only from statutory authority. State v. Par-12. CARRIERS Cw92—CARRIAGE OF Goods-LIker Distilling Co., 236 Mo. 219, loc. cit. 253, ABILITY AS WAREHOUSEMAN-TIME FOR RE MOVAL. 139 S. W. 453; Rosenberger v. Pacific Ex Where the consignees of shipments of inpress Co., 258 Mo. 97, loc. cit. 109, 167 S. W. toxicating liquor which arrived at defendant's 429. Hence, when plaintiff contracted in station at O. on August 21st and 22d did Texas with defendant to have it deliver in- not live at C., the reasonable time allowed the toxicating liquor in Texas and collect the not elapsed when a federal officer seized the consignees before liability as carrier ceased had purchase price, it made such contract subject liquor on August 22d and 23d. to the right of the state to pass laws forbid- [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Carriers, ding the performance thereof. And if, at Cent. Dig. 88 343, 364-366; Dec. Dig. Om92.j any time before the fulfillment of such con- 3. CARRIERS Cw92-DELIVERY OF Goods--Extract, and while it yet remained executory CUSE-PROCESS OF LAW. as to any feature of it, the state forbids the The strict rule of the common law whereby doing of the unperformed act, the contracts to deliver goods received for carriage, except by a carrier could not escape liability for failure therefor is annulled. And the parties, in showing that such failure was caused by the act making their contract, seemed to have had in of God or the public enemy, has been modified mind the possibility of such a contingency; the goods have been taken from his possession so as to excuse the carrier from liability where for they stipulated therein that the express by process of law, without any fraud, collusion, company was “not to be held liable for any or consent on its part, by an officer of the law loss or damage, except as forwarders only, acting under authority apparently valid on its nor for any loss of damage * * * by the face, and when it notifies the consignor of such seizure. restraints of government,” etc. In view of [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Carriers, all of which, it is difficult to see how plain-Cent. Dig. $$ 343, 364-366; Dec. Dig. Om 92.) tiffs can lay claim to any vested rights by reason of the contract it succeeded, though 4. CARRIERS Cw92 – FAILURE TO DELIVER GOODS-TAKING UNDER PROCESS OF LAWwithout right, in forcing upon defendant. NOTICE TO CONSIGNOR. In the case of Rosenberger v. Pacific Ex- The notice which a carrier is required to press Co., supra, the defendant voluntarily give to the consignor of goods which have been entered into the contract, and yet the Su- to enable the consignor to protect his interest, taken from its possession by process of law is preme Court held the contract was annulled. and was satisfied by a notice given shortly aftWe cannot see how plaintiffs can occupy any er the property was taken, when, under the better position by reason of having forced a given the consignor an opportunity to protect circumstances, no notice could possibly have contract upon defendant against its will. himself. The locus of the contract herein, as well as [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Carriers, the place of its performance, were all in the Cent. Dig. $8 343, 364-366; Dec. Dig. Om92.) state of Texas. The cause of action arose there. The suit, if brought there, would have 5. CARRIERS Om92 – CARRIAGE OF Goods – . , TAKING UNDER PROCESS OF LAW-LIABILITY failed under the ruling in Craddock v. Wells FOR DESTRUCTION. Fargo Express Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 125 S. W. Where an officer of the United States Indian 59, and our own Supreme Court has followed Service engaged in the suppression of the liquor traffic took intoxicating liquors from defendthis case, and, if possible, has extended its ant's possession at its station in Kansas, near scope and effect. the "Indian country” in Oklahoma, the carrier The judgment is affirmed. All concur. could not be held liable to the shipper for its loss, where the officer had authority to seize the goods, even though he thereafter destroyed them, since his act in destroying them was act, with which the carrier had nothing to do. DANCIGER et al. v. ATCHISON, T. & S. F. Cent. Dig. $$ 343, 364-366; Dec. Dig. 92.) [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Carriers, RY. CO. (No. 11677.) 