er is unauthorized, and that the sewer on, S. W. 1028, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 265); Newport Second street, where abutted by their lot, is v. Silva, 143 Ky. 704 [137 S. W. 546)." larger than that connecting with it. As to [4, 5] It is also insisted for appellants that the first contention it is only necessary to say a number of the items which enter into the that section 3706, Kentucky Statutes, con- apportionment for the work of improvement fers upon the board of trustees of a town of done were originally embraced in a contract the sixth class power to construct sewers as for the same construction, let to J. H. Franwell as streets and also provides that the ex- cisco, and which the appellee town, upon his pense incurred in doing so may be paid by a insolvency, completed, and that such items local assessment upon abutting property, not are not proper charges in the assessment exceeding 50 per cent. of the value of the against their property. It appears that the ground, after such improvement is made, ex-work of construction, or a part of it, was cluding the value of the buildings and other originally let to Francisco, that he became inimprovements upon the property so improv- solvent, and by reason thereof the town, acted. It is not claimed by appellants that the ing under advice of its counsel, made a setassessment, both for the cost of constructing tlement with Francisco's sureties, accepting the street and sewer, exceeds 50 per cent. of a specified sum by way of damages for his the value of the ground assessed, after the breach of the contract, which sum was apexclusion of the buildings and other improve- plied to the further cost of the work; that ments upon the property. The plan of pav- the town took charge of the work and coming the streets included the construction of pleted it without advertising for further bids. sewers for carrying off the surface water. It The work in question to the extent indicated appears that in some of the streets the di- having been done by the town itself, the promensions of the sewer pipe are smaller than vision of its charter, requiring that contracts in others, but where this is so it was, accord- involving expenditures of more than $100 ing to the testimony of competent engineers should not be made by municipalities except and others, appearing in the record, indis-through competitive bidding, it seems to us, pensably necessary to the work of paving the has no application. Under the embarrassing street; and, while the sewer in the particu- circumstances attending the failure of Franlar street complained of by appellants may cisco and his violation of the contract, the be somewhat larger than that connecting town could have relieved itself from the with it, this fact affords no evidence that the dilemma in no other way than that employwork was defectively performed, or that it ed, and in so doing they minimized the loss could otherwise have been done, consistent to the greatest degree possible. We think it with the work of paving.

fairly apparent that this action of the town It is well settled in this jurisdiction that did not increase to an appréciable extent the the plan or method of improvement, as well cost to appellants or other property owners, as the necessity therefor, is a matter solely of the entire work of construction, and it within the discretion of the legislative body, is also a well-recognized rule of law in this whose discretion in respect thereto is beyond jurisdiction that the burden is on the propreview by the courts, in the absence of aerty owner to show that a wrong basis of apshowing of fraud or corruption upon the part portionment was followed, and he must alof that body in the adoption or execution of lege and prove facts showing such to be the the plan. In the recent case of Town of Rus-case, and that under the proper 'method of sell v. Whitt, 161 Ky. 187, 170 S. W. 609, one apportionment he would be required to pay of the complaints made by the property own- less. Barret v. Stone, 52 S. W. 947, 21 Ky. er was that the construction of the street Law Rep. 669; Chawk v. Beville, 56 S. W. abutting his property failed, in certain par- 414, 21 Ky. Law Rep. 1769. ticulars therein alleged, to conform to the [6] The complaint of appellants that the contract under which the work of construc- work performed by the Dunn Construction tion was to be performed. In overruling that Company under its contract with the city complaint we said:

had been originally let to Francisco at a “The complaint made in the petition that the lower price is, we think, equally unavailing. construction of the street abutting appellee's It is true that the Dunn Construction Comproperty failed, in the particulars therein alleg- pany, under its contract, did some paving ed, to conform to the contract, may be eliminated from the case, because the work as com- work upon certain streets where paving work pleted was admittedly accepted by appellant's had previously been let to Francisco, but board of trustees; and their judgment is con- the work performed by the Dunn Construcclusive in the absence of a showing that they tion Company was a different work, under a were guilty of fraud or mistake. This rule is stated in the case of Creekmore v. Central Con- different plan and involving larger territory, struction Co., 157 Ky. 336 [163 S. W. 194] as than that covered by the Francisco contract. follows: "The defendants pleaded in their an- The board of trustees, following the passing swers that the work [street construction) was not done in accordance with the contract, and of an ordinance directing the paving of cerwas in several respects defective. But the countain of the streets upon

