ant by the officers in whose custody he was, by a series of questions put to him and the answers made thereto by him, the interrogating having been done by the chief of police, assistant district attorney and others. (See notes of testimony, pages 105-125.) (4th assignment.) tablish the prisoner's guilt in the minds | confession was wrung from the defendof the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. ANSWER. This point we refuse. If the corpus delicti, that is the crime itself, that is the actual killing of Alfred Hallman, is proven to your satisfaction, and you believe the confessions made by the defendant that he was one of the parties who took part in the robbery, or planned the robbery, that he was at the house, and there is no other testimony to show it, that of itself would be sufficient to convict the defendant, and that statement of his would need no corroboration to justify you in such conviction." (1st assignment.) "6. Under the law, the jury cannot convict Benjamin Aston upon the testimony or confession of Paul Fornwalt, an accomplice, unless such testimony or confession is corroborated in some material way. ANSWER. This point we refuse. It is not the law in Pennsylvania that a person cannot be convicted upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, though it is the duty of the court to caution the jury that such testimony should be taken with allowance. But the question does not arise in this case, as Paul Fornwalt has not testified at all, and what he said in the presence of the defendant at the police station on February 3rd, and which was testified to you by Mr. Eshleman, the stenographer, does little, if anything, to connect the defendant with the offence charged, and the defendant has affirmed that some at least of what was said in that statement was true." (2d assignment.) The Court erred in admitting in evidence the confession or statement of Paul Fornwalt, a co-defendant, which statement was taken in the presence of Benjamin Aston, by the police officers and others in whose custody he then was; said statement of Paul Fornwalt having been made when Benjamin Aston was not present voluntarily. (See notes of testimony, page 104.) (3rd assignment.) 4. The Court erred in admitting in evidence the confession of Benjamin Aston for the reason that the testimony absolutely established the fact that said After verdict of murder in the first degree and sentence thereon the defendant took this appeal, assigning error as above. E. M. Gilbert and M. G. Schaeffer, for appellant. convicted solely on his own alleged conBenjamin Aston, the appellant, was fession and the confession or statement of Paul Fornwalt, a co-defendant, which confessions were admitted in evidence in the Court below. The confession of Benjamin Aston was not corroborated in any particular. The only testimony the confession, was the fact that three produced by the commonwealth outside persons attempted to burglarize the home of Alfred Hallman on the night of January 31, 1909, and that in the commission of said offence Alfred Hallman was shot by some unknown person. It is contended on the part of the defendant that the confession of Benjamin Aston was not in itself sufficient to convict him of this serious crime unless there were such intrinsic, corroborative circumstances proved by the commonwealth as would when taken in connection with the confession establish the defendant's guilt in the minds of the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. U. S. vs. Boos, 46 Fed. Rep., 917. U. S. vs. Manfield, 59 Fed. Rep., 119. Am. and Eng. Ency. of Law, 2d Edition, page 582. Commonwealth vs. Handon, 3 Brewster, page 461. Watson vs. Com., 95 Pa., 418. The statement or confession of Paul Fornwalt was not admissible in evidence against Benjamin Aston for two sons, first: because a confession or statement drawn from an accused party in the presence of a co-defendant is not ad missible against the latter, it appearing that his presence was not voluntary and that he was compelled to listen to said statement (State VS. McCullon, 18 Wash., 394), and second, because it did not serve the purpose for which it was offered by the commonwealth and admitted in evidence by the Court below. As a matter of fact, and the evidence so discloses, the defendant, Benjamin Aston, did not remain silent after the Fornwalt confession was made but explained any portion that might have connected him with the burglary. The confession of Benjamin Aston made at the police station in the presence of the police officers and assistant district attorney was not involuntary under the law. "Specially interrogating the accused on a preliminary examination is unwarranted on the principles of common law and confessions made by a prisoner in answer to questions propounded to him will be taken to be involuntary although no threats were made or promises given." State vs. Clifford, 86 Ia., 43. 