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with conditions in our large cities that the com- , the benefit of laborers and materialmen on paratively recent introduction of this class of terms that would make him liable for 25 per vehicle, commonly known as the 'jitney,' for the carriage of passengers on the
public streets, for cent. above the contract price. The court a charge closely approximating that made on held that the act there in question was not street cars, in view of the almost phenomenal justifiable by the police power, and was viogrowth of the institution, has made clearly ap- lative of constitutional provisions pointed parent the necessity of some special regulations in order to reasonably provide for the comfort
out. and safety of the public. It may well be that We fail to see the pertinency of these cases the board of supervisors concluded that, in view to the one at bar, which involves the right of the number of this class of public conveyances to regulate a common or public carrier in rethat were operated upon the public streets, especially upon the principal streets already oc- spect of the use of public streets. cupied almost to overflowing during the hours of  It is too clear for extended discussion heaviest traffic by street cars and other vehicles, that it was competent for the Legislature as well as by pedestrians at street crossings, the under the police power to regulate the use of speed at which they would naturally be operated in order to make them pay on such a low rate the streets and public places by jitney operaof fare, and the probable lack of substantial finan- tors, who, as common carriers, have no vestcial responsibility on the part of very many un- ed right to use the same without complying dertaking to operate such vehicles, special regu; with a requirement as to obtaining a permit lations as to condition of car,
as well as security to protect against improper or neg. or license.
or license. The right to make such use is ligent operation, were essential to the public a franchise, to be withheld or granted as the . cannot ;
Dill. Mun. Corp. lative body was not justified in so determining." Legislature may see fit.
SS .  Counsel for the appellee relator treats $$ 1210, 1229; Fifth Ave. Coach Co. v. New his case against the act as made out if he be York, 194 N. Y. 19, 86 N. E. 824, 21 L. R. A. able to present some points of similarity in (N. S.
) 744, 16 Ann. Cas. 695. Further, the the jitney and the taxicab or privately operat-ecution of a bond for the indemnification of
use or license may be conditioned on the exed automobile. But mathematical or logical those injured. So held in respect of motorexactness, in every aspect, in a division for classification is not always possible, and it is propelled vehicles in the recent cases of State not required in order to validity. "The best city of San Antonio (Tex. Civ. App.) 178
v. Howell (Wash.) 147 Pac. 1159, Greene v. that can be done is to keep within the clearly s. w. 6, Ex parte Dickey (W. Va.) 85 S. E. reasonable and practicable. That is accomplished where there are such general char- | 781, and Ex parte Cardinal, supra. acteristics of the members of the class as to subject to the objections urged by the appel
We are of opinion that the statute is not reasonably call for special legislative treat- subject to the objections urged by the appel
lee, and that therefore the lower court erred ment. That may be true, generally, and yet in its disposition of the case. Reversed and some such characteristics sometimes may be found to exist outside the boundaries of the remanded; all costs to be paid by the re
lator. class.” Mehlos v. Milwaukee, 156 Wis. 591, 146 N. W. 882, 51 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1009, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 1102; Central Lumber Co. v.
Central Lumber Co. v. MEMPHIS ST. RY. CO. v. RAPID TRANSIT South Dakota, 226 U. S. 157, 33 Sup. Ct. 66,
CO. et al. 57 L. Ed. 164; Motlow v. State, supra; 6 (Supreme Court of Tennessee. Oct. 23, 1915.) R. C. L. P. 360, § 373. We therefore hold that the segregation of 1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Cw46 – CONSTITU
TIONAL QUESTIONS-NECESSITY OF DECISION. the jitney automobile for regulation in the
The Supreme Court on appeal has jurisdicmatter of the execution of an indemnity bond tion and will determine the constitutionality of by its owner is not vicious or unreasonable a law, although the cause can be decided upon class legislation.
other grounds, where the constitutional question
is made in good faith and relied on in the case, Counsel for appellee commends to our con- since by Acts of 1907, c. 82, establishing and sideration People v. Coolidge, 124 Mich. 664, defining the powers of the Court of Civil Ap83 N. W. 591, 50 L. R. A. 493, 83 Am. St. Rep. peals, jurisdiction of that court is defeated by 352, and Gibbs v. Tally, 133 Cal. 373, 65 Pac. the presence of a constitutional question. 970, 60 L. R. A. 815. In the first of these cases Law, Cent. Dig. S8 43-45; Dec. Dig. Om46.]