6. INDIANS Om 35-INTRODUCING LIQUORS IN(Kansas City Court of Appeals. Missouri. TO INDIAN COUNTRY – RIGHT TO SEIZE STATUTE. Under Act Cong. March 1, 1907, c. 2285, 34 Stat. 1017 (U. S. Comp. St. 1913, $_4142), 1. CARRIERS Cw140—CARRIER AS WAREHOUSE- giving the special agent of the Indian Bureau MAN-CHANGE IN NATURE OF LIABILITY. for the suppression of liquor traffic among InWhen a shipment arrives on time, and the dians and in the Indian country, and his deputransit is ended, and the carrier puts the goods ties, the powers conferred on Indian agents and in its warehouse to await delivery to the con- the commanding officers of military posts by signee, its liability as carrier ceases, although Rev. St. U. S. § 2140 (U. S. Comp. St. 1913, § no notice is given to the consignee, and it is 4141), providing that, if an Indian agent has thereafter liable only as a warehouseman; but the liability of a carrier does not cease imme- reason to suspect or is informed that any white diately upon the prompt arrival of goods at its person, etc., is about to introduce any spiritu ous liquor into the Indian country in violation destination, but only after the lapse of a rea of law, he may search such person's place of sonable time for their removal by the consignee, deposit, and shall seize any liquor found and deand the time when the liability as carrier ceases liver it to the proper officer, to be proceeded may depend upon special contracts or local cus-against by libel and forfeited, an Indian officer tom. who suspected that intoxicating liquor in the [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Carriers, wareroom of a carrier's station in Kansas, about Cent. Dig. $8 609, 6091/2, 611-616; Dec. Dig. half a mile from the "Indian country” in Okla140.] homa, was consigned to parties in the Indian country, had a right to seize it and take it from , Brown.” In the other four contracts the the carrier's possession. goods were consigned directly to the respec[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Indians, tive persons named therein, with no proviCent. -Dig. $$ 61, 62; Dec. Dig. Om 35.] sion requiring the carrier to notify any one. 7. CARRIERS Om92—TRANSPORTATION OF LIQ- All of the contracts provided that the car UOR-SEIZURE DUTY OF CARRIER CON- rier should hold the goods a certain number Where an officer of the United States In- of days after arrival at destination, and, if dian Service, under the statute and his commis- not accepted in that time, they were to be sion, had apparent authority to take from a carrier's possession liquors which he suspected returned to shipper. In the first three conwere to be introduced into the Indian territory, tracts this period was 10 days, and in the the carrier, as against the consignor suing for last three it was 15 days. In the first two, their loss, was not bound to construe the statute, those in which the goods were sent to shipnor foresee a subsequent ruling that the officer had no real authority to act outside his terri- per's order, the surrender of the original tory. bill of lading, properly indorsed, was re[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Carriers, quired before delivery. The conditions on Cent. Dig. $$ 343, 364-366; Dec. Dig. Om 92.] the back of all of them provided that the 8. CARRIERS C 92 – CARRIAGE OF GOODS carrier should be liable for any loss of the SEIZURE UNDER PROCESS OF LAW_RESISTANCE. goods, except that "caused by the act of God, In such case the carrier's agent was not the public enemy, quarantine, the authority required to resist the officer's taking and at- of law,” etc. The shipments in counts 1, 4, tempt to decide the question of law himself, 5, and 6 were made August 20, 1912, and arsince the officer's apparent authority to take the liquor was the highest form of vis major; rived at Caney, Kan., August 21, 1912. The and, at any rate, his failure to resist could not one in count 2 was made August 21st and be taken a consent to the taking. arrived August 22d, while the one in the [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Carriers, third count was made August 8th, and ar · Cent. Dig. $$ 343, 364-366; Dec. Dig. Eww92.) rived August 9th. So that all the shipments 9. COURTS Om 231 231 – MISSOURI APPELLATE COURT-CERTIFICATE TO SUPREME COURT. were transported without delay, and reached Where a former decision of the Springfield Caney the next day after they were shipped. Court of Appeals held that an Indian officer had Caney, Kan., is located within a half or no authority to act outside of the Indian coun-three-quarters of a mile of the "Indian country, the Kansas City Court of Appeals, holding that such officer might act outside the Indian try" in Oklahoma. The United States laws country in taking liquor about to be introduced for the suppression of the liquor traffic therein, was required to certify the case to the among Indians and in the Indian country Supreme Court for final adjudication. [Ed. Note.--For other cases, see Courts, Cent. were very stringent, and the government was Dig. $$ 487, 491, 644, 646-648, 650, 652-659, actively engaged in the enforcement thereof. 