Wasted Effort. W. Barnes and his wife, Susanna E. Barnes, that the property was to be hers, As every lawyer knows, or, at least, and when she expressed surprise in dis-ought to know, Senator Daniel, of Vircovering it was not in her name he prom-ginia, is the author of a standard work ised to have it put in her name, and as this was before and while she was furn-way, is characterized by about the most on negotiable instruments, which, by the ishing money to pay for it, it is to be elegant literary style to be found in any presumed she furnished the money be-law book. On one occasion a friend cause of this promise. It was, therefore, a contract binding on him. She was entitled to it at what it cost, and not what it was actually worth, and a conveyance to her upon her having paid such cost even though it was not its real value raises no presumption of fraud. We dismiss the bill at plaintiff's costs and direct the prothonotary to enter a decree nisi, giving notice thereof to counsel of both plaintiff and defendants that such decree has been filed. inquired of the senator how he came to write the book. "Well," he replied, "it was this way. Somebody asked me whether a sight draft bore interest, and I couldn't tell him. I was so ashamed of my ignorance that I determined to master the question at once, and from my study on this point I got the idea of writing a book on the subject." "Well, Senator," asked the friend,“ does a sight draft bear interest?" Senator Daniel reflected for some moments and then replied, "Blamed if I haven't forgotten." -Law Notes. Legal Miscellany. Liability of Saloon Keeper for Death Due to Intoxication. One Jacob Woodring, addicted first to drink and as a consequence thereof to violence, was sold liquor, whereupon, following his natural bent, he became intoxicated, quarrelsome, vindictive, and abusive, and his mental powers became deranged to such an extent that he made an unprovoked and deadly assault upon one Grosjean, who struck him so violently that his death ensued. In Woodring vs. Jacobino, 103 Pacific Reporter, 809, the minor child of decedent sued the seller of the deranging elixir for damages for her father's death. The jury found that appellant had conducted a saloon; that he had sold liquors to Woodring, which intoxicated him, causing him to become involved in the disastrous altercation with Grosjean; that the liquor was purchased from appellant under circumstances which would have led a man of ordinary intelligence to believe intoxication would probably result therefrom; and that respondent had sustained loss in her support and maintenace in the sum of $400. The Washington Supreme Court refused to disturb the judgment of the trial court. O. C. ADJUDICATIONS AND Thursday, June 9, 1910. By Judge SMITH. Catharine Baker, Lititz, $6.775.31. Jacob B. Kauffman, East Hempfield, $3.634. Levi L. Engle, Elizabethtown, $2,069.40. Emanuel Rogers, city, $1,292.54. Joseph Bresch, city, $4,323.51. Joseph Oberholtzer, East Earl, S14307.54. John N. Mummah, West Hempfield. $849.88 (substituted.) Opinion: Estate of Emanuel Royers, deceased. Exception sustained and re-distribution made. LANCASTER LAW REVIEW. Common Pleas--Law. C. P. OF LANCASTER COUNTY. In re Application of Lancaster & Northern or near Lancaster being at a point be tween the Conestoga River and the New Holland Turnpike in the Second Ward of the City of Lancaster, Pa." On April 14, 1906, at a meeting of the Board of Directors of the company, a resolution was adopted that " J. Marshall Young, of Easton, Pa., be and is hereby appointed engineer for this company to survey and locate its line of railroad from a point at or near Lancaster, Pa., the point of connection with the line of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, to a point at or near Millway, in Lancaster County, to the point of connection with the Philadelphia & Reading Railroad Company, and the line so conveyed and located by J. Marshall Young shall be located as and for the location of this company." On May 14, 1906, the engineer thus appointed appeared at a meeting of the Board and submitted a draw On petition of a railroad company for the approval of its bond for damages for the taking of land by eminent domain, the court cannot inquire into its right to take the land. The question whether a corporation has forfeited its charter by not having completed its organization and exercised its franchises within the required period from the date of its letters patent can not be determined in a collateral proceeding but only by a direct pro-ing and survey of the location made by ceeding to which the commonwealth is a party. him, and on motion it was adopted as the location of the line of the railroad Where such bond is