[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Constitutional it was held that an act, requiring all mer
2. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS Omw 703-REGUchants who sell farm produce on a commission
LATION OF JITNEYS. to execute a bond of $5,000 to faithfully per- Under Acts 1915, c. 60, making jitneys comform their contracts, was unwarranted class mon carriers, and requiring them, under erdilegislation, and that the act could find no sup- nances of the cities or towns, to file bonds and port in the police power, since there was noth- perform the conditions of the statute and ordi
nances, a jitney company is altogether without ing in the business hostile to the comfort, right to do business on the streets of a city, health, morals, or even convenience of a com- where the city has passed no ordinance pursuant munity. The second case involved an effort on to the act, and the company has failed to procure the part of the Legislature to require the own any license or execute any bond under the act. er of property, who contracts for the placing Corporations, Cent. Dig. 88 1509–1513; Dec.
[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Municipal of a building thereon, to furnish a bond for Dig. Om703.]
3. INJUNCTION @ 64-RIGHT TO INVOKE–Ex- the chancellor, and the complainant has apCLUSIVE FRANCHISE.
pealed to this court. Where the plaintiff street railway company has a franchise from the city, its franchise is a
Complainant alleged that it was organized property right, under which it can restrain any under the laws of Tennessee, and had a person from becoming a common carrier of pas- franchise from the city of Memphis to opersengers in competition with it without legislative ate a street railway system in that city; or municipal authority, and for that purpose its franchise is exclusive against all persons upon that it had expended in excess of $10,000,000 whom similar rights have not been conferred. in constructing and equipping its street rail
[Ed. Note. -For other cases, see Injunction, way lines; that it operated about 129 miles Cent. Dig. $$ 131-133; Dec. Dig. Omw 64.]
of track, extending over all parts of the 4. INJUNCTION 9 – RIGHT TO REMEDY On9
city; and that it had complied with all the DOUBTFUL OASE.
An injunction will not be awarded to protect laws of Tennessee and all the terms of its an alleged right, except upon a clear case.
franchise from the city of Memphis. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Injunction,
The bill further averred that the defendCent. Dig. & 8; Dec. Dig. 9.]
ants were engaged in operating jitneys or 5. INJUNCTION Om65 - RIGHT TO REMEDY jitney busses upon the streets of Memphis in GROUNDS.
competition with the complainant, and that Where, under an act of the Legislature, mu defendants were conducting this business nicipalities are authorized to regulate by ordinance, subject to the statute, the operation of without having made any attempt to comply jitney busses as common carriers, and the city with the statute of Tennessee regulating said council fails to regulate, a street railway com- business; that said defendants were operpany can have the operation of jitneys enjoined, since the city council might fail to act at ali ating their automobiles on the same streets under the statute, and thus the rights of the upon which complainant ran its cars; that company be unlawfully invaded.
the jitneys were running at high rates of [Ed. Note.-For_other cases, see Injunction, speed, cutting in front of complainant's cars, Cent. Dig. § 134; Dec. Dig. Om 65.]
and racing by the cars in their efforts to 6. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS Cw697—UNAU- reach the stopping places first, in order to
THORIZED OPERATION OF JITNEYS—NUISANCE
pick up passengers; that they frequently Where statute authorizes the regulation of ran in front of complainant's cars, thus forcjitneys, and prohibits their operation, except up- ing the cars to be stopped in order to preon conditions named, and those conditions are vent accident; that they often ran dangernot fulfilled, but many jitneys are operated with consequent danger to persons and property, they ously close to and by complainant's cars constitute a nuisance, and may be enjoined on the while the cars were standing for the purpose bill of a private individual who can show spe of taking off and discharging passengers, cial damage to himself.
thereby causing many very serious accidents [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Municipal and even deaths. It was said that such opCorporations, Cent. Dig. & 1502–1505; Dec. eration of the said jitneys was hindering
$$ Dig. Om697.] 7. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS O 697 OB
and impeding complainant from giving firstSTRUCTION OF STREETS—RIGHT TO REMEDY.
class service; that such illegal and unauRelief by an injunction against a nuisance thorized competition was depriving complainby which the highway is obstructed need not be ant of a large amount of revenue, by unsought by an abutting owner, but may be had by lawfully diverting from it intended passenany individual who can show special damage to himself.
gers upon its cars. The bill contains other [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Municipal charges upon which it is not necessary to Corporations, Cent. Dig. 88 1502–1505; Dec. dwell. Dig. Om 697.)