But the countain of the streets upon a plan contained in cil had regularly accepted the work, and their the contract let to Francisco, concluded, aftaction is conclusive upon the property owner in er the failure of the latter, to do the work the absence of fraud and collusion.' Henderson v. Lambert ([14 Bush.] 77 Ky.) 25; Reuter according to a different plan and different v. Meacham Contracting Co., 143 Ky. 557 (136) system of drainage, and covering other streets than those included in the contract of Fran-ed to supply their stock with drinking water, cisco. In view of this change of plan and was diverted elsewhere, which resulted in the default of Francisco in his contract, the deprivation to appellants of the use of which the town completed as before stated, the water; (2) that there was such a defecthe board of trustees, by proper ordinance, tive construction of the sewer in the street repealed the former ordinance under which in front of their property as prevented a the contract was let to Francisco, and adopt- connection with it by a private sewer from ed another, requiring that the larger work their residence; (3) that by reason of appelof construction be done according to the lee's abandonment of the contract with Franchanged plans, the contract for which was cisco and the letting by it of the contract to let to the Dunn Construction Company as the the Dunn Construction Company, the cost of lowest and best bidder.

the entire work of construction was so inIn Horne, etc., v. Mehler, 64 S. W. 918, 23 creased as to unduly enlarge the apportionKy. Law Rep. 1176, which was an action to ment of the cost imposed upon the property recover an assessment for street construc- of appellants. tion as in this case, the property owners It may here be remarked that if appelpleaded that one J. M. McNaughton entered lants' counterclaim could be relied on, the into a contract with the city to do the work above items of damage would not be recovin question and gave bond, but that without erable upon the record presented. In the reason or right this contract was canceled by first place, the exclusive control given to the the city and a new one made with one Glea- authorities of a municipality over its streets son, by which the cost of the work was in- empowers them to fix the grades of the creased 50 per cent. They prayed that the streets without liability for any damages ocamount of the work assessed against them in casioned thereby. The only instances in favor of Gleason be abated to that extent, which the municipality can be made liable but this complaint, upon being considered by in damages to the abutting property owner the court, was held insufficient to constitute from the establishing of the original grade a defense.

of a street are such as result from such a In Gibson, etc., v. O'Brien, etc., 6 S. W. 28, negligent doing of the work as will interfere 9 Ky. Law Rep. 639, it was held:

with the owner's use of his property. City “That a prior ordinance had been passed of Owensboro v. Hope, 128 Ky. 524, 108 S. * * to do the work for less money consti- W. 873, 33 Ky. Law Rep. 375, 15 L. R. A. tutes no defense. That ordinance had been repealed, and, if not, the failure of the city to (N. S.) 996; Ewing et al. v. City of Louisabide its contract under it is with the party to ville, 140 Ky. 726, 131 S. W. 1016, 31 L. R. the contract who has sustained damages by its A. (N. S.) 612. breach; and, besides, reasons deemed sufficient by the city council 'existed why that contract the benefit of the bondholders, against whom

This action was instituted by appellee for should not be carried out."

the claim to damages asserted by appellants It appears from the record that the work

cannot be maintained. The assessment is in of street and sewer construction here involved was done under three ordinances and as against appellants' property by appellee in

the nature of a tax imposed and apportioned many contracts. That under an ordinance

its governmental capacity for a public imof June 18, 1906, was commenced by Francisco and completed by the appellee town. The provement. In enforcing its collection apco and completed by the appellee town. The pellee is acting as the trustee of the bondsewers were constructed by C. P. Sanburn holders, and, as said in 28 Cyc. 1161: under an ordinance of the same date and a

"The fact that an abutter has a remedy contract made by him with the town. The against the city for damages from change of paving of the streets was done by the Dunn grade does not affect his liability for paving Construction Company, by contract with ap

assessment." pellee authorized by an ordinance of April In the same volume, on page 1229, it is 1, 1907.

further said: In our opinion, none of the matters set up defendant may not set up a counterclaim against

"In an action to enforce a special assessment, by the appellants' answer in resistance of defendant may not set up a counterclaim against

the city or the contractor." the assessments sought to be enforced against

And again on the same page: their property constitute a valid defense; hence they were properly rejected by the which an assessment is levied may not be set up

"Damages for injury to property against circuit court.

