contracts, as well of individuals as of bodies corporate, shall continue as if said alterations and amendments had not been made.'

Mr. WOODWARD, of Luzerne, said he found that there had been omitted one important word. He would therefore move to amend the section, by inserting after the word" actions," in the third line, the word "prosecutions.'

The question being put, the amendment was agreed to.

The section, as amended was then agreed to.

The second section was then read as follows, viz:—

Second-The alterations and amendments in the said constitution shall take effect from the first day of January, eighteen hundred and thirtymine.

No amendment being proposed, this section was agreed to.

Third-The clauses, sections and articles of the said constitution which remain unaltered, shall continue to be construed and have effect as if the said constitution had not been amended.

Agreed to.

Fourth-lao geral assembly which shall convene in December, eighteen hundred and thirty-eight, shall continue its session as heretofore, notwithstanding the provision in the eleventh section of the first article, and shail at all times be regarded as the first general assem bly under the amended constitution.

Agreed to.

Fifth-The governor who shall be elected in October, eighteen hundred and thirty-eight, shall be inaugurated on the third Tuesday in January, eighteen hundred and thirty-nine, to which time the present executive term is hereby extended.

Mr. PORTER, of Northampton, moved to amend the fifth section, in the second line, by striking therefrom the word "January," and inserting in lien thereof the word" December;" and by striking from the third line thereof the word "nine," and inserting in lieu thereof the word “ eight," and by striking therefrom all after the word “nine," in the third line.

Mr. WOODWARD, of Luzerne, said that the effect of the amendment moved by the gentleman from Northampton, (Mr. Porter) would be to add a few weeks to the term of the new governor, and which the committee had added to the old term of the governor. The people would not know what amendments were adopted till the meeting of the legisla ture on the first Monday of December next. The legislature would convene under the old constitution, and the new constitution would go into effect on the first day of January, 1839.

We should thus have a governor in office under a constitution that does not go into operation for nearly two months after he has become chief magistrate of the commonwealth. He having been sworn to preserve the old constitution, must be inaugurated under the new.

Mr. PORTER said, that his object was to direct the legislature to meet at the usual time, as if there had been no amendments made to the constitution. He had supposed it would be as well to let matters go on as Esual until the new constitution should have gone into effect. When his

excellency the present governor of Pennsylvania was elected, it was understood that he was to hold his office until the 1st of January, 1839. He had neither part nor lot in placing the chief magistrate where he now was-for he did not vote for him- -nor did he mean to lend his aid to continue him in the high station which he at present filled, yet, as he had before remarked, that personage was elected till 1838. If he should be elected in October next, he would expect to serve till 1842. When the legislature meet, they must have a governor, and they would prefer to have one who was elected by the voice of the people, rather than one who was rol. If the present governor had answered the expectations of the people, they would request him to serve them longer. But, on the contrary, if he had disappointed them, they would not bestow their votes upon him.

Mr. Cox, of Somerset observed that he was quite indifferent whether the amendment of the gentleman from Northampton, (Mr. Porter) went into operation or not. In his opinion the present chief magistrate of the commonwealth was an able and efficient officer, and he believed that the people would intimate as much in October next by re-electing him.

Mr. BANKS, of Mifflin, could not pretend to say whether the amendment would be advantageous to one party or the other, or whether either would agree to its adoption. With regard to what had fallen from the gentleman from Northampton, (Mr. Porter) as to the period when a newly elected governor should commence the duties of his office, he would merely say that the cominittee were unanim us in making no difference between the old and the new constition in that respect.

The question being taken on Mr. PORTER's amendment, it was negatived.

And the fifth section was agreed to.

The sixth section of the said report being under consideration, in the words as follow, viz:

"Six h-The commissions of the judges of now in commission, shall not be affected by the fifth article of the amended constitution; their according to the tenure therein prescribed."

the supreme court second section of the successors shall hold

Mr. WOODWARD, of Luzerne, moved to amend the section by striking therefrom all after number "six," and inserting in lieu thereof the words as follow, viz :

"Within three months from and after the third Tuesday of January next, the gove: nor shall, by and with the advice and consent of the senate, re-appoint one of the then existing judges of the supreme court for the term of three years, one of them for the term of six years, one of them for the term of nine years, one of them for the term of twelve years, and one of them for the term of fifteen years."