3 Am. and Eng. Encyc. of Law, Ist Edition, 438. J. W. Johnson, Dist. Atty., S. V. Hosterman, Asst. Dist. Atty., and B. C. Atlee, for appellee. There is no rule of law which forbids a conviction on the testimony of an accomplice alone. The appearance of the witness and his manner of testifying may so impress a jury as to satisfy them of the truth of his evidence. Coyle vs. Com. 125 Pa., 94. Com. vs. Craig, 19 Pa. Super., 81. Com. vs. Lenhart, 45 Pa. Super., 585. "Where three burglars, each armed with deadly weapons, enter a dwellinghouse with intent to commit burglary, and one of them shoots and kills the owner who attempts to interfere with their operations, all three are guilty of murder in the first degree, and it is immaterial that at the time of the killing they had not then accomplished their purpose of robbing the house." Com. vs. Biddle, 200 Pa., 640. February 14, 1910. Opinion by ELKIN, J. The assignments of error are without any substantial merit under the facts developed at the trial. All of the questions raised by this appeal were fully considered and properly disposed of by the learned trial judge upon the motion for a new trial. The opinion filed when the motion for a new trial was refused amply sustains the correctness of every ruling made and principle of law laid down during the course of the trial. We can add nothing of value by further discussion of the same questions raised here. As to the confession of the defendant, as well as the confession of Paul Fornwalt, and whether they were made voluntarily, or whether appellant was voluntarily present when Fornwalt made his statement, the reasons given by the Court below in the opinion filed fully and convincingly sustain every position taken by the trial judge about which complaint is made. The appellant had a fair and impartial trial under the law and no unbiased person who reads this record can have any doubt that the verdict was rendered in accordance with the evidence. Assignments of error overruled, judg ment affirmed and record remitted to the Court of Oyer and Terminer of Lancaster County for the purpose of execution. Quarter Sessions. Q. S. OF LANCASTER COUNTY. Commonwealth vs. Peaco, et al. Trespass - Crime - Practice - Act of April 14, 1905, P. L., 169. authorizes a criminal proceeding begun in The trespass Act of April 14, 1905, P. L. 169 the name of the commonwealth by a warrant. Where an act is made unlawful by an act of assembly and no form of proceeding Sessions because it is a public offence. is provided in it, it is indictable in Quarter Where an act of assembly provides a fine or penalty for violation of it, to be collected as fines and penalties are now collected by law it is a criminal proceeding and not a civil one, though violations of municipal ordinances are brought in the name of the municipality. September Sessions, 1909. No. 43. | Criminal Law, sections 14 et seq. Where an act is made unlawful by an act of assembly and no form of proceeding is Rule to quash proceedings of magis- provided in it, it is indictable in the trate. B. F. Davis, for rule. W. U. Hensel, Wm. C. Rehm and J. W. Johnson, District Attorney, contra. January 15, 1910. Opinion by HASSLER, J. The defendants were convicted by an alderman and sentenced for a violation of the Act of 14 April, 1905, P. L., 169. Upon their applications, an appeal to this Court was allowed and taken, and is now pending. They now ask to have the proceedings quashed and set aside for the reasons that the act of which they were convicted is not a criminal offence and should not have been commenced in the name of the Commonwealth, that the alderman, therefore, had no jurisdiction to entertain the complaints and issue warrants, but that the action to recover the penalty described in the Act was a civil matter, and should have been commenced by a summons in which the prosecutor should have been named as plaintiff. The act under which defendants were convicted, is that of 14 April, 1905, P. L., 169, and is entitled, "An Act making it unlawful to trespass upon land posted as private property, and providing the penalty therefore." The first section provides what lands are covered by the act and how the notice must be given. The second section provides, "Every person violating the provisions of this act shall be liable to a penalty of not exceed ing $10.00, together with the costs of prosecution, to be recovered before any magistrate or justice of the peace, as fines and penalties are by law recoverable; and in default of payment of said fine and costs, the party convicted shall be committed to the county jail of the proper county, for one day for each dollar of fine imposed." 