this, that it sets before itself an end. This end would be the matter of every good will. But since in the idea of a will that is absolutely good without being limited by any condition (of attaining this or that end), we must abstract wholly from every end to be effected (since this would make every will only relatively good), it follows that in this case the end must be conceived, not as an end to be effected, but as an independently existing end, consequently only negatively; i.e. as that which we must never act against, and which therefore must never be regarded merely as means, but must in every volition be esteemed as an end likewise. Now this end can be nothing but the subject of all possible ends, since this is also the subject of a possible absolutely good will; for such a will cannot without contradiction be postponed to any other object. The principle: So act in regard to every rational being (thyself and others), that he may always have place in thy maxim as an end in himself, is accordingly essentially identical with this other: Act upon a maxim which, at the same time, involves its own universal validity for every rational being. For that in using means for every end I should limit my maxim by the condition of its holding good as a law for every subject, this comes to the same thing as that the fundamental principle of all maxims of action must be that the subject of all ends-i.e. the rational being himself-be never employed merely as means, but as the supreme condition restricting the use of all means; that is, in every case as an end likewise.

It follows incontestably that, to whatever laws any rational being may be subject, he being an end in himself must be able to regard himself as also legislating universally in respect of these same laws, since it is just this fitness of his maxims for universal legislation that distinguishes him as an end in himself; also it follows that this implies his dignity (prerogative) above all mere physical beings, that he must always take his maxims from the point of view which regards himself, and likewise every other rational being, as lawgiving beings (on which account they are called persons). In this way a world of rational beings (mundus intelligibilis) is possible as a kingdom of ends, and this by virtue of the legislation proper to all persons as members. Therefore every rational being must so act as if he were by his maxims in every case a legislating member in the universal kingdom of ends. The formal principle of these maxims is: So act as if thy maxim were to serve likewise

as the universal law (of all rational beings). A kingdom of ends is thus only possible on the analogy of a kingdom of nature; the former however only by maxims—that is, selfimposed rules the latter only by the laws of efficient causes acting under necessitation from without. Nevertheless, although the system of nature is looked upon as a machine, yet so far as it has reference to rational beings as its ends, it is given on this account the name of a kingdom of nature. Now such a kingdom of ends would be actually realized by maxims conforming to the canon which the categorical imperative prescribes to all rational beings, if they were universally followed. But although a rational being, even if he punctually follows this maxim himself, cannot reckon upon all others being therefore true to the same, nor that the kingdom of nature and its orderly arrangements shall be in harmony with him as a fitting member, so as to form a kingdom of ends to which he himself contributes that is to say, that it shall favor his expectation of happiness-still that law: Act according to the maxims of a member of a merely possible kingdom of ends legislating in it universally remains in full force, since it commands categorically. And it is just in this that the paradox lies; that the mere dignity of man as a rational creature, without any other end or advantage to be attained thereby-in other words, respect for a mere idea-should yet serve as an inflexible precept of the will, and that it is precisely in this independence of the maxim on all such springs of action that its sublimity consists and it is this that makes every rational subject worthy to be a legislative member in the kingdom of ends; for otherwise he would have to be conceived only as subject to the physical law of his wants. And although we should suppose the kingdom of nature and the kingdom of ends to be united under one sovereign, so that the latter thereby ceased to be a mere idea and acquired true reality, then it would no doubt gain the accession of a strong spring, but by no means any increase of its intrinsic worth. For this sole absolute lawgiver must, notwithstanding this, be always conceived as estimating the worth of rational beings only by their disinterested behavior, as prescribed to themselves from that idea (the dignity of man) alone. The essence of things is not altered by their external relations, and that which, abstracting from these, alone constitutes the absolute worth of man, is also that by which he must be judged, whoever the judge may be, and even

by the Supreme Being. Morality then is the relation of actions to the autonomy of the will; that is, to the potential universal legislation by its maxims. An action that is consistent with the autonomy of the will is permitted; one that does not agree therewith is forbidden. A will whose maxims necessarily coincide with the laws of autonomy is a holy will, good absolutely. The dependence of a will not absolutely good on the principle of autonomy (moral necessitation) is obligation. This, then, cannot be applied to a holy being. The objective necessity of actions from obligation is called duty.

PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN ACTION.

BY SPINOZA.

All our endeavors or desires so follow from the necessity of our nature, that they can be understood either through it alone, as their approximate cause, or by virtue of our being a part of nature, which cannot be adequately conceived through itself without other individuals.