Mr. PORTER moved to amend the report by striking out all after “shall” in the second line, to the word "constitution" in line three.

The CHAIR said the motion was not in order.

Mr. PORTER then modified his motion so as to strike out of the amend ment from the word “shall” in the second line to "of" in line three, and

insert "recommission;" and in the fourth line strike out all after "years."

Mr. WOODWARD said, that before the question was taken, he wished to say a few words in relation to the governor and senate conjointly exercising the power of appointment. That was a matter which had been settled, and could not now be changed. If, after the new constitution should have gone into effect, the governor and senate were to re-appoint the supreme court judges for fifteen years, and they should all live to go out at once, the supreme court bench would then be entirely revolutionized. All of them would probably be driven from the bench in order to make way for the introduction of new judges-men, perhaps, who had had no experience. He was opposed to any and every proposition the object of which was to turn all the judges out at the same time; and also, to every arrangement which went to give to one governor the appointment of five judges at once. Circumstances might throw such power into his hands, but it should not be given by constitutional provision.

That is a contingency against which no legislation can guard; but I am altogether opposed to placing in the constitution, or in the schedule, a provision which will necessarily, at a certain period, throw into the hands of the governor the appointment of so many officers. It is better to distribute them along a series of years-allowing them to be in for a series of years-so that we shall always have experience in the incumbents, and the governor will not have the appointment of five judges at one time.

The plan proposed by the minority of the committee is, that the present judges of the supreme court, whom it might seem hard to turn out at once, shall be re-appointed; that one shall be re-appointed for the period of three years-one for the period of six years-one for the period of nine years-one for the period of twelve years-and one for the period of fifteen years. You will then have got five judges upon the

bench-the same men who are now there. The commission of one of them must expire every three years-so that one commission will expire in the term of one governor, and, unless death interferes, one governor will have the appointment of only one of the judges of the supreme court. You will also avoid the evils which must inevitably arise from the entire change of all the judges at one time.

Another feature of the report of the minority is, that it leaves to the governor and senate the assignment of the different periods to the different judges. The governor has an opportunity of discriminating, which this convention does not, and can not possess. If we should now go on to provide that a particular judge should go out at the end of three years from the adoption of this constitution, and another at the end of three years, death may remove them before this principle can go into operation. He, therefore, thought it would be better to leave this matter to be dispo sed of by the governor and the senate, and to allow them to arrange the then existing judges of the supreme court, through their several successive periods, precisely in such manner as they, in view of all the circumstances, may think best and most advisable.

These are briefly the reasons which have influenced the minority in the report they have made, and which influenced my own mind against

the adoption of the amendment of the gentleman from Northampton, (Mr. Porter.)

Mr. PORTER, of Northampton, said:

I confess that the inclination of my own mind, would be to give to the present judges of the supreme court, the tenure for which they were in the first instance commissioned. I know not how far the principles of those gentlemen who are so keen for reform may carry them; but, for my own part, I feel a great repugnance to violate the understanding-to say the least of it-which subsisted at the time the present judges were commissioned. It is to be borne in mind that, at the time they came on to the bench, they either quitted inferior judicial stations, or at all events a handsome practice at the bar, in order that they might take the stations which they now occupy. At the time they entered upon the duties of these stations, it was with the understanding, agreeably to the constitution and the laws of the commonwealth, that they were to hold their commissions so long as they behaved well. I do not apprehend, however, from what I have seen of the temper and disposition of this convention-and inasmuch as the judicial term has been reduced down to fifteen years for the judges of the supreme court-I do not, I say, apprehend that the proposition to retain those judges in their stations for the term for which they were originally commissioned, will meet with the favor of a majority here. Entertaining this belief, I think that we ought to come to the nearest step which will bear any thing like a resemblance to justice in relation to them.