661; Dec. Dig. Om 231; Appeal and Error, On the evening of August 22, 1912, a deputy Cent. Dig. 8 1773.] special officer of the United States Indian Appeal from Circuit Court, Jackson Coun-Service, engaged in the suppression of the ty; Wm. 0. Thomas, Judge. liquor traffic, discovered the liquor covered "Not to be officially published." by the shipments in question, together with Action by Joseph Danciger and others a large number of other liquor shipments, a against the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fé Rail in the wareroom of defendant's station at way Company. Judgment for plaintiffs, and Caney. He informed the station agent that defendant appeals. Reversed, and cause cer- he was a United States officer, told him the tified to the Supreme Court. business he was engaged in, and asked the See, also, 179 S. W. 797. agent if he knew the consignees of the liquor, Thomas R. Morrow, George J. Mersereau, where it was destined, and whether or not and John H. Lathrop, all of Kansas City, it was going into prohibition country in Okfor appellant. I. J. Ringolsky and Harry lahoma. The agent, not knowing any of L. Jacobs, both of Kansas City, for re the consignees or persons to be notified nor spondents. where they lived, told the officer he did not know where the liquor was going. ThereupTRIMBLE, J. Plaintiffs, a partnership, on the officer demanded that he hold the under the name of Danciger Bros., carry on liquor until investigation could be made as a mail order liquor business in Kansas City, to its intended introduction. The agent askMo. They sue for the loss of six shipments ed for his credentials, and the officer showed of intoxicating liquor over defendant's rail- him his appointment and commission, and road from Kansas City, Mo., to Caney, Kan. served written notice on him directing the The suit began in a justice court, and is in six agent to hold all liquors in his possession uncounts, one for each shipment, all being made til further notice from the officer. Thereupunder separate shipping contracts. Those in Those in on the agent wired his superintendent that counts 1 and 2 provided that the goods were he had been served with notice from the shipped to the order of Danciger Bros., with deputy special officer of the United States a provision in the first that the carrier (giving his name and the number, date, and should “notify Raymond Edwards,” and in signature on his commission) to hold all intoxthe second that it should "notify Tom icating liquor until further notice, and asked On For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes for advice quick. At 8:55 the next morning , Mo. 524; Holtzclaw v. Duff, 27 Mo. 395. the agent received a telegram from the su- Our authorities also hold that the time when perintendent which asked if the order ap- the liability as carrier will cease may deplied to all liquor on hand, regardless of pend upon special contract or a local custom. territory into which the same was going, and Gashweiler v. Wabash, etc., R. Co., supra, closed by saying: “Handle as per officer's 83 Mo. loc. cit. 120, 53 Am. Rep. 558; Frank orders until advised.” Shortly thereafter, on v. Grand Tower, etc., R. Co., 57 Mo. App. the same morning, to wit, the 23d of August, 181. Consequently, as to the first two counts, the United States officer appeared at the sta- the provision for notification might require tion in company with the sheriff of Mont- notice to be given before the liability as cargomery county, in which Caney is located, rier would cease. Again, so far as they, as and the two officials went into the wareroom well as the last four counts, are concerned, and looked over the various liquor shipments our courts hold that the liability of carrier that were there, package by package. They does not cease immediately upon the prompt took the numbers, and went over the names arrival of goods at their destination, but only of the consignees or persons to whom notifi- after the lapse of a reasonable time for its cation was required, with particular refer- removal by the consignee. Scott County Millence to whether the parties to whom the liq- ing Co. v. St. Louis, Iron Mountain, etc., R. uor was sent lived in the Indian country of Co., 127 Mo. App. 80, loc. cit. 92, 104 S. W. Oklahoma or in Kansas; and all packages 924; Pindell v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 34 Mo. of liquor the officers found destined for the App. 675; Bell v. St. Louis & Iron Mountain Indian country were checked and separated R. Co., 6 Mo. App. 363. from the liquor intended for parties living [2] The evidence seems to show that the in Kansas. Then the United States officer consignees did not live in Caney, and hence, got two wagons and hauled away the liquor except as to the shipment in the third count, destined for the Indian country. The liquor the reasonable time allowed the consignees going to those residing in Kansas was not before liability as carrier would cease had molested. After the officer had taken the not elapsed at the time the officer seized the liquor out of the depot and away from de- goods. As to the third count, the defendant fendant's premises, he destroyed it. had held it more than the ten days required, The suit is bottomed upon the common- but, if the agreement to return the goods law liability of the carrier as an insurer. to shipper at the expiration of the ten days Each count in the petition alleges that de- had the effect to reinstate the status of carfendant is a common