single trial as contemplated in the Act, we must discharge the rule to show cause why an issue should not be framed to ascertain the value of the property, for which the verdict of the jury was in favor of the defendant. As the verdict, in its present shape, amounts to nothing, it is but proper that the matter should again be submitted to a jury, that they may dispose of it as required by law. We therefore make absolute the rule for a new trial. C. P. OF LANCASTER COUNTY. Trust Estate of Stephanie Nutto. Husband and wife-Death benefits. A wife's estate is not liable for debts incurred by her deceased husband to obtain money to pay assessments to a beneficial organization from which the money of her estate was derived. Trust Book No. 21, p. 194. Wm. H. Roland and J. R. Kinzer, contra. April 16, 1910. Opinion by HASSLER, J. The exceptions filed to the auditor's. report in this case raise objections to the allowance of five claims to which the whole balance in the hands of the accountant was awarded, there not being sufficient to pay them in full. It appears that all of the claims are debts of the deceased husband of Stephanie Nutto, a weak-minded person, who now also is deceased, and were incurred by him in obtaining money to pay the assessments to a beneficial organization, from which, the money which is now the subject of distribution, came. They, however, are not the debts of Stephanie Nutto, and as the law does not make her estate liable for the debts of her husband, except for certain purposes, of which the claims in question are not one, it was improper for the auditor to have allowed them to share in the distribution of her estate. We must, therefore, sustain the exceptions and re-commit the report to the auditor to distribute the balance to and among those entitled to it. Legal Miscelany. O. C. ADJUDICATIONS. By Judge SMITH. Monday, Sept. 19, 1910. James A. Caldwell, Columbia Boro. Robert E. Locher, City. Christian Wenger, Manheim Twp. Albert Zercher, Lancaster, $873.15. Samuel Ressel, Lancaster, $4.189.34. Elizabeth Hoffman, Elizabethtown, $2,796.75. Elizabeth Ginder, Columbia, $227.85. Jacob Myers, East Hempfield, $75.29. John P. Reisinger, Columbia, $320.29. Rev. Isaac Gerhart, City, $3.190.37. John B. Erb, Lititz, $366.23. Anna Louisa Derby, City, $372.98. Samuel Shaub, Strasburg, $2,585.98. Abraham R. Forney, Elizabethtown, $14.644.92. Mary Erisman, East Hempfield, $6,117.97. John Shimp, East Cocalico, $1,426.84. Thursday, Sept. 22, 1910. Sarah A. Grimley, New Holland, $51.50. John H. Bushong, City, $3.648.93. Catharine Dahlman, City, $424.06. Elizabeth H. Denlinger, City, $251.94 John M. Seitz, Jr., East Hempfield, $4.113.80. Benjamin H. Brubaker, East Hempfield, $3,311.98. Christian K. Stoltzfus, Leacock, $3.085.06. John Kemmler, City, $2,620.54. Charles H. Lamparter, $262.29. Rapho, J. B. Livingston, City, $425.15. John Wittmer, City, $7,778.93. Samuel McGlaughlin, Martic, $1,211.19. Philopena Hertgen, City, $173.41. Palo Alto Road, 160 Pa., 104.` LANCASTER LAW REVIEW. If so, the order to open was properly VOL. XXVII.] MONDAY, OCT. 3, 1910. [No. 48. Superior Court. Road in West Lampeter Township and issued to the street commissioner. Act of April 18, 1873, P. L., 811. Bachler's Appeal, 90 Pa., 207: The street commissioner has not attempted to carry out the order of the court. Geisenberger & Rosenthal, City Solicitors, for appellee. The road is not in the city plan and Streets-Bridges-Act of January 31, is therefore within the Act of 1857. 1857, P. L., 9. A Quarter Sessions Court has no power to compel a street commissioner to build an expensive bridge in connection with the opening of a street. The local Act of January 31, 1857 applies to a street not on the plan of Lancaster City though only partly in the city. Appeal No. 196 of October Term, 1909, from order and decree of Q. S. of Lancaster County, to January Term, 1909, Min. 514, discharging rule for attachment against street commissioner of Lancaster City for contempt for failure to carry out order of court to open road. (For opinion of court below see 26 LAW REVIEW, 309.) The errors assigned were the action of the court below, LANDIS, P. J., (1) in discharging the said rule for attachment and (2) in entering the following decree: In re E. Grant St., 121 Pa., 596. This act gives the power to councils and they have not ordered the street opened. The street commissioner has no authority to comply with an order of court to build a bridge or open a street and moreover has not been ordered to build the bridge. July 20, 1910. Opinion by