The General Assembly of Tennessee, in Appeal from Chancery Court, Shelby Coun- 1915, by chapter 60, Acts of that year, underty; F. H. Heiskell, Chancellor.
took to regulate the jitney business in the Action by the Memphis Street Railway cities and towns of this state. This act deCompany against the Rapid Transit Compa-clared those operating such vehicles to be ny and others. From an order dismissing common carriers, and provided that the opthe bill on defendants' demurrer, complain-eration of these conveyances should be unant appeals. Reversed.
lawful in the incorporated cities or towns
of this state without first obtaining a permit Charles T. Cates, Jr., of Knoxville, and or license under ordinance from said city
, Wright, Miles, Waring & Walker, of Memor town, and it was further provided that no phis, for appellant. Caruthers Ewing, of such license should be issued unless the ownMemphis, for appellees.
er or operator filed with the clerk of the
county court in the county in which the busiGREEN, J. This bill was filed by the ness was proposed to be done, a bond of not Memphis Street Railway Company to enjoin less than $5,000 to cover loss of life or inthe Rapid Transit Company and other de-jury to person or property inflicted by such fendants from operating jitneys on the streets carrier or caused by his negligence. It was of Memphis in competition with the com- further enacted that said license should emplainant's street cars. A demurrer was in- body such routes, terms, and conditions as terposed by defendants, and sustained by the city or town might elect to impose, pro
vided that no such permit or license should will not be considered or adjudged if the be granted which did not require the execu- case can be otherwise decided. We do not tion and filing of the bond mentioned above. think, however, such a rule should control Said act is set out in the margin of this opin- here. We have formerly said that, when ion. 1
any question involving the constitutionali The demurrer of defendants challenges ty of an act of the Legislature is bona fide the constitutionality of the act referred to made and relied on in a case, this court and relied on by complainant. It does not should take appellate jurisdiction of such a distinctly appear whether the chancellor case under chapter 82, of the Acts of 1907. passed on the constitutionality of the statute Campbell County V. Wright, 127 Tenn. 1, or based his decision on other grounds of 151 S. W. 411. the demurrer. It is said by counsel for de- The chief contention of complainant in this fendants that the result below was reached case is that defendants are outlaws on the without consideration of the validity of the streets of Memphis, with no right to pursue act in question, and it is urged that the their business, by reason of the fact that the case can be determined in this court without city has passed no ordinance giving them reference to the said act. Defendants there- permission to operate, and because they have fore insist that this court is without juris- made no bonds, according to the provisions diction, and the case is properly one for the of chapter 60, Acts of 1915. Defendants, as Court of Civil Appeals; that no constitution- we have said, challenge the constitutionality al question is involved.
of this act. We think, therefore, the constiWe are referred to cases in which it is tutional question in this case is bona fide, said that the constitutionality of a statute and that constitutional rights are relied on.
1 An act to define as common carriers within this is to be carried on, and renew or increase from
state, persons, firms and corporations operating time to time as may be required by such city or certain self-propelling public conveyances and town, a bond with good and sufficient surety or affording means of street transportation similar sureties, to be approved by the mayor of such into that ordinarily afforded by street railways corporated city or town, in such sum as such city but not operated upon fixed tracks, to declare or town may reasonably demand (in no case, howthe business of all such common carriers a ever, in a sum less than five thousand dollars for privilege and to forbid and declare a misde- each car operated), conditioned that such commeanor their operation upon streets, alleys, mon carrier will pay any damage that may be public places of incorporated cities or towns adjudged finally against such carrier as compensawithout obtaining permits or licenses from such tion for loss of life or injury to person or property cites or towns and giving bond to indemnify inflicted by such carrier or caused by his negliagainst loss of life and damage to person and gence. property; and to authorize incorporated cities Section 4. Be it further enacted, that any common and towns of this state to grant permits and li- carrier as defined in section 1, of this act which censes to such carriers to operate over streets, shall use or occupy any street, alley or other public alleys and public places and to fix routes, terms place in any incorporated city or town of this state and conditions of such operation, and to limit without first obtaining á permit or license to sò such operation in the interest of public con- use and occupy such street, alley or other public venience and safety, and to impose a tax for the place, or shall operate any such conveyance withexercise of the privilege herein granted.