carrier for hire, and rier, then defendant cannot claim it was a that the goods therein mentioned were de- warehouseman as to it. We do not say livered to it for transportation, and that it that it did reinstate such status, but merely neither delivered the goods to the consignee that, if it did so, then even the third count nor returned them to the shippers. The con- cannot be dealt with on the theory that detracts all provide, as hereinbefore stated, for fendant was merely a warehouseman. We å holding of the liquor a certain number of shall, therefore, treat the entire case upon days, and from this defendant argues that the theory that defendant's relation to all of its liability, if any exists at all, is that of a the shipments was that of carrier, and not warehouseman, and not that of a carrier. warehouseman. The question would then arise: Did the re- [3] By the strict rule of the common law lation of carrier cease and that of ware- a carrier could escape liability for failure houseman begin? If so, when? In the last to deliver goods received by him for carriage four counts there is no provision in the con- only by showing that such failure was caustracts requiring the carrier to notify the ed by act of God or the public enemy. But consignee; while in the first two there is “this stringent rule has been modified so as such a provision. There was no delay in to excuse the carrier from liability where the carriage of the goods. They all arrived the goods have been taken from his possespromptly. sion by process of law, provided the carrier [1] Missouri seems to have adopted the gives prompt notice of such seizure to his Massachusetts rule (slightly modified) as to bailor.” Kohn v. Richmond, etc., R. Co., 37 the time when a carrier's liability changes s. c. 1, 16 S. E. 376, 24 L. R. A. 100, 34 Am. to that of a warehouseman; namely, that St. Rep. 726. In Stiles v. Davis, 1 Black, 101, when the shipment arrives on time, and the loc. cit. 106, 17 L. Ed. 33, the Supreme Court transit is ended, and the carrier has put the of the United States say: goods in its warehouse to await delivery to "It is true that these goods had been delivered the consignee, its liability as carrier ceases, to the defendant, as carriers, by the plaintiffs, although no notice is given to the consignee, to be conveyed for them to the place of destinaand the carrier is thereafter liable as ware- tion, and were seized under an attachment houseman only. Gashweiler v. Wabash, etc., did not impair the legal effect of the seizure or against third persons; but this circumstance R. Co., 83 Mo. 112, 53 Am. Rep. 558; Stan- custody of the goods under it, so as to justify ard Milling Co. v. White Line, etc., Transit the defendant in taking them out of the hands Co., 122 Mo. 258, 26 S. W. 704; Rankin v. of the sheriff. The right of the sheriff to hold them was a question of law, to be determined Pacific Railroad, 55 Mo. 167; Cramer v. by the proper legal proceedings, and not at the American Merchants', etc., Express Co., 56 will of the defendant, nor that of the plaintiffs." In Pingree v. Detroit, etc., R. Co., 66 Mich., excuse a carrier for failure to deliver goods 143, loc. cit. 145, 33 N. W. 298, 299 (11 Am. intrusted to it for carriage, is not without St. Rep. 479), it is said that, if a carrier "is exception. And that rule has been modified, excusable for yielding to a public enemy, he i at least to this extent, that when goods in a cannot be at fault for yielding to actual au- carrier's possession have been seized, the thority what he may yield to usurped au carrier will not be liable where: First, there thority.” In Railroad Co. v. O'Donnell, 49 has been no fraud, collusion, consent, or conOhio St. 489, loc. cit. 500, 32 N. E. 476, 479, nivance on the part of the carrier; second, it is said: where the seizure was made by an officer "The rule seems to be now established that a of the law acting under authority apparentcommon carrier is not liable, if the goods be ly valid on its face; third, that the carrier taken from his possession by legal process against the owner, or if, without his fault, they gave notice to the consignor—this last being become obnoxious to the requirements of the for the purpose of enabling him to protect police power of the state, and are injured or de- his own interest. 