ment of a contract or agreement on the part of another? Surely he would. He conjured gentlemen to give him a reason why a judge should go out of office, because of the adoption of an arbitrary rule on this day, or on that day? Why should not a judge be permitted to remain in office to the end of his term? He desired to know on what principle this strange course of proceeding rests? By what rule could it be shown that a judge's commission shall expire whether he behave well or ill? He believed that two of the judges of the supreme court were commissioned in 1820, and are to go out of office in 1845. Why, he would inquire, were they to go out at that time? Was it because they understood the law too well? No; it was owing to the spirit of change which seemed to be entering into, and overturning every thing-a change in the principle of law, which would render all things insecure, and no man would be able to call, or reckon any thing his own. He wished then to learn from delegates the grounds upon which they advocated a shorter term than fifteen years. He would ask this question of every gentleman who appeared to be so anxious to adopt the rotary principle.

All these supreme judges had left an excellent and lucrative practice, and came upon the bench, and performed their duties honestly and faithfully, and now it was proposed to put it in the power of the governor for the future, to say to them-"if you do not support the measures of my administration from the present moment, you shall at the termination of your tenure, go out."

If there was any thing which he deprecated more than another-if there was any thing which he believed calculated to jeopardize the peace and good order of society, it was the introduction of politics into the supreme

court.

He would ask if there had been a single petition presented to this body requesting us to provide for the judges being turned out in the manner proposed? This convention had been told, and that too, forsooth, by gentlemen on this floor who, perhaps had never been in a supreme court in their lives, that they understood the matter better than those who were in the constant habit of attending courts.

Now, for his own part, he should have thought that those who had most to do with the tribunals of justice, were most competent judges as to what was fair and proper. Were we, he asked, to sacrifice a certain good-to part with that which had been found, from long experience, to have worked well, for the purpose of trying a wild chimera?

This spirit of change, of late years, had struck at and exploded tha which was good and worthy of preservation. He implored gentlemen to take care what they did in a matter so important as this was admitted to be. Above all things they should place these judges beyond the reach of political influence.

Mr. FULLER, of Fayette, hoped that the convention would agree to reconsider the vote, for he thought it had been taken without sufficient consideration and reflection. Gentlemen could not have forgotten that it was stated by a majority of this body, at the very outset of their proceedings, that the principle the main object for which this convention was convened, was to effect a reform in our judiciary system-to provide that the officers of the several courts shall hold their respective offices for a erm of years.

He regarded the life tenure as wholly incompatible with the principles of our government; and he would maintain that judicial offices should be limited to a term of years. The people, too, desired to change many of the present incumbents, and to get rid of those officers who were incompetent to the proper discharge of their duties. He was willing to admit that the conduct of the judges of the supreme court had not afforded so much cause for complaint as the president judges of the courts of common pleas and some others. Nevertheless, however, his wish was that the principle of limitation should be carried out in respect to all the courts, beginning with the judges of the supreme court.

The gentleman from Northampton, (Mr. Porter) had asked whether this convention was going to organize themselves into a court of impeachment to put the judges of the supreme court at a less term than fifteen years? That gentleman ought to recollect that the offices were not created for these men, or any other set of men, but for the benefit of the people of the commonwealth.

Now, taking this view of the matter, and which he (Mr. F.) deemed a fair and correct one, would the delegate go so far as to say, that these men have any claims on the commonwealth? Have they any just claims on the voters of Pennsylvania, to retain them in office. He (Mr. Fuller) would boldly and unhesitatatingly declare that they have not. There were three principle reasons which the people had for calling this convention, and they were- -First, that no man shall, hereafter, hold an office for a life tenure, or for good behavior. Second-that a large portion of the officers are holding office against the wishes of the people. Thirdthey desire a change-a new selection of officers to be made from the highest to the lowest. Another reason was, that the harmony and symmetry of the decisions of the supreme court should be retained.

Now, he did not see exactly how that was to be accomplished under the proposition that the judges should hold for fifteen years, when, at the expiration of that period they might be all off the bench, and a new set of judges have come in. If so, the main object which the gentleman had in view-and which he advocated when at Harrisburg-viz: the preservation of harmony in the decisions of the supreme court, would not be attained.

