episcopal Church. Judgment for de- come derived from the Kenyon Building confendant, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed. stitutes about two-thirds of the entire income
of the board. Some of the teachers in Union, Nazareth Literary Benevolent Institution, College are Methodists, some are Presbyteri-100 Ky. 519, 36 S. W. 994, 19 Ky. Law Rep. ans, and one is a member of the Christian 1102; and the subsequent case of CommonChurch; and all are paid salaries for their wealth v. Berea College, decided in 1912, and services. The course taught is a regular aca- reported in 149 Ky. 95, 147 S. W. 929. demic course, equivalent to that of the It is sufficient to say, in passing, that the Louisville high school, and a collegiate course case of Widows' and Orphans' Home v. Boshaving a curriculum similar to colleges of worth, 112 Ky, 200, 65 S. W. 591, 23 Ky. Law that character. No question is ever asked Rep. 1505, relied upon by counsel for appela teacher concerning his religious affiliation, lant, was expressly overruled in Widows' and no doctrinal features of the Methodist and Orphans' Home v. Commonwealth, 126 Church are taught, although Union College Ky. 386, 400, 103 S. W. 354, 31 Ky. Law Rep. is under the auspices and operation and 775, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 829; and also that management of the
the Methodist Episcopal the dissenting opinions in the Midway OrChurch, because that church owns the proper- phan School Case and the Southern Baptist ty. The religious teachings consist of chapel Theological Seminary Case, supra, are not exercises every morning.
to be now considered, unless this court should The chancellor was of opinion that the be of opinion that the decisions in those Kenyon Building, considering its ownership cases should be departed from. Indeed, counand the use to which its rents were applied, sel for appellant concedes that, if the law is was not subject to taxation; and, having as it was declared by the court in the madismissed the petition, the commonwealth jority opinion in the Midway Orphan School appeals.
Case, and the like cases above mentioned, Section 170 of the Constitution, in so far the judgment of the circuit court must be as it is material to this case, reads as affirmed; but he now asks that those cases follows:
be overruled, although they have repeatedly "There shall be exempt from taxation been approved and followed by this court.
institutions of purely public charity, It has often been held by this court that and institutions of education not used or em- the phrases "institution of purely public ployed for gain by any person or corporation, charity," or "institution of education,” used and the income of which is devoted solely to the in section 170 of the Constitution, embrace cause of education.”
not only the buildings actually used in teachfrom taxation depends upon the character of ing, or actually used in administering charthe appellee corporation and the use to which ity, but that they also embrace all the propit puts said property, or its income derived erty of the institution, wherever situated. it puts said property, or its income derived This appears from the following language therefrom. It will be observed that so much taken from the opinion in the Midway Feof section 170 of the Constitution as is above
male Orphan School Case, supra: quoted exempts from taxation two classes
"We think, therefore, a proper construction of property: (1) Institutions of purely pub- of the language used in the section requires the lic charity; and (2) institutions of education, exemption of the entire property of this institunot used or employed for gain by any per- tion, wherever situated, and in whatever form son or corporation, the income thereof being 36 S. W. 925, 19 Ky. Law Rep. 1091, 40 L. R.