as a counterclaim in an action to enforce the [7] Having thus disposed of the matters assessment." of defense relied on by the appellants, as The opinion in Bodley v. Finley, 111 Ky. their answer was made a counterclaim, it 618, 64 S. W. 439, 23 Ky. Law Rep. 851, is now becomes necessary to determine wheth-decisive of the question under consideration. er a counterclaim can be pleaded or relied in that case the city of Louisville had orderon by the appellants in this case. The three ed a street improved, and issued apportionitems of damages included in the counter-ment warrants which were delivered to the claim are: (1) That by the construction of contractor. Suit was brought by the conthe street and sewer in front of their resi- tractor to enforce the lien existing by virtue dence property a stream that ran through of the warrant. The property, holder sued

latter, which he asked to be permitted to prospective contractor indebted to one or more set off against the assessment against his abutting property holders might either refrain property, due upon the apportionment war. I would make if such set-off were not allowed.

from bidding or make a higher bid than he rant. This court held that the note, under This objection does not seem to us very forcithe circumstances of that case, was a proper ble, for we must assume that each contractor matter of set-off, but it is declared by the knows of the existence of all legal demands opinion that a set-off, or counterclaim such against him, and we cannot assume that he in

to

We reach the as is relied on in this case, cannot be main- conclusion, therefore, that on proper showing a tained in a similar action brought by a mu- set-off may be allowed against a claim for street

improvement in such cases as it would be alnicipality. It is therein said:

lowed against the assertion of other liens upon “This brings us to a consideration of the ques- property not having their origin in the exercise tion whether a set-off or counterclaim can be of governmental power. pleaded against a suit upon an assessment for lucal improvement. In Purdy v. Drake, 32 S. In Board of Council City of Frankfort v. W. 939, 17 Ky. Law Rep. 819, the question was Brislan, 126 Ky. 477, 104 S. W. 1199, 32 Ky. presented, but not decided, as the set-off there Law Rep. 377, it was held that an abutting attempted to be pleaded was not sustained by the proof. In Dill. Mun. Corp. & 810, it is said: property holder could set up a counterclaim ‘As to agreements between the corporation and for damages against the city in an action a contractor to do the work the abutters or brought by the latter to enforce an apportionproperty owners on whom the expense falls are not parties, but are brought into direct relation ment warrant lien against his property, but with the proceeding for the local improvement in the response to a petition for rehearing, for the first time when the assessment is made. following the opinion, it is said: An assessment is a tax levied by the corpora

“In a petition for rehearing the point is made, tion upon property to defray the expenses of the improvement, and the suit to collect it have the right to assert, as against the city's

on behalf of appellant, that appellee should not (though brought by the contractor under, au: claim for street improvements, the counterclaim thority given for that purpose) is not the subject for damages. The improvement was not made of set-off or counterclaim. The cases cited in by the city, but by a contractor, and the injury support of the text above quoted are Califor- and resulting damage to appellee's property, if nia cases, to the effect, in general, that such an assessment is a tax levied by the corporation completing the contract, the contractor assigned

'. upon certain property to defray the expenses of his claim to appellant, and the rule that would the improvement of a street adjacent to the deny a property owner the right to assert a property. Said the court, in Himmelmann v: counterclaim or set-off against the city, if the Spanagel, 39 Cal. 393: "The origin, obligatory work had been done by it, and it was seeking to force, a force, and whole nature of a tax is such that assert its lien, does not apply. As assignee of it is impossible to conceive of a demand that the contractor's claim, the city occupies no betmight be set off against it, unless expressly so ter position than the contractor, and appellee authorized by statute. No case has been cited, can set up against it any claim for damages and probably none can be found, which authoriz- that he could have asserted against the contrac

I es a defendant, when sued for a municipal as

tor. Kentucky Statutes, $ 474; Civil Code, s doubtedly, this reasoning applies with full force, 19. The doctrine that the property owner may not only to cases of general taxation, but also rely upon a set-off or counterclaim in a suit by to cases where the municipality is asserting Finley, 111 Ky. 618, 64 S. W. 439, 23 Ky.

a contractor is expressly decided in Bodley v. against a citizen a claim for a special assess- Law Rep. 351. The petition for rehearing is