Mr. PORTER, of Northampton: I offered nothing of the kind. I want to keep the present judges in for fifteen years, and in that term it is probable they will die off.

Mr. FULLER: The amendment of the gentleman provides, that the judges of the supreme court shall retain their offices for fifteen years after the adoption of the amended constitution. I ask if they are swept off, whether they will not then be swept off?

Mr. PORTER. I hope not.

Mr. FULLER: Well, let the gentleman's hope be what it may, suppose that the governor and the senate decide that it should be so. What will become of the symmetry and harmony of which the gentleman speaks?

But again, sir. When all the judges are thus thrown off the bench, by this amendment they would come before the governor and senate for reappointment all at the same time. To my mind, this is a great difficulty, and we ought to guard against its occurrence. A combination for the

purpose of procuring a judgeship may take place from one end of the commonwealth to the other, by which means we may have such judges placed on the bench of the supreme court as a majority of this body would not wish to see there. Applications will be made from all parts of the state. I would like to know whether it is not probable that a combination of interests may take place for a seat on the bench, to say nothing of political parties, but on account of the feelings which we know pervade all society.

Every man has his friends. A combination might thus be formed in an application for the judicial office, which might result in securing a seat to men whom this convention would much grieve to see in an office so respectable and important. It seems to me that if this principle is to be established, the convention, in order to be consistent with itself, must carry out its own principle; and if they do carry it out, they must then declare that the president judges of the several courts of common pleas throughout this state, shall be commissioned for at least ten years after the adoption of the amended constitution. And a like combination may take place there also, as the appointments or re-appointments will have to take place all in one year. If political feelings are not brought to bear, other feeling may be brought to bear which may lead to an injudicious selection. If this is the fact as regards the president judges of the court of common pleas, it is also with the associate judges who, it is to be remembered, are a very numerous body of men. So it will be with the justices of the peace; because I maintain that if there is not a strict adherence to this principle, if it is not thoroughly carried out, it will argue an inconsistency in this body not very complimentary to it.

It is true that the gentleman from Northampton, (Mr. Porter) has favor ed us fully with his sentiments on this subject. I am always pleased to hear him speak, but I do not like it so well when he speaks the same thing two or three times over. Still it is a pleasure to me to hear him speak, although his arguments are the same as those which he urged on another occasion at Harrisburg. I thought at that time that the gentleman had said every thing that could be said in favor of retaining the judges during good behavior.

The motion which is now made to re-consider the vote on the sixth section is one which, to my mind, can not fail to meet with the approbation of a majority of this convention. It appears to me that the question is one of more importance than any that has come before us, because I regard it as being the guide in this body in relation to all the judicial offices of the state from the highest to the lowest grade; and I have no doubt that this convention will ultimately decide as to the president judges of the court of common pleas and all other judicial officers of a lower grade, in the same manner as they may decide in relation to the judges of the supreme court.

I hope, therefore, that the motion to re-consider will be agreed to; and that we will grade these officers in accordance with the proposition of the gentleman from Luzerne, (Mr. Woodward) that a portion of the judges may go out gradually, thus continuing a portion of the judicial officers in every district of the commonwealth.

Mr. BIDDLE said:

The question now before us is one of vast importance, probably as much

so as any which we have yet passed upon. It is one upon which the expression of the opinion of this convention was given on Saturday. That opinion, it is true, was given without debate, because those gentlemen who seem now to be in favor of the re-consideration were then for the most part opposed to any debate or consideration on the subject. How then can they with any consistency, ask this body to allow their time and attention to be consumed with distracting that principle which they then determined to establish?

But, says the gentleman from Fayette, (Mr. Fuller) this is a subject on which the decision has been often made-that it has been consid. ered from the earliest period of our deliberations. I deny that this is so. Has this convention ever entered on a crusade against individuals, and that it would, right or wrong, remove them from office? I say that nothing so discreditable to the character of this body has ever occurred.

This convention has determined that it will settle great principles; and, amongst them, a majority of this body have determined that, for the time to come, the judges of this commonwealth shall hold their offices not during good behavior-as they have heretofore held under the constitution of 1790-but for a certain term of years. This is all that the convention has determined.