its investments may be found.” 100 Ky. 489, devoted solely to the cause of education. It A. 119. is not necessary in this opinion to consider
In that case the school was located at Midwhether the appellee is an institution of way, while the property which the city of purely public charity, since we are of opin-. Louisville sought to assess was, of course, ion it clearly comes within the second clause located within the corporate limits of the city of exemptions above referred to, in that it of Louisville. is an institution of education whose property At the same time the court decided the is not used or employed for gain, and the in- case of the Southern Baptist Theological come thereof is devoted solely to the cause Seminary, reported in the same
same volume, of education. In considering this question which likewise involved the question of the of exemption from taxation, it would be use- right of the state to impose a tax on the less to discuss the cases decided under the property of the seminary located in LouisConstitution of 1850, since section 170 of the ville, and certain lands and property not acpresent Constitution of 1891 made a change tually used in teaching, and some of which in this respect, and is, of course, controlling. was situated in a distant county. The same
The meaning, scope, and effect of section ruling was there made, and all the property 170 of the present Constitution was discussed of the seminary, wherever located, was deat great length by this court in 1897 in the clared exempt from taxation. The reason for cases of Trustees of Kentucky Female Or- the ruling was, that it was the use to which phan School, of Midway, v. City of Louisville, the property, or the income therefrom, was 100 Ky. 470, 36 S. W. 921, 19 Ky. Law Rep. put, that exempted it from taxation. The 1091, 40 L. R. A. 119; City of Louisville v. use of the property and income for the purSouthern Baptist Theological Seminary, 100 poses of education, although it was sectarian, Ky. 506, 36 S. W. 995, 19 Ky. Law Rep. 1100; exempted it from taxation under section 170 In Commonwealth v. Gray, 115 Ky. 665, property used in its support does not come 74 S. W. 702, 25 Ky. Law Rep. 52, this court within the rule above announced. There is reaffirmed the Midway Orphan School Case no such qualifying restriction in the language and the Baptist Theological Seminary Case, giving the exemption; it speaks of “instituas to the meaning of the word "institution," tions of education"—not of nonsectarian inand called attention to the fact that the mere stitutions of education. The proof shows, ownership of a building in which a school moreover, that the only sense in which Union might be conducted, without the ownership College may be said to be a sectarian school of other property from which a revenue could is the fact that it is owned by the Board of be derived, might leave the institution en- Education of the Methodist Church. But it tirely unable, for lack of money, to conduct further appears from the proof that its secthe school. In speaking upon that subject, tarian character begins and ends with its the court said:
ownership. Belief in the doctrines of the "It is not a complete definition to define 'in- Methodist Church is not made an essential stitution' as simply a building or a plant or a for admission to the school, either as student body corporate. It may be all of these, but, or as teacher. In none of the divisions or more broadly speaking, it is that which is set branches of its curriculum are any of the up, provided, ordained, established, or set apart branches of its curriculum are any of the for a particular end, especially of a public char-doctrinal features of the Methodist Church acter or affecting the community. So, when taught in contradistinction from other demoney or other property is set apart, the exclu
the resive use and income of which is to be applied nominations. As heretofore stated, to the cause of education or pedagogy, the prop- ligious teachings consist of chapel exercises erty, impressed with that character becomes an in the morning and the fact that the school institution, without regard to the particular is under Christian influences. Counsel for form of its investment. When the dedicator, in his munificence, sets apart property or a fund appellant, however, refer to that provision to this end, the people, in a kindred spirit, have in section 11 of the amended articles of indeclared by their organic law that such property, corporation, which gives a preference to canwhen so used without gain or profit to the giver didates for the ministry who may be “recomor owner, shall be exempt from taxation." 115 Ky. 669, 74 S. W. 702, 25 Ky. Law Rep. 52. mended by the quarterly conference of the
Again, in Commonwealth v. Pollit, 76 s. circuit or station where they hold memberW. 412, 25 Ky. Law Rep. 790, a fund of $12,- ship,” and contend that this feature of the
a 000 held by trustees for the benefit of a
charter makes appellee's school a sectarian school district was held exempt from taxa- school, and its property taxable. When, howtion, because the income from it was devoted ever, the entire section is read, it appears solely to the cause of education.
that the language above referred to is merely In Commonwealth v. Young Men's Chris- a provision that, if there be any income left tian Association, 116 Ky. 711, 76 S. W. 522. after paying the cost of caring for the trust 25 Ky. Law Rep. 940, 105 Am. St. Rep. 234, fund, and after paying the salaries of teachthis court again approved the ruling in the ers and the general cost of administration, Midway Orphan School Case, supra, and held the board is given the right to give some that certain property belonging to the Young thing, in its discretion, in the aid of worthy Men's Christian Association in Louisville, but youths of either sex struggling to acquire which was not actually used in operating the an education, preference being given in the institution, was exempt from taxation be- case of said aid-afforded students to such cause it was a part of the institution.