so small that its amount of the company. The plan, survey and may be inadequate, testimony should be pre-location was then, by direction of the sented if the parties cannot agree and the bond should not be approved until the amount is satisfactorily adjusted. Trust Book No. 21, page 429. Reeder & Coffin for petition. Coyle & Keller, B. F. Davis, A. F. Hostetter, John E. Malone and M. G. Schaeffer, contra. Board, identified by the signature of the secretary and the seal of the company. On April 6, 1910, a revised location was prepared by J. Marshall Young, and was presented to the Board of Directors by the secretary. The original location It was then resolved that was then changed and modified, so as to conform to the revised plan, and the original plan, where inconsistent, was abandoned. the company *** does hereby adopt May 21, 1910. Opinion by LANDIS, and permanently locate its line of railP. J. road beginning at a point of connection. in the main line of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, at or near the City of Lancaster, in the County of Lancaster, Pennsylvania, and extending_along the Conestoga and Cocalico Creeks, through the Townships of Manheim, Warwick and Ephrata, to a point at or near Millway in the Township of Ephrata, in said County of Lancaster, which point is the connecting point of the railroad company's line with the main line of the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad Company, following the survey made by J. Marshall Young, chief engineer, as evidenced by a map thereof On April 11, 1906, the Lancaster and Northern Railroad Company was duly incorporated, and its charter was recorded in the Recorder's Office in Charter Book No. 2, at page 518, etc.. The company was, by virtue thereof, authorized to construct and maintain a railroad "from a point at or near Lancaster, Pa., the point of connection with the main line of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, to a point at or near Millway, in Lancaster County, the point of connection with the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad, the said point of beginning at Ravegum, and asking for the approval of the bond of the company in the sum of $200, with the Farmers' Trust Company as security. Objection was made on the part of the landholder, first, on the ground that the company had no right to take the land, and secondly, on account of the inadequacy of the amount of the bond. These are the questions which we will briefly consider. this day presented and identified by the | the appropriation of the land of Clayton signature of the secretary, which map is dated March 9th, 1910.' On the same day, it was "resolved that this company does hereby appropriate, for its proper corporate purposes, a strip of land sixty feet wide, being thirty feet on either side of the center of its located line of railroad as set forth on the plan of location this day filed, through the property of U. D. Miley, Estate, Edwin Wanger, Clayton Ravegum, Mrs. Anna Cachel, Jacob F. Minnich, Amos Rudy, Lemon Shirk, D. R. Bracbill, Myer Weaver, Esaias Witmer, John Geist, Elias Mumma, Samuel Wanger, Martha Frymyer; and that Reeder and Coffin, general counsel of this company, be and are hereby authorized and directed, in case said parties do not consent to an appropriation of said strip of land, to proceed to condemn the same under the company's right of eminent domain under the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania." The capital of the company, as originally set forth in the articles of incorporation, was $100,000; but, on April 6, 1910, it was increased to $500,000. The fees for filing the return have been paid to the State; but, up to this time, the bonus has not been paid, and no stock has, as yet, been issued. The original capital stock has not all been paid in. Rights-of-way were secured between April 24, 1906, and August 25, 1906, from a number of land-holders along the proposed route, some of which, however, are for land situated along the abandoned portion of the line. About thirty per cent. of the portion which is in dispute has been secured, but a considerably larger percentage than that has been obtained of the whole line of the road. Grading has been started on about twenty-five per cent. of the distance, and some of the work has been finished. The length of the line is ten and three-eighths miles. On the upper three and a-half miles, grading and tracking have been done through the farm of Anna Bard. The ground for this work was broken in March last. On April 23, 1910, a petition was presented by the Railroad Company, alleging Court will ap As to the first proposition, we think an extended discussion is unnecessary. In In re Petition of