" ment for local improvement, for which it has

overruled.” paid, or become bound to the contractor. On grounds of public policy, the sovereign, in the It is manifest from the foregoing authoriexercise of the power of taxation for govern- ties that this court has fully recognized the mental purposes, must not be compelled to stay its proceedings in order to adjust its indebted- doctrine that the property holder cannot, in ness to a citizen. And in this state, while we a state of case such as is here presented, hold that these special assessments are not in- assert a counterclaim or set-off against the cluded under the designation of taxation in certain constitutional provisions, we nevertheless municipality, in an action brought by the recognize that their imposition is an exercise latter to enforce a lien for the payment of of the sovereign power of taxation. Richardson an apportionment warrant for a street imv. Mehler [111 Ky. 408] 63 S. W. 957 [23 Ky.

provement. Law Rep. 917). But is any public policy violated in permitting a set-off against the claim

The judgment appealed from dismissed of a contractor in whose favor this governmental appellants' counterclaim, enforced the appelpower has been exercised? In such case a con-lee's apportionment liens, each as to the proptract is entered into by the municinality, on behalf of the abutting property holders, with erty against which it was asserted, and dia contractor, for the making of the improve- rected the sale of a sufficiency of each parcel ment. Under the statute this is held to give the to satisfy the lien against it. There is nothcontractor a lien upon such property for the contract price of the work. If, when he seeks ing in the record couducing to show any to enforce his lien, the property holder is per- inequality in the assessments as made by the mitted to set off a demand against him, this appellee's board of trustees for the cost of does not in any wise interfere with the exer- the street and sewerage construction; and, cise of the governmental power, nor with the progress of the improvement. This claim is not as the cost of the improvements apportioned one by the government, or by the municipality to appellants' property seems no greater than in the exercise of delegated governmental power. the benefits conferred, and the record disclosIt is a private claim, for the enforcement of es no error that we regard prejudicial to which a statutory lien is given. The only ground of public policy against the allowance their substantial rights, the judgment is

held in this state that neither spouse could LILLIENKAMP v. RIPPETOE. maintain an action against the other for (Supreme Court of Tennessee.' Oct. 26, 1915.) torts committed by one against the other durHUSBAND AND WIFE 205 - ACTIONS FOR ing coverture. The holding was said to rest

m.

. TORTS-STATUTORY PROVISIONS,

in part upon their unity by virtue of the Neither Shannon's Code, 6470, making marriage, which was said to preclude one one committing an assault and battery upon his wife for any cause whatsoever guilty of a mis- from suing the other at law, and in part it demeanor, nor Pub. Acts 1913, c. 26, providing was said to rest upon the respective rights that married women are thereby fully emanci- and duties involved in the marriage relation. pated from all disability on account of cover- McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. (3 Cates) ture, that marriage shall not impose any disability or incapacity, on a woman as to the owner-388, 77 S. W. 664, 64 L. R. A. 991, 102 Am. ship, acquisition, or disposition of property, or St. Rep. 787, 1 Ann. Cas. 130. This holding is as to her capacity to make contracts, and do all supported by a practically unanimous curacts in reference to property which she could lawfully do if she were not married, but that rent of authority. Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Me. every married woman shall have the same ca-304, 24 Am. Rep. 27; Schouler's Domestic pacity to acquire, hold, control, and dispose of Relations, § 52 (4th Ed.); Cooley on Torts property and to make any contract in reference (2d. Ed.) 88 223-233; 21 Cyc. 1519, 1520; thereto and to bind herself personally, and to sue and be sued as if she were not married, ab- Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U. S. 611, 31 rogates the common-law rule that one spouse Sup. Ct. 111, 54 L. Ed. 1180, 30 L. R. A. (N. cannot sue the other for a tort committed dur. S.) 1153, 21 Ann. Cas. 921; Strom v. Strom, ing the marriage, as it must be assumed that, if 98 Minn. 427, 107 N. W. 1047, 6 L. R. A. (N. it had been the purpose of the Legislature to change this rule, such purpose would have been s.) 191, 116 Am. St. Rep. 387, and note; Freeclearly expressed, or would have appeared by thy v. Freethy, 42 Barb. (N. Y.) 641; Schultz necessary implication.

v. Christopher, 65 Wash, 496, 118 Pac. 629, [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Husband and 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 780; Schultz v. Schultz, Wife, Cent. Dig. 88 744, 748–755, 970; Dec. 89 N. Y. 644; Peters v. Peters, 156 Cal. 32, Dig. Om 205.]