'Do the facts in the case at stroyed by its authority; as where they are in bar bring the case within the above excepfected with contagious disease, or are intoxicating liquors intended for use or sale in violation tion? of the laws of the state, which require their There was no fraud, consent, collusion, or seizure and destruction." connivance on the part of the agent of the In McAlister v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 74 carrier or of the carrier itself. Plaintiff Mo. 363, it was held that the carrier was not endeavored to get both the agent and the bound to know whether a statute under officer to say that the former turned the which cattle carried by it were seized was property over to the latter, but both deny it, constitutional or not, and if the process was and the officer testified that the goods were not void on its face, the carrier was not not released, but that “they were really takliable. en from him," referring to the agent. In Ohio, etc., R. Co. v. Yohe, 51 Ind. 181, [4] As to the notice which the agent was loc. cit. 184 (19 Am. Rep. 727), it is said: required to give the consignors, the purpose “The carrier is deprived of the possession of of such requirement is to enable the latter the property by a superior power, the power to protect their interests. The notice was -in all things as potent and overpowering, as far given shortly after the property was taken, as the carrier is concerned, as if it were the but, under the circumstances shown in evi‘act of God or the public enemy. In fact, it dence, no notice could possibly have given amounts to the same thing; the carrier is equal- plaintiffs an opportunity to protect themly powerless in the grasp of either.” selves. The liquors were destroyed within See, also, Southern Express Co. v. Sottile a few moments after they were seized and Bros., 134 Ga. 40, 67 S. E. 414; Robinson v. taken away, and, had the agent telegraphed Memphis, etc., R. Co. (C. C.) 16 Fed. 57. plaintiffs the moment they were seized, it In Southern R. Co. v. Heymann, 118 Ga. would have availed them nothing, because by 616, loc. cit. 622, 45 S. E. 491, 493, it is said: the time or before a telegram could have “ 'Like every other person, the carrier is been delivered, the property was no longer bound, both by duty and necessity, to respect in existence. So that, even if the agent had and yield to the paramount public authority in power at the place where his undertaking is telegraphed the consignors the instant the to be performed. * * * If the goods, without officer notified him to hold the shipments, it his fault, are or become obnoxious to the re- would not have enabled plaintiffs to protect quirements of the police power of the state, and are injured or destroyed by its authority, as in themselves. the case of * * * intoxicating liquors intend- [5] Hence the question comes down to the ed for use or sale in violation of law, the carrier authority of the officer to take the goods cannot be held liable.' Hutch. Car. (2d Ed.) from the depot. We think the distinction $S 210b, 210c. The reason for such a rule is at once apparent; for to hold that a railroad com- between the officer's right to take the goods pany is bound to resist the lawful authority in and his right to destroy them upon his own protecting the goods of a shipper would be to responsibility without waiting for a judglay down a doctrine dangerously approaching anarchy. In the present case it was in evidence ment of condemnation should be carefully that the whisky was seized by duly appointed preserved. His act of destroying the goods officers of law of the state of South Carolina, was his own act, with which the agent had and that they were acting within the authority nothing to do. It was accomplished after he a to hold that the railroad company was bound to had taken the goods from the agent's possestest the validity of the statute under which sion. So that, if he had authority to seize the goods were seized, by resisting the seizure; the goods, the defendant should not be held for to do so would be to entirely change the con- liable, even though the officer had no authora burden greater than it undertook, or in rea- ity to thereafter destroy them. son and common sense ought to bear." [6] Chapter 2285, Act March 1, 1907, 34 While this case was reversed by the Su- Stats. at Large, 1017 (U. S. Comp. St. 1913, preme Court of the United States in 203 U. $ 4142), gave the "special agent of the InS. 270, 27 Sup. Ct. 104, 51 L. Ed. 178, 7 Ann. dian Bureau for the suppression of the Cas. 1130, yet it was upon other grounds. So liquor traffic among Indians and in the Inthat the old common-law rule that nothing dian country and duly authorized deputies 9 * powers conferred by section 2140 of the Re-, held that the place was not Indian country; vised Statutes of the United States (U. S. consequently the plaintiffs had not introducComp. St. 1913, 8 4141) upon "Indian agents ed any liquor. They were not charged with and subagents and commanding officers of attempting or being about to introduce ligmilitary posts." uor into forbidden territory. And, since the Section 2140 provides that: store where the liquor was kept for sale was “If any superintendent of Indian affairs, In- not in Indian country, there could have been dian agent, or subagent, or commanding officer no foundation for any claim that they were of a military post, has reason to suspect or is The court, at page informed that any white person or Indian is about to introduce it. about to introduce or has introduced any spir- | 209 of 95 U. S. (24 L. Ed. 471), says: ituous liquor or wine into the Indian country in "The plaintiffs below violated