licentiates or candidates for the ministry ag. Again, in Louisville College of Pharmacy may be properly recommended by the quar5. City of Louisville, 82 s. W. 610, 26 Ky. terly conference of the circuit or station Law Rep. 825, where a part of the appel- where they hold membership. But it is oblant's building was used by it for teaching vious that aid thus afforded is given strictly purposes, and the remainder thereof was in the cause of education; and the fact that rented out to tenants, this court again reaf- in this one particular preference is given by firmed the Midway Orphan School Case, su- appellee to candidates for ministry in the pra, and held the entire property exempt.
Methodist Church does not make it any the To the same effect see German Gymnastic less an institution of education or take it out Association v. Louisville, 117 Ky. 958, 80 s. of the exemption afforded by section 170 of
the Constitution. W. 201, 25 Ky. Law hep. 2105, 65 L. R. A. 120, 111 Am. St. Rep. 287; Norton v. Trus
But this question is not an open one in this tees, 118 Ky. 836, 82 S. W. 621, 26 Ky. Law jurisdiction. In the Southern Baptist TheoRep. 816; Commonwealth v. Hamilton Col-logical Seminary Case, supra, the Seminary lege, 125 Ky. 330, 101 S. W. 405; and Book property was held exempt from taxation, alAgents of Methodist Episcopal Church South though it was used as a Baptist school v. Hinton, 92 Tenn. 188, 21 S. W. 321, 19 L. wherein the doctrines of that denomination R. A. 289.
alone were taught. On that subject this There can be no question, therefore, that court said: this case comes within the rule laid down in “The work of the institution is confessedly a the several cases above cited.
pure charity, and we think it is no less a public  It is insisted, however, that I'nion Col-national control, so are nearly all successful
one. It is free to all, and, while under denomilege is a sectarian school, and for that reason seats of learning, and this fact has never been.
held to affect the nature of the charity. The company so organized, which executed a mort, peculiar tenets of this denomination are doubt-gage securing bonds aggregating $100,000, and less taught, but a belief of them is not required, plaintiffs executed their deeds to the company and it is not made the test of admission." in consideration of "the sum of $10 and other
The case at bar is stronger for the exemp- considerations in hand paid," and received bonds tion than the Baptist Theological Seminary face that the whole number of bonds aggregat
at 80 cents on the dollar which showed on their Case, supra; since here Union College does ed $100,000. In the transactions plaintiffs, who not teach the doctrines of the Methodist were neither ignorant nor unlettered, had the Church, as distinguished from other Christian for 2 years, drawing the interest thereon, but
. doctrines, although it might do so and still after the company became in failing circumbe exempt under the rule laid down in the stances they brought a suit to cancel their deeds, Baptist Theological Seminary Case. See,
or have it adjudged that they had a prior lien also, Burd Orphan Asylum v. School District money, alleging that it was represented to them
on the lands for the balance of the purchase of Upper Darby, 90 Pa. 21, quoted with ap- that the mortgage, which covered lanıls in addiproval in the Midway Orphan School Case, tion to their own, would secure only enough supra. This view of the case was made plain bonds to cover the purchase price of the mort
gaged lands. There was no allegation, however, in Widows' and Orphans' Home of Odd Fel- that any such provision was omitted from the lows V. Commonwealth, 126 Ky. 386, 103 S. option contract, and no such stipulation was W. 354, 31 Ky. Law Rep. 775, 16 L. R. A. (N. therein contained. Ield, that plaintiffs had no S.) 829, where the exemption was claimed right to a priority of lien over innocent cred
itors and other bondholders, but had only the upon the ground that the orphanage was a same rights and remedies as the holders of othpurely public charity, rather than an institu- er bonds, no fraud having been shown, and there tion of education. In that case we said:
having been no relation of trust or confidence "The convention meant by the word 'purely to the interests of plaintiffs.
imposing on the optionees the duty to protect describe the quality of the charity, rather than the means by which it is administered, that it cent. Dig. Š8 2283–2286; Dec. Dig. Om566.]