1 Quarter Sessions because it is a public offence: Com. vs. Betts, 76 Pa., 465. Where an act of assembly provides a fine or penalty for the violation of it, to be collected as fines and penalties are now collected by law, it is a criminal proceeding and not a civil one: Com. vs. Betts, 76 Pa., 465; Mahanoy City vs. Wadlinger, 142 Pa., 308; Colwin vs. Tarbottom, I Sup., 179; Com. vs. Davison, II Sup. Ct., 130. Where an offence for which a fine or penalty may be imposed is a violation of an act of assembly an action must be brought in the name of the commonwealth. This is so, even though part or all of it must be paid to the informer or a municipality: Van Swartow vs. The Com., 24 Pa., 131; Specht vs. The Com., 24 Pa., 103; Com. vs. Borden, 61 Pa., 272; Com. vs. Dulaney, 25 L. L. R., 350. It is not material to a proper disposition of this case, but as the defendant's counsel seems to have failed to observe the distinction between offences which are a violation of acts of assembly and those which are violations of borough or city ordinances, we state the law to be that for offences which are violations of a borough ordinance, where a fine or penalty is imposed, the action must be in the name of the borough or city against the offender and not in the name of the commonwealth: Lemon vs. The City of Lancaster, I L. L. R., 3; The Borough of Warren vs. Geer, 117 Pa., 207; City vs. Duncan, 4 Philadelphia, 145; City vs. Campbell, 11 Phila., 163; Com. vs. Clark, 14 L. L. R., 42; Com. vs. Davison, II Sup. Ct., 130, all of these being cases which appear on defendant's brief. In this case the defendants were convicted of an act, made unlawful by an act of assembly, which imposes a fine or penalty to be recovered before a magistrate or justice of the peace as fines and An offence, which may be the subject penalties are by law recoverable, and in of a criminal prosecution, has been de- default of payment he is to be imprisfined to be, an act committed or omitted oned. The fines and penalties imposed in violation of public law either forbid-, for a violation of an act of assembly are ding or commanding it: 1 Wharton on by law recoverable in an action in the name of the commonwealth as they are a public offence. The form of action was therefore proper and the alderman had jurisdiction to entertain it, and to issue warrants for the defendant's arrest. We do not see how he could have entertained an action in the name of the prosecutor as plaintiff for the violation of this act of assembly, as the prosecutor was not entitled to the fine or any portion of it. Legal Miscellany. Twelve Sportsmen Good and True. A southern Missouri man recently was tried on a charge of assault. The state brought into court, as the weapons used, a rail, an axe, a pair of tongs, a saw, and a rifle. The defendant's counsel exhibited, as the other man's weapons, a Without discussing our power to grant the relief sought for, in the form which scythe blade, a pitchfork, a pistol, and a the relief sought for, in the form which hoe. The jury's verdict is said to have defendants have applied for it, we dis-been: "Resolved, That we, the jury, charge the rule to quash and set aside the proceedings, at the costs of petitioners, for the reasons which we have given. Rule discharged. Orphans' Court. O. C. OF LANCASTER COUNTY. Estate of John Lefever, Deceased (No 6). Costs Who liable for-Practice. Questions as to how costs are to be paid and by whom are not properly brought before the court by a rule to tax and appeal therefrom. March Term, 1907. No. 9. Appeal from rule for taxation of costs. H. R. Fulton for appeal. February 3, 1910. Opinion by SMITH, P. J. A rule was entered for the taxation of costs and Superior Court Paper Books ". The bills submitted to the Clerk were mutually admitted to be correct and the costs were taxed accordingly. From the concededly correct taxation an appeal has been taken by George N. Lefever, the executor. As no one interested disputes the accuracy | of the bill of costs as taxed, there was nothing from which to appeal and nothing open for a ruling. The bill as taxed is approved. How the costs are to be paid and by whom is foreign to the rule for their taxation. would have given a dollar to have seen the fight." -Case and Comment. CANADA'S Supreme Court has fixed a maximum of three hours