RICE, P. J. The facts of this case are clearly stated in the opinion of the learned judge of the quarter sessions and need not be re-stated. It is important, however, that the exact terms of the order which it is alleged the street commissioner of the city of Lancaster disobeyed should be brought clearly into view. It directs him "to forthwith lay out and open for public use, of the width of thirty-three feet, said road, by removing all stumps, trees or other obstructions and in accordance with the courses and distances as given in the draft annexed, and the copy of said report of viewers, and according to law." Taking for Coyle & Keller and H. M. Houser, verity, as we must on this appeal, the for appellant. "We have concluded that no attachment ought to issue in this case and, therefore, the rule is discharged. Rule discharged." Where a public road is laid out across a non-fordable stream, building a bridge is a necessary part of laying out the road. Elliot on Roads and Streets, p. 21. Trickett on Pa. Road Law, 317. Com. vs. Johnson, 134 Pa., 635. The "Streets, Lanes and Alleys" referred to in the local act of January 31, 1857 do not include a public road located partly within the limits of the city of Lancaster and partly in an adjoining township. Somerset and Stoystown Road, 74 Pa., 61. undenied averments of his answer to the But while this is the general rule, it does Common Pleas -Equity. not meet the precise question presented here, namely, the power of the court of quarter sessions to compel a street commissioner of the city of Lancaster to build bridges. Speaking of this subject, the learned judge points out the distinction between the powers of supervisors and the powers of the street commissioner, and says that the former have authority to levy taxes and therefore they can, whenever it is required, erect necessary bridges, but the street commissioner's duties do not embrace any such authority. He then points out what those duties are and shows quite clearly that he is not authorized to make contracts of any considerable amount, authority of that character being vested in the councils. His duties appear to be ministerial and it is difficult to see how, if the court had specifically directed him to build the bridge in question, he could have obeyed the order. It is reasonable to interpret the order as not including so extraordinary a matter as the building of an expensive bridge across a nonfordable stream. We agree with the learned judge's conclusion that the order issued by the court does not compel him to build and that such an order in any event could be considered as one improvidently granted. In view of the foregoing conclusion, it seems unnecessary to discuss at length the act of 1857; but we are not prepared to adopt the view of appellant's counsel with regard to the construction of that act. It is part of a system of laws relating to the city of Lancaster, presumably adapted to local conditions (in re East Grant Street, 121 Pa., 596), and the principle upon which the case of Somerset and Stoystown Road, 74 Pa., 61, was decided does not in our judgment necessarily require a construction of the act, which would make it inapplicable to the present case. The case is so well considered in the opinion of the learned judge of the quarter sessions that we deem is unnecessary to add anything further in support of the conclusion that the attachment for contempt should not issue. The order is affirmed. C. P. OF LANCASTER COUNTY. Agreement-Setting aside of-Mistake take as to his rights under the general law Equity will relieve against a plaintiff's miswhere there are also circumstances which show that the defendant was guilty of what amounts to fraud in concealing that which ought to have been made known when a written contract was executed by them. Where the plaintiff signed a written agreement with her half brother the defendant dividing real estate under the mistaken belief that he had as large an interest therein under the law as hers, and though this was shown by her conversation and he knew that he had not, he said nothing, equity will set aside the agreement. Where a party to a partition agreement believing that it vested title in him, expended moneys for repairs, and the agreement is afterwards set aside, though through his own fault, he is entitled to recover contribution from the other party benefited. Equity Docket No. 5, page 102. Bill to cancel agreement partitioning lands. Coyle & Keller, for plaintiff. W. U. Hensel and John E. Snyder, for defendant. January 15, 1910. Opinion by HASSLER, J. From the bill, answer and testimony we find the following facts: 1. The plaintiff is one of the children of Philip Kirchoff, deceased, who died seized and possessed of eight houses and lots of ground upon which they are erected, and of a separate lot of ground upon which there is no house. All of this property is located in the city of Lancaster. Subsequent to his death, the heirs of said Philip Kirchoff sold and conveyed the said lot of ground upon which there is no building. 