no law in having violation of law, such superintendent, agent, the whisky for sale at the place where it was subagent, or commanding officer, may cause the seized." boats, stores, packages, wagons, sleds and places of deposit of such person to be searched; The case of Clairmont v. United States, and if any such liquor is found therein, the 225 U. S. 551, 32 Sup. Ct. 787, 56 L. Ed. 1201, same, together with the boats, teams, wagons, and sleds used in conveying the same, and also was upon an indictment for introducing liqthe goods, packages, and peltries of such person, uor into Indian country. Of course, if the shall be seized and delivered to the proper offi- place where the liquor was seized was not cer, and shall be proceeded against by libel in the proper court, and forfeited, one half to the forbidden territory, then the defendant could informer and the other half to the use of the not be convicted, since he had not introduced United States; and if such person be a trader, it. The court in that case preserves the dishis license shall be revoked and his bond put tinction we are here dealing with, since it in suit. It shall moreover be the duty of any person in the service of the United States, or of says on page 555 of 225 U. S., on page 787 any Indian, to take and destroy any ardent spir- of 32 Sup. Ct. (56 L. Ed. 1201): its or wine found in the Indian country, except such as may be introduced therein by the War error did then and there wrongfully and unlaw "The indictment charged that the plaintiff in Department.” ' fully introduce a quantity of intoxicating liqNow, the officer who seized the liquor had uor into, etc. * The offense alleged was a proper and legal commission as a deputy the introduction of the liquor into the reservaspecial agent, and was, in fact, such officer. tion, and not ‘attempting to introduce. » And, under the two statutes above mention- Again, at page 560 of 225 U. S., on page ed, if he had “reason to suspect” that any 790 of 32 Sup. Ct. (56 L. Ed. 1201), the person is "about to introduce” any liquor court say: into the Indian country in violation of law, “To repeat, the plaintiff in error was not he could cause the store or place of deposit charged with 'attempting to introduce the liqto be searched, and if liquor was found troduction. If having the liquor in his possestherein, the same could be seized, etc. This sion on the train on this right of way did not he could do summarily and without war- constitute such introduction, it is immaterial, rant or process. He was not required to ob- so far as the charge is concerned, whether or tain a writ to authorize him to do so. In not he intended to take it elsewhere." Wells v. Maine Steamship Co., 29 Fed. Cas. In Evans V. Victor, 204 Fed. 361, 122 C. 669, No. 17,401, the seizure was without pro- C. A. 531, defendants, who were governcess by an officer that should have had it, ment officers, searched plaintiff's drug store but the carrier was held not liable. in Muskogee, and plaintiff brought injuncBut plaintiffs say the station was outside tion to prevent further searches. The deof the Indian country, and therefore the offi- fense was that Muskogee was in Indian cer had no authority to seize the liquor, ex- country, and that defendants had reasonable cept in such territory, and that, as he had grounds to believe that plaintiff kept liquors no authority to act outside of his territory, in his store, and that they had a right to he was a mere trespasser like any other, and search for them. Here again there was no the defendant is liable the same as if it had claim that the storekeeper was about to inpermitted an ordinary trespasser to take it, troduce liquor into Indian country, but that and a number of cases are cited in support his keeping it in his store constituted an inof the contention that he had no such au- troduction already effected. The court held thority outside of Indian country. In our that, as Muskogee was not in Indian counopinion, they do not decide the precise ques- try, of course, the keeping of liquors for sale tion here presented. In Bates v. Clark, 95 in a store in that city was not the introducU. S. 204, 24 L. Ed. 471, the plaintiffs had tion of them into such forbidden territory. liquor for sale in their store, and the de- The opinion is dealing only with the facts fendants, a captain and lieutenant in the before it, and as the opinion itself says, on United States army, seized it. They were page 367 of 204 Fed., on page 537 of 122 C. sued by the merchants, and defended, not c. A., quoting from Chief Justice Marshall: upon the ground that the liquor was about “An opinion in a particular case, founded on to be introduced into Indian country, but on its special circumstances, is not applicable to the ground that the place where they found essentially different.' and seized it was Indian country; i. e., that The court, in the remarks made in the it had already been introduced, and that Victor Case, had in mind only the facts be cases |