for counsel's addresses, which decree has recalled some tales of overlong speeches. The story is told of a counsel who pressed his argument for a long time with frequent repetition. have said that before." Mr. - "said the judge, "you "Have I, my lord?" replied counsel, apologetically. "I am very sorry; I forgot it." "Don't apologize," was the judicial response, “it was so very long ago." "It may be assumed that a man can recognize his mother-in-law when he sees her." Hirschberg, P. J., in Matter of McInnes, 119 N. Y. App. Div., 443-Laze Notes. O. C. ADJUDICATIONS. By Judge SMITH. Thursday, March 3, 1910. Christian B. Eshbach, Lancaster township. $18,751.29. Joseph Shaub, Manheim township. $596.80; Jessee Girvin, Salisbury, $692.93. J. Gust. Zook, city, $155.013.10. Juliet S. S. Herr, city, $4,722.64. LANCASTER LAW REVIEW. VOL. XXVII.] MONDAY, MAR. 14,1910. [No. 19. Common Pleas--Law. C. P. OF LANCASTER COUNTY. Ream vs. Hershey. to have sheathed the roof with boards; but, instead of doing this, he placed thereon, eight or nine inches apart, oak lath, which he had on hand. As a consequence, Ream said, he could not finish the roof in as thorough a manner as he could have done had there been sheathing, as originally agreed upon; but that he did the work in as good and workmanlike way as it could have been done under the circumstances. Therefore, we charged the jury that, "if***it (the Breach of contract - Damages - When roof) was to be sheathed with boards, too remote. On the trial of a suit for the cost of putting a corrugated iron roof on the defendants barn it appeared that defendant was to have first sheathed the roof with boards but instead, used oak lath which he had on hand, in consequence of which as the plaintiff claimed, the roof leaked, and he was directed to relay it at defendant's cost. The verdict was for the plaintiff for his claims for both the laying and the relaying. Held that the verdict should be sustained, and the court properly excluded testimony of the defendant as to the value of crops destroyed by reason of the leaks. Damages for which compensation may be recovered for breach of contract must be such as naturally an ordinarily would flow from the breach and might be fairly supposed to have entered in the contemplation of the parties when they made the contract or might ordinarily be expected to follow its violation. April Term, 1908. No. 5. Rule for a new trial. and Hershey, instead, put on the oak lath, then Ream was not responsible for the bad character of the work, if he notified Hershey that this would be the effect, and Hershey insisted and directed him to go on in that way." This question has, however, been determined by the jury, and there does not now appear to be any serious complaint concerning it. The first and second reasons for a new trial are general reasons, and do not require any special attention: nor need the third reason be discussed, as there was no testimony presented upon the trial by the defendant relative to the alleged set-off mentioned therein. The $132 was part of the plaintiff's claim, and not set up by the defendant in defense. The fourth reason complains that we erred in not charging the jury that there could be no recovery of this same sum of $132, charged for re-laying the said 66 Willis G. Kendig for defendant and roof, when the uncontradicted evidence rule. Harnish & Harnish for plaintiff. January 15, 1910. Opinion by LANDIS, P. J. The plaintiff brought suit to recover for certain work performed by him in roofing the barn of the defendant, and the amount of the work done and its quality were the subjects of dispute before the jury. The defendant was to prepare the roof, and the plaintiff was to put thereon corrugated iron roofing, and the price which was to be paid for this work and the necessary materials was to be $4.70 per square. According to Ream (and his story must now be assumed to be the true one), Hershey was was, that the roof leaked badly after having been re-laid, and that plaintiff was only to be paid in event of the roof being water-tight." It might, perhaps, be a sufficient answer to this objection that no special instructions were requested on this point by the defendant; but it is best not to rest wholly upon this foundation, for, as a matter of fact, there is a better one shown in the testimony, namely, that this question was one of the matters of controversy between the parties, and was not, as alleged, an uncontradicted point. The plaintiff claimed that, after he had performed his original contract with the defendant, the roof leaked in consequence of the manner in which he was directed to put it |