2. Philip Kirchoff died May 2, 1884, leaving a will which was duly probated. In it he gave to his wife Martha Kirchoff whatever she would have been entitled to of his estate under the intestate laws of this Commonwealth, if he had died and devised all his estate, real and personal, to Mina, wife of William Stamm, Philip Weisman, Anna Kirchoff and Mary Kirchoff, as tenants in common, their heirs and assigns, each to have onefourth interest. He stated in his will that the first was his natural daughter, the second his wife's son, and the two last his daughters by his wife Martha Kirchoff. intestate. Subject to this he bequeathed | tion of the agreement nor at any time during the negotiations which culminated in it. The fact that she was so anxious to get her full share of the properties, shown by their differences as to advantages which each had out of the estate amounting to but a few dollars, and that she based her claim to some advantage in the division on the fact that she was a daughter of Philip Kirchoff, and he not a son, making no mention of her right to such advantages as a sister of the whole blood of Anna Kirchoff Jones, was notice to the defendant that she did not know she was entitled to any advantage on that account, and imposed upon him the duty of telling her, as he says he knew it. His failure to do so was an imposition on his part which amounted to fraud. 3. Mina Stamm on January 20, 1885, conveyed all her interest in said real estate to Philip Weisman, Anna Kirchoff and Mary Kirchoff. 4. Anna Kirchoff married Freeland Jones and died November 1, 1885, leaving her husband but no issue to survive her. The husband conveyed all his interest, as tenants by the courtesy, in the real estate in question to Mary Kirchoff, who was a sister of said Anna Kirchoff Jones of the whole blood. Philip Weisman was a brother of the half blood. 5. Martha Kirchoff, the widow of Philip Kirchoff, died in 1906. Mary Kirchoff, the plaintiff, and Philip Weisman, the defendant, entered into an agreement of partition on the 13th of April, 1907, which is recorded in the recorder's office of this county in Deed Book T, Vol. 18, page 291, whereby they divided the properties, each getting onehalf of them, as near as possible, according to their value. 6. The plaintiff entered into the said partition agreement with Philip Weisman, the defendant, in ignorance of her rights under the law, in that she did not know that, as a sister of the whole blood, she was the heir to all the property left by Anna Kirchoff Jones, subject to her husband's right as tenant by the courtesy, but she believed that she and Philip Weisman, the defendant, inherited it in equal shares. She was not advised by counsel of her rights in this particular. The defendant and his counsel, who was present when the agreement was signed; did know that as her sister of the full blood, the plaintiff, inherited all the Anna Kirchoff Jones share in the properties, which were the subject of this partition. No mention of this fact was made by either of them at the execu 7. The defendant is a business man, having been engaged in the manufacture of cigars in this city for a number of years. The plaintiff is nearly blind, and her manner and her answers when a witness on the stand does not appear to be conversant with business affairs. 8. As soon as the plaintiff discovered that she was entitled to all of the share of Anna Kirchoff Jones, as her full sister, she did not delay to take the proper steps to assert her rights. The only material facts that are alleged in the bill and denied in the answer are whether or not the plaintiff acted through a mistake, and whether or not the defendant is guilty of any acts which amount to fraud. It is proper, therefore, that we state the reasons why we find these facts. The plaintiff testifies that she did not know her rights. The defendant testifies that he knew what her rights were. The answer denies that she knew what her rights were. It being responsive to the bill however, it is necessary for her to support that averment with other testimony