It never has determined that it would be guilty of acts of atrocious injustice towards individuals who have faithfully done their duty, and against whom no complaint has been made in any quarter here or elsewhere.

Upon what condition did these gentlemen, leaving the private walks of life and resigning their professional practice and emoluments, accept seats upon the bench? On the condition, that if they behaved themselves well, if they conducted themselves with integrity and fidelity and were guilty of no misdemeanor in office, they should not be removed. Is it said then that they have no claim upon that community which on the terms which I have stated, invited them to take their places? Is it said that now, when they are unable again to return to those walks of life in which they were accustomed to move and to the duties of that profession to which they once looked for support-now when they are in circumstances far from affluent and, consequenly, are unable to retire with comfort to themselves and families-now, after having for years recieved a paltry salary, scarcely sufficient to maintain them well-and after they have upheld the laws of the commonwealth with fidelity-is it now said that, weared and worn out with service, they are to be turned out of office to sustain themselves in the best way they can? Has this convention ever declared itself to be the advocate of such a principle as this?

What do we say to these judges by refusing now to continue them in office? We say to them you have not heretofore betrayed your trust; there is no impeachment, no address to the governor, you have faithfully discharged the duties of your respective offices; but now we will turn you out. And why? Because we have the power to do so, and we are responsible to none for the abuse of that power. This is the only thing which we can say. We had the high-handed power, and we were resolved to exercise it, be the consequences what they might.

But what reason does the gentleman from Fayette, (Mr. Fuller) assign in favor of this course? He says it may happen that the whole

symmetry of justice may, in fifteen years, be disturbed, because at the. end of fifteen years, all the judges may go out of office together. This, sir, is not within the range of human probability; indeed it may be regarded as a state of things almost, if not altogether, impossible. The present judges of the supreme court are all advanced in life, and the chances are many that, at the end of fifteen years, so far from all being alive, there may not be one of those who now adorn the bench living, to be removed. And is it by arguments such as these that we are to be cajoled into acts of great injustice and cruel ingratitude?

But it is said, that there may be combinations-there may be conspiracies. Suppositions, unfortunately, are at all times haunting the minds of some men that none are to be trusted except the people in the aggregate that neither the judges nor the legislature have any integrity or any honesty left. If this is so, deplorable indeed are the times upon which we have fallen; and instead of boasting of our courts, and of the purity and integrity with which our laws are administered, we have cause to weep over their degradation and delinquency.

But, sir, it seems to me that there is no ground to justify the indulgence of these fears. It seems to me that these gentlemen have a claim upon us that they have a claim upon our justice-that they have a claim upon the justice of the community; and I hope that this convention, so far from completing its labors by an act reproachful to itself and disreputable to the state, will say to these judges, we violate no principle by retaining you, and as an act of justice to ourselves and to the great commonwealth whose interests are entrusted to our charge, we will continue you in office.

Mr. M'DOWELL said. At the time the different votes were given for the limitation of the judicial tenure, I should suppose that every gentleman who voted in favor of that limitation, had made up his mind so to vote hereafter as to carry out the great principle then settled, if a great principle it be. And, it seems to me that the only question now before us, the only legitimate question which we have now to decide is, whether a majority of this body will shrink from the performance of their duty. And if we are to shrink, what are the reasons here urged to induce members to do so?

At present, the object appears to be to protect the judges of the supreme court from the operation of the great principle which we have settled; and, for the purpose of effecting that object, our sympathies have been appealed to in a way well calculated, I confess, to reach the heart of every feeling man in this convention. I was myself ready when the venerable gentlaman from the city of Philadelphia, (Mr. Hopkinson) was on the flour, to exclaim, "if you have tears to shed, it is proper to shed them now."

Is this a question of sympathy with this convention, or is it not? Are our sympathies to be appealed to for the purpose of influencing and controlling the free action of our minds upon a matter of principlebecause gentlemen admit that is to be regarded as the settlement of a great and permanent principle in the judicial system of the commonwealth? For my own part, I cannot beleive that we have any thing to do with sympathy. I believe that this is a question of justice of stern and inexorable justice; and that the operation of this principle is to be car