out first executing and filing bond as required by Section 1. Be it enacted by the General Assembly section 3 of this act shall be guilty of a misdeof the state of Tennessee, that any person, firm meanor and shall upon conviction be fined not less or corporation operating for hire any public con- than fifty dollars nor more than one hundred dolveyance propelled by steam, compressed air, gaso- lars for each offense, and each day upon which line, naptha, electricity or other motive power for such common carrier shall so unlawfully use or the purpose of affording a means of street trans- occupy any street, 'alley or other public place in portation similar to that ordinarily afforded by any incorporated city or town of this state, shall street railways (but not operated upon fixed tracks) constitute a separate offense. by indiscriminately accepting and discharging such Section 5. Be it further enacted, that all incorpersons as may offer themselves for transportation porated cities and towns of this state be and they along the way and course of operation, be and the are hereby authorized and empowered to grant same is hereby declared and defined to be a com- permits or licenses to such common carriers to mon carrier, and the business of all such com- operate over the streets, alleys and public places mon carriers is hereby declared to be a privilege of such cities and towns, and to fix in such licenses
Section 2. Be it further enacted, that it shall be and permits the routes, terms and conditions upon unlawful for any common carrier as defined in which such common carriers may operate, subject section 1 of this act, to use or occupy any street, to the limitations contained in section 2 of this act: alley or other public place in any incorporated city Provided that no license or permit shall be granted or town of this state without first obtaining from to any such common carrier without the execution such city or town a permit or license by ordinance and filing of bond as required by section 3 of this giving the right to so use or occupy such street, act being required. alley or other public place, such permit or license And all such incorporated cities and towns are to embody such routes, terms and conditions as hereby authorized and empowered to impose upon such city or town may elect to impose: Provided all such common carriers a tax for the exercise however, that no such permit or license shall be of the privilege herein granted. granted which does not require the execution and Section 6. Be it further enacted, that if any secfiling of a bond as provided for in section 3 of tion or part of this act be for any reason held unthis act,
constitutional or invalid, such holding shall not Section 3. Be it further enacted, that any such affect the validity or the remaining portions of common carrier, before operating any public con- this act, but such remaining portions shall be and veyance as aforesaid, in addition to obtaining a remain valid. permit or license as aforesaid, shall execute to the Section 7. Be it further enacted, that this act take state of Tennessee' and file with the clerk of the effect from and after its passage, the public welAlthough we appreciate the delicacy of ant to an injunction against defendants unpassing on the validity of an act of the Leg- der the circumstances above detailed. islature, such a duty is often imposed upon The complainant does not seek an injuncus, and we must not dodge our jurisdiction. tion here on the theory that it is possessed Where an act of the Legislature undertakes of an exclusive franchise to conduct the busito regulate a particular subject, and the ap- ness of common carrier of passengers on the plication of such an act is invoked by one streets of Memphis. The contention of comparty in a suit involving that subject, and plainant is that, having been granted a franthe validity of the act is questioned by the chise as such common carrier, it has a propother party, we think it proper that the stat. erty right that will entitle it to restrain any ute should be tested. Statutes are enacted to person or corporation from attempting to enmake the law plain and rights distinct. They gage in the business of common carrier of are intended to be administered, and it is passengers on the streets of Memphis, in comnot incumbent upon the courts to enter up- petition with complainant, without legislative on a difficult and doubtful investigation of or municipal authority. Complainant conthe rights of the parties under the common cedes that its franchise is not exclusive, in law—such rights being defined by a statute the sense that a similar franchise might not merely to avoid passing on the constitution be granted to another to be exercised and enality of such a statute.
joyed in the city of Memphis; but it mainSo we think that there is a constitutional tains that its franchise is exclusive against question in this case properly made, and all persons upon whom similar rights have that this court has appellate jurisdiction. not been conferred by legislative sanction.