or corroborating circumstances. We think the whole transaction between the parties leading up to and culminating in the agreement of partition shows circumstances strongly corroborating her testimony. They disputed and differed on matters of a few dollars' advantage which each claimed the other had got out of the estate, showing how anxious the plaintiff was to get all that she was entitled to, and it is not likely that she would have conceded to the defendant | one-half of one-third of the whole estate, if she had not acted under the mistaken belief that he was entitled to it. She made claim to some advantage in the division of the properties on the ground that she was a daughter of Philip Kirchoff, deceased, from whom they originally came, and that the defendant was not his son, which was a claim without merit, and made no mention of her rights as a sister of the whole blood of Anna Kirchoff Jones, which had merit. This shows that she did not know she was entitled to any advantage on that account, or she would have said so, and that she thought she was only entitled to an interest in the properties under the will of her father. These circumstances, as we have said in our opinion, are sufficient corroboration of her testimony. The defendant admits he knew of her rights, but alleges that it was understood by the family, including the plaintiff, that when his mother married Philip Kirchoff it was a family arrangement that the defendant should be equal in all things and that he believed, because of this, the law that the plaintiff was entitled to all of her full sister's share at her death did not apply. The partition was not of plaintiff's seeking; she did not want to have it, and only consented on the threat of a forced sale, or, as defendant says, of letting the Court settle it, which amounted to the same thing. The only advice she said she received from counsel was that such a sale could be made. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. In Rankin vs. Mortimere, 7 Watts, 372, it is said, "It is an unquestionable principle, which applies to civil as well as criminal cases, that ignorance of law will not furnish an excuse for any person, either for a breach or omission of duty. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat is a maxim which is as much respected in equity as in law. This doctrine is among the settled elements of the law; for every man, at his peril, is bound to take notice of what the law is, as well the law made by statute as the common law . . . and Chancellor Kent, in Lyon vs. Richmond, 2 Johns. Ch. Rep., 60, says, the court (speaking of the court of chancery) do not undertake to relieve parties from their acts and deeds, fairly done, though under a mistake of the law. . . . To this maxim there are some exceptions, which do not touch the case, in the point of view it is now presented. As when there has been a mutual mistake, or when in addition to the mistake of law there are circumstances which tend to show misrepresentation under confidence, mental imbecility, undue influence, or any kind of fraud or species of imposition. In all such cases, a court of equity will grant relief. So ignorance of the law may be one of the ingredients of fraud on which the court will act; for when there is gross ignorance, or a plain and palpable mistake, of a plain and familiar principle of law, it may well give rise to a presumption, with admixture of other and even slight circumstances, that there has been undue influence, imposition, mental imbecility, surprise, or that the confidence of the party has been abused." In Norris vs. Crowe, 206 Pa., 438, Justice Dean says, "We adhere to that rule as the law of this Commonwealth that in no case is ignorance or mistake of law with full knowledge of the facts per se ground for equitable relief." In Good vs. Herr, 7 W. & S., 253, it is decided that ignorance of the law itself is not grounds for equitable relief. The cases relied on by the plaintiff are not where the parties sought relief because of a mistake of a general law, but rather of a mistake as to their rights, arising from a will or contract. They come under the second class pointed out in Bispham's Equity in Sec. 187, where the learned author in pointing out the distinction betwen cases where courts of equity will relieve for mistakes of law, says, "The distinction has been taken by the word jus as used to indicate general law, and the same word as emploved to denote private right. In the former sense a mistake as to the general law is irremediable in equity, as well as |