How does the matter now stand? You have agreed to alter the constitution of the commonwealth in such a manner, as that the judges of the supreme court shall hold their offices for the term of fifteen years only, if they shall so long behave themselves well. I think that the present incumbents are entitled to retain their stations to the extent of the new tenure thus created-that they are entitled to do so by every principle of honor and public faith. I have a regard for the condition on which they originally received their commissions; and if I can not secure the fulfilment of that, I will at least appeal to the magnanimity of a majority of this convention to say, whether the present incumbents are not entitled to the benefit of the extension of their terms to the utmost limit to which the judges of the supreme court are to be entitled for the time to come to hold their seats on the bench?

The gentleman from Luzerne, (Mr. Woodward) has expressed his apprehensions as to the consequences which might result, if these judges were all to be changed at one time. And I must here be permitted to call the notice of the convention to the singular phraseology of the minority report. It says:

"Within three months from and after the third Tuesday of January next, the governor shall, by and with the advice and consent of the senate, re-appoint one of the then existing judges of the supreme court for the term of three years; one of them for the term of six years; one of them for the term of nine years; one of them for the term of twelve years; and one of them for the term of fifteen years."

Now, continued Mr. P., the governor may say, I appoint the chief justice for three years. No, says the senate. I appoint another judge

for six years, says the governor. The senate says, no; we will have the chief justice for fifteen years, and you shall appoint one of the other judges for three years. Suppose that both the governor and the senate remain firm in their resolution. How is the difficulty to be settled? I feel disposed, as regards the present judges, to leave out all this matter of discrimination, to let them all remain where they are for fifteen years.

Suppose, for instance, that the governor commissions the chief justice for three years, and the senate says no. The governor commissions one judge for three years-another for nine years-another for twelve years -and another for fifteen years. The senate agree as to one, and disa gree as to all the others. How are you going to get out of this difficulty? And why require the action or assent of the senate on a matter which this convention is competent to settle in relation to the continuance of the judges? Here, then, is a difficulty, which, to my mind, is insurmountab.e; and I will thank the gentleman from Luzerne, (Mr. Woodward) or any other member of the convention, to get us out of the difficulty if it is possible to do so.

What is the next argument? The gentleman from Luzerne, says that the appointment for fifteen years would operate so as to let all the judges go out at once. I should like to know how many of the existing judges have been in office for fifteen years, and whether it is likely they will all go out together at the end of fifteen years. I apprehend it is not; and that, in the course of nature they will go out at intervals, and their places can then be supplied. But if the argument is good in one instance, it is also good in another. If the judges are to be turned out neck and heels, when the term of their commission expires, what odds does it make whether they go out at intervals or all together? For myself, I do not believe that, excepting in times of high political excitement, there would beone fell swoop" made of your judges. Although I fear, and always have feared, for the effect of political excitement on the appointments of your term judges, but that fear does not pervade my mind to so great an extent as to induce me to believe that all the judges of the supreme court will be turned out at once. They will consist, no doubt, of men of dif ferent political parties--for a man must be a very consistent politician in these times who goes straight for fifteen years. I have seen strange things in my day. I have seen many men, whe, in former years were considered orthodox, and who are now declared to be heterodox; and some men who were thought heterodox then, are declared to be orthodox now. But the main objection I have to urge, is, that at the time you commissioned the gentlemen who now fill these stations, they understood-the government understood, and the people understood, that they were to have the benefit of the term for which they were appointed; and as you have altered the term, and they have been guilty of no official misconduct, they ought to be entitled to remain in their stations during the entire term on which you have now fixed-that is to say, filteen years. I dislike this way of getting rid of men who have been guilty of no fault. Does it comport with the stability of your judicial decisions— does it comport with the stability of your republican institutions, that your judges should be put out of office without having committed any fault, and merely for the purpose of giving effect to the views of reform that are now entertained.