Columbia and Port Deposit Railroad Company, 23 LANCAS TER LAW REVIEW, 396, we said, in referring to similar petitions: "The petitions before us are regular upon their face. The purposes set forth therein are the widening and straightening of the line. Prima facie, they are presented in good faith and for these purposes. We, therefore, conclude that we have nothing to do but to pass upon the question of the sufficiency of the sureties and the amounts of the bonds. *** In Pennsylvania Company vs. Jones, 2 Dist. Rep., 759, Judge Biddle, of Philadelphia, held that a Railroad Company has an apparent right to take property for railroad purposes, and if it tenders a bond in a sufficient sum, with adequate security, the prove the same, and the burden is on the land-owner to show that, in his case, the right does not exist." In Heine et al. vs. Columbia and Port Deposit Railroad Co., et al., 24 LANCASTER LAW REVIEW, 9, we held that, where such company has the right of eminent domain, the Court has no right to interfere with its exercise, unless it is clearly shown that the company is using that right for a purpose not contained within its charter." And in the late case of Vinton Colliery Co. 7's. Blacklick & Yellow Creek Railroad Co., 226 Pa., 131, Mr. Justice Elkin, in delivering the opinion of the Court, said: "The appellee is a railroad incorporated as a public service corporation and under its charter powers possesses the right of eminent domain. It may be compelled by law to perform its duties as a common carrier, and in a proper case its franchises may be forfeited for failure to do so. Questions growing out of the exercise of the powers granted cannot be raised in a proceeding under the Act of June 19, 1871, P. L., 1360, under which the inquiry is always limited to a consideration of the question, Does the corporation possess the power to do what it is attempting to do, and not whether it is exercising its powers in an improper manner. In the present case, the appellee company has the prima facie right under its charter powers to do everything it is attempting to do, including the condemnation of lands for public use." It has been suggested that this corporation not having completed its organization and exercised its franchises within the required period from the date of its letter patent, the charter should be held and deemed to be forfeited. That question cannot, however, arise in this proceeding. In Olyphant SewageDrainage Co. vs. Borough of Olyphant, 196 Pa., 553, it was held that "the validity of a charter for public purposes cannot be determined in a collateral proceeding by a private suitor; it can be done only in a direct proceeding to which the Commonwealth is a party"; that "whether a right or franchise claimed by a corporation is conferred by its charter may be inquired into in a proceeding at law or in equity by a party injured, *** but whether for any reason the charter of a corporation was originally invalid or has been forfeited is a question which the Commonwealth alone raise." To the same effect are: Gas and Water Company of Downingtown vs. Borough of Downingtown, et al., 193 Pa., 255; Commonwealth vs. Philadelphia, Harrisburg and Pittsburgh Railroad Co., 23 Sup., 235; and Hinchman. vs. Philadelphia and West Chester Turnpike Road, 160 Pa., 150. can The second objection seems to us to have some force. The bond presented is for a small sum, and, though the surety upon it is ample, it may, from inadequacy in amount, be insufficient to protect the land-owner. We, therefore, think that, if the parties cannot agree among themselves, testimony should be presented upon this point; and, until the amount is satisfactorily adjusted or determined, we refrain from approving the bond which has been presented. Quarter Sessions. Q. S. OF LANCASTER COUNTY. Health law-Interfering with officer- 27, 1905. An indictment is insufficient, which avers that the defendant did unlawfully interfere with" Dr. M. "a duly authorized agent of the Department of Health of the Commonof his duty as such agent in the examination wealth of Pennsylvania in the performance of questions affecting security of life and health.” Such indictment should set forth what the able him to know what he is to meet upon defendant did, with sufficient precision to enthe trial, and the jury to comprehend what it is called upon to try. An indic:ment is bad for duplicity where two offenses, committed on different days and so far as appears based upon entirely different violations of the law, are contained in onecount. The Act of April 27, 1905, P. L., 312, does not make an offense of interfering with an agent in the examination of questions affecting security of life and health," without it having been made