103 Pac. 219, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 699; BandCertiorari to Court of Civil Appeals.

field v. Bandfield, 117 Mich. 80, 75 N. W. Action by Sara A. Lillienkamp against 'W.287, 40 L, R. A. 757, 72 Am. St. Rep. 550 ; T. Rippetoe. A judgment of dismissal was Libby v. Berry, 74 Me.. 286, 43 Am. Rep. 589; affirmed by the Court of Civil Appeals, and Phillips v. Barnett, 1 Q. B. D. 436 (English). plaintiff brings certiorari. Affirmed.

In some of the cases cited above the insisGreen, Webb & Tate, of Knoxville, and Mc-tence was made that, the marriage relation Canless, Coleman & Taylor, of Morristown, having been terminated by the divorce, the for plaintiff. W. N. Hickey, of Morristown, right of action revived, having been merely for defendant.

suspended during coverture; but in reply it

was said: BUCHANAN, J. The only question neces- “That the error in this insistence was in supsary to be decided is whether a divorced posing that a right of action ever existed; that

can maintain against her former there was no civil remedy either during or after husband an action for damages resulting be redressed." Phillips v. Barnett and Abbott

coverture, because there was no civil right to from an assault and battery committed by V. Abbott, supra. him upon her person after the passage of

See, also, McKelvey v. McKelvey, supra. chapter 26 of the Acts of 1913, and while

We do not understand plaintiff's brief to they sustained toward each other the rela-question the rule of the common law, as tion of husband and wife; the action having above set out. Her insistence is that the been instituted after the divorce, and within rule of the common law was abrogated by one year after the date of the battery.

the following statutes of this state: The case is before us on plaintiff's peti

"If any person commits an assault and battion for certiorari, seeking to reverse the tery upon his wife, for any cause whatsoever, judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals, he is guilty of a misdemeanor, and punishable which affirmed the judgment of the circuit accoraingly.” Shan. Code 1896, § 6470. court by which plaintiff's suit was dismissed Chapter 26 of the Public Acts of the year at the point of a demurrer interposed by de- 1913: fendant.

“A bill for an act to be entitled 'An act to reBeyond all question, under the common move disabilities of coverture from married law as it was in force in this state prior to

women, and to repeal all acts and parts of

acts in conflict with the provisions of this the passage of the act of 1913, supra, such

act.' an action as this could not have been main- “Section 1. Be it enacted by the General Astained. It was a fundamental principle of sembly of the state of Tennessee, that married the common law that by marriage husband from all disability on account of coverture, and

women be, and are, hereby fully emancipated and wife became one. Her existence as a the common law as to the disabilities of married legal unit became merged into that of the women and its effects on the rights of property husband, and during the continuance of the of the wife, is totally abrogated, and marriage coverture she was capable of suing or defend- shall not impose any disability or incapacity on

a woman as to the ownership, acquisition, or ing an action only with his concurrence, and disposition of property of any sort, or as to her in his name as well as her own. It has been capacity to make contracts and do all acts in

reference to property which she could lawfully complished by a statute when such purpose do if she were not married; but every woman is clearly expressed therein. now married, or hereafter to be married, shall have the same capacity to acquire, hold, man

It has been held in this state: age, control, 'use, enjoy, and dispose of, all prop

“That a statute will not be construed to alter erty, real and personal, in possession, and to the common law, further than the act expressly make any contract in reference to it, and to declares or than is necessarily implied from the bind herself personally, and to sue and be sued fact that it covers the whole subject matter." with all the rights and incidents thereof, as if State v. Cooper, 120 Tenn. (12 Cates) 549, 113 she were not married.

S. W. 1048, 15 Ann. Cas. 1116. “Sec. 2. Be it further enacted, that all acts

We must assume that the Legislature had and parts of acts in conflict with the provisions in mind in the passage of the act the fundaof this act be, and the same are, hereby repealed.