Desires which follow from our nature, in such a manner that they can be understood through it alone, are those which are referred to the mind in so far as the latter is conceived to consist of adequate ideas: the remaining desires are only referred to the mind in so far as it conceives things inadequately, and their force and increase are generally defined, not by the power of man, but by the power of things external to us: wherefore the former are rightly called actions, the latter passions; for the former always indicate our power, the latter, on the other hand, show our infirmity and fragmentary knowledge. Our actions, that is, those desires which are defined by man's power or reason, are always good. The rest may be either good or bad.

Thus, in life it is before all things useful to perfect the understanding or reason, as far as we can, and in this alone man's highest happiness or blessedness consists, indeed blessedness is nothing else but the contentment of spirit which arises from the intuitive knowledge of God: now, to perfect the understanding is nothing else but to understand God, God's attributes, and the actions which follow from the necessity of his nature. Wherefore, of a man who is led by reason, the ultimate aim of our highest desire, whereby he seeks to govern all his fellows, is that whereby he is brought to the adequate concep

tion of himself and of all things within the scope of his intelligence.

Therefore, without intelligence there is no rational life: and things are only good in so far as they aid man in his enjoyment of the intellectual life, which is defined by intelligence. Contrariwise, whatsoever things hinder man's perfecting of his reason and capability to enjoy the rational life are alone called evil.

As all things whereof man is the efficient cause are necessarily good, no evil can befall man except through external causes; namely, by virtue of man being a part of universal nature, whose laws human nature is compelled to obey, and to conform to in almost infinite ways.

It is impossible that man should not be a part of nature, or that he should not follow her general order: but if he be thrown among individuals whose nature is in harmony with his own, his power of action will thereby be aided and fostered; whereas, if he be thrown among such as are but very little in harmony with his nature, he will hardly be able to accommodate himself to them without undergoing a great change himself.

Whatsoever in nature we deem to be evil, or to be capable of injuring our faculty for existing and enjoying the rational life, we may endeavor to remove in whatever way seems safest to us; on the other hand, whatsoever we deem to be good or useful for preserving our being, and enabling us to enjoy the rational life, we may appropriate to our use and employ as we think best. Every one without exception may, by sovereign right of nature, do whatsoever he thinks will advance his own interest.

Nothing can be in more harmony with the nature of any given thing than other individuals of the same species; therefore for man, in the preservation of his being and the enjoyment of the rational life, there is nothing more useful than his fellowman who is led by reason. Further, as we know not anything among individual things which is more excellent than a man led by reason, no man can better display the power of his skill and disposition than in so training man that they come at last to live under the dominion of their own reason.

In so far as men are influenced by envy or any kind of hatred, one towards another, they are at variance, and are therefore to be feared in proportion as they are more powerful than their fellows.

Yet minds are not conquered by force, but by love and high-mindedness.

It is before all things useful to men to associate their ways of life, to bind themselves together with such bonds as they think most fitted to gather them all into unity, and generally to do whatsoever serves to strengthen friendship.

But for this there is need of skill and watchfulness. For men are diverse (seeing that those who live under the guidance of reason are few), yet are they generally envious, and more prone to revenge than to sympathy. No small force of character is therefore required to take every one as he is, and to restrain one's self from imitating the emotions of others. But those who carp at mankind, and are more skilled in railing advice than instilling virtue, and who break rather than strengthen men's dispositions, are hurtful both to themselves and others. Thus many, from too great impatience of spirit, or from misguided religious zeal, have preferred to live among brutes rather than among men as boys or youths, who cannot peaceably endure the chidings of their parents, will enlist as soldiers and choose the hardships of war and the despotic discipline, in preference to the comforts of home and the admonitions of their father; suffering any burden to be put upon them, so long as they may spite their parents.

Those things which beget harmony are such as are attributable to justice, equity, and honorable living. For men brook ill not only what is unjust or iniquitous, but also what is reckoned disgraceful, or that a man should slight the received customs of their society. For winning love those qualities are especially necessary which have regard to religion and piety.

Further, harmony is often the result of fear; but such harmony is insecure. Further, fear arises from infirmity of spirit, and moreover belongs not to the exercise of reason; the same is true of compassion, though this latter seems to bear a certain resemblance to piety.

Men are also gained over by liberality, especially such as have not the means to buy what is necessary to sustain life. However, to give aid to every poor man is far beyond the power and the advantage of any private person. For the riches of any private person are wholly inadequate to meet such a call; again, an individual man's resources of character are too limited for him to be able to make all men his friends. Hence providing