such by an order or regulation of the board of health, properly advertised and promulgated. The Act of April 27, 1905, P. L., 312, is not unconstitutional because its punitive features are omitted from its title. January Sessions, 1910. No. 13. Indictment for interfering with health officer. Motion to quash indictment. B. F. Davis for motion. W. U. Hensel, John A. Nauman and J. IV. Johnson, District Attorney, contra. April 16, 1910. Opinion by LANDIS, P. J. The complaint made by J. L. Mowery before the Alderman avers that the de- vs. Commonwealth, 98 Pa., 480; Fulmer dendant did, on or about the 24th day vs. Commonwealth, 97 Pa., 503; Comof December, A. D. 1909, *** unlaw-monwealth vs. Neil, 25 LANCASTER LAW fully interfere with deponent, an agent REVIEW, 68. Numerous other cases to of the State Department of Health, in the same effect might be added, but I the performance of his duty as said agent think the principle is so well settled as of said Department, and on January 3rd, to require no further citations. 1910, again commit said offence;" and the indictment found in pursuance thereof alleges that Wayne S. Grube, late of the said county, yoeman, on or about the 24th day of December, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and nine, and January third, 1910, did unlawfully interfere with Dr. J. L. Mowery, a duly authorized agent of the Department of Health of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, in the perform ance of his duty as such agent in the examination questions affecting security of life and health." The indictment is claimed to be insufficient, and, therefore, the defendant's counsel has entered this motion to quash. * * * I am convinced that the motion ought to be sustained. If for no other reason, it is certainly bad for duplicity. Two offenses, committed on different days, and, so far as we know, based upon entirely different violations of the law, are contained in one count. In Wharton's Criminal Pleading and Practice, section 243 (Ninth Edition), it is said: "A count in an indictment which charges two distinct offenses, each distinctively punishable, is bad, and may be quashed on motion of the defendant, or judgment may be entered for the defense on special demurrer." In Hutchison vs. Commonwealth, 82 Pa.. 472, Mr. Justice Paxson said: "Offenses which are a part of the same transaction may be joined in the same indictment, when it is triable in the Quarter Sessions, even though one of said offenses be a felony. Hunter vs. Commonwealth, 79 Pa., 503. This, however, does not justify the joining of separate offenses in one count.' In Commonwealth vs. Hall, 23 Sup., 104, it was held that, "in criminal pleading, as a general rule, two or more offenses, distinct and unconnected, should be charged in separate counts, and if they are charged in a single count, such count is bad for duplicity." See, also, Kilrow "Indictments require only the same certainty as declarations, namely, certainty to a common intent in general, and not certainty in every particular, as is required in pleading an estoppel. *** It is a rule that that which is apparent to the Court and appears from a nécessary implication, need not be averred. *** It is sufficient in indictments that the charge be stated with so much certainty that the defendant may know what he is called on to answer, and that the Court may know how to render the proper judgment thereon." Sherban vs. Commonwealth, 8 Watts, 212. The Penal Code of 1860, section II, declares that every indictment shall be deemed and adjudged sufficient and good in law which charges the crime substantially in the language of the Act of the Assembly prohibiting the crime and prescribing the punishment, if any such there be, or, if, at common law, so plainly that the nature of the offense charged may be easily understood by the jury." In Commonwealth 7's. Swallow, 8 Sup., 539, it was said that "this provision is to be construed with reference to the relaxation of the rules of pleading in relation to technical niceties which has long obtained in this state." In Commonwealth vs. New Bethlehem Borough, 15 Sup., 158, Rice, P. J., in delivering the opinion of the Court, said, that, "notwithstanding this liberality of pleading, the rule undoubtedly is, that an indictment must show that an offense has been committed, and, if, at common law, must describe the same so plainly that the nature of the offense charged may be easily understood by the jury.' This is the test by which the sufficiency of the indictment is to be determined." In the present case, the indictment charges the defendant with unlawfully interfering with "Dr. J. L. Mowery, a duly authorized agent of the Department of Health of the Commonwealth of |