“Sec. 3. Be it further enacted, that this act mental doctrine of the unity of husband and take effect from and after January 1, 1914, the wife under the common law, and the correla, public welfare requiring it.

tive duties of husband and wife to each oth: "Passed February 20th, 1913."

er, and to the well-being of the social order The constitutionality of the act of 1913 growing out of the marriage relation, and was assailed in Parlow v. Turner, 178 S. W. that, if it had been the purpose of the Leg. 766, and on that point this court, speaking islature to alter these further than as indithrough its Chief Justice, said:

cated in the act, that purpose would have "It is said the act is unconstitutional because been clearly expressed, or would have apit violates so much of article 2, $ 17, of the Constitution as provides that no bill shall become a peared by necessary implication. law which embraces more than one subject, that We are not warranted in ascribing to the subject to be expressed in the title. There is Legislature by anything appearing in this act but a single subject, and that appears fully in the title, viz., the relief of married women from a purpose to empower a wife to bring an acthe disabilities of coverture. That subject fully tion against her husband for injuries to her covers every element that is written into the person occurring during the coverture, therebody of the act. The first clause, standing by making public scandal of family discord, alone, 'that married women be, and are, hereby to the hurt of the reputation of husband and fully emancipated from all disability on account to the hurt of the reputation of husband and of coverture,' would have made thoroughly ef- wife, their families and connections, unless fective the purpose expressed in the title. All such purpose clearly appears by the express that followed merely amplified the thought, but terms of the act. each term of particularization lay implicit within the clause quoted."

It results that, in our opinion, there is no It is clear that section 6470, Shan. Code error in the judgment of the Court of Civil 1896, quoted supra, does not accomplish any

Appeals, and the same is therefore affirmed. abrogation of the common-law rule in respect of actions for tort by either spouse against the other.

BENNETT et al. v. HUTCHENS et al. That section merely denounces any person who commits an assault and bat (Supreme Court of Tennessee. Nov. 3, 1915.) tery upon his wife, for any cause whatso- 1. HUSBAND AND WIFE ww14-AFTER-ACQUIR

ED PROPERTY-ESTATES BY THE ENTIRETIES. ever, as guilty of a misdemeanor, and punish

Where a deed of land is to a husband and able accordingly. In connection with the wife, an estate therein is by the entireties, and statute last referred to, and chapter 26 of not in common, so that, on the death of one, the the Acts of 1913, plaintiff's brief relies upon other takes the land absolutely. the following of our cases: Queen v. Dayton Wife, Cent. Dig. $$ 71-86, 88, 89; Dec. Dig.

[Ed. Note.- For other cases, see Husband and Coal & Iron Co., 95 Tenn. (11 Pick.) 458, 32 m 14.]

. S. W. 460, 30 L. R. A. 82, 49 Am. St. Rep. 2. HUSBAND AND WIFE 14 – ESTATES BY 935; Adams v. Insurance Co., 117 Tenn. (9 THE ENTIRETIES–DEED-CONSTRUCTION. Cates) 470, 101 S. W. 428; Weeks v. Mc- Where a deed of land is to a husband and Nulty, 101 Tenn. (17 Pick.) 495, 48 S. w. wife, it is immaterial that it does not show up809, 43 L. R. A. 185, 70 Am. St. Rep. 693 ; that it was the intention of the grantor to create

on its face that they are husband and wife, or Railway v. Haynes, 112 Tenn. (4 Cates) 712, an estate by the entireties, but the common law 81 S. W. 374. But we do not understand requires that the estate be by the entireties. the brief to insist that section 6470, Shan.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Husband and Code, and the principles on which he relies Wife, Cent, Dig. 88 71-86, 88, 89; Dec. Dig.

Om 14.] as established by the cases last cited, would a fail to change the common-law doctrine

3. HUSBAND AND WIFE 14 — ESTATES BY

THE ENTIRETIES-STATUTORY PROVISIONS. that one spouse cannot maintain suit against Shannon's Code, $ 3677, providing that in the other for a tort committed during the ex-all estates held in joint tenancy the share of istence of the marriage relation. At all the joint tenant dying shall descend to his heirs,

instead of the other joint tenant, does not abolevents, in our opinion, there would be no mer- ish estates by the entireties, but is limited to it in such an insistence, if made.

estates held in technical joint tenancy. Examination of the cases cited to sustain [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Husband and the existence of the common-law rule first Wife, Cent. Dig. $$ 71–86, 88, 89; Dec. Dig. laid down herein will disclose a practically

ww14.] unanimous concurrence of judicial opinion to 4. HUSBAND AND WIFE Cw113—ESTATES BY

THE ENTIRETIES-STATUTE-CONSTRUCTION. the effect that an abrogation of the common- Laws 1913, c. 26, providing that married law rule will only be held to have been ac- I women shall be released from all disability on