[Ed. Note.–For other cases, see Corporations, should be wholly altruistic in the end to be attained, and that no profit or selfish interest 2. DEEDS Ow70—RESCISSION AND CANCELLAshould be fostered under the guise of charity; TION-FRAUD. but it was never meant that, because a charity The company's inability to make good its was limited by its terms to objects belonging promise to repurchase the bonds at 90 cents on to a certain sect or fraternal order, or color or the dollar was neither a badge of fraud nor a class, it was a private, and not a public, charity ground for canceling the deed. The members of the convention were wise and (Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Deeds, Cent. practical, and knew that men, as a rule, ad-Dig. $$ 165-182; Dec. Dig. Om70.] minister their charity through the organization or organizations to which they belong. Thus 3. CORPORATIONS ww437 .
CONVEYANCE TO Catholics will naturally distribute their charity
CORPORATIONS BEFORE COMPLETION OF ORthrough the organization of the Catholic GANIZATION. Church; Presbyterians through those of the
Where, pursuant to an option for the purPresbyterian Church ; Masons through the or- chase of land stating that the conveyances were ganization of the Masonic order," etc.
to be made to a company to be organized by
the optionees, a deed was made on the day the And, as was said in Commonwealth v. charter was filed for record in the county clerk's Young Men's Christian Association, 116 Ky, office, and 12 days thereafter a certified copy of 711, 76 S. W. 522, 25 Ky. Law Rep. 940, 105 the articles of incorporation were filed for recAm. St. Rep. 234, the fact that some part of ord with the secretary of state, the conveyance
was valid as between the parties, though made the expense in maintaining an institution is before the organization of the corporation was required to be paid by those who enjoy all complete. its privileges does not change its character, [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Corporations, since that regulation merely made it partly Cent. Dig. § 1773; Dec. Dig. ww437.) self-sustaining.
4. CORPORATIONS O34, 388 - ESTOPPEL TO
DENY CORPORATE EXISTENCE. It follows that the judgment of the chan
A person executing an obligation to a corcellor dismissing the petition was right, and poration cannot, in an action thereon by the it is aflirmed.
corporation, deny that such a corporation had an existence, nor deny its power to contract, unless the contract be expressly forbidden by
law. YELLOW CHIEF COAL CO.'S TRUSTEE v. Cent. Dig. $8 81-96, 1556–1567; Dec. Dig. Om
[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Corporations, JOHNSON et al.
34, 388.] (Court of Appeals of Kentucky. Nov. 11, 5. MORTGAGES O13-PROPERTY SUBJECT TO 1915.)
MORTGAGE-AFTER-ACQUIRED PROPERTY. 1. CORPORATIONS O566—INSOLVENCY-PRI- to be acquired in futuro is void as against mort
As a general rule, a mortgage of property ORITY OF CLAIMS-FRAUD.
, . owned by them for $25 an acre, one-third to be Cent. Dig. & 15; Dec. Dig. Om 13.] Plaintiffs gave options to purchase land gagors, creditors, or purchasers for value.
[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Mortgages, paid in cash when the conveyance was made, and the remaining two-thirds in mortgage bonds 6. MORTGAGES 12-PROPERTY SUBJECT TO of a corporation to be organized by the option- MORTGAGE-OPTIONS TO PURCHASE. ees at 80 per cent. of their par value. The op- Under Ky. St. § 2341, providing that any tion further provided that plaintiffs should have interest in or claim to real estate may be disthe option at any time after the expiration of posed of by deed or will in writing, an assignee 18 months, and within 24 months to sell the of an option for the purchase of land had such bonds to the company at 90 per cent. of their an estate in the land as could be conveyed by
The options were assigned to the mortgage, and, when it acquired the legal ti