 Chapter 60, Acts of 1915, has been We think this contention is well founded considered, and the act adjudged valid and and supported by the great body of authoriconstitutional, in the case of City of Memphis ty. In Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence it et al. v. State of Tennessee ex rel. S. B. Ry- is said: als, 179 S. W. 631, opinion in which has just “An injunction is the appropriate remedy to been filed by Mr. Justice Williams. It is protect a party in the enjoyment of an exclusive not, therefore, necessary to further discuss Such continuous encroachments constitute a pri
franchise against continuous encroachments. this question in this opinion.
vate nuisance, which courts of equity will abate The act being valid, there is little trouble by injunction. The jurisdiction rests on the firm as to its proper construction. We have here and satisfactory ground of its necessity to avoid
a ruinous multiplicity of suits, and to give adetofore intimated our conception of its mean- quate protection to the plaintiff's property in his ing. Under it, no jitney may be operated in franchise. To be entitled to relief, a plaintiff any city or town of the state of Tennessee, and that there is continuous interference there
need only show that he is entitled to a franchise, except under a license or permit from said with by the defendant. It is not necessary that city or town, issuing under an ordinance the plaintiff first establish his right at law.” passed in conformity with the said statute, Pomeroy's Eq. Jur. § 583. nor shall such permit or license be issued un- Further it is said: til the statutory bond has been executed and "It is not necessary, 'to entitle the owner to filed with the county court clerk. In other relief in equity, that the franchise should be an
exclusive franchise in the sense that the grantwords, jitneys have no right to operate on ing of another franchise to be exercised and the streets of any incorporated city or town enjoyed at the same place would be void.' The in Tennessee until an ordinance has been theory is 'that the defendant who has no franpassed providing for licenses or permits, and chise, is acting in violation of law in operating
* without authority from the sovereign such permits or licenses have been secured, power, and that the owner of the franchise may and they have no right then to operate un- complain of and restrain such illegal acts when til they have made bond as required by the they result in injury to his franchise, which, in statute.
the eye of the law, is property. As to the one
who is invading his rights without legal sancIn the case before us the city of Memphis tion, the franchise is an exclusive franchise, alhas passed no ordinance authorizing the is though the owner of it might not be entitled to suance of licenses or permits to engage in any protection as against the granting of a simi
lar franchise to another.' Pomeroy's Eq. Jur. this business, nor have the defendants un
§ 584. dertaken to procure any such licenses, nor
In dealing with a controversy between two have they executed any bonds.
electric light companies, one without a franIt is very clear, then, that defendants have chise, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma obno right whatever to do business on the
served: streets of Memphis. They are lawbreakers,
“When plaintiff accepted its franchise, it did subject to criminal prosecution, operating in so subject to the power of the municipality to direct violation of the statute of this state. grant other persons or corporations similar fran
 These conclusions upon the statute be chises, and with the knowledge that it might be ing reached, many of the questions presented chise with others exercising similar rights. If,
compelled to exercise its rights under its franby the demurrer of defendants as to their by the competition of rival companies to whom common-law rights are eliminated from fur- the use of the streets and public grounds has ther consideration. The status of defendants been granted by the municipality," plaintiff is
rendered unable to discharge the obligations of is fixed by the act. There remains, however, its contract to furnish the city and its inhabthe question as to the right of the con plain-itants with light and power at stipulated prices, except at a financial loss to it, plaintiff cannot him, which impose upon him the duties of keepcomplain, for it must be held to have contem- ing a proper and safe boat and equipments, and plated such condition might arise, and to have of his constant attendance at the ferry, and of agreed thereto when it accepted the franchise; the due and speedy transportation over it of all but such cannot be said of the defendant, who persons and property desired to be transported, unlawfully occupies the streets and public and to secure these and other stringent duties grounds of the city in competition with plaintiff. required of him he is placed under heavy liabiliBy its unlawful acts defendant can and will ties, civil and criminal, for their performance, take from plaintiff a portion of its business. At all of which is necessary for the public conventhe same time, defendant is under no obliga ience, and as a remuneration for his services tion to the city or its inhabitants, and is all the and liabilities he is allowed a fixed rate of ferwhile maintaining upon the streets and public riage. The right secured to the licensee is a legrounds of the city a public nuisance, and the gal right, created by public law, and not to be loss plaintiff sustains is to defendant its fruits infringed except by the authority of the state itfrom its violation of the law. By these unlaw- self; and such right would be of no avail, unless ful acts of defendant, plaintiff may be rendered the party holding it is protected by law in its financially unable to comply with the obligations enjoyment. Indeed, it is a maxim of law that of its contract, and may be subjected to suits for there is no right without a remedy, for 'whensodamages, mandamus proceedings to enforce the ever the law giveth any right,' says Coke, 'it also performance of its contract, or an action to for- giveth a remedy.' Coke on Litt. 56. The ferry feit its franchise. Defendant does not undertake right of appellant should have secured to him the to compete with plaintiff for the business of the tolls lost to him by the infringement of his right city and its inhabitants by furnishing to them by the defendants, and they should make him light and power other than by the use of the whole for the damages that he has sustained, to streets and alleys. Its right to sell light and be measured by the amount of tolls diverted." power is not dependent upon any franchise, but McInnis v. Pace, 78 Miss. 550, 29 South. 835. its right to use the streets and public grounds of the city for that purpose does depend up
Other ferry cases are Patterson v. Wollon the consent of the city; and, when it uses mann, 5 N. D. 608, 69 N. W. 1010, 33 L. R. the streets without that consent, it is not only A. 537; Green v. Ivey, 45 Fla. 338, 33 South. guilty of maintaining a public nuisance, but al- 711; Tugwell v. Ferry Co., 74 Tex. 480, 9 so inflicts upon plaintiff a special injury by, S. W. 120, 13 S. W. 654. All these cases susits unlawful act, which may be restrained." Bartlesville E. L. & P. Co. v. Bartlesville I. R. tain the views expressed in the foregoing Company, 26 Okl. 457, 109 Pac. 229, 29 L, R. A. quotations, and many other cases in which (N. S.) 81.
the same doctrine is recognized are collected In a similar case the New Jersey court in a note to Bartlesville Elec. L. & Power said:
Co. v. Bartlesville I. R. Co., reported in 29 “Legislative grants of franchises of the nature L. R. A. (N. S.) 77. claimed by complainant, whether granted by spe- We are unable to follow the effort of learncial
privileges which are necessarily exclusive in their nature as against all persons ed counsel for the defendants to distinguish upon whom similar rights have not been con- the cases from which we have quoted from ferred, for any attempted exercise of such rights, the case here presented. We think the forewithout legislative sanction, is not only an un- going authorities are sound and should conwarranted usurpation of power, but operates as a direct invasion of the private property rights trol this controversy. a of those upon whom the franchises have been. When a business may not be conducted so conferred. Raritan & Delaware Bay R. R. as a matter of common right, but legislative Co. v. Delaware & Raritan Canal Co., 18 N. J. authority is necessary, such authority, when Eq. (3 C. E. Gr.) 546, 569; Penn. R. R. Co. v. Nat. R. R. Co., 23 N. J. Eq. (8 C. E. Gr.) 441, conferred, is exclusive against all persons 447; Jersey City Gas Co. v. Dwight, 29 N. J. not endowed with like authority. Such Eq. (2 Stew.) 242, 250; Elizabethtown Gas Co. rights, so bestowed by law, may not be inv."Green, 46 N. J. Eq. (1 Dick.) 118, 124 [18 fringed, except by authority of the state, Atl. 844]. It follows that, if complainant is at this time entitled to exercise in the disputed ter- and will be protected by injunction against ritory the privileges set forth in the legislative unlawful invasion. act referred to, and defendant, as claimed, en
 As a matter of course, the observation joys no legislative sanction for the conduct sought to be enjoined, complainant will be enti- just made is only applicable to clear cases, tled to the relief prayed for.” Millville Gas L. as the case before us. If the franchise or Co. v. Vineland L. & P. Co., 72 N. J. Eq. 305, license of a complainant was doubtful, an 65 Atl. 504.
injunction would not be awarded to protect The same question has often arisen with it, nor could the validity of a license or reference to ferries, and the courts have franchise possessed by a competing defendawarded injunction against the operation of ant be questioned, and its exercise restrainunlicensed ferries at the suit of the ferry-ed, in proceedings of this character. Genevaman legally authorized to conduct his busi-Seneca Electric Co. v. Economic Power & ness.
Const. Co., 136 App. Div. 219, 120 N. Y. Supp. In one of these cases the Supreme Court of 926; Coffeyville Min. & Gas Co. v. Citizens' Mississippi said:
Natural Gas & Min. Co., 55 Kan. 173, 40 Pac. "A public ferry cannot be erected and oper- 326; Market St. Ry. Co. v. Pen. Ry. Co., 51 ated in this state without a special license there- Cal. 583. We are in full accord with the for, and such license bestows upon the licensee the exclusive right of such ferry-exclusive as to views expressed in these and like cases. all persons, except that the board of supervisors Questions upon the regularity of a charter, may establish as many ferries as the public con- the validity of a franchise, and the like, are venience may require at the same or adjacent to be determined upon suit of the Attorney places of crossing. Every such licensee, however, is required